Discussion Questions: A Theory of Justice, sections 26-30
26. The Reasoning Leading to the Two Principles of Justice
(1) why is it intuitively plausible that parties would choose equal distribution as a benchmark?
why is it intuitively plausible that they would depart from equal distribution and accept the
difference principle?
(2) what intuitive considerations are said to favor the serial ordering of the principles? is this
really plausible? why wouldn’t parties be content to restrict, say, their political liberties?
(3) explain the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty with reference to the table on p. 126.
(4) what are the three conditions under which the maximin rule is a reasonable principle of social
choice? might maximin be a reasonable principle of choice under other circumstances -- say,
when the second and third hold and when one knows that the probability of achieving significant
gains above the minimum is low?
(5) do the three conditions hold of the choice in the original position?
(6) why wouldn’t it be more reasonable for the parties in the o.p. to adopt a mixed conception?
(7) explain the objection illustrated by the gain-loss table on p. 136. explain the reply. note that
this reply depends, not just upon the chain connection and close-knittedness, but on the claim
that expectations become more closely knit over time, that there is a tendency to equality. is this
plausible?
(8) on what grounds does Rawls argue that it is appropriate for justice as fairness to rely upon
general facts? why does he think it necessary to make the argument?
(9) what does it mean to ask of an ethical theory whether it “embeds a moral ideal in its first
principles”? why is such embedding desirable?
(10) recall that one of the criteria parties employ in assessing principles of justice is the
consequence of the public knowledge of the principles. Rawls seems to argue that, when it is
publicly known that a given moral ideal is embedded in the first principles of justice as fairness
and when it is publicly known why it is embedded, desirable consequences will follow. what are
the consequences and why are they desirable? what, if anything, is wrong with citizens’ knowing
that their liberties, say, depend upon contingencies? clearly justice as fairness enjoys an
advantage in this respect only if the main lines of the doctrine are widely understood. is this
likely to happen, or is even justice as fairness too complex for its public knowledge to have the
beneficial consequences Rawls foresees? for example, are its significant differences from
Hobbesian contractualism too subtle to be generally appreciated?
27. The Reasoning Leading to the Principle of Average Utility
(1) explain the difference between classical and average utilitarianism.
(2) under what conditions does classical utilitarianism require the population to grow without
limit? explain with reference to the figure on p. 141.
(3) why would parties in the o.p. prefer average to classical utility?
(4) work through the decision problems to which average utilitarianism is the solution, from that
of a choice with full information to choice in the o.p., explaining the differences between
successive stages.
(5) is it correct to say that this argument explains the appeal of the principle of average utility, or
is there some other ground for its appeal?
28. Some Difficulties with the Average Principle
(1) explain the objection raised to average utility on p. 144 and the response to it. is the reply
adequate?
(2) explain the principle of insufficient reason, the circumstances in which it is appropriate and
how the hypothetical chooser who opts for the average principle depends upon it.
(3) why should parties in the o.p. discount likelihoods arrived at on the basis of the principle of
insufficient reason. how crucial is the assumption that parties are heads of families?
(4) explain the Edgeworth-style argument for average utility.
(5) what are the problems with the Edgeworth-style argument?
(6) why shouldn’t the basic design of a social system depend upon special attitudes toward risk?
why isn’t it an argument in favor of the two principles that their choice depends upon a
conservative attitude to risk?
(7) why is it necessary that judgments of probability have an objective basis? is the assumption
that parties are heads of families crucial to this argument (see “the parties want their decision to
appear well founded to others” p. 150)?
(8) explain the last of the difficulties with the reasoning for average utility. is this a compelling
objection?
29. Some Main Grounds for the Two Principles of Justice
(1) what is the argument from the strains of commitment? is it really true, as Rawls suggests, that
“compacts of this sort exceed the capacity of human nature”? are there exceptions?
(2) what is the argument from stability? clearly this argument depends upon the psychological
law that people tend to support what furthers their good. the argument therefore depends upon
a claim about the human tendency to reciprocity. is this a reasonable claim on which to build a
theory of justice?
(3) as we shall see later, it is important to Rawls, not only that they support basic social
institutions, but also that they do so “for the right reasons”. it is important, that is, that they lend
institutions their moral support. does support for reasons of reciprocity count as moral support?
why or why not?
(4) why is it important that a conception of justice should publicly express citizens’ respect for
one another? how does public knowledge of the procedure for choosing principles do this? how
do the principles themselves do this? how does this confer an advantage over utilitarianism?
(5) how does justice as fairness give expression to Kant’s idea that persons are to be treated as
ends in themselves? how does utilitarianism do this?
30. Classical Utilitarianism, Impartiality and Benevolence
(1) what is the definition of right given by Hume and Adam Smith?
(2) how does the fact that the impartial spectator could approve of justice as fairness show that
there is an essential difference between the point of view of the impartial spectator and that given
by the o.p.?
(3) how might we supplement the description of the ideal observer to arrive at a deductive
argument for classical utility? how is the classical utilitarian’s failure to take seriously the
difference between persons a natural consequence of this supplementation?
(4) why does Rawls think that “while the average principle of utility is the ethic of a single
rational individual (with no aversion to risk) who tries to maximize his prospects, the classical
doctrine is the ethic of perfect altruists” (p. 165)? does this conclusion rest on an uncontroversial
conception of altruism?
(5) why might one think that the point of view of the impartial spectator provides the only
acceptable interpretation of impartiality? explain how the o.p. provides an alternative. are there
still other renderings of this notion?
(6) if the impartial spectator were characterized by benevolence rather than sympathy, what
would the result be? is it true that a love of mankind which wishes to respect the distinction
between persons would use the two principles? suppose that instead of Nagel’s “splitting”
experience to illustrate the problem of benevolence, we used that of a parent with many adult
children whose desires conflict. would a loving parent opt the two principles to order their
competing claims? if nto, then do benevolence and Rawlsian impartiality come apart after all?