Compare how the supply and the scarcity of natural resources
influences the conduct of contemporary conflict.
Robin Solomon (rs342), IR5001, November 2005
Word count:
Summary
This essay examines the role that the natural resource of oil, both its abundance and
scarcity, has on contemporary conflict. Conflict for the purposes of the discussion is
broadly defined to include violent and non-violent interactions, involving states and
non-state organizations. The major theories informing the study of natural resources
and conflict are reviewed and their findings with respect to oil are cross-examined.
An overview is provided of the unique characteristics that shape oil related conflicts.
Finally, the current geopolitical environment surrounding oil dependence is analyzed;
with an emphasis on non-violent conflicts emerging from competition for scarce oil
resources that could in the next decade become violent.
Contemporary conflict and security within the natural resource context
The bi-polar balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has yielded to a
multi-polar environment where asymmetrical conflicts are more likely to arise. The
black and white picture of conflict in the Cold War, in which enemies were clearly
defined, is now largely grey and arguably has left “the overall state of current conflict
typology in a state of confusion”1 and has ushered in a “new world disorder.”2
Conflicts are still driven by differences in ideology but are increasingly characterized
by a more complex set of underlying causes including but not limited to: ethnicity,
culture, religion, and nationalist/separatist ideology. 3
War is typically defined as military engagement conducted between states involving
greater than 1,000 casualties.4 Conflict, however, can be inter or intrastate, high or
low intensity5 and may or may not involve the military. Conflict can be violent but
can also be based solely on discordant dialogue. As articulated in the book,
Contemporary Conflict Resolution, there is not a simple definition.6 While conflicts
involving oil may have originated long before the break-up of the Soviet Union, the
conflict dynamics examined in this essay are largely related to the post-Cold War
period. The author considers that conflict can be intra and/or interstate, involve nonstate players, can be violent and/or have the potential to become violent. However,
conflict also can be non-violent and be predominately viewed as geopolitical
posturing through a state’s projection of military force capabilities, formation of
1
Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The
prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p.
29.
2
Hampson, Fen Osler, and David Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention, (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 28.
3
Rupesinghe, Kumar (ed.), Conflict Transformation, (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 1995), p. 66.
4
Sambanis, Nicholas, “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational
Definition”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 48, No. 6 (December 2004), p. 815.
5
Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, ?, p. 27.
6
Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, ?, p. 66.
geostrategic alliances and rhetoric. Throughout this essay, the term supply is used
interchangeably with abundance and scarcity is often referred to in terms of resource
dependence.
The break-up of the Soviet Union has led to constantly changing political, economic
and social environments where globalization and economic development play an
increasingly important role in shaping conflict dynamics, including onset, duration
and resolution. The landscape of contemporary conflict is distinguished by some of
the following elements (illustrative):
 Access to information and communication technologies;
 Globalization of economies (i.e. increased interdependence and ease of
transnational shipments of commodities);
 Availability of sophisticated military technology and hardware;
 Sophistication of international financial networks;
In the past, states primarily had access to military and civilian technologies. In
contemporary conflicts, however, especially civil wars in oil rich countries, both rebel
groups and governments can access sophisticated financial, military, information and
transportation networks.
Two fields of security studies, environmental and economic, have become associated
with natural resources and conflict. The security lexicon and the environmental
lexicons are very different and as Lorraine Elliott notes in The Global Politics of the
Environment, one “can’t just militarize environmental politics or demilitarize security
thinking.”7 While both elements of security studies are vital to addressing post-Cold
war natural resource conflicts, 8/9 the economic security field has developed a more
dynamic body of research on oil. This body of research has examined how the need
for secure supplies of oil shape security strategies and elements of conflict of oil
dependent states, and has undertaken in-depth research on conflict in states that have
an abundance of oil.
The U.S. ‘securitization’ of oil began in 1980, after the oil crises of the 1970’s and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. U.S. President Jimmy Carter decided oil was a
strategic resource vital to U.S. security. In what has become referred to as ‘The
Carter Doctrine,’ he asserted “Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United
States of America…[and] will be repelled by any means necessary, including military
force.”10 President Carter laid the foundations for the development of a significant
U.S. military infrastructure in the Persian Gulf to address potential and actual conflict
in the region. 11 By linking the supply of oil to national security, the dynamics of
conflict around oil changed. The Carter Doctrine made it possible for the U.S. to go
7
Elliott, Lorraine, The Global Politics of the Environment, (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1998), p.
220, 221 & 240.
8
Matthew, Richard, “In Defense of Environment and Security Research”, U.S. National Intelligence
Council, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 2002, p. 1.
9
Elliott, The Global Politics of the Environment, p. 238.
10
Klare, Michael, Resource Wars: The new landscape of global conflict, (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2002), p. 4.
11
Klare, Resource Wars, p. 61.
beyond traditional diplomacy by justifying pre-emptive strikes and implementation of
defensive military measures.
The conflict landscape linked to oil dependence by industrialized states is extremely
complicated. Primarily non-violent conflict dynamics are constantly evolving
amongst powerful nations as they vie for control over scarce oil resources critical to
their economic survival. The recognition of the need to secure energy supplies from
areas characterized by conflict is evident in the U.S. National Energy Policy (NEP),
published in May 2001. The NEP acknowledges that the Persian Gulf will “remain
vital to U.S. interests” and emphasizes the importance of the “Western Hemisphere,
Africa and the Caspian” to help meet increased U.S. oil demand.12 The U.S. is not
alone in acknowledging the link between oil dependence and security. The European
Union, United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have embraced
environmental security, including natural resources, as a strategic concept.13/14
Major Theories on the Role of Supply and Scarcity in Natural Resource
Conflicts
There is a substantial body of evidence “that resources and civil wars are causally
linked.”15 Different scholarly schools of thought have different ways of examining
the causal relationship between natural resources and conflict. In order to understand
the relationship of oil and conflict, it is critical to examine the primary theories
informing the debate on the causal links; typically referred to as ‘greed versus
grievance’ and a further school of thought ‘beyond greed and grievance’.
Grievance
Academics and policy specialists from one school of thought argue resource scarcity
drives conflict through grievance; resource scarcity can cause citizens to grow
disillusioned with state leaders, this disillusionment can turn into grievance which in
turn can lead to violent conflict. Thomas Homer-Dixon, the “Toronto School,” and
Robert Kaplan16 are recognized leaders in the field of grievance studies. While often
a source of conflict, resource scarcity argues Homer-Dixon can sometimes be turned
into a benefit for the state by promoting: innovation (alternative energy), government
accountability (taxation required instead of money from sales of resources), and
investment in human capital. (SOURCE) According to the grievance school of
thought, “scarcities of renewable resources do produce conflict and instability.
However…the mechanisms by which this happens are complex and environmental
scarcity essentially produces conflict by generating social effects, such as poverty and
migrations.”
There are limitations with Homer-Dixon and the grievance school’s approach,
however, when examining the dynamics of oil and conflict. Grievance studies have
National Energy Policy, “Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group”, Washington,
May 2001, Chapter 8, p. 3 & 4.
13
Elliott, ?, p. 230.
14
“Environmental Security: United Nations Doctrine for Managing Environmental Issues in Military
Actions”, AC/UNU Millennium Project, 2003 (http://www.acunu.org/millennium/es-un-execsum.html
- accessed on November 20, 2005).
15
Ballentine, Karen and Jake Sherman, (eds.), The political economy of armed conflict: beyond greed
and grievance, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 48.
16
Nevins, Joseph, “Resource Conflicts in a New World Order”, Geopolitics, Volume 9, No. 1, (Spring
2004), p. 258.
12
largely been based on the assumption that non-renewable natural resources are in
oversupply and therefore do not influence conflict.17 They have focused primarily on
developing countries in the southern hemisphere, where conflicts tend to be intrastate
and violent, and thus there is limited grievance research on interstate wars such as the
Iraq-Kuwait War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003). By focusing on scarcity in
developing countries, this school pays less attention to resource dependence in the
industrialized world, and its potential to influence conflict, especially non-violent.
Finally, the notion that there is an oversupply of oil is inaccurate (see pages 14-16).
Greed
The field of political ecology18 has emerged to examine the role of natural resource
abundance rather than scarcity in conflict. Political ecologists generally argue
abundance (greed), not scarcity (grievance), is the main cause of natural resource
conflict. Conflict theory related to natural resource abundance is also referred to as
the ‘paradox of plenty’ or the ‘resource curse’.19 Paul Collier and from the World
Bank, and Philippe Le Billon from Oxford University, are widely credited with
developing what has come to be termed the study of ‘political ecology’.
The research undertaken by political ecologists indicates resource rich countries are
20% more likely to go to war than countries that have a scarcity of resources.20/21 In
the case of resource abundance, governments obtain ‘rents’22 from natural resources
such as oil and the negative consequences on governance and societies can be
tremendous. “Through a ‘renter’ effect, governments can rely on fiscal transfers from
resource rents, rather than statecraft, to sustain their regime. Rents from oil are
considered “differentially important in conflict risk.”23 The income generated from
oil exports can create an enmeshed network between governments, private companies
and in some cases even guerrilla organizations as well as promotes a system of
patronage and even in some cases prolong conflict. 24/25
Philipe Le Billon in his Adelphi Paper, “Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed
Conflict”, assesses conflicts in accordance with a matrix based on resource
characteristics. Le Billon asserts “the specific characteristics of a resource, its
location and its mode of exploitation can affect the balance of power between
belligerents.”26 He examines the prevalence of different types of conflict (i.e. state
control/coup d’etat, secession, peasant/mass rebellion and warlordism) through the
prism of two sets of resource characteristics: geography - whether the resource is
proximate (i.e. easier for governments to control) or distant (i.e. remote locations near
17
Nevins, Joseph, full text.
Peters, p. 190 & 191.
19
Le Billon, Philipe and Fouad El Khatib, “From Free Oil to ‘Freedom Oil’: Terrorism, War and U.S.
Geopolitics in the Persian Gulf”, Geopolitics, Volume 9, No. 1 (Spring 2004), p. 111.
20
IR5007 lecture on natural resources, Dr. Taylor, November ?, 2005.
21
Auty, Richard, “Natural Resources and Civil Strife: A Two-Stage Process”, Geopolitics, (January 20,
2004), p. 29.
22
Collier and Hoeffler, Resource Rents, p. 7.
23
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler, Resource rents, p. 7.
24
“Resources can induce patronage politics”, Collier and Hoeffler, Resource Rents, p. 14.
25
“There is a new reason for policy concern over the risk from primary commodities [oil]: they
generate the worst sort of civil wars”, Collier and Hoeffler, Resource Rents, p. 4
26
Le Billon, Philippe, Fuelling War: Natural resources and armed conflict, Adelphi Paper 373,
(Abingdon: Routledge, March 2005), p 31.
18
porous borders); and exploitation characteristics - diffuse (i.e. across broad swaths of
land such as crops, timber or gems) or point (i.e. located in single locations such as oil
and gas). Le Billon characterizes oil as a point resource that can be both proximate
and distant. His study of specific oil conflicts leads him to conclude they typically
involve governments. Examples of violence related to state control of oil include:
Congo-Brazzaville, Colombia, Iraq-Kuwait, and Yemen. Conflicts resulting from
secessionist movements include: Angola, Chechnya, Nigeria and Sudan.
One of the best known and most widely quoted statistical models created to study the
role of natural resources in conflict was developed in 2003 by Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler for The World Bank. Their economic model of civil war based on
quantitative empirical analysis considers a range of issues: initiation, duration,
repetition, costs, and post-conflict recovery. 27 Of the multiple factors examined,
three had the most statistical relevance: level of income per capita, rate of economic
growth and structure of the economy, namely dependence on primary commodity
exports.28 Specifically regarding vulnerability to conflict, Collier and Hoeffler
reached the conclusion that resource abundance creates four conditions, which can
sow the seeds for civil strife. These include economic growth collapse, low
educational attainment, a large cohort of unemployed young males and high resource
dependence.29
Collier, Hoeffler and another member of their team, Ian Bannon, undertook statistical
research specifically examining the effect of oil on conflict.30 In developing countries
where natural resource revenues account for more than 50% of gross domestic
product (GDP), they determined the risk of secessionist war increases by
approximately 38%. If a country has oil the risk increases to 100%.
(SOURCE/PAGE) Collier’s (et-al) research has led him to conclude, “if oil is present
a rebellion it is almost certain to be secessionist.”31 The oil related conflicts noted by
Collier (et-al) include: Aceh (Indonesia), Biafra (Nigeria), Cabinda (Angola), Katanga
(ex-Congo) and West Papua (Indonesia). In these cases, greed and grievance are
interconnected; state leaders are motivated to maintain control of oil and generally
have not distributed wealth amongst their constituents. The lack of wealth sharing has
given rise to grievance and rebel secessionist groups have emerged. The rebel groups,
however, also become trapped in the greed cycle of conflict. Through extortion of
companies exploiting oil and theft from illegally tapping into pipelines, the rebel
groups often receive important financing for their guerrilla campaigns.32 In this case
both greed and grievance are literally fuelling conflict. The main weakness with
Collier’s (et-al) research is that it focuses exclusively on violent intrastate wars and
does not capture interstate or non-violent conflict dynamics in its economic modelling.
27
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler, 2003 in World Bank Natural Resources and Violent Conflict, p. 2.
Bannon, Ian and Paul Collier, (eds.), “Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions”,
The World Bank, 2003, p. 2.
29
Auty, Richard, “Natural Resources and Civil Strife: A Two-Stage Process”, Geopolitics, (January 20,
2004), p. 46.
30
Bannon, Ian and Paul Collier, (eds.), “Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions”,
The World Bank, 2003.
31
Collier and Hoeffler, Resource Rents, p. 10.
32
Collier, Bannon, p. 5. (MORE?)
28
Beyond Greed and Grievance
A third school of study has emerged to examine the relationship between natural
resources and conflict and the body of research is generally published under the rubric
‘beyond greed and grievance’.33 Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman have undertaken
some of the most in-depth statistical analysis in this area. They argue there is a “Need
to weigh economic factors vis-à-vis the role played by other political, cultural, and
strategic factors in shaping the incidence, duration, and character of intrastate
conflict.”34
Ballentine and Sherman developed seven hypotheses on resources and conflict – two
of which are directly related to oil: “the more unlootable a resource is [i.e. Le Billon –
point] the more likely it will lead to separatist conflicts; the more a resource is
obstructable [i.e. Le Billon – distant] the more likely there is for an increase in the
duration and intensity of conflicts.”35 They study eight separatist conflicts, of which
five have unlootable resources and two involve oil: Angola (Cabinda) and Sudan.
They identified two oil related conflicts in which obstructability played a key role:
Sudan and Columbia. They also researched financial flows and found that out of the
eight cases, “revenues went exclusively to the government in four cases and to both
sides [rebels/government] in four cases.” 36 In both Columbia and Sudan, the
obstructable nature of their land-locked oil resources influenced conflict because both
sides received revenues.37 Regarding oil, one can draw the conclusion from
Ballentine and Sherman’s research that where oil is abundant there is a higher
likelihood of secessionist conflict. If obstructable (i.e. primarily in the ground in
remote locations), oil has a high potential to be a source of both grievance and greed
for secessionist groups.
Michael Klare is a well-known author on the subject of natural resources and conflict.
His research and writing could arguably be classified as belonging to the ‘beyond
greed and grievance’ school of thought. Klare’s work emphasizes the role of natural
resource dependence, beyond the rigid understanding of scarcity, in shaping
contemporary conflict, both inter and intrastate. Klare also studies grievance
motivated conflicts, especially involving ‘lootable’38 natural resources such as
diamonds and timber. In his book Resource Wars, Klare outlines three factors he
believes distinguish contemporary resource conflicts: “relentless expansion in
worldwide demand, the emergence of significant resource shortages and the
proliferation of ownership contests.”39 Just as there is a paradox within the greed
paradigm, whereby not just governments but secessionist leaders can become
dependent on financing from oil, many of the oil conflict examples used by Klare
point out the paradox of oil dependence; on the one hand it makes a nation’s economy
strong, but on the other it leaves the nation vulnerable. Klare argues this dichotomy
between strength and vulnerability greatly influences conflict around oil and will
33
Le Billon, Philippe, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict, Adelphi Paper 373,
(Abingdon: Routledge, March 2005), p. 8.
34
Ballentine, Karen and Jake Sherman, (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond
Greed and Grievance, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 5.
35
Ballentine and Sherman, p. 54-55.
36
Ballentine and Sherman, p. 57.
37
Ballentine and Sherman, p. 57.
38
Klare, Michael, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 2002), p. 23.p. 13.
39
Klare, Resource Wars, p. 23.
cause there to be more conflicts driven by dependence and scarcity in the future,
rather than greed.40
While Homer-Dixon, Le Billon, Collier and Klare may not agree on many issues,
there is one common characteristic of oil and conflict they do agree upon: the fact that
the availability of oil does not in and of itself cause conflict but rather is part of a
more complex set of variables that can predispose a state or region to conflict.41
While there may be as wide a variety of opinions on the links between natural
resources and conflict, most international relations specialists agree, “conflict over
resources will remain a conspicuous feature of the international security
environment.”42
Specific Examples of Oil Abundance Conflicts
In cross-referencing the research by Le Billon, Collier (et-al), Ballentine/Sherman and
Klare, some common conflicts related to oil abundance emerge:43
 Where oil resources are point or unlootable (i.e. offshore or close to urban
centres) conflict is likely to take the form of challenge to state control through
a coup d’etat: Algeria, Angola, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Iraq-Iran, and IraqKuwait;
 Where oil resources are distant or obstructable (i.e. inland and require
transportation to ports via a pipeline network) conflict is likely to be
secessionist in nature: Angola (Cabinda), Caucasus, Nigeria (Biafra), Sudan,
and Columbia.
In addition to the above variables, the type of oil produced by a country can play a
role in greed motivated conflict through the potential to obtain higher resource rents.
Light, sweet crude oil of low sulphur content is the most valuable type of petroleum
because it is most easily refined. Countries such as Nigeria and Angola have sweeter,
lighter crude which might make them more prone to conflict that countries such as
Venezuela or Saudi Arabia that tend to have heavier, sour oil. 44 In Nigeria, in
particular, the high resource rents from its high quality oil have been considered an
element in prolonging the violent conflict between rebel and government forces.
Nigeria produces approximately 2.3 million barrels of oil per day and the violent
secessionist conflict that developed in the River States of the Niger Delta, where a
large part of the country’s oil resources are located, is extremely complex.45 The
secessionist civil war in Nigeria has its origins in the grievances of the local
population but the secessionist groups were able to obtain financing through a variety
of illegal means, including extortion, kidnapping and sabotage and/or seizure of oil
facilities; 46 “Secessionist movements or efforts to oust a government start with
40
Klare, Blood and Oil, p. 11. (FIRST?)
Bannon, Ian and Paul Collier, (eds.), “Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions”,
The World Bank, 2003, p. ix.
42
Klare, Blood and Oil, p. xiii.
43
Le Billon, Political Ecology of War, p. 573.
44
British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2005 (www.bp.com/statisticalreview), p. 12.
45
OPEC Production - Table 3a, EIA, November 2005. (MORE?)
46
“World Energy Hotspots”, September 2005, p. 7.
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Energy_Hotspots/Overview.html - accessed on October 31,
2005).
41
certain ideals but turn into opportunistic endeavours to gain wealth and power.”47
Since much of the Niger Delta’s oil passes through pipeline systems (obstructable) it’s
an easy target for sabotage; between January 2004 and September 2004, there were
581 cases of pipeline vandalism reported.48 The profit’s from large-scale sealing from
oil pipelines in the Delta region are reported to be approximately $1 billion per year,
with sales primarily to East Asia.49 The Nigerian state’s response has been
characterized by the use of force.50 The greed and grievance paradigm in Nigeria has
all the hallmarks of conflict in a developing country as outlined on page 7.
Sudan produces 301,000 million barrels a day of oil and oil accounts for more than
80% of the Nigerian Federal Government’s revenue.51 Oil abundance in Sudan
provides an excellent example of how greed and grievance shape conflict where civil
war was waged for 19 years and has cost 2 million lives.52 The separatist organization,
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), is based in southern Sudan (upper Nile
region) where there are significant oil reserves. Initially, the SPLA used guerrilla
tactics to forward their cause. They targeted oil companies operating in the region
through extortion, kidnapping and infrastructure sabotage and the money financed
their operations. While the conflict has been on and off again over the 19 year period,
the Sudanese government led a renewed military campaign against the rebels in 1999
in order to gain control of the oil fields in the south. “The government used summary
executions, rape, ground attacks, helicopter gunships, and high-altitude bombings to
force tens of thousands of people from their homes in the oil region.”53 The Sudanese
government became heavily reliant on resource rents and was largely motivated by
greed to increase these rents thus moving to use military force to re-gain control of
the south.54 While a cease-fire agreement was reached in January 2005, there are still
thousands of Sudanese refugees living in Ethiopia and the relationship between
government and rebel forces has been termed “a cold peace.”55
As the above examples demonstrate, greed and grievance can shape conflict in two
very distinct ways. An abundance of natural resources can lead to the emergence of
separatist conflicts motivated by grievance. Secessionists claim ownership of the
resources based on ethnic or tribal rights but also claim that national authorities
misuse the resource rents. While secessionist groups can emerge with legitimate
aspirations to create an independent state where resource wealth is equally shared,
what often happens is rebels find a way to benefit from the resource wealth
themselves and their motivations transform from grievance to greed; profit taking
replaces separatist ideology. This dynamic can especially be seen in conflicts where
Weinstein, Jeremy, “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment”, Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Volume 49, No. 4 (2005).
48
World Energy Hotpots, U.S. Energy Information Administration, p. 7. (MORE?)
49
Collier and Hoeffler, Resource Rents, p. 14.
50
Florquin, Nicolas, and Eric G. Berman, “Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns and Human
Security in the ECOWAS Region”, A Small Arms Survey Publication, April 26, 2004, p. 27.
51
Booker, Salih and William Minter, “The U.S. and Nigeria: thinking beyond oil”, USA-Africa
Institute, Volume 1, Issue 4 (Winter 2003), p. 27.
52
“Dialogue or Destruction? Organising for Peace as the War in Sudan Escalates”, International Crisis
Group, Africa Report Number 48 (June 27, 2002), p. 1.
53
Ballentine and Sherman, p. 62-63.
54
“Africa Policy Outlook 2001”, Africa Policy Information Center, January 2001.
55
“South Sudanese bemoan lack of peace”, Reuters, November 21, 2005,
(www.today.reuters.com/news - accessed on November 22, 2005).
47
oil is located in the interior of a country. Resource abundance can also lead
governments to engage in violent conflict to gain or maintain control over resource
rents. Dictatorial and authoritarian regimes that are plagued by corruption often
become reliant on the benefits that come with lucrative oil revenues and “spoil
politics takes over.”56
Characteristics of Oil Scarcity and Dependence in Contemporary Conflict
Within the study of political ecology, few researchers have focused on oil scarcity and
its links to conflict, with Michael Klare a notable exception. While oil “fuels military
power, national treasuries, and international politics”57 it happens to be located
predominately in regions and states vulnerable to conflict. There is currently more
evidence pointing to resource abundance driving conflict, but over the long term there
are signs that dependence and increasing resource scarcity could become more
prevalent in conflicts.
Three elements distinguish contemporary conflict linked to the scarcity of and
dependence on oil: oil’s physical characteristics; violent inter-state conflicts involving
military intervention; large number of non-violent geo-strategic manoeuvring between
states aiming to gain exclusive access to long-term oil supplies, which have the
potential to lead to violent conflict.
Characteristics of Oil – Conflict Vulnerability
Le Billon, Collier and Ballentine/Sherman characterize oil as a non-renewable, point
resource that is often obstructable. While these characteristics make the resource
vulnerable in countries where oil is abundant, they also influence the scarcity side of
the equation where there is constant tension between supply and demand.
With global economic expansion comes increasing oil consumption. “While there is
much debate with regard to supply, there does not seem to be any disagreement that
demand will increase significantly in the coming decades.”58 Oil consumption during
2004 increased to 80.75 million barrels per day (MBD), which represented a 3.4%
increase from 2003 and was the largest increase in terms of volume since 1976.59
Global oil production in 2004 was 80.26 MBD. (?SOURCE) While production has
largely kept up with demand, there is a lack of excess production capacity, which
plays into the scarcity equation. Out of the OPEC’s 11 producing nations, only three
are not producing at capacity.60
In addition to basic supply/demand dynamics, there are other oil industry factors
influencing scarcity concerns:
 The means to transport oil (pipelines/maritime routes) are vulnerable targets
for nationalist/separatist groups or terrorist organizations. Over 40 million
barrels of oil per day are moved by tanker,61 and over 85% of oil from the
56
Le Billon, The political ecology of war, p. 568.
Klare, Michael, Blood and Oil, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), p. 9.
58
Peters, Susanne, “Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies: ‘Resource Wars’ as a New Threat to
Global Security”, Geopolitics, Volume 91 (January 20, 2004), p. 192.
59
BP Statistical Review 2005, p. 2 and 9.
60
U.S. Energy Information Agency, Table 3a. OPEC Oil Production, October 2005
(www.eia.gov/emmeu/steo/pub/3atab.html - accessed on November 3, 2005).
61
Country Analysis Brief, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints”, Energy Information Administration,
November 2005.
57


Persian Gulf transits the Straits of Hormuz.62 There are a further eight
‘chokepoints’ around the world that are considered vulnerable to conflict.63
Pipeline capacity is also an issue with most major pipelines operating at full or
near full capacity. As demonstrated in the case of Nigeria, pipelines are
extremely vulnerable targets in conflict. Russia’s Friendship Pipeline
accounts for approximately 42% of Russian oil and gas exports to the
European market64; “The vulnerabilities of Russia’s energy-export corridors
are a source of significant concern,”65 especially to the EU. 66 Vital Russian
pipelines cross conflict ridden regions in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan where nationalist
groups operate. Russia’s ongoing conflict with Chechen separatists is also
cause for concern. Furthermore, new pipeline routes tend to be in conflict
zones. For instance the construction of a proposed pipeline route between
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan has been delayed for many years due to
conflict.67
Shortages of oil tankers, drilling rigs and refining capacity all impact supply.
Between 2003 and 2004, global refining capacity decreased in spite of
increased petroleum product output.68
Over the long-term, scarcity fears are driven by a perception that depletion of proven
reserves is taking place more rapidly than new reserves are being discovered,
explored and brought on-line and thus demand will eventually exceed supply.
Exactly when the balance will shift is the subject of heated debate amongst global oil
experts. The British Petroleum 2005 Statistical Review for Energy indicates a less
than 40-year supply of fossil fuel at current rates of consumption and current levels of
new reserves coming on-line.69 In his recently published book, Twilight in the Desert:
The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy, oil industry expert Matthew
Simmons has brought the issue of ‘peak oil’ into the spotlight. ‘Peak oil’ refers to the
debate about whether global oil output has already reached its maximum potential.70
Simmons and other energy industry experts who share the ‘peak oil’ view, do not
believe efficiency measures or improved technology will substantially impact
62
Le Billon and El Khatib, p. 115.
Country Analysis Brief, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints”, Energy Information Administration,
November 2005.
64
BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005 (PAGE?).
65
Le Billon and El Khatib, p. 124.
66
Peters, Susanne, “Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies: ‘Resource Wars’ as a New Threat to
Global Security”, Geopolitics, Volume 91 (January 20, 2004), p. 206.
67
Hill, Fiona and Regine Spector, “The Caspian Basin and Asian Energy Markets”, The Brookings
Institution, No. 8 Conference Report, September 2001, p. 3.
68
BP Statistical Review 2005, p. 16.
69
BP Statistical Review 2005, p. 40
70
“It is still to early [to predict peak oil] but there is no doubt at all that the day of peak production is
coming…two early-warning signs of such depletion materialized in early 2004, when Royal
Dutch/Shell lowered its estimate of its proven reserves by 20% and oil-industry experts concluded that
Saudi Arabia was exhausting its reserves at a faster rate than had previously been assumed.”, Klare,
Blood and Oil, p. 184.
63
declining production and that by 2050 we could be out of oil.71 The International
Energy Agency does not estimate oil production will peak before 2030. 72
There is wide agreement that global oil consumption is on the rise. While there are
debates about supply, there is largely agreement that there is a fine balance between
supply and demand, which will be the case for the foreseeable future. The other
unique characteristics of oil also influence the supply/demand equation. Concern
about the reliability of future oil supplies has moved from a purely economic
consideration to a national security issue and the psychological impact of higher oil
prices also impacts general public perceptions about scarcity. “Scarcity is often
determined by politics rather than, as Brock puts it, the ‘physical limitations of natural
resources’.”73
Military Intervention Related to Oil Dependence
Since the adoption by U.S. of the Cater Doctrine, the U.S. has built an impressive
military presence in the Middle East. The U.S. has military bases in Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait,74 as well as a naval aircraft carrier and three expeditionary
strike groups in the Persian Gulf.75 U.S. oil dependence in the region, and increasing
U.S. concerns over oil scarcity, have arguably played an important role in U.S.
engagement in regional conflicts in the Middle East including the Iran-Iraq war of
1980-1988, Persian Gulf War in 1991, Afghanistan War in 2001 and the Iraq War in
2003.76 “The Gulf War of 1991 was the first war in modern history fought
specifically over oil. It serves as a reminder that as long as hydrocarbon resources
remain fundamental to economic growth…there will be a commitment to use force to
prevent any single government from controlling the market.”77
The U.S. invasion of Iraq, with the UK, has perhaps been the most controversial of
U.S. military actions in the Middle East. Multiple theories exist about the motives
behind the U.S. war in Iraq beyond the official U.S. statements about Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction program. Both Klare in Blood and Oil, and Le Billon78 examine
the possible oil agenda behind the U.S. ‘war on terror.’ Their research points to the
potential for an escalation in violent conflict in the Persian Gulf as a result of the
U.S.-UK occupation of Iraq.
U.S. offensive and defensive military activities in the Persian Gulf region do not fit
the classic Homer-Dixon model of grievance motivated conflict. The U.S. actions are
more in line with studies of ‘beyond greed and grievance,’ yet arguably the violent
Peters, Susanne, “Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies: ‘Resource Wars’ as a New Threat to
Global Security”, Geopolitics, Volume 91 (January 20, 2004), p. 194.
72
Key World Energy Statistics 2004, International Energy Agency, p. 48, (http://www.iea.org/dbtwwpd/Textbase/nppdf/free/2004/keyworld2004.pdf),.
73
Elliott, Lorraine, p. 237.
74
Magdoff, Harry and John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesney, Paul Sweezy,
“U.S. Military Bases and Empire”, Monthly Review, Volume 53, No. 10 (March 2002),
(http://www.monthlyreview.org/0302editr.htm - accessed November 21, 2005).
75
“U.S. Navy, Around the World Around the Clock: Status of the Navy”, November 22, 2005.
(http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/.www/status.html - accessed on November 22, 2005).
76
Klare, Blood and Oil, p. 2.
77
Morse, Edward, “A New Political Economy of Oil?”, Journal of International Affairs, Volume 53,
No. 1 (Fall 1999), p. 16.
78
Le Billon and El Khatib, entire article.
71
inter-state conflicts in which the U.S. has been involved, coupled with U.S. nonviolent defensive security activities in the region, establish a somewhat more complex
conflict dynamic than just ‘resource wars’; with war implying violent conflict. The
relationship between the U.S., Syria and Iran has become more complicated as a result
of the U.S. invasion and tensions are increasing. The U.S. and UK Governments have
accused Syria and Iran of supporting armed Shiia insurgents in Iraq against coalition
forces. (SOURCE?) While the tensions are not new, the conflict between the U.S.
and Iran and/or the U.S. and Syria could escalate given the significant U.S. military
presence in the region. Whether the outcome of the Iraqi invasion was predictable or
not, the reality is that the already complex dynamics of both violent and non-violent
conflict in the Middle East have been altered and have the potential to become more
violent as has been seen in Iraq in 2005.
The Geopolitics of Oil Conflict
The landscape of non-violent real or potential conflict related to oil dependence is
perhaps one of the most interesting areas of study in contemporary international
security studies. While entire books have been written on oil dependence dynamics
in regions such as the Caucasus’, 79 two examples of current political manoeuvring by
states will be highlighted to provide a window into the complexity of underlying
political and economic dynamics that could influence conflict:
China, energy and balance of power politics80
 China has one of the fastest growing economies in the world.81 The Chinese
government has made securing energy supplies a national security priority. 82
“As of 2003, China’s three state energy organizations had secured important
ties with energy enterprises in more than a dozen countries, including Angola,
Burma, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thailand, Venezuela, and
Yemen.”83 The Chinese Government arguably has fewer constraints regarding
the types of governments it can negotiate with. Unlike the U.S., Chinese
government owned companies do not have to abide by the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, nor are Chinese companies as concerned as U.S.
companies might be about working in countries with poor human rights
records.84
 China’s military budget for 2005 is $29.9 billion (12.9% increase over 2004),
representing a doubling since 2000.85 China’s military budget’s expansion has
been linked to several issues including securing the energy corridors to China,
79
Forsythe, Rosemarie, The politics of oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia: prospects for oil
exploration and export in the Caspian basin, (London: IISS/ Oxford University Press, 1996) and
Peimani, Hooman, The Caspian Pipeline Dilemma: political games and economic losses, (Westport:
Praeger, 2001).
80
Bader, Jeffry and Leverett,Flynt, “Oil Politics, The Middle East and the Middle Kingdom”, The
Financial Times, August 17, 2005.
81
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 2004, Figure 1.7 (Real GDP).
(http://www/imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02 - accessed on November 21, 2005.)
82
Klare, Blood Oil, p. 169.
83
Klare, Blood Oil, p. 169.
84
Jaffe, Amy Myers and Steven Lewis, “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy”, Survival, Volume 44, No. 1
(Spring 2002), p. 116.
85
Annual Military Balance Report for 2005-2006, International Institute for Strategic Studies, October
2005 and U.S. Department of Defence Annual Report to Congress on China’s Military, July 2005.

tensions with Taiwan, and projection of military power vis-à-vis the U.S. and
Russia.86 China’s ‘Blue Water Navy Strategy’ has been characterized as a
force projection measure primarily directed at securing China’s energy supply,
especially in the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf. 87/88
Ownership rights to offshore oil and gas resources in the South China Sea
(SCS) remain largely contested. Six Asian states bordering the SCS have
made various territorial claims over the years and according to Klare there
were 13 military clashes in the SCS between 1988-1999.89 11 million barrels
per day of oil flow through the Straits of Malacca, including the majority of
Japan’s oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.90 The U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet is
based in Yokosuka, Japan and has access to ports in the Philippines.91
Multiple journal and newspaper articles in the past two years have drawn a link
between China’s military build-up and its drive to secure scarce energy supplies.
The South China Sea, according to Michael Klare, is “the area most likely to
witness large-scale warfare, because all of the factors associated with resource
conflict are concentrated here.”92 China provides an excellent example of a
country that has linked its national security policy with energy supplies, just as the
U.S. China is not involved in violent overt conflicts for oil supplies at this time.
It is, however, engaged in balance of power politics that have the potential to lead
to escalation of non-violent conflict (i.e. diplomatic disputes) as well as violent
conflicts (i.e. SCS).
Russia, China and the U.S.
 The Russian Government (GOR) is wary of China’s growing interest in
energy from the CIS. The GOR is deftly working to strike a balance between
maintaining friendly relations with China, while making sure China does not
gain what Russia would consider to be too much political leverage in the CIS.
To this end Russia has developed a two-pronged engagement strategy.
o The GOR is enhancing cooperation with China on oil and gas
exploration in Russia’s East Siberian fields that could be shipped by
pipeline to China.93 Russia’s military hardware exporter,
Rosoboronexport, has sold billions of dollars of equipment to China,
including naval vessels.94
o In September 2005, the Chinese National Petroleum Company reached
agreement with PetroKazakhstan (PKZ) to purchase the company for
$14.8 billion. In early October, however, Russia’s largest oil company,
Lukoil, took legal action to block the sale. Lukoil offered to match
86
Le Billon and El Khatib, p. 125.
Annual Military Balance Report for 2005-2006, International Institute for Strategic Studies, October
2005 and U.S. Department of Defence Annual Report to Congress on China’s Military, July 2005.
88
Klare, Resource Wars, p. 127.
89
Klare, Resource Wars, p. 124.
90
World Energy Outlook, “Oil Flows & Major Chokepoints: The ‘Dire Straits’,” International Energy
Agency, 2004.
91
Klare, Resource Wars, p. 133.
92
Klare, Resource Wars, p. 136.
93
Hill and Spector, p. 8.
94
Blagov, Sergei, “More Russian weapons go to China”, Asia Times, reprinted by Center for Defense
Information, January 29, 2003.
(http://www.cdi.org/russia/242-16.cfm - accessed on November 22, 2005.)
87

CNPC’s bid and after lobbying by the Russian Ministry of Industry,
President Nazerbayev blocked the sale to the Chinese in favour of
Lukoil.
Russia aims to strike a similar balance with the United States.
o The GOR is concerned about the presence of U.S. military bases in the
CIS. During the July 2005 meeting of The Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO), that includes China, Russia and four Central
Asian republics, a statement was issued “calling on the United States to
set a deadline for the removal of its military bases in Central Asia.”95
In June 2005, Uzbekistan’s President Karimov traveled to China,
“where he was welcomed with a ‘golden handshake’ in the form of a
$600 million natural-gas development contract.”96 Uzbekistan told the
U.S. in June the base would have to be closed in six months.97 As the
U.S. Government looks for alternative supplies of oil, the CIS region is
attractive, and the U.S. has heavily influenced pipeline politics related
to the Caspian Sea for over a decade.98
o Meanwhile, Russia is a U.S. ally in the ‘war on terror’ and has a formal
energy cooperation dialogue with the U.S. through the U.S.-Russia
Energy Working Group and the U.S.-Russia Energy Commercial
Dialogue.99 The energy dialogue was highlighted during the Bratislava
Summit in February 2005 by President’s Bush and Putin when they
called for “identifying concrete trade and investment opportunities for
U.S. and Russian firms.”100
The examples above are meant to illustrate the complexity of the oil equation in
geopolitics. Within the period of one year, Russia has re-asserted itself into power
politics in the CIS and countered moves by the U.S. to establish a wider military
presence in the region, which could have served to help the U.S. gain greater access to
oil and gas supplies. At the same time, Russia has endorsed expanding bilateral
energy cooperation with the U.S. While the chances of overt U.S.-Russian violent
conflict are highly unlikely, the U.S. need to diversify oil supply and its interest in
energy security in the Caspian Sea basin, make it likely that non-violent conflict
dynamics will continue to place tension on the U.S.-Russian relationship. Given
China’s close proximity to CIS countries, and its need for new energy supplies, great
power politics will most likely continue to unfold between the U.S. and China as both
countries vie for access to scarce oil resources. While direct conflict will likely not
Chan, John, “Russia and China Call for Closure of U.S. Bases in Central Asia”, World Socialist Web
Site, July 30, 2005. (http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jul2005/base-j30.shtml - accessed on
November 22, 2005.)
96
Cohen, Ariel, “Washington Grapples with Uzbekistan's Eviction Notice”, EurasiaNet, August 17,
2005, p. 1. (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6158 - accessed on November 22, 2005.)
96
Hill, Fiona and Regine Spector, “The Caspian Basin and Asian Energy Markets”, The Brookings
Institution, No. 8 Conference Report, September 2001, p. 2.
97
Cohen, p. 3.
98
Hill and Spector, p. 3.
99
“U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet, Bratislava Initiatives”, February 24, 2004.
(http://moscow.usembassy.gov/bilateral/print_joint_statement.php?record_id=40 - accessed November
22, 2005.).
100
Ibid.
95
unfold, the potential for the contemporary conflict landscape in the CIS to be shaped
by the U.S.-China-Russia political axis is substantial.101
Conclusion
As agreed by scholars referenced in this essay, the natural resource of oil does not in
and of itself make conflict a certainty. The scarcity and abundance oil, its unique
properties, and other strategic, political, economic, cultural and geographical factors,
shape contemporary conflict characteristics. Most conflicts in countries with an
abundance of oil are intra-state secessionist wars or coups against ruling regimes.
Greed over resource rents motivates governments to maintain control over oil fields
by using force and coercion. Greed can also become a factor for secessionist groups
who are able to finance their operations through illegal access to resource rents. In
this case, both greed and grievance influence the conflict, in particular its duration.
Grievance related to oil scarcity is driven primarily by state dependence on oil to
support economic growth. Conflicts related to dependence on oil are typically interstate and can involve the use of military force but can also be non-violent. In the case
of non-violent conflict, the geopolitics of oil manifests through balance of power
politics that shapes security policies, political agendas, alliance considerations and
military budgets. While oil and gas industry experts disagree widely on their specific
projections about the extent to which oil supplying countries will be able to meet
demand requirements of oil dependent countries in the next 50 years, most agree the
balance between supply and demand is tenuous. Adding to concerns about the
balance is that most additional supplies will likely come from conflict prone countries
and/or countries in conflict prone regions. Factors beyond supplies of oil in the
ground also have the potential to increase the likelihood of scarcity including lack of
pipeline, tanker transportation, and refining capacity. Therefore, in conclusion, while
research by Le Billon, Collier (et-al) and Ballentine/Sherman point to a
preponderance of greed motivated conflict related to natural resource abundance
today, as Klare, Le Billon and others agree, in the future, contemporary conflict will
be influenced is more likely to be influenced by the scarcity of and dependence on oil
as a vital natural resource that will inform security, economic and political policies for
decades.
101
Klare, Resource Wars, Chapter 4 (p. 81 – 108).