RESIT/DEFERRED COURSEWORK REQUIREMENTS
ACADEMIC SESSION 2008/2009
TUTOR:
DR. MICK BOWLES
ALL RESIT/DEFERRED COURSEWORK MUST BE SUBMITTED BY 4pm on 21st
AUGUST 2009
HEADER SHEET NUMBER:
ASSESSMENT DETAILS:
COURSE CODE
COURSE TITLE
152351
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS:
SPINOZA
PHIL0006
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS
There are two sections in the following test; each section involves two questions.
You must answer all four of the questions below.
Please note that the test requires that you:
1) understand and comprehend Spinoza’s claims (and to do this you need to try
and define Spinoza’s key vocabulary: don’t simply repeat and paraphrase but try
and explain).
2) try and identify Spinoza’s arguments (don’t treat the writing as just a string of
opinions but try and look for the arguments that support the claims).
3) give some critical attention to the arguments – do they actually work, do they
do what Spinoza claims they do?
And please note that this test does require that you are familiar with the text
from which the following extracts are taken.
FIRST SECTION
Carefully read the following three paragraphs from Spinoza’s Treatise on the
Improvement of the Understanding and then answer both of the questions:
33
A true idea, (for we possess a true idea) is something different
from its correlate [the object which the idea is of]; thus a circle is different
from the idea of a circle. The idea of a circle is not something having a
circumference and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body that
body itself. Now, as an idea is something different from its correlate, it is
capable of being understood through itself; that is to say, the idea, [can in
turn, be treated as the object/correlate for a further idea; or, to express
the point more technically] in so far as its formal essence [essentia
formalis] is concerned, functions as the object of a further objective
essence [essentia objectiva]. And, this latter, if regarded in itself, will be
something real, and so, also, capable of being understood; and so on,
indefinitely.
34
For instance, the man Peter is something real [= formal essence];
the true idea of Peter is the objective essence, which is in itself something
real, and quite distinct from the actual Peter. Now, as this true idea of
Peter is in itself something real, and has its own individual existence, it will
also be capable of being understood — that is, of being the correlate of
another idea, and this further idea will have in itself objectively everything
that the idea of Peter has formally. And, again, this idea of the idea of
Peter is itself an individual thing, which may become the correlate of yet
another idea; and so on, indefinitely. This everyone may make trial of for
himself, by reflecting that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he
knows, and further knows that he knows that he knows, etc. Hence it is
plain that, in order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first
to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of the idea of Peter.
This is the same as saying that, in order to know, there is no need to know
that we know, much less to know that we know that we know. This is no
more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the
nature of a triangle. But, with ideas, the contrary is the case: for, in order
to know that I know, I must first know.
35
Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the objective
essence of a thing: that is to say, the way in which we perceive the formal
essence is certainty. Further, it is also evident that, for the certitude of
truth, no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea:
for, as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that we
know. Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know the nature of the
highest certainty, unless he possesses an adequate idea, or the objective
essence of a thing: certainty is identical with such objective essence.
1. Why does Spinoza state that “the true idea of Peter is the objective essence,
which is in itself something real, and quite distinct from the actual Peter”?
2. Why does Spinoza claim that “for the certitude of truth, no further sign is
necessary beyond the possession of a true idea”? Is his argument
satisfactory?
SECOND SECTION
Carefully read the following two paragraphs from Spinoza’s Treatise on the
Improvement of the Understanding and then answer both of the questions:
84
Thus we have distinguished between the true idea and other
perceptions, and have shown that fictitious ideas, false ideas, and the rest,
originate in the imagination — that is, in a kind of [linking of] sensations
that is fortuitous and, so to speak, loose and unbound, arising not from
the power of the mind [understanding], but from external causes,
according as the body (whether sleeping or waking) receives various
motions. But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long
as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and that
[in regard to the imagination] the mind’s rational function is passive. The
view taken doesn’t matter, now that we know that the imagination is
random [vagum] and with regard to which the mind is passive, and that
we can, by some means or other, free ourselves from the imagination with
the help of the understanding. Let no one then be astonished that before
proving the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of
imagination, of body and its constitution. The view taken, I repeat, doesn’t
matter, so long as we know that imagination is random [sequence of
sensations], etc.
85
As regards a true idea, we have shown that it is simple or
compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something is the
case or has been so; and that its ideal [objectivi] effects in the mind
correspond to the rational reality [rationem formalitatis] of its object. This
conclusion is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true science
proceeds from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as I know,
never formed the conception put forward here that the mind acts
according to fixed laws, and is as it were a spiritual automaton.
3. How does Spinoza distinguish the understanding from the imagination?
4. What arguments does Spinoza provide to support his contention that
understanding and imagination are distinct? Are the argument[s] satisfactory?

The deadline for this work is 21ST AUGUST 2009.

Two copies of your work should be handed in to the School of Humanities
Reception Desk with a header-sheet stapled to the front. The Header
Sheet Number is: 152351.

Please type your work and make it clear which question you are
answering.

Note that the word limit for this whole test is 2500 words. This work
contributes 25% to your overall grade for this course.

Before submission make sure you have complied with the following check
list:
 Proof read your work. This will enable you to check that you
have answered the questions (or addressed the issue) set and
correct any grammatical or presentation errors.

Perform a spell check.

Include page numbers.

Reference all quotations and paraphrases.