Phil 1200
Notes: Singer: Feed the Poor
Peter Singer: Influential professor of ethics at Princeton. Advocates utilitarianism. About the article:
The basic issue
Many people are suffering/dying of starvation, disease, and other hardships in the Third World. We
have many luxuries. We could assist them by giving up these luxuries, but we choose not to. Q: what
is the correct moral assessment of our decision?
Singer’s position
• Each of us, individually, has a positive obligation to give money to help people in the Third World.
• There is no morally significant difference between killing and allowing to die one whom one could
easily save.
• How much money should one give away? How much would be required to save everyone one
can? (Lots.)
• Singer thinks that any reasonable moral theory will have to agree with this.
The argument for the obligation to assist
1. If we can prevent something very bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, we
ought to (i.e., must) do so.
2. Absolute poverty is very bad.
3. We can prevent some absolute poverty without sacrificing anything of comparable significance,
by donating to charity.
4. Therefore, we ought to do so.
The Shallow Pond example (supports (1))
You are walking to class, when you notice a small child drowning in a shallow pond. You could wade
in and save the child, but if you did so, you would use up some of your time and get your clothes
muddy. Therefore, you decide to just walk on by.
What would be the appropriate moral assessment of this decision? Is this comparable to refusing
to assist the people in the Third World?
Possible differences in the 3rd-World charity case: Singer argues that none of these can explain why you needn’t give:
• It is uncertain that my money will really save the people in the 3rd world.
• There are so many starving people in the 3rd world, and it’s impossible to save all of them.
• There are other people who could help. If everyone gave, it would not be necessary for me to give
very much.
• People in the 3rd world have such bad lives that it’s hardly worth preserving them.
• Sending food will just cause them to increase the population, until the same level of starvation is
restored.
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Phil. 1200
Notes: Rawls, Distributive Justice
Important Concepts
@ Distributive Justice: Justice in the distribution of goods/wealth.
@ End-state (or ‘patterned’) conceptions of distributive justice: Say there is some overall pattern of distribution
we should aim at. Justice is a matter of closeness to the desired pattern. Examples:
Perfect equality
Distribution in accordance with need
Distribution in accordance with desert/merit
@ Historical conceptions of distributive justice: Say that whether a person is entitled to some bit of wealth
depends on the process by which he got it. Justice is a matter of following the correct rules in
acquiring property.
Ideas in Rawls’ Theory of Justice
@ The Original Position: A hypothetical situation in which the future members of a society meet to agree
upon the general political principles to govern their society. Features of the OP:
- The Veil of Ignorance: no one knows what their position in the society will be. In fact, they know
no personal information about themselves (including their race, sex, religion, social class,
philosophical beliefs, and values).
- They have access to all relevant general information about society. Also, they are intelligent and
make no errors in reasoning.
- They will choose political principles on the basis of self-interest.
@ Rawls’ Two Principles of Justice:
- First principle: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible
with a similar liberty for others.”
- Second principle (the “Difference Principle”): Social and economic inequalities are allowed only to the
extent that they benefit those who are worst-off.
How might this happen? Perhaps if more productive people are rewarded with more wealth,
then the society as a whole will be richer, so much so that even the (relatively) poor will benefit.
Rawls’ Overall Argument
1. What would be chosen in the Original Position is just.
Why? Because the OP is set up in such a way as to guarantee a fair outcome. The parties start in
a position of equality, and no one can unfairly privilege himself, since no one knows their position
in the society.
2. Rawls’ Two Principles of justice would be chosen in the Original Position.
3. Therefore, Rawls’ Two Principles are just (and so should be adopted).
Why Choose the Two Principles?
a) The first principle would be chosen because the parties don’t know what their plans and values
will be; therefore, it makes sense to secure the most liberty possible, to allow for pursuing
whatever goals they will have.
b) Why would the second principle be chosen? Two lines of reasoning:
First:
@ There would be a natural default assumption of equality. Unless there was some special reason
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for privileging someone, people would accept an even division of the wealth.
@ But obviously, it would be acceptable to allow some inequality if doing so benefitted everyone.
No one can complain if everyone is benefitted.
@ Inequalities obviously benefit the people who get more. They benefit everyone only if they benefit
those who get less.
@ Therefore, the parties would agree to allow economic inequalities (only) to the extent that they
benefitted those worst off.
Second:
@ For very poor people, money means a lot. Some minimum level of income is necessary for
anyone to have a decent life.
@ For the wealthy, money has less importance; if they lose some of their money, it won’t prevent
them from having a decent life.
@ The parties in the Original Position would be more afraid of winding up poor, than they would
be eager to wind up rich. They would want to minimize their risk of winding up badly off.
(Rawls has them put an absolute priority on this, i.e., they only look at what the worst possible
outcome is, and try to improve that.)
@ Therefore, they would choose the system that maximizes the position of the poorest people.
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Phil. 1200
Notes: Objections to Rawls
I. Harsanyi: Parties Would Choose Utilitarianism
Overview
@ John C. Harsanyi: Nobel-prize-winning economist, advocate of utilitarianism.
@ H says that the parties should choose utilitarianism: that everything should be arranged to
maximize average welfare for society (no special attention given to the worst off).
@ H devised an original-position argument for utilitarianism before Rawls published his own work.
• How to get to (average) utilitarianism:
- Rational choice rule: Maximize expected utility.
- In the veil of ignorance: Assign equal probability to being anyone in the society.
- Suppose there are n people in a society. Ui is the utility of the ith person. Then your expected
utility upon being dropped into this society is:
- The average utility of the society is:
.
- These are equal. Hence, if the parties in the OP maximize their individual expected utility, they
would have the society maximize its average utility.
• Two decision rules:
(1) Maximize expected utility. (max-util.)
(2) Maximize the worst outcome. (maximin)
Which is more rational?
- Maximin seems rational in those cases where it approximates max-util.
- When it deviates significantly from max-util., it is, intuitively, irrational.
* The example of the Chicago job.
* Crossing the street, etc.
* The example of the retarded person vs. the geniuses (who should get a scholarship?).
- So no reason to prefer maximin over max-util.
• Rawls responds: I’m not proposing maximin for small-scale choices, only for large-scale social
choices.
Reply: “I must say that this is a singularly inept defense.” (605)
- There is no basis for claiming that a different moral principle applies when you have more
people.
- The examples can be easily extended to large scales. E.g., let there be many retarded people and
many geniuses.
II. Nozick: The OP Rules out Morally Relevant Considerations at the Start
• OP is biased against historical theories.
- There is no way the parties in the OP would consider anything other than an end-state theory,
since they are choosing on consequentialist (sc., self-interested) grounds.
• OP begs the question against natural property rights.
- The OP exercise assumes ‘society’ has a right to decide how to redistribute people’s property, and
the only question is how they should distribute it.
- But the people who create goods might have a claim to those goods.
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• No reason to think the OP results in a correct distribution.
- What if grades in a class were distributed according to a similar procedure? Is there reason to
think that the resulting distribution would be correct?
• OP ignores any morally relevant factors affecting distributive justice, other than equality and utility.
- Rawls does not argue against any such factors; he just assumes there are none by setting up the OP.
- So the OP provides no grounds for rejecting theories that rely on such factors. For instance,
Nozick’s theory (see next class).
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Phil. 1200
Notes: Nozick, the Entitlement Theory
The Entitlement Theory of Distributive Justice
The entitlement theory needs three rules (or kinds of rule):
1) A principle of acquisition.
One may claim previously-unowned items provided one is using them and there is enough left for
others.
2) A principle of transfer.
Property can be transferred from one person to another by mutual consent.
3) A principle of rectification of injustices.
What to do when someone violates one of these rules. Generally, the offender has to pay back the
victim.
@ Note: The Entitlement Theory is historical, not end-state.
Nozick’s arguments against end-state theories of distributive justice
Argument #1
1. Forced labor is wrong.
2. End-state theories sanction forced labor.
a. People must work to get money.
b. Hence, forcing them to give their money to others is like forcing them to labor for the benefit
of those others.
3. So end-state theories are wrong.
Argument #2
1. No one may own another person, even partially.
2. End-state theories imply that people may (partially) own other people.
a. Ownership of x = the right to decide how x is used.
b. End-state theories give you a right to the fruits of others’ labor.
c. This is a right to decide what use other people are put to.
3. So end-state theories are wrong.
Argument #3: The Wilt Chamberlain Argument
Example: Assume there is some patterned conception of distributive justice, and assume that we start
out with a distribution, D1, that perfectly satisfies the desired pattern. Wilt then agrees to play
basketball for other people’s entertainment, for 25¢ per person. 1 million people agree, resulting
in a new distribution, D2, where Wilt has an extra $250K, and 1 million people have 25¢ less. Q:
Is D2 unjust?
Argument:
1. If no one has a reasonable complaint about D2, then D2 is just.
2. No one has a reasonable complaint about D2.
a. Wilt can’t complain.
b. People who paid to see him can’t complain. (They got what they paid for.)
c. People who didn’t pay can’t complain. (They still have their shares.)
3. So D2 is just. (From 1, 2.)
4. D2 violates the preferred pattern.
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5. So the patterned conception of distributive justice is false. (From 3, 4.)
III. Objections to Nozick
• Nagel’s objection: The Wilt Chamberlain argument fails because:
- It assumes that, when we distribute in accordance with a patterned principle of distributive
justice, we distribute absolute property rights.
- But people with patterned principles would say property rights are not (ever) absolute.
[Discuss: Does Nozick assume this? Is the second point a strong criticism?]
• Property rights are not absolute.
- The cabin in the woods example.
• The unjust history of actual holdings.
- The case of the Native Americans.
• Problems with initial acquisition.
- When one acquires previously unowned natural resources, this worsens the situation of others,
who can no longer use those resources. Why is this permissible? (Or why don’t you have to
compensate the others?)
- Should resources start out with communal ownership?
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Phil. 1200
Notes: On Government Aid to the Poor
1. The Drowning Child Analogy
@ If you pass by a child drowning in a shallow pond, you should pull the child out.
@ Suppose you can’t reach the child, but you see another bystander who can save the child. The other
bystander doesn’t want to save the child, but you could force him to. You should force the
bystander to save the child.
@ This is like the government forcing taxpayers to aid the poor, by supporting gov’t social welfare
programs.
2. Objection: Are gov’t programs effective?
@ You should only force the bystander to help if you are reasonably sure that this will do much more
good than harm.
@ Why govt programs might do more good than harm: The “Diminishing Marginal Utility of Money”: A poor
person gets a lot more benefit from $100 than a rich person does. Therefore, redistribution from
rich to poor will increase total benefits.
@ Why govt programs might do more harm than good:
@ Charles Murray: gov’t poverty programs create a “cycle of dependency”: they make it easier in
the short run for people to engage in behavior that is self-destructive in the long run. (E.g.,
having illegitimate children, dropping out of school, being unemployed.)
@ Empirical evidence: govt poverty programs expanded enormously from 1960-1980, but poverty,
unemployment, illegitimacy, crime, deficient education, etc., persisted. Not clear that there was
any benefit.
@ Wealthy people spend more money on investment " Wealth redistribution decreases the rate
of investment " this leads to lower rate of economic growth " leads to much lower wealth in
the long run (exponentially increasing impacts over time).
@ It is unclear that govt programs do more good than harm.
@ Hence, these programs are impermissible.
3. Are govt programs properly
targeted?
@ You shouldn’t force A to help B,
if C is much needier than B and
you could help C instead.
@ The poor in America are only
relatively poor (relative to other
Americans). They are still well off
compared to most of the world.
(See figure.)
@ The poor in the developing world
are absolutely poor. They are in
danger of starvation,
malnutrition, and death by easilypreventable diseases.
@ Instead of giving money to
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American poor, the govt could give it to the absolutely poor in the developing world.
@ Therefore, the gov’t should not give money to the American poor. Hence, actual gov’t poverty
programs are wrong.
4. The Charity Mugging vs. Drowning Child Analogy
@ In this case, you mug people to collect money for charity. This seems wrong.
@ Which is a better analogy to gov’t poverty programs: the Drowning Child or the Charity Mugging?
@ Some points of distinction:
- Chronic social condition vs. acute emergency
- Solving vs. alleviating a problem.
- One-time intervention vs. ongoing program of coercion.
@ The Charity Mugging seems like a closer analogy than the Drowning Child.
@ The Drowning Child analogy has counter-intuitive consequences:
1. Assume that giving to charity is just like saving drowning child.
2. So failure to give to charity is like failing to save a drowning child. (From 1.)
3. This would be utterly reprehensible.
4. Even after giving away 80% of one’s income to charity, one is still (equally) obligated to save
a drowning child.
5. So, even after giving away 80% of one’s income to charity, one is obligated to give more. (From
1, 4.)
6. Conclusion: failing to give away over 80% of one’s income to charity is utterly reprehensible.
(From 3, 5.)
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Phil. 1200
Review, Unit 3
Know these concepts:
Distributive Justice
Historical conception
End-state conceptions
The Original Position
These examples & what they are supposed to show:
Singer’s Shallow Pond / drowning child
Retarded person & geniuses (Harsanyi)
Distributing grades by agreement (Nozick)
Wilt Chamberlain
Charity mugging
Know these principles:
Rawls’ 2 principles of justice, esp. the second one (the Difference Principle)
Utilitarianism
Rational choice rules:
maximizing expected utility
maximin
The Entitlement Theory of Dist. Justice:
Pr. of Acquisition
Pr. of Transfer
Pr. of Rectification
Diminishing marginal utility of money
Be familiar with these arguments:
Singer’s argument for the obligation to assist
Rawls main argument for adopting his 2 Principles.
Why Harsanyi says the parties in the Original Position would not choose Rawls’ principles
How wealth-redistribution might be like forced labor or slavery
+ how it might violate individuals’ rights (which rights?)
How wealth-redistribution could be harmful:
the cycle of dependency argument
the rate of investment argument
Why we should maybe give to other countries instead of the domestic poor
Know the main positions of these people:
Singer
Rawls
Harsanyi
Nozick
Huemer
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