Milliken v. Bradley: Racial Discrimination in Primary and Secondary Schools
Public Interest Law and Policy
October 9 and 11, 2007
By Michael Hoffman, Mary Neal, and LaVonne Meyer
Detroit’s Racial Demographics in the Middle of the 20th Century
Much like the rest of the Midwest, Detroit experienced a population boom in the
middle of the 20th century, spurred by the migration of African-Americans from the
South. In 1940, 90.8% of Detroit residents were White. Over the next ten years, the city’s
economy boomed with the success of the automotive industry and the population reached
its peak of 1.85 million in 1950.
Since the 1950s, the State contributed to racial segregation by busing black high
schoolers from one outlying school district into a Detroit school, despite the fact that a
white school district was more closely located to the black students’ residences. White
flight to the suburbs was spurred by the race riots of 1967, which arguably contributed to
the de facto racial segregation within Detroit’s public schools. Between 1950 and 1970,
the city lost 338,000 residents while the metropolitan region gained almost 1.4 million
residents. By 1974, 71.5% of Detroit’s student population was African American.
In 1973, Detroit elected its first African American Mayor, Coleman Young.
Young was one of the first African Americans to lead a major U.S. city and his
movement to define Detroit as a “black city” was almost as polarizing as allegations of
his personal corruption. Despite his tireless advocacy for Detroit construction projects
such as the Renaissance Center, the People Mover, and Joe Louis Arena, he is perhaps
most famous around Detroit for rumors that he stored South African Krugerrands in his
mansion, for the development of the Devils’ Night tradition of arson during his terms in
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 11
office, and for his famous quote: “It’s time to leave Detroit; hit Eight Mile Road!” While
the statement was part of a longer plea for criminals of all races to leave the city, whites
who were already moving out to the suburbs rarely heard more than the terse excerpt and
assumed the mayor was speaking to them.
The separation of white and black populations in Metro Detroit was dramatic. The
National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development described Detroit in 1972 as a “web of discrimination” that
maintained racially separate housing markets and ensured segregation. Journal of
Housing Research, Vol. 4.1 1993 p.2. Without transportation between the black city and
white suburbs, the existence of these separate neighborhoods acted to bar integration of
locally-tied public services such as schools.
The Detroit Public Schools and the Origin of Milliken v. Bradley
In 1970, the Detroit Board of Education voluntarily began implementation of
what came to be known as the “April 7, 1970 Plan” in an effort to desegregate the city’s
high schools. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 727 (1974). It was slated to become
effective during the fall semester of 1970. Id. However, the Michigan state legislature
thwarted the Board’s attempts to racially integrate the schools through overt action and
inaction. Id.
One clear example of the legislature’s efforts was Act 48 of the Public Acts of
1970, which delayed the implementation of the April 7 Plan and perpetuated the growing
segregation of the Detroit school system. Id. In particular, § 12 of the Act prescribed
“free choice” and “neighborhood schools” in each of Detroit’s eight regions. Id.
Furthermore, the legislature delayed the authorization of and funding for pupil
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 21
transportation within Detroit, while at the same time providing neighboring (and
primarily white) suburban districts a full range of state-supported transportation. Id. at
726-727. Finally, the legislature amended the State Transportation Aid Act to cover
intracity transportation, but expressly prohibited the allocation of funds for the crossbusing of students within a school district to achieve racial balance. Id. In addition to the
legislature’s actions, the Detroit Board of Education developed and maintained what were
known as “optional attendance zones,” which allowed white students to avoid attending
schools in neighborhoods undergoing racial integration. Id. at 725.
These actions prompted the lawsuit Milliken v. Bradley, which challenged the
constitutionality of Michigan’s statutes. The class action suit, which was named for two
African-American children, Ronald Bradley and Richard Bradley, was brought by their
mother, Verda Bradley. Nathanial R. Jones brought the suit on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Jones was the general counsel for the NAACP; Thomas Atkins replaced him as lead
counsel during later phases of litigation. With him on the case were Paul R. Dimond,
Louis R. Lucas, Robert A. Murphy, William E. Caldwell, and Richard S. Kohn. The
plaintiffs alleged that the policies, actions, and inaction of Detroit and Michigan officials
contributed to de jure racial segregation within the Detroit school district. The suit named
numerous defendants, including Michigan governor William G. Milliken, Michigan
Attorney General Frank J. Kelley, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the
State Treasurer, the Michigan Board of Education, the Detroit Board of Education and its
members, and Detroit’s current and former school superintendents.
School Desegregation Caselaw Prior to Milliken I
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 31
The Supreme Court declared that segregated schools violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, but put off discussion of
appropriate remedies until the next year. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Then, in Brown II the
Court held that “In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs.” Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955). Such remedies
were best ordered and overseen by the District Courts “[b]ecause of their proximity to
local conditions and the possible need for further hearings.” Id. at 299. The Court
envisioned broad remedies touching on aspects of a school system: physical facilities,
transportation of students, assignment of personnel, and even the redrawing of attendance
zones and district boundaries. Id. at 300-301. The Court also famously declared that
remedies to segregation should be implemented “with all deliberate speed.” Id at 301.
Efficiency and Practicality of Remedies
Throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, the Court grew impatient with
parties seeking to stall or obstruct implementation of court-ordered desegregation plans.
In Green v. County School Board the Court expressed frustration at a Virginia school
board's feeble efforts to comply with Brown by eliminating de jure segregation without
taking any effective steps to alter the composition of either the student body or the faculty
and staff of county schools. 391 U.S. 430, 439 (U.S. 1968). Thirteen years after Brown,
the Court declared that the time for deliberate speed was over, and “[t]he burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now.” Id. (emphasis in original). Similarly, in U.S. v.
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 41
Montgomery County Board of Education, the Court reinstated a district court
desegregation plan over the modified order of the Court of Appeals holding that “[t]he
modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of Appeals... would, we think, take from
the order some of its capacity to expedite... the day when a completely unified, unitary,
nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality.” 395 U.S. 225, 235 (1969).
Breadth of Remedies
Also during this time period, the Court approved very broad equitable remedies
by district courts in desegregation cases. The most expansive equitable remedy approved
by the Court was likely that in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education in
which the Court held that “[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). In this case, the
Court approved a remedy including reassignment of faculty, transportation of students
between the City of Charlotte and suburban and rural areas of the county, and even
“gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones.” Id. at 8-9. While the remedy
approved in Swann would seem to give limitless power to the District Courts in
fashioning equitable remedies, the Court did caution that while “[n]o fixed or even
substantially fixed guidelines can be established as to how far a court can go,” still “it
must be recognized that there are limits.” Id. at 28. The Court further stated that “[a]s
with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.”
The Supreme Court's approval of a broad, county-wide remedy in Swann, coupled
with its hesitance to set any clear limits on the scope of district courts' powers in such
cases, challenged prospective plaintiffs and district court judges to “push the envelope”
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 51
when crafting remedies for segregation. In Milliken, the district court's inter-district
remedy tested the limits of Swann.
Objectives of Remedies
While the Court was very vague about the limits of equitable remedies, it did give
some guidance as to the proper objective of desegregation orders. “The first remedial
responsibility of school authorities is to eliminate invidious racial distinctions,” the
Court held, echoing language from Green. Id. at 18. While recognizing that accurate
knowledge of the area's racial demographics was useful in crafting and monitoring a
desegregation plan, the Court held that “[t]he constitutional command to desegregate
schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the
racial composition of the school system as a whole.” Id. at 24.
Supreme Court Holding in Milliken I
Constitutional violations addressed by the Supreme Court in Milliken I
The Milliken plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ policies and actions created de
jure racial segregation within Detroit’s schools in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs maintained that these policies and
actions denied African-American schoolchildren educational opportunities enjoyed by
their white counterparts. Accordingly, they sought the implementation of a plan to
eliminate Detroit’s dual school system and promote racial integration.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found
evidence that de jure segregation existed within the Detroit schools and ordered the
parties to submit desegregation plans for both Detroit and the three-county metropolitan
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 61
area, despite the fact that no suburban school districts were parties to the action and that
the plaintiffs had not alleged any unconstitutional violation by these outlying districts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s holding that de jure segregation existed in Detroit and agreed that a metropolitanwide remedy, rather than a city-only remedy, was necessary to dismantle the segregation
present throughout the city’s schools. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that the evidence on the record warranted only a city-wide remedy.
Chief Justice Burger, who authored the Court’s 5-4 majority decision, began his
discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment by noting that “[N]o state law is above the
Constitution. School district lines and the present laws with respect to local control are
not sacrosanct, and if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, federal courts have a
duty to prescribe appropriate remedies.” Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744. Burger asserted,
however, that the issue presented in Milliken – that is, the validity of a judicial remedy
mandating inter-district consolidation to rectify racial segregation that existed in only one
school district – was an issue of first impression before the Court. As such, the Court’s
prior holdings addressing dual public school systems and various state and local officials’
roles in drawing district lines in order to maintain racial segregation in public schools
were therefore not directly applicable to Milliken’s facts. See id.
Burger’s opinion further distinguished Milliken from precedent cases by attacking
the metropolitan-wide remedy fashioned by the District Court and upheld by the Sixth
Circuit. He conceded that although the record contained evidence of de jure segregated
conditions in the Detroit schools, an inter-district remedy would be “wholly
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 71
impermissible [and] based on a standard not hinted at in Brown I and II or any holding of
this Court.” Milliken at 745.
Justice Stewart’s concurrence noted that the Supreme Court upheld the Sixth
Circuit’s finding of an Equal Protection Clause violation, but he maintained that
Milliken’s procedural posture did not concern questions of substantive constitutional law.
Instead, he asserted that the basic issue the Court needed to address was “the appropriate
exercise of federal equity jurisdiction.” Milliken at 753. Because Stewart agreed that no
inter-district constitutional violations existed, he wrote that “the mere fact of different
racial compositions in contiguous districts does not itself imply or constitute a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of a showing that such disparity was
imposed, fostered, or encouraged by the State or its political subdivisions…” Milliken at
756.
According to Justice Douglas’ dissent, the central issue of Milliken was “not
whether there should be racial balance [in the public schools] but whether the State’s use
of various devices that end up with black schools and white schools brought the Equal
Protection Clause into effect … since Michigan by one device or another has over the
years created black school districts and white school districts, the task of equity is to
provide a unitary system for the affected area where, as here, the State washes its hands
of its own creations.” Milliken at 762. Douglas ruefully noted, “Today’s decision …
means that there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause though the schools are
segregated by race and though the black schools are not only ‘separate’ but ‘inferior.’ So
far as equal protection is concerned, we are now in a dramatic retreat from the 7-to-1
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decision in 1896 that blacks could be segregated in public facilities, provided they
received equal treatment.” Milliken at 761.
Justice White’s dissent reiterated Douglas’ concern that the majority’s holding
“would call up haunting memories of the now long overruled and discredited ‘separate
but equal doctrine’ of Plessy v. Ferguson” and could eventually lead to the nullification
of Brown v. Board of Education. Milliken at 767. He also noted that the holding allowed
“the State of Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, [to]
successfully insulate itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies by
vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local school districts.” Milliken at
763. He then expressed concern that the judicial lenience shown to Michigan would be
replicated in other states found to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Finally,
White pointed out that white as well as black students suffered from the effects of
segregated education policies when they were not allowed to attend schools and learn
together. Id. at 779.
Justice Marshall began his dissenting opinion by invoking Brown I’s holding and
the role of the Fourteenth Amendment in ensuring equal educational opportunities for all
children. He noted the difficulties inherent in desegregating schools, but quoted the nowfamous passage from Cooper v. Aaron: “[H]owever embedded old ways, however
ingrained old prejudices, this Court has not been diverted from its appointed task of
making a ‘living truth’ of our constitutional idea of equal justice under law.” Milliken at
781-82 (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958)). He asserted that the majority
“[took] a giant step backwards” after 20 years of widespread efforts to implement the
Brown mandate. Id. at 782. The decision, he wrote, “[guaranteed] that Negro children in
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Detroit will receive the same separate and inherently unequal education in the future as
they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past” and characterized it as an
“emasculation of our constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws…” Id.
Like his fellow dissenting colleagues, Marshall emphasized that “actions by an
agent or officer of the State are encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment,” that school
districts such as Detroit’s were agencies of the State government, and that “[r]acial
discrimination by the school district, an agency of the State, is therefore racial
discrimination by the State itself.” Milliken at 792-93. Marshall acknowledged the racial
inequality inherent in the Detroit school system: “Absent a constitutional violation there
would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis … But
all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained
to enforce segregation.” Milliken at 814 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 28 1971)). Marshall concluded his dissent by admitting that
desegregation would pose challenges to the school district, but insisted that the Court’s
role in upholding the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee superseded the majority’s
inclination to bow to public pressure and discontinue its efforts to ensure that States and
their agents abided by the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment.
De facto Versus De Jure Segregation
Milliken does not discuss the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation
at length since the Supreme Court itself conceded that de jure segregation existed in the
Detroit school system. However, it is worth noting that the de facto segregation that
arguably existed in the decades prior to Milliken was due to factors other than official
policies and decisions that can be characterized as discriminatory.
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 101
De jure segregation, in contrast, is triggered by officials’ policies or decisions that
either create or maintain racial segregation, and the allegedly discriminatory actions by
local and state officials caused the de jure segregation that prompted the initial lawsuit.
Local Control in Michigan Public Education
Burger justified the majority’s holding, in part, by noting the importance of
autonomy by individual school districts: “No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long
been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for
public schools and to quality of the educational process.” Milliken at 741-42.
However, Douglas, White, and Marshall each delivered a scathing attack on this
position in their dissents. Douglas noted that Michigan’s educational system is actually a
unitary one, maintained and supported by the state legislature and supervised by the State
Board of Education. See Milliken at 758. White argued that the Michigan legislature’s
attempt to dismantle the Detroit Board of Education’s April 7 Plan in 1971 proved that
the state indeed maintained control over local school districts. See Milliken at 768.
Marshall expanded upon Douglas’ opinion, citing Michigan case law and statutes
in noting that “Michigan, unlike some other States, operates a single statewide system of
education … the majority’s emphasis on local governmental control and local autonomy
of school districts in Michigan will come as a surprise to those with any familiarity with
that State’s system of education.” Milliken at 794. He concluded that the majority’s
invocation of deeply rooted traditions of local autonomy “simply flies in the face of
reality...” See Milliken at 797.
The Scope of the Remedy in School Desegregation Cases:
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 111
Majority Holding and Criticism by Dissenters
The Milliken majority invoked its standard controlling principle in equity cases,
applying the general standard stated in Swann to the specifics of the case at hand:
[T]he scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation…Specifically, it must be shown that racially
discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single
school district have been a substantial cause of inter-district segregation…
Conversely, without an inter-district violation and inter-district effect,
there is no constitutional wrong calling for an inter-district remedy.
Milliken at 744-45.
Because the record contained no evidence of constitutional violations by the 53 outlying
school districts included in the District Court’s metropolitan remedy, the majority held
that the lower court went beyond the case’s original theory and exceeded its remedial
powers in fashioning such relief. See Milliken at 745.
Douglas responded by arguing that “[m]etropolitan treatment of metropolitan
problems is commonplace,” citing sewage, water, and energy problems as examples in
which Michigan would be well within its federal constitutional bounds to seek a
metropolitan remedy. See Milliken at 758. White challenged the majority’s approach as
well, opining that “the Court fashions out of whole cloth an arbitrary rule that remedies
for constitutional violations occurring in a single Michigan school district must stop at
the school district line.” Milliken at 768. He also attacked the majority’s departure from
the traditional approach of allowing lower courts to fashion equitable remedies under the
presupposition that such courts are more familiar with both the record and the particular
factual circumstances of a given case. See Milliken at 769.
Constitutional violations addressed by the Supreme Court in Milliken II
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 121
Following the Supreme Court’s remand in Milliken I to fashion an appropriate
remedy to desegregate the Detroit school system, the District Court entered an order
requiring pupil assignments and the implementation of various compensatory and
remedial programs, which were approved by the Supreme Court in its 1977 Milliken II
decision.
The District Court ordered the Detroit Board of Education and the State of
Michigan to split the cost of the programs – which included remedial reading and
communication skills programs, in-service teacher training sessions, testing programs
“free from racial, ethnic and cultural bias” and the utilization of career counselors – and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1977).
The state defendants challenged the order’s requirement that the defendants share
the cost of such programs, citing the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. However, the
Supreme Court held, 8-0 (with one opinion concurring in the judgment), that the Eleventh
Amendment permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to act in accordance with
federal law. See Milliken at 289 (1977). The Court characterized the District Court’s
order as “wholly prospective,” despite the State's characterization of the remedial
program’s components as “compensatory.” See Milliken at 290 (1977).
The Court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the relief ordered by the
District Court violated the Tenth Amendment, holding that the amendment’s reservation
of non-delegated powers to the States “is not implicated by a federal-court judgment
enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Milliken at 291 (1977). In addition, the Court noted that the District Court
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 131
did not attempt to restructure local governmental entities nor mandate a particular method
or structure of state or local financing when fashioning its remedy, but rather properly
enforced the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent with Supreme Court
precedents and in a way that did not jeopardize the integrity of the structure or functions
of state and local government. Id.
Implications of Milliken I for Future Desegregation Litigation
Milliken I limited the scope of equitable remedies available to district courts in
discrimination cases, such courts are now precluded from ordering inter-district remedies
absent a showing of an inter-district violation. It is unknown whether the plaintiffs in
Milliken could have successfully met that burden. Although the plaintiffs were given
leave to amend their complaint to include evidence of violations by or including the
suburban districts, no amendments were ever made. Filing such an amendment was
predicated on the plaintiffs (the NAACP) paying the costs of the suburban district's first
appeal to the Supreme Court; the NAACP chose to focus its efforts and money on other
aspects of the case.1
Some cases in the 1970s did succeed in meeting this burden, however. In
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education, a Sixth Circuit case involving
Louisville and surrounding county schools, the court distinguished from Milliken I based
on the fact that “school district lines in Kentucky have been ignored in the past for the
purpose of aiding and implementing continued segregation.” 510 F.2d 1358, 1360 (6th
Cir. 1974). In Evans v. Buchanan, a case involving a plan for desegregation throughout
greater Wilmington, the plaintiffs took a different approach, showing that, ala Gatreuax,
“Governmental authorities condoned and encouraged discrimination in the private
1 From conversation with Martin Malin, clerk to Judge DeMascio during remand of case in district court.
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 141
housing market and provided public housing.” 393 F. Supp. 428, 438 (D. Del. 1975) aff'd
per curiam 423 U.S. 963 (1975). The district court in Evans declared that “[t]he record
in this case is replete with evidence that racial balance in housing is integrally related to
racial balance in the public schools,” and that state-sponsored housing discrimination
“constitutes segregative action with inter-district effects under Milliken.” Id. at 437, 438.
In some cases, Milliken I has been cited to deny such remedies. Missouri. v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (U.S. 1995); Goldsboro City Bd. of Education v. Wayne County Bd.
of Education, 745 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1984). In Jenkins, the Court even went so far as to
declare a court-ordered program of magnet schools and increased teacher pay in Kansas
City was an impermissible inter-district remedy because it was a use of state funds to lure
students from suburban districts to the city schools. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70.
Judicial Oversight in Desegregation Cases
High-Risk Cases
Desegregation cases in the 1960s and 1970s were risky for the judges and court
officers involved. Judges Roth and DeMascio who presided over Milliken were both
subject to public scorn as opponents of desegregation held demonstrations which at times
led to riots.2 In a similar cases in Richmond, Virginia, the presiding judge's house was
fire-bombed, and in Dayton, Ohio a Special Master appointed by the court to assist in
desegregation efforts was shot by an enraged parent. Id. In the Eastern District of
Michigan, special security measures were undertaken during the Milliken period,
including a bullet-proof bench and federal marshal protection for both the judges and
their families. Id. When Judge Roth succumbed to a heart attack prior the the Supreme
Court decision in Milliken, there was a general feeling that the case was the cause. Id.
2 From conversation with Martin Malin, clerk to Judge DeMascio during remand of case in district court.
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 151
High-Maintenance Cases
A school desegregation case such as Milliken requires a great deal of time and
resources from the overseeing court. Long-term equitable remedies involving multiple
parties continuous oversight even absent further litigation, and further litigation is sure to
arise-- after the Supreme Court opinion in Milliken I, there were seven more opinion out
of the district court, five out of the Sixth Circuit, one more Supreme Court opinion, and a
denial of certiorari over the course of the next 16 years. Judge DeMascio employed two
clerks for two-year terms at any given time, one was assigned full time to Milliken
throughout course of case. Id. He also met with community leaders and appointed a
liaison to meet with heads of local colleges and universities to solicit their involvement in
remedy for public schools. Bradley v. Milliken, 426 F. Supp. 929, 937 (E.D. Mich.,
1977). At one point, he even called the School Board and Teachers' Union into quarters
for status hearing on contract negotiations out of concern that imminent strike could
scuttle portions of proposed remedy, and ordered them to meet daily to resolve issue. Id.
at 937. Furthermore, three desegregation experts were appointed to serve as officers of
the court during the course of the case. Id.
Disillusionment with Court-ordered Desegregation
The ongoing, labor-intensive oversight of school districts by district courts may
be one reason for a change in attitude in the higher courts through the 1980s and 1990s.
While the Court in Green in 1967 showed impatience with recalcitrant school boards
resisting real efforts at desegregation, by the mid-1980s courts begin to show impatience
and frustration with the desegregation plans themselves. The attitude was best expressed
by the Fourth Circuit in a case involving the de facto segregation of schools in
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 161
Goldsboro, NC and the surrounding county which bore little no relation to the former de
jure segregation patterns in the city:
The plaintiff has a problem. Yet, its problem is one beyond our power, in
the present state of the law, to correct. The plaintiff's problem is the result
of movement from city to suburbs seen throughout the United States and
the abandonment of public schools by white, city residents seen in many
communities where desegregation has occurred. We are not at present
charged with a responsibility to remedy problems caused by demography
and private racism.
Goldsboro City Bd. of Education v. Wayne County Bd. of Education, 745 F.2d 324 (4th
Cir. 1984)
As decades passed, what had been intended as temporary remedies to be overseen
by the district courts became entrenched in many school districts, and the Court began to
stress the need for judicial oversight to end at some point. “Local autonomy of school
districts is a vital national tradition, and that a district court must strive to restore state
and local authorities to the control of a school system operating in compliance with the
Constitution,” held the Court in Jenkins, while effectively accusing the Kansas City
School District of continuing to operate under court order for the purpose of obtaining a
greater share of state funds, long after any vestiges of the de jure school system were
gone. Similarly, in Freeman v. Pitts, where a suburban Atlanta county experiencing
massive population growth had resegregated after a decade of good-faith compliance
with a court-ordered desegregation plan, the Court held that the county should be
released from most aspects of the court order: “It is beyond the authority and beyond the
practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and
massive demographic shifts. To attempt such results would require ongoing and never-
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 171
ending supervision by the courts of school districts simply because they were once de
jure segregated.”
Conclusion
Milliken v. Bradley was a turning point in school desegregation jurisprudence; a
case in which the Supreme Court put boundaries on the powers of district courts to
fashion broad equitable remedies. The holding was contentious at the time, garnering
only a 5-4 majority with strong dissents, and it has been decried by many integration
proponents in the years since. While the limits placed on equitable remedies in Milliken
curtailed district court remedies in some cases, others were able to meet the increased
evidentiary burden and achieve inter-district desegregation remedies. In the larger
historical context, Milliken can be seen as the beginning of a trend disfavoring judicial
oversight of sweeping desegregation plans.
Hoffman, Neal, and Meyer 181