CHAPTER 2: UTILITARIANISM AND EQUALITY
CONTENTS
[pp 38 B 46]
Page
2.1.
Introduction
38
2.2.
2.3.
Utilitarianism
Critique of Utilitarianism
39
40
2.4.
2.5.
The Egalitarian Elements in Utilitarianism
Conclusion
43
45
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Before embarking, in Chapters 3 to 10, on an investigation of equality in modern liberal theories, a brief
diversion to utilitarianism, and its egalitarian content, is necessary, because utilitarianism was the
dominant political theory for almost 150 years (prior to Rawls) and Rawls explicitly developed his theory
of justice as fairness in reaction to the deficiencies he perceived in utilitarian theory (in its main
manifestations) as a theory of justice. Rawls in turn, provided the platform for Dworkin, Sen and Walzer
to further develop modern liberal theories broadly along the lines first shown by Rawls. Likewise,
Nozick=s Anarchy, State and Utopia may be seen as a libertarian response to the challenge posed by
Rawls=s A Theory of Justice. The main body of this thesis goes beyond utilitarianism1 and focuses on the
work of the previously mentioned modern theorists. Logically one therefore needs to enquire, even if in a
cursory fashion, Awhat one wants to go beyond@, before embarking on one=s journey. It is this starting
point that is provided in this chapter. The aim of this chapter is not to subject utilitarianism to an in-depth
egalitarian analysis, but to point to some of its characteristics [Section 2.2.], the critique these have
attracted [Section 2.3.], and the extent to which a tendency towards equality may be found in
utilitarianism [Section 2.4.]. The conclusion is reached that, while utilitarianism may provide the
normative justification for very strong forms of affirmative measures [even amounting to unfair Areverse
discrimination@], utilitarianism is an insufficient theory for the compound equality of opportunity model
[the ACEOP model@], for a number of reasons [Section 2.5.].
1
This phrase is borrowed from the title of a book by Sen A. K. & B. Williams (Eds) (1982): Utilitarianism and Beyond,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
38
2.2. UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism2 is characterized by three features:3
(i)
Consequentialism: The rightness of actions must be judged entirely by the goodness of
the consequent state of affairs. This means that if two or more actions are compared, that
one which yields the most Agoodness@ (however this may be measured) is to be preferred
irrespective of the nature or rightness of the action itself. For example, if blatantly unfair
Areverse discrimination@ will yield more aggregate utility or Agoodness@ than other less
extreme forms of affirmative action, the former should be preferred over the latter.
(ii)
Welfarism: The goodness of states of affairs must be judged entirely by the goodness of
the set of individual utilities in the respective state of affairs. This means that whatever is
deemed to constitute Awelfare@ (be it happiness, income or wealth), this is the only
measure that is to be used in determining which is the Abest@ state of affairs.
(iii)
Sum-ranking: The goodness of any set of individual utilities must be judged entirely by
their sum total. This implies that if two or more sets of individual utilities are compared,
no special weight may be given to any individual=s holding of utilities or disutilities.
Each and every person is to be treated as of equal worth and hence the only matter that
counts is the individual=s aggregate holding of utilities.
The aim of utilitarianism is to maximize the aggregate utility taken over all the members of
society, irrespective of the shape of the actual distribution, but this will be attained when the
marginal utility of everyone is equal, because the utility that a person derives from his share of a
resource increases at a diminishing rate as his share in the resource increases. For this reason one
could argue that there is a built-in tendency toward equality of well-being in the utilitarian
conception of equality and that the total utility approach collapses into the utilitarian equality
approach. Much of the critique directed at utilitarianism is directed at the total utility approach to
welfarist equality. For example, Rawls criticizes the violations to our notions of liberty and
equality that can be justified in the name of utilitarianism, and Sen, from a different perspective,
2
For the purposes of this brief chapter on utilitarianism (which is of an introductory nature only), I do not distinguish between
rule and act utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism focusses on the likely aggregate consequences if a particular rule were to be applied whereas
act utilitarianism has as its object the likely consequences of particular acts. Similarly, the distinction between aggregate and average utility
is not given any attention. The main purpose of this chapter is to point to the historical passage from utilitarianism to modern liberal theories,
using Rawls as our link between the Apast@ and the Amodern@.
3
Sen A. (1984): Resources, Values and Development, Oxford: Blackwell, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: p 278.
39
criticizes utilitarianism for allowing, because of human diversity, very unequal distributions as
long as aggregate utility is maximized. In what follows, this distinction between utilitarian
equality and total utility equality is set aside.
2.3. CRITIQUE OF UTILITARIANISM
2.3.1. General
The critique of utilitarianism is structured by reference to the three features of utilitarianism
listed at the beginning of Section 2.2..
1.
Consequentialism B The rightness of actions must be judged entirely by the goodness of
the consequent state of affairs: However, there is nothing self-evidently valuable as a
moral goal in the mere increase in aggregate pleasure or happiness abstracted from all
concerns with the shape of the distribution of wealth or happiness. Separate individuals
are of no intrinsic importance other than as mere receptacles or collection points of what
is regarded as important, namely some mental state, such as happiness or need
satisfaction.4 This allows for trade-offs between the need satisfactions of individuals as
long as the aggregate need satisfaction is increased thereby.5 The major problem with this
way of judging the morality of actions is that it ignores the possibility that some actions
are intrinsically wrong, irrespective of the utilities these may yield for the doer. I here
subscribe to Mill=s Aharm principle@ in holding that the harm done to another cannot be
off-set against the good consequences that the perpetrator may derive from his or her
harmful act. To steal is wrong, and the fact that the thief may be able to put the stolen
object to better use (either for himself or for the greater general good) or derive greater
goodness from it, than I can, does not make the theft morally right.
4
5
Hart H.L.A.: ABetween utility and rights@, in Columbia Law Review, Vol. 79, 1979: pp 828-846
Idem: pp 829 B 830.
40
2.
Welfarism B The goodness of states of affairs must be judged entirely by the goodness of
the set of individual utilities in the respective state of affairs: A welfarist approach has
two fundamental shortcomings. Firstly it conceives of human beings as no more than
receptacles of certain mental states, such as happiness, but humans are not only
experiencers or preference satisfiers, they are also evaluators and doers.6 As such they
form and revise conceptions of the good and pursue desire satisfaction associated with
these conceptions. Utilitarianism ignores the Kantian aspects of agency and autonomy of
human beings. For Sen, agency and well-being are two fundamental but distinct and
irreducible dimensions of being human. Secondly, Sen argues that Autility does not
adequately represent well-being@.7 While happiness and desire-fulfilment are important
aspects of well-being it is not sufficient for well-being and are totally inadequate as
measures of well-being. Sen illustrates this point by using the example of the poor person
who, although objectively deprived, has accepted his disadvantaged position and has
scaled down his aspirations and desires to such an extent that he is happy and his needs
are satisfied by the smallest windfall that comes his way despite still being objectively in
a state of non-well-being.8 Conversely, rich people may have well-being and yet be
unhappy and frustrated. Together these considerations show the moral deficiencies of
welfarist and utilitarian methods of moral accounting. What is needed is a theory that is
concerned with what people are able to do and be, where being happy or having one=s
desires fulfilled is only one valuable capability among others.9
3.
Sum-ranking B The goodness of any set of individual utilities must be judged entirely by
their sum total: Utilitarianism treats people as of equal worth in the sense that it treats
persons equally as of no worth. It is true that utilitarianism may tend towards equal
welfare due to factors such as diminishing marginal utility and the disutility of envy if
6
Nozick (1974) provides an excellent example of the fact that humans have an innate propensity to Ado@ rather than to only
Aexperience@. Nozick invites us to imagine an Aexperience machine@ that has the ability to let one experience everything you wish for as if it
occurs in real life. One could spend one=s whole life in this machine and maximize your experience of happiness, or whatever takes your
fancy. Nozick then asks the rhetorical question: would most people opt to be connected to the experience machine (which in all respects will
be Areal@) to optimize their pleasure or happiness, or will most people decline the opportunity to maximize their happiness in favour of
actually living their lives, taking the good with the bad [Nozick R. (1974): Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books]. This
example of Nozick is echoed in the 1999 film, AThe Matrix@, which also illustrates the point that most people will rather experience the
hardships of the Areal@ world as opposed to a simulated good life.
7
Sen A. (1987): On Ethics and Economics, Oxford: Blackwell: pp 47 B 60.
8
AThe hopeless beggar, the precarious landless labourer, the dominated housewife, the hardened unemployed or the overexhausted coolie may all take pleasures in small mercies, and manage to suppress intense suffering for the necessity of continued survival,
but it would be ethically deeply mistaken to attach a correspondingly small value to the loss of their well-being because of their survival
strategy@ [Sen, cited by Crocker (1992): p 602 -- see Crocker D.A.: AFunctioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen=s and Nussbaum=s
Development Ethic@, in Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 4, November 1992: pp 584-612].
9
Idem: p 602.
41
great inequalities of wealth occurs, but this is by no means inevitable because there are
also factors pointing the other way, such as loss of incentives and the failure of
assumptions such as that individuals derive the same utility from the same amount of
wealth and that all individuals are equally good pleasure or satisfaction machines.10
Utilitarianism proceeds on the false analogy between the individual (who can postpone
pleasure or willingly subject himself to pain in the expectation that such sacrifices will
yield, in the long term, greater need satisfaction or deferred pleasure), and the population
at large. While it may be rational for the individual to incur these sacrifices it is not
rational for an individual to incur these disutilities if the benefits will ultimately fall
elsewhere.11
2.3.2. Rawls=s Critique of Utilitarianism
10
11
Idem: p 830.
Idem: p 831.
42
In his preface to A Theory of Justice Rawls explains that the main aim of his theory of justice is
to offer an alternative to utilitarianism.12 It is therefore not surprising that the largest share of
Rawls=s critical comments are reserved for utilitarianism, both in its Aclassical@ form [which
stresses the maximization of total utility] and its more modern form [which argues for the
maximization of average utility].
The issues raised by his critique of utilitarianism, at various stages of the exposition of his theory
of justice, are too numerous to do justice to here, but two points are worth mentioning: First,
Rawls alleges that Autilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons@13 in
that in its pursuit of the maximal total utility to all, it ignores the fairness of the distribution of
goods to specific individuals. People are distinct in a way that makes it impermissible to discount
a harm to one against a benefit to another.14 The charge on this count is that utilitarianism fails to
account for our considered conviction that persons have rights that should not be subject to the
calculus of social interests.15 The central proposition of classical utilitarianism is the greatest
happiness principle, which prescribes that the best political and social arrangement is the one that
yields the maximum aggregate happiness of the members of society as a whole. In principle the
utilitarian maxim would be satisfied by a social arrangement whereby some are enslaved for the
greater happiness of others, provided that the aggregate disutility or unhappiness of those
enslaved is offset by the aggregate utility of the beneficiaries of the arrangement to the extent
that this arrangement yields the greatest nett aggregate utility. To put it differently, Rawls
charges utilitarianism of asking too much of individuals, in that people are required to sacrifice
12
Rawls (1999): A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (Revised
Edition): pp xvii -- xviii.
13
Rawls (1999): p 24; p 26; pp 163 B 164; p 167; and p 189.
14
Also see Glover J. (1988): The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity, London: Penguin Books: pp 104 B 105. The
author cites an argument by Parfit, that ostensibly weakens the separateness of persons argument relied upon by Rawls.
15
Rawls (1999): p 4.
43
their own particular good for others, if this would lead to greater aggregate utility.16 According to
Rawls, this conception of justice will lead to social instability and a loss of self-esteem by those
who are required to make sacrifices for the greater social good.
16
Ibid: p 154; p 155; p 180; and p 157.
44
Rawls=s second criticism directed at utilitarianism is that it erroneously proposes that there is
only one good that counts, namely mental pleasure. Utilitarians assume, according to Rawls, that
while many goods may contribute to psychological well-being, only one conception of the good
exists and that is mental pleasure. Rawls rejects this monistic conception of the good, claiming
that a plurality of conceptions of the good, some of which may even be irreconcilable with other
conceptions, exists among members of society and that any adequate political theory should
reflect this. These two criticisms against utilitarianism form the starting points of Rawls=s theory
which aims to account for the fact that, first of all, individuals have rights that should be immune
to the calculus of social interests, and, secondly, recognizes that not all rational and informed
individuals would accept a single conception of the good, that conceptions of the good in a
modern constitutional democracy are irreducibly plural. Rawls conceives of society as a fair
system of social cooperation among free and equal individuals under conditions of moderate
scarcity.17 Because of the plurality of conceptions of the good existing alongside the need to
cooperate with other members of society to achieve our respective individual ends, the relations
among members of society are marked by conflict as well as mutual benefit.18 The Kantian basis
of Rawls=s rejection of utilitarianism is clear: Kant argued that empirical principles such as
utility, are unfit to serve as basis for the moral law, because an instrumental defence of freedom
and rights not only leaves rights vulnerable, but fails to respect the inherent dignity of persons.
The utilitarian calculus treats people as means to the happiness of others, not as ends in
themselves, worthy of respect.19
2.4. THE EGALITARIAN ELEMENTS IN UTILITARIANISM
In utilitarianism, the concept of equality fulfils the following functions: Firstly, everyone should be
counted as one and no one as more than one. This means that no person, by virtue of his status or power
or privileged position in society, or for whatever other reason, has a claim that his level of welfare or
happiness or need satisfaction, or whatever is used as the metric for assessing utility levels, should be
regarded as more important than that of another. Secondly, alternative systems of political and social
arrangements will be regarded as equal if their aggregate utility levels (or average utility levels) are the
same, irrespective of vast differences in the actual shape of their distributive outcomes. For example, in a
society consisting of persons A, B, C and D, the distributions depicted in Table 2.1. will be regarded as
17
18
19
Ibid: pp 3 B 19; and Rawls J. (1993): Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press: pp 3 B 46.
Ackerman (1980): Social Justice in the Liberal State, Binghampton, N.Y.: Yale University Press.
See Sandel=s Introduction in Liberalism and Its Critics [Sandel (ed)(1984): p 3].
45
equally just, despite the fact that the shares allocated to each individual differ significantly depending on
which distributive scheme is adopted. Note that under a system of truncated utilitarianism,20 only
distribution III will be regarded as just, if we assume that 10 utiles is the subsistence level or social
minimum.
Person
Distribution I
Distribution II
Distribution III
A
70
5
40
B
20
60
30
C
10
35
20
D
0
0
10
100/25
100/25
100/25
Aggregate/Average Utility
Table 2.1.: Equally Just Distributions Under Utilitarianism
20
The term Atruncated utilitarianism@ is used here to describe a distributive scheme which provides a social minimum to
everyone, irrespective of aggregative utility considerations; above this social minimum the utilitarian principle applies unchecked.
46
Thirdly, (and as previously stated) on some interpretations of utilitarianism, a political and social system
based on its precepts will tend towards an equal distribution of social goods, because the marginal utility
of the same amount of goods will be more for the person with a smaller holding than for a person with a
larger holding. The consequence of this is that transfers from the rich to the poor will always lead to an
increase in the aggregate or the average utility. However, this interpretation is not without its detractors.
For example, Miller argues, from a Marxist perspective, that it is plausible to assume that the rich, or the
ruling class, have an Aespecially acute need for wealth and power.@21 If this assumption holds, then it may
not necessarily be true that transfers from the wealthy to the destitute will always increase the aggregate
or the average utility of society. To accommodate this concern, the transfer from the rich to the poor may
be made subject to the qualification that everyone should have the same welfare function. Thus the rule
for selecting a distribution will now be:
if everyone has the same welfare function, then any transfer from a wealthier person to a poorer person,
22
which does not reverse the inequality, is always preferable.
Sen proposes the following equity axiom:
If person A is worse off than person B, whenever A and B have the same income level, then person A should
receive more or at least the same income than person B, in the optimal solution to the pure distribution
problem.
According to Sen, this rule is not extremist in the sense that Rawls=s difference principle is, that is,
concentrating only on the worst-off group, and yet it uses exactly the same type of information as the
Rawlsian rule.23 The point that Sen makes can be illustrated by the example of distributions provided in
Table 2.1.. Under Rawls=s difference principle only the position of Person D, being the worst-off person,
will receive attention (or at least until his position equals or exceeds that of the second worst-off person,
Person C). The difference principle will therefore not concern itself with the great disparity between
Persons B and A in Distribution I, nor can Person B complain that the position of Person D is improved
while his position remains unaltered. Under the equity axiom, any transfer from A to B or C or from B to
C (Distribution I) or from A to B or C or from B to C (Distribution III) may be justified, while the
Rawlsian difference principle is completely insensitive to these transfers.
21
22
Miller, in Daniels (1989), pp 206 B 230: p 211.
Sen, in Daniels (1989), pp 283 B 292: p 285.
23
See Sections 5.4. and 6.4.4. infra for a discussion of how Rawls proposes to determine Arelevant social positions@ and the
problems associated with his solution.
47
From the previous point, another interesting comparison between utilitarianism and Rawlsian equality
flows: As was seen, the utilitarian procedure is based on comparing the aggregate gains and losses in
welfare between different persons, under different distributive arrangements (for example, Person A
gained more in the move from one distributive system to another, than did Person B, and it is the
aggregate gains or losses which determine which distributive scheme is to be preferred), while ignoring
levels of welfare comparisons between people (for example, Person A is in a relatively better position
than Person B). Rawls=s theory, on the other hand, is sensitive to comparing welfare levels only, without
computing for comparative gains and losses. In this sense, one may conclude that both utilitarianism and
the Rawlsian system of justice as fairness are incomplete normative theories, because distributive
judgements should be based on both comparisons of total welfare gains and losses (as utilitarianism does)
and on comparisons of relative levels of welfare (as Rawlsian justice does).24 One can agree with Sen=s
conclusion regarding Rawls on the implementation level, as long as it is kept in mind that under the
Rawlsian model of justice as fairness, the comparison of distributive schemes (that is of comparing
absolute gains and losses) would have been done when the selection of the principles of justice took place
in the original position.25 Thereafter, Sen is correct: only welfare levels are compared.
2.5. CONCLUSION
What is the relevance of utilitarianism for equality and distributive justice? The equality asserted in
utilitarianism is only the equality of the like amount of utility of any two individuals and places no
constraints on unequal distributions, as long as aggregate nett utility is maximized. For example
if Person A gets 100 utiles and Person B minus 50 utiles, this distribution would be preferred to
one under which Person A and Person B only got 20 utiles each, for the aggregate nett utility is
higher under the former than the latter distribution.26 But, because the marginal utility of
economic goods diminishes as one’s share increases, it may be that utilitarianism has
egalitarian implications for economic justice, as Hume puts it:
24
25
26
Sen, in Daniels (1989), pp 283 B 292: p 284 & p 292.
In this regard, see Section 5.3.6., in which the social nature of talents and handicaps is discussed.
Narveson J.: AEquality vs. Liberty: Advantage, Liberty@, in Social Philosophy & Policv, Vol. 2, No. 1, Autumn 1984, pp 33-60:
pp43 -- 46.
48
AIt must be confessed, that, wherever we depart from this equality, we rob the poor of more
satisfaction than we add to the rich, and that the slight gratification of a frivolous vanity, in one
individual, frequently costs more than bread to many families, and even provinces@.27
But Hume also argues, along with Adam Smith and Rawls, that inequalities should be permitted
as incentives to move people to produce more for the greater good. On this reading economic
inequality can be justified on utilitarian grounds because allowing self-interested accumulation of
wealth by those best-suited to produce wealth will result in greater aggregate utility. Therefore, if
one can argue polar opposite implications from the same basic premises, utilitarianism does not
provide us with the conceptual tools necessary to argue in favour of economic equality.
Utilitarianism therefore fails the feasibility test, as specified by the second question in Section
1.7. The conception of equality found in utilitarianism is insensitive to the different spheres of life
and social activities from which the individual may derive his happiness and this is contrary to
the postulate contained in the third question posed in Section 1.7.
Furthermore, as the critique discussed in Section 2.3. clearly demonstrates, utilitarianism cannot
supply the basis for the compound equality of opportunity model proposed in Chapter 11,
because, amongst others: utilitarianism ignores the agency aspects of personhood [Sen, Hart
and Nozick]; it gives insufficient recognition to the individual [Rawls], and, as explained in
Section 1.6., I set out to develop a model which recognizes the importance of the individual,
albeit in a particular social context; it places too large a burden on altruistic social benevolence
[Rawls]; and it has perfectionist tendencies, based on an inadequate conception of the person
[Rawls and Sen]. Per definition, utilitarianism therefore cannot begin to provide the moral basis
for the model as encapsulated in the general problem statement in Section 1.5.
27
Hume D. (1751): Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Chap. III. sec. ii. [cited by Narveson (1984): p 44].
49
Utilitarianism, by paying exclusive attention to only one aspect of human well-being, namely, utility, is an
inaccurate and incomplete conception of individual well-being and fails to yield an appropriate concept of
social equality.28 For example, because it ignores the shapes of competing distributive schemes, in favour
of aggregate nett welfare as the sole normative standard, types of unfair discrimination [such as
affirmative measures amounting to Areverse discrimination@], may easily be justified under utilitarianism,
especially if the principle of decreasing marginal utility is used to determine total welfare levels [i.e.
redistribution from the rich to the poor, other things remaining constant, will always lead to a greater
increase in the welfare levels of the poor compared with the accompanying reduction in the welfare levels
of the rich].
The focus of this thesis being liberal conceptions of equality, no more attention is given to
utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is important mainly for being grounded in an intuitively appealing, but
grossly simplified, psychology (humans seek to maximize pleasure and minimize pain) and for
the fact that it was the dominant political philosophy in the pre-Rawlsian period. In the next three
chapters I discuss Rawls=s theory of justice and his claims how his theory avoids the alleged
deficiencies of utilitarianism as a theory of justice.
28
Crocker (1992): p 600.
50