Self and Other in International Relations Theory:
Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates
In a special issue of International Studies Review “Responsible Scholarship in
International Relations,” edited by J. Ann Tickner and Andrei P. Tsygankov, Vol. 10, No.
4, 2008, pp. 762-775.
Abstract
One important critique of the “West’s” hegemony in international relations theory has
been this theory’s inability to come to terms with the problem of difference or the
Self/Other dialectic. To further highlight the importance of the Self/Other relations, this
article proposes to analyze Russian theoretical discourse of relating to Europe and the
West. For centuries, Russia has participated in intense interactions among European,
Asian and Middle Eastern regions, and it has developed a language and theories for
relating to its various Others. Studying Russian debates can assist us in the task of
reflecting on problematic epistemological and ethical assumptions behind international
relations scholarship, as well as suggest some paths to a genuinely diverse and global IR
theory. To research both continuity and progression of Russian arguments, I draw cases
from imperial and post-Soviet historical periods and analyze their debates – Eurocentrism
and Eurasia – in terms of assumptions their participants held about interacting with the
Other. Although moving beyond viewing the East/West interaction as something
mutually exclusive has been a challenge to Russian thinkers, some of them have found
ways to conceptualize the two cultural entities as in dialogue with one another and to
learn from opposing perspectives.
Word count: 7,550
Bio
Andrei P. Tsygankov is Professor at the departments of Political Science and
International Relations at San Francisco State University. He served as Program Chair of
International Studies Association, 2006-07. His latest books are Russophobia: the AntiRussian Lobby and American Foreign Policy (Palgrave 2009 forthcoming) and Russia’s
Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Rawman & Littlefield,
2006).
1
Self and Other in International Relations Theory:
Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates
By Andrei P. Tsygankov1
Resemblances are the shadows of differences. Different people see
different similarities and similar differences.
- Vladimir Nabokov
1. Introduction
Scholars in the field of international relations acknowledge that their discipline
remains largely ethnocentric and hegemonic reflecting various cultural biases of Western
nations, particularly the United States (Hoffmann, 1995 [1977]; Alker and Biersteker,
1984; Holsti, 1985; Weaver, 1998; Crawford and Jarvis, 2001; Tickner, 2003). Despite
various attempts to broaden and deepen the discipline, however, there remains a thick
wall separating us from the rest of the world in terms of how “we do IR.” Graduate
students coming to the United States from outside are typically surprised to learn that
debates over relative power and democratic peace dominate this diverse field. Those
trained to be sensitive to history, culture and ethics, find that top international relations
programs offer a limited selection of courses in these areas, often at the expense of
statistics and game theory. Area studies scholars rarely try to publish in international
relations journals, and – when they do – they are not infrequently rejected on the ground
that their work is “not really IR.” In the meantime, some of the “real” international
relations scholars often equate understanding of the world with elaboration on perceived
foreign policy concerns of their national governments.
One important critique of the “West’s” hegemony in international relations theory
has been this theory’s inability to come to terms with the problem of difference
(Inayatulla and Blaney 2004; Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Jones 2006) or the Self/Other
dialectic. Scholars with interests in culture have argued that the discipline of international
relations continues colonial practices of teaching at the periphery, rather than trying to
learn from it. To further highlight the importance of Self/Other relations, this paper
proposes to analyze Russian theoretical discourse of relating to Europe and the West.
Russian civilizational debates, defined as sustained reflections on reproducing cultural
ties across time and space, present an interesting case. For centuries, Russia has
participated in intense interactions among European, Asian and Middle Eastern regions,
and it has developed a language and theories for relating to its various Others. Studying
Russian civilizational debates can, therefore, assist us in the task of reflecting on
problematic epistemological and ethical assumptions behind international relations
scholarship.
I argue that, as a European nation, Russians too had to face the challenge of
“provincializing Europe” (Chakrabarty 2000) and overcoming the attitude of
Eurocentrism in relations to significant Others. In the aftermath of the Crimean war,
through the voices of Nikolai Danilevski and Konstantin Leontyev, Russians moved from
1
Some of the themes of this essay are explored in greater details in Tsygankov
2004, 2007.
2
not recognizing their distinctiveness from the European Self toward the recognition-threat
attitude to it. With some modifications, the new attitude persisted throughout most of the
twentieth century, but in the late 1970s-1980s, Russians developed new, more dialectical
ways of relating to the Other. Rather than thinking about the East/West interaction as
something mutually exclusive, the late socialist and then post-socialist thinkers came to
conceptualize the two cultural entities as in dialogue with one another. Learning from
opposing perspectives has been a major challenge for Russian civilizational theory which
continues to be dominated by essentialist approaches. Still, some intellectual progress
took place, evidence of which has been Russia’s new and increasingly diverse field of
international relations. To research both continuity and progression of Russian
civilizational arguments, I draw cases from imperial and post-Soviet historical periods.
After reviewing scholarship on the Self/Other dialectic (section 2) and Russian key
civilizational schools (section 3), I analyze two prominent debates – Eurocentrism and
Eurasia – in terms of assumptions their participants hold about interacting with the Other
(section 4). In conclusion, I summarize lessons of Russian engagement with the Other
and its implications for global international relations theory.
2. International Relations Theory and the Self/Other Dialectic
Scholars who are interested in culture have long argued that international relations
ought not be viewed as a product of Western discourse alone – such an approach would
reflect a status quo bias and deprive us of the same transformative logic that John Ruggie
(1983) found missing in static neorealist thinking. Over time, a number of scholars have
issued a strong challenge to western intellectual hegemony in international studies. For
example, critics of modernization theory revealed its unilinear and progressive proWestern bias (Wiarda 1981; Oren 2000). Much like modernization theory, that
historically assisted the state in justifying its colonial practices, international relations
theory tends to offer no reciprocal engagement with the Other merely expecting it to
follow the West’s lead. By allowing little conceptual space for “non-western” theorists,
western IR treats them as dependent subjects (“subalterns”) and consumers of already
developed knowledge. Taking the Other seriously, or engaging in a dialogue with it,
means committing to assumptions of the Other’s equality to the Self in terms of defining
parameters and boundaries of knowledge. By contrast, ethnocentric, or excessively proWestern theories proclaim their commitment to exclusively defined values of their
environment and are closed for possible fertilization from the external environment. Such
theories assume superiority of the Self and its moral community, and inferiority of the
Other thereby justifying the legitimacy of hegemonic actions toward the Other. The
authors of ethnocentric ideas are willing to promote their visions outside their social
universe because they are firmly committed to their concept of “virtue” and “good.” Postcolonial scholarship argues that, in contrast to ethnocentrism, production of a more global
knowledge requires defining the Self and its moral values as something open to
negotiation, rather than absolute, exclusive, and essentialist; and viewing the Other as
different, but morally equal and, for that reason, as a source of potential learning. In
practical terms, such an approach would promote negotiations to establish mutually
acceptable norms and reduce space for hegemonic actions.
Engaging in a dialogue with the Other also requires a particular sense of ethics as
mutual empowerment of the Self and the Other. In the West, the tradition of
3
communitarian thought in the humanities has long been engaged in debates about
inclusiveness and recognition in building order and community (MacIntyre 1981, 1987;
Walzer 1977; Taylor 1983, 1991, 1992). The principal accomplishment of these debates
has been justification of the ethics of responsibility as that to/for the Other(s) and
distinction between such ethics and that of rules/regulations for pre-given, autonomous
subjects.2 Non-western thinkers have also generated important ideas about dialogue,
mutual engagement, and responsiveness for our words and actions. For instance, one
might mention the Russian religious philosophical tradition of acknowledging
guilt/responsibility by intellectuals for contributing to a discourse of social violence. In
the early twentieth century, a group of former Marxist sympathizers responded to the
revolution of 1905 by publishing the collective volume Vekhi (1991) (Signposts) and
calling for the Russian intelligentsia to be constructive, rather than “nihilist,” in its social
criticism. The authors of the volume held the Russian radical intelligentsia responsible
for the revolutionary violence giving a new turn to the old tradition of intellectuals’
reflections on their engagements with social reality.3 If we are to adequately address
challenges of a global multicultural world, we need a notion of responsibility that
involves both the Self and the Other. In this world, it it important to sustain a discourse of
constructive tensions in which “local” and “global” both conflict and cooperate for the
purpose of dialectical engagement and negotiating a mutually acceptable norms and
solutions.
Such mutual engagement or dialogical perspective should be distinguished from
realist and cosmopolitan perspectives, each of which is refusing to engage the Other. For
realists, the image of anarchy and competition remains the key metaphor in describing the
nature of world order. Although some realists appreciate the role of culture in
international politics, most of them deny that the world is becoming more globalized.
This group is explicit about defining its cultural community as local,4 and its vision of
responsibility is, therefore, highly reductionist. Realists emphasize anarchy as the key
force in the world. They perceive the Other as a threat and typically limit their
recommendations for the Self to those of a defensive nature. The cosmopolitan writers
are fully aware of the increasingly globalized character of world politics, but they
maintain an image of a progressively culturally homogeneous global society and
overlook the forces of identity and diversity. Most typically, this cultural development in
2
Here, more traditionally-oriented theorists like MacIntyre (1981) appealed to
premodern morality, whereas more postmodernist thinkers argued for a need to radically
reinterpret the notion of ethics and morality (Gilligan 1982; Taylor 1992).
3
In 1974, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn continued this tradition of self-reflection and
self-critique by publishing the samizdat collective volume Iz-pod glib. Solzhenitsyn
charged that the intelligensia had essentially lost its sense of social responsibility and
turned itself into a loyal servant of the Soviet regime (Ibid, 187-221). The Russian
tradition of intellectual repentance and responsibility is alive and well, however. See
Siniyavski (1996) for an example of liberal self-reflections (“Intelligentsiya i vlast’”) and
Panarin (1998), for a more conservative perspective.
4
For example, Huntington (1996) is explicit in dichotomizing the “West against
the rest” and perceiving the rise of alternative cultural communities as a threatening
development.
4
global society is linked to the progress of western civilization. Both conservative and
radical cosmopolitan writers tend to view cultural development as a worldwide spread of
westernized modernity and its norms of nation-states, market economy, political
democracy, etc., rather than as a dialectical interaction of diverse local communities.5
Whether supportive or critical of the Westernization process, cosmopolitans trace how
the norms of a dominant civilization transcend the values of different cultural
communities, rather than studying non-unproblematic receptions of “dominant” values by
local cultures and emerging dialectic syntheses of global and local.
These biases hidden in hegemonic international relations theories reveal
themselves in multiple research agendas. Hegemonic theories avoid asking crucial
questions: Who is the Other that may react to their theories? How different is the Other
from the Self in its previous experience? How distinct is the Other in its present
concerns? Such ethical and epistemological agenda tend to produce knowledge that is
didactic and ethnocentric, rather than dialogical and dialectical. One can hardly be
surprised, for instance, by highly critical reactions to the familiar west-centered theories
of the end of history or clash of civilizations from non-western Others, such as Russia
and China (Tsygankov 2004). These theories bear an excessive imprint of western culture
and, by insisting on their universal applicability, they contribute to the
hegemony/dependence relationships in the global context. Therefore, cultural biases
hidden in international relations theory remain a deep-seated obstacle for establishing
robust institutions of world peace. In a world that is multicultural and discourse-sensitive,
not giving the Other the consideration it deserves means not describing the world’s
problems adequately, much less offering sensible solutions.
3. Russian Civilizational Theory and Its Currents
Seeking to respond to their nation’s borderland location between European and
Asian civilizations, Russian politicians and intellectuals have pursued diverse visions of
relating to the Other. For the purpose of this article, civilization is defined as an idea5
Some radical cosmopolitan writers, favoring the classical Marxist tradition
emphasize the power of western capitalism and industrial technology in reshaping world
order and subsuming the diversity of local cultures. Ernst Gellner (1983) and Benedict
Anderson (1983) link nationalism to industrial modernization and print technology, and
Antony Giddens (1985) adds the role of information and military technology. Other,
liberal cosmopolitans, such as Michael Doyle (1986) and Francis Fukuyama (1989),
argue for the progressive spread of Westernized market democracy throughout the world.
Still other scholars (Held 1995; Linklater 1998) argue for the emergence of new
structures and institutions of governance at the supranational and transnational levels.
This group recognizes the pluralism of local cultures and identities, and proposes that this
plurality of identities flourish, not disappear, during the globalization era. At the same
time, they call for radical global democratization transcending the currently existing
system of nation-states (Held 2000), “The Changing Contours of Political Community,”
283), rather than for dialogue and learning among local communities. Their procedural
universalism can hardly be neutral and may eventually encourage new divisions between
exclusively defined Self and Other. For more “bottom up” perspectives, see Dallmayr
1999; Inayatulla and Blaney 2004.
5
based community that extends beyond a nation and is reproduced across time and space
in response to various historical developments.6 Russian civilizational perspectives can
be classified along two main axes: their identity - Europe/West versus non-West – and a
degree of essentialism.
The argument that Russia is a part of Europe is centuries-old (Neumann 1996),
and it figures prominently in the national discourse, at least since Czar Peter the Great. It
was Europe that created the larger meaningful environment in which Russia's rulers
defended their core values. Although Europe’s recognition of Russia as one of its own
was never unproblematic (Neumann 1999; Malia 1999), all Russia’s leaders identified
with European ideas. Some rulers––most prominently Alexander II––attempted to
redefine the country's identity in line with the new European ideas of Enlightenment,
constitutionalism, and capitalism. Others sought to defend the old Europe and preserve
the basic features of the autocratic regime. Yet Russians disagreed on whether western
Europe could serve as a role model or whether Russia itself should become the leader of
European civilization. The disagreement lied at heart of the debate between Westernizers
and Slavophiles.
Westernizers supported Peter the Great’s efforts to modernize Russia and went on
to advocate the widespread application of European institutions on Russian soil.
Influenced by the French Revolution, Westernizers grew critical of the Russian autocratic
tradition and produced a variety of arguments in favor of social reform. The Decembrists
of the early nineteenth century, for example, followed the lead of people like Speranski
and advocated constitutionalism and the abolition of serfdom in Russia. Later, in the
aftermath of Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, Westernizers split into two distinct
camps. One group—Cadets, or constitutional democrats—continued to advocate Russia’s
liberal reforms and constitutional development. Their most prominent spokesman was the
historian turned politician Pavel Milyukov (1910). Other Westernizers emphasized the
need for the country’s industrialization. For example, Minister of Finance Sergei Witte
argued for a more radical break with the country’s rural tradition and the monarchy-led
“energetic and decisive measures” to develop the industrial base and satisfy the needs of
Russia (Neumann 1996:70, 213). Unlike Slavophiles, who often saw the industrialization
of Russia as a sell-out to Europe, this group advocated rapid economic development.
In contrast to Westernizers, Slavophiles thought of Russia as a unique culture,
rather than merely as an offspring of the European civilization.7 Beginning with Ivan
Kireyevski and Alexei Khomyakov, they saw their nation as a part of Europe while
advocating Russia’s indigenous tradition, which they visualized as a genuine religious
and social community. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the spiritual leader of
Slavophiles was the philosopher Vladimir Solovyev (2000), who placed Christian
religion at the center of his reflections about the role of Russia in Europe. In response to
the crisis of European identity in the 1840s-1850s, even some prominent Westernizers,
6
For similar definitions of civilization that emphasize ideas and claims that hold
them together by reproduction and defense over time, see Cox 1995, 11; Jackson 1999,
143; O’Hagan 2002; Hall and Jackson 2007.
7
For good overviews of the Russian Westernizers-Slavophiles’ debates, see
Neumann (1996) and Tolz (2000). For a selection of Russian original writings of
Westernizers and Slavophiles, see Kohn (1955).
6
such as Alexander Herzen, grew disappointed with conservative restorations and adopted
some of the ideas of the Slavophiles. Herzen (1946), proposed not to discard Russia’s
communal cultural features, but instead, build on those features in order to take a
development shortcut and “catch up” with the West. In an extreme way, the “catching
up” line of thinking found its continuation in Bolshevism. Even for Slavophiles, however,
the West (Europe) remained the significant Other, and they continued to make sense of
Russian development by contrasting it to that of Europe. Like Westernizers, Slavophiles
were thoroughly familiar with western religious, social, and political traditions, even
though they were convinced that the West was finished its role as the world’s leader and
that Russia must now become the capital of world civilization.
The East, on the other hand, was viewed by both currents in a typical European
fashion – as barbaric, backward, and unworthy of acceptance. The attitude only began to
change when philosophers, such as Nikolai Danilevski and Konstantin Leontyev, grew
especially fearful of Europe in the aftermath of Russia’s humiliating defeat in the
Crimean war. Lond before Samuel Huntington, the late Slavophile Danilevski (1869)
asserted that Russia was a “special cultural-historical type” that could not see itself as a
part of Europe. Leontyev went further and became known for his calls to embrace the
East. He parted with his teacher’s belief in a kingdom of Slavs as a way to defend
Russia’s distinctiveness and predicted that Russia would create a “neo-Byzantine”, rather
than a Slavonic, cultural type (Leontyev 1875). Russia’s global mission, Leontyev
believed, would be to draw on the moral force of Byzantine Orthodoxy and save Europe
from herself by “uniting the Chinese state model with Indian religiousness, and
subordinating European socialism to them” (Duncan 2000 42-43). At about the same time,
Russia’s prominent writers and philosophers, such as Fedor Dostoyevski, were also
reevaluating their original beliefs in Russia’s European destiny and arguing that “our
future lies in Asia. It is time to part with ungrateful Europe. Russians are as much Asians
as they are Europeans. The error of our recent policy was in attempting to convince
peoples of Europe that we are genuine Europeans” (Utkin 2000, 135). Russians, therefore,
turned to the East, but more as a result of their new hatred toward Europe than of
eagerness to learn from different civilizations.
The Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 did not end the civilizational debates.
Although liberal Westernizers could no longer be part of the official discourse, arguments
between those who wanted to “teach” Europe and those who wanted to build Russia’s
own distinct civilization continued. The former line was especially pronounced in the
Lenin-Trotski doctrine of world revolution which was based on the self-perception of
Soviet Russia as superior to the “decadent” and “rotten” western capitalist civilization
and justified a widespread external expansion. The latter, however, emphasized selfsufficiency and rebuilt many of familiar features of the old Russia, such as a strong
autocratic state and a state-dependent economy. They were assisted by the work of some
émigré intellectuals who, building on Danilevski and Leontyev’s ideas, developed the
notion of Russia as a principally non-European, “Eurasian” civilization (see especially
Eurasianism 1926).8 Indeed, over the decades of revolutionary transformations, the
The connection between Eurasianists and the official Soviet “Marxist” view is
far from obvious. For some work tracing the connection, see Hauner 1990; Zyuganov
1998.
8
7
Soviet system obtained qualities of a distinctive civilization (Kotkin 1990; Sinyavski
2001; Kara-Murza 2002). Yet, those who favored Russia’s strong cultural association
with Europe persisted and ultimately prevailed. As Russia grew more open to the outside
world in the post-Stalin period, it developed its own version of democratic socialism
culminating in Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ in relations with the West (English
2000). The leader of Perestroika was relying on ideas of Russia’s socialist distinctiveness
(Larson and Shevchenko 2003), while drawing on European social democratic ideas, as
well as American theories of trasnationalism and interdependence.
Soviet disintegration, while bringing about a fundamental change in Russia’s
discourse, preserved the core civilizational disagreements. Liberal Westernizers (Kozyrev
1995; Gaidar 1997; Trenin 2006) returned and argued for a “natural” affinity of their
country with the West based on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a
free market. The new leaders Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin’s vision of “integration”
and “strategic partnership with the West” assumed that Russia would develop liberal
democratic institutions and build a market economy after the manner of the West.
Westernizers were opposed by neo-Eurasianists (Panarin 1998; Zyuganov 1999; Dugin
2002), the group that traced its roots to Danilevski and the classical Eurasianist
movement of the 1920-1930s. Neo-Eurasianism viewed Russia as a land-based
civilization with strong ties in the former Soviet region, Asia, and the Muslim world, and
emphasized relative cultural and geopolitical independence, or “self-standing”
(samostoianiye in Russian). It is a concern with the stability of borders and the
accommodation of an ethnically diverse Euro-Asian periphery and the domestic
population, as well as the sometimes uncooperative stances of seemingly alien
Westerners, that lay at the heart of Eurasianist political philosophy and has given
Eurasianism a new life under the post-Soviet geopolitical situation.
Westernizers and Eurasianists represent polar opposites of Russia’s civilizational
identity. Spatially, they relate to the West and non-Western nations respectively. They
also offer radically different perspectives on Russia’s past. While Westernizers have a
tendency to be nihilistic about the national history, Eurasianists are prone to an
exaggerated sense of pride, even glorification of Russia’s past. Both currents also have a
tendency to display essentialist attitudes toward the Other: if Russia is with the West,
then it cannot be with the East, and vice versa. Between these two extremes are multiple
less essentialist perspectives that view civilization building as an interactive process
involving elements of learning from diverse cultural entities. One example of such a
perspective is the so-called “civilized Eurasianism” pioneered by the philosopher
Aleksandr Panarin in his early writings (1994, 1995).9 Other intellectuals and politicians
have developed civilizational visions with similar dualistic meanings. Thus,
parliamentarian Vladimir Lukin (1994) and presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich (1994)
argued that the market economy and political democracy should be viewed as compatible
with Russia’s distinct Eurasianist interests. The political consultant Gleb Pavlovski
(2004) coined another term —“Euro-East” which seeks to position Russia as culturally
European, yet poised to preserve a special influence in the former Soviet region.
[TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]
After 1996, Panarin’s views became closer to radical Eurasianists. See
especially, Panarin 2000, 2001.
9
8
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the discussed civilizational currents in Russia along the
axes of their identity and degree of essentialism.
.
4. The Self/Other in Russian Civilization Debates
This section offers a brief discussion of how Russian thinkers have analyzed
relationships with the Other. The cases are drawn from the Russian and post-Soviet eras–
to demonstrate complexity, as well as a learning curve, in civilizational discussions. In
the span of a hundred years, some Russian thinkers have abandoned the essentialist
“either West or East” discourse and learned to conduct a dialogue between two opposing
perspectives. In so doing, they have moved beyond ignoring or recognizing the Other
merely as a threat and toward viewing it in more inclusive terms.
4.1. Eurocentrism
With regard to viewing the Eastern Other, Russia’s nineteenth century discourse
was not principally different from that of western Europe. The lands toward the east of
Russia were viewed with a mixture of superiority and fear. The superiority attitude was
the predominant one, as both Westernizers and Slavophiles were engaged in sparing over
how Europe should be leading the rest of the world toward a better future. While
Westernizers put the emphasis on its “progressive” institutions, Slavophiles pointed to
Europe’s decline and argued that only Russia could offer genuine salvation for the world.
However, both currents viewed the non-Western nations as an object of modernization or
a source of threat either because of their “primitive” political institutions or because of
what Vladimir Solovyev referred to as an “inhumane God” (Duncan 2000, 44). The
challenge to this deeply ingrained Eurocentric worldview only came when Europe itself
began to crumble under pressures generated by a struggle of ideas. The liberal and
egalitarian ideas of the French revolution split the European continent into progressive
and anti-revolutionary camps. Divided against itself, Europe was increasingly viewed by
many Russians as morally weak. The defeat in the Crimean war added to the perception
of weakness and the view of Europe as politically hostile. The combined image of a
morally corrupt and politically hostile continent laid the groundwork for the emergence
of anti-European civilizational theories.
Danilevski was among first to turn to the East and away from Europe, and his
approach soon resonated with dominant attitudes in elite circles. His response to the
Eurocentric attitude, displayed by both Westernizers and Slavophiles, included several
key points. The most significant was the concept of “historico-cultural types,” which was
meant to undermine the linier view of progress. Anticipating the later theories of Oswald
Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, Danilevski distinquished ten types of civilization in the
past, of which Romano-Germanic of European was only one. “These types are not
evolutionary stages on the ladder of gradual perfectibility … but entirely different plans –
plans without any common denominator – in which each entity evolves in a specific and
distinct fashion toward the multiformity and perfection within its reach.” (Danilevski
1990: 8). Progress therefore was not unidirectional and universal. Danilevski (1990: 123)
proposed abandoning the concept “universal humanity” (obshchechelovechestvo) in favor
of the notion of “all-humanity” (vsechelovechestvo), by which he meant a richness of
cross-cultural interactions across the world. For Russia, this perspective did not mean the
need to “lead” Europe or “catch up” with it, as was emphasized by Westernizers and
9
Slavophiles, respectively. Russia could still create a new, eleventh cultural type – and it
might yet prove to be the most developed – but it would not owe anything to Europe. In
fact, Danilevski insisted on Russia being tough on Europe in defending its foreign policy
interests.
Leontyev, a student of Danilevski, went even further in parting with Russia’s
Eurocentrism. A former diplomat in Turkey, he abandoned Danilevski’s idea of creating
the Slav cultural type. “We should regard Pan-Slavism as something very dangerous if
not downright disastrous” (Walcki 1979, 304). Although he shared his teacher’s desire
for Russia to control Constantinopole, Leontyev saw such control as a platform for
creating an original Orthodox-Byzantine, rather than Slavonic, culture. His greater trust
in non-European cultures was expressed in his belief that Russia should ultimately save
Europe from itself by “uniting the Chinese state model with Indian religiousness and
subordinating European socialism to them” (Duncan 2000, 43). Leontyev, therefore,
showed himself to be even more hostile toward Europe and more receptive toward nonEuropean cultures than Danilevski. Of all nineteenth century philosophers, Leontyev
came the closest to the worldview of Vostochniki (“Easterners”), or those Russian
scholars who saw Russia’s mission as being in Asia, rather than in the Balkans and
Eastern Europe (Hauner 1990, 49).
Europeanists responded to writings of Danilevski and Leontyev by reiterating
their beliefs in Europe’s future and hailing the two thinkers’ projects as dangerous
utopias. Milyukov saw in Danilevski’s Russia and Europe an ideology of “hatred toward
Europe and a grand project - a Pan-Slav federation headed by Russia” (Novikova and
Sizemskaya 1997: 174). Solovyev (2000: 413) accused Danilevski of a desire to create a
Slav future on the ruins of European culture and he had a similarly harsh reaction to the
writing of Leontyev (Solovyev 2000: 418). Both Westernizers and Slavophiles showed
hardly any enlightenment regarding non-European cultures, and they refused to engage
Danilevski and Leontyev on this issue. The pro-European attitude toward the East
remained deeply ethnocentric, which was soon noted by their critics (Strakhov 1990).
Solovyev, for instance, demonstrated his deep fear of the Muslim East and later became
obsessed with the “yellow peril” (Duncan 2000: 44-45). His way of reconciling the East
with the West was through coercive power and the imposition of Russian values.
Although Danilevski and Leontyev were far from adopting the recognition-acceptance
attitude toward the East, by challenging the Eurocentric ideology they laid out important
preconditions for future movement in the identified direction.
4.2. Post-Soviet Eurasia
A different discursive development took place under post-Soviet conditions. The
dominance of pro-Western narratives, associated with Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris
Yeltsin, was soon met with a formidable opposition, which advanced a different
civilizational identity for Russia. Initiated by presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich and
then the Chief of Foreign Intelligence, Yevgeni Primakov, this perspective advocated the
notion of Russia as a distinctly Eurasianist power. Although the Eurasia debate is far
from over, it has already revealed the full spectrum of Russian attitudes toward the Other.
Westernizers – not unlike the Europeanists a century ago – have demonstrated the
attitude of hegemony or non recognition toward the non-Western Other and an attitude of
dependence toward the Western Other. According to this school, Russia is an organic part
10
of Western civilization, whose “genuine” identity was hijacked by the Bolsheviks and the
Soviet system. During the Cold War Russia had acted against its own national identity
and interests, and now it finally has an opportunity to become a “normal” western
country. Thus, Andrei Kozyrev (1995 16) argued that the Soviet Union was not merely a
“normal” or merely “underdeveloped,” but a “wrongfully developed” country. Russia is
now to correct this distortion by accepting the priority of the individual and the free
market over society and the state in order to develop what he referred to as a “natural
partnership” with western countries (Kozyrev 1992). By ignoring historically specific
aspects of Russia’s development and challenges of interaction with both East and West,
this vision sought to sidestep the question of Russia’s civilizational Other. It was a clear
product of a long tradition of linear Westernist thinking. Such eminent 19th century
historians, as Vasili Klyuchevski and Pavel Milyukov, saw Russia’s national
characteristics, but insisted – not unlike the west-centered modernization school – that
their country would nevertheless develop in the same direction as the West and go
through the same stages of development.
Many neo-Eurasianists, on the other hand, revealed the recognition-threat attitude
toward western nations. Much like Samuel Huntington (1996) in his “clash of
civilizations” thesis, Eurasianists concluded that the world represents a struggle for
identity and domination among culturally alien units. In this world, the main threat to
Russia’s identity and status comes from the Atlanticism or “trade civilization,” associated
especially with the United States. Some neo-Eurasianists (Dugin 2002) advocate constant
accumulation of power by way of territorial expansion as the only appropriate behavior.
In this struggle for power against the “trade civilization”, they want to pit Europe against
the United States and eventually build a larger geopolitical axis of allies—such as
Germany, Iran, and Japan—in order to resist Atlanticist influences. Other neoEurasianists (Zyuganov 1999) advocate the restoration of the “union” within the former
Soviet borders and interpret empires as independent civilizations that are relatively selfsufficient and geopolitically stable, not constantly expanding units. The two groups are in
agreement, however, about the perceived threat from the West and want to build closer
relationships with China, India, and the Muslim world in response to this threat. Much
like Danilevski and the earlier Eurasianists, neo-Eurasianists are mainly concerned about
containing European cultural influences. As this group’s guru wrote (Gumilev 1990),
Europe represents an alien Supraethnic group and can never be mixed with Russia.
This battle of the two civilizational essentialisms, Western and Eurasinist, is far
from the only discoursive development in Russia. A powerful intellectual tradition,
Eurasianism has been adopted and considerably modified by scholars and politicians
uncomfortable with the zero sum civilizational dichotomy. Politically, the move was
supported by Russia’s second foreign minister Yevgeni Primakov and therefore – at least
by default – by President Yeltsin who appointed Primakov.
One influential spokesman of the moderate Eurasianism in policy circles was
Presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich. Stankevich (1992) took issue with Kozyrev since
his first attempt to systematically formulate Russia’s national interests at the Foreign
Ministry conference “The Transformed Russia in the New World” in February 1992, and
since then, Stankevich (1992) has sought to promote the vision of Russia as a cultural
bridge between Europe and Asia insisting, for example, on defending the rights of ethnic
Russians in the former Soviet republics and reactivating special relations with Muslim
11
countries. In arguing the notion of Russia’s special “civilizational status,” Stankevich and
those who shared this perspective (Panarin 1995) have been critical of many of the
West’s characteristics, such as individualism and consumerism, and do not view western
civilization as universal. Yet, they have also fought against Neo-Eurasianist attempts to
present Russia as culturally superior, insisting on learning from the West skills of free
enterprise and political liberty. The more dialectical perspective was reflected in official
documents. For example, the country’s National Security Concept of 1997 described
Russia as an “influential European and Asian power” and recommended that Russia
maintain equal relations with “global European and Asian economic and political
actors.”10
More recently, Russians have developed yet another version of a cross-cultural
dialogue. President Putin embraced the earlier articulated vision of Russia as a part of the
West insisting that Russia “was, is and will, of course, be a major European power”
(Putin 2005). Putin is clear, however, that while moving in the same direction of freedom
and democracy as Europeans, Russia does so at its own pace given its own conditions and
special ties with non-European nations.11 Putin’s supporters have interpreted his vision
using the idea of “Euro-Eastern” civilization, which should be differentiated from the
previously discussed “West” and “Eurasia” (Tsygankov 2007). They have articulated
three components of the new civilizational idea. First, the countries of the Euro-East,
such as Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, share with Europe values of a market economy
and a growing middle class. Second, because of their preoccupation with domestic
economic and social modernization, the Euro-Eastern area is in special need of
maintaining political stability. Finally, domestic transformation of the Euro-Eastern
nations requires preservation of political sovereignty and defense from attempts by
outsiders to exploit the internal resources of the nations of the region.
The Eurasia debate has demonstrated that, despite the prominence of essentialist
perspectives on relating to the Western Other, Russians have been moving in a number of
different directions. This movement is far from homogeneous, yet it shows that many
Russians refuse to reflect on their identity in essentialist categories and see the challenge
of identity construction as bridging separate elements from East and West, rather than
chosing between them. This growing attitude of recognition-acceptance reflects realities
of a rapidly changing world of globalization, in which culturally ethnocentric
perspectives, such as Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” or Huntington’s “clash of
civilizations”, cannot serve as reliable guides. Increasingly, understanding of this
compexity finds its expression in a pluralistic IR scholarship emerging in post-Soviet
Russia. If anything, Russian theory of international relations today is arguably more open
to dialogue with the outside world than that of Western nations. Intellectual paroichialism
and isolationism, widespread in the Soviet era, are now fighting a marginal battle, and
10
National Security Concepts and Foreign Policy Concepts are available in:
Shakleyina 2002 Vol. 4, 51-90, 110-111.
11
On a number of occasions, Putin has referred to Russia as a country of
“Eurasian” identity, and he has further developed ties with nations outside the West. In
the mind of many Russian politicians, “European” and “Eurasian” are not in opposition to
one another.
12
mainstream IR scholars can no longer imagine their development without a dialogue with
their foreign colleagues (Lebedeva 2004; Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2004).
5. Conclusion
For scholars of International Relations – a discipline commonly viewed as
excessively Western and America-centric – reviewing Russian debates on relating to
different Others is important. Geographically positioned between Europe and Asia,
Russia has been involved in intense cross-national interactions and has produced a rich
civilizational discourse. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Russian thinkers
were intellectually dependent on Europe, and they gave little recognition to the Eastern
Other. The situation began to change with Russia’s defeat in the Crimean war and the
resulting growing perception that Europe was no longer interested in giving Russia its
due recognition. Danilevski and Leontyev’s writings marked the end of Russia’s
intellectual Eurocentrism and – through formulation of theories of “historico-cultural
types” and “Byzantian roots” – prepared the ground for a more complex civilizational
engagement with Europe and non-European nations. The more recent Eurasia debate
revealed, along with highly essentialist attitudes toward the Western Other, a number of
efforts to develop a dialogue among different cultures and civilizations. Overall, despite
the prominence of essentialism in Russian civilizational discourse, one can register
intellectual progress in moving from not recognizing the Other to recognizing and
accepting it.
Table 3 summarizes Russia’s civilizational debates.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
As scholars of international relations develop an awareness of the cultural and
civilizational assumptions behind their research, it is important to study various roles
played by these assumptions, as well as ways in which one can move beyond the
Self/Other dichotomy in empirical research and policy recommendations. This, of course,
cannot happen without full realization that scholarship has profound ethical implications,
and that the scholar is involved in the production of values, as much as empirical
knowledge. Avoiding engaging in ethical reasoning is impossible, so long as we continue
to live in a multicultural world, in which there are multiple Others and multiple moral
contexts. Much more is required for moving away from what remains “an American
social science” (Hoffmann 1977) and toward a genuinely global discipline that is able to
accept the vital significance of the Other in the production of knowledge. Global theory
of international relations is cosmopolitan and culturally diverse at the same time, and it is
a process, in which bottom-up developments and influences are as valuable as those that
look at the world from the top-down.
13
Table 1. Russian Civilizational Currents: West Versus Non-West
Europe/West
Conservative Westernizers
Liberal Westernizers
Non-West
Slavophiles
Socialist expansionists
Democratic socialists
Civilized Eurasianists
Late Slavophiles
Easterners
Eurasianists
Socialist isolationists
Neo-Eurasianists
Table 2. Russian Civilizational Currents: Degree of Essentialism
More Essentialist
Less Essentialist
Pre-Soviet
Westernizers
Slavophiles
Easterners
Soviet
Socialist expansionists
Socialist isolationists
Democratic Socialists
Pre-Soviet
Liberal Westernizers
Neo-Eurasianists
Civilized Eurasianists
Euro-Easterners
14
Table 3. Russia’s Civilizational Debates:
Recognition of the Other and Representative Authors
No recognition
Recognition-threat
Eurocentrism
Milyukov
Solovyev
Danilevski
Leontyev
Eurasia
Kozyrev
Zyuganov
Recognition-acceptance
Stankevich
15
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