JERUSALEM POST, 29 MARCH 2004
The Peace with Egypt
EFRAIM INBAR
President Hosni Mubarak canceled a formal visit by an Egyptian delegation of legislators and
other dignitaries to Israel in protest over the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. The
delegation planned to go to Jerusalem to participate in the ceremonies of the 25th anniversary of
the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Last minute cancellation of visits by
Egyptians to Israel is a common practise, underscoring the Egyptian ambivalence toward cordial
relations with Israel.
The March 1979 peace treaty was the first between Israel and an Arab state, constituting a
dramatic change in the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the political-symbolic level it
proclaimed acceptance of the Jewish state by the largest and most important Arab state, thereby
legitimizing the eventual peace process between Israel and other Arab actors. Indeed, Egypt
overcame the attempt to ostracize it by the Arabs, who vehemently opposed any rapprochement
with the Jewish state, paving the way for direct negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.
In strategic terms, the peace treaty meant a defection of a crucial participant in the Arab military
coalition against Israel, weakening it considerably. Moreover, the peace treaty denied the Arabs
the two-front option, the worst-case scenario for Israeli military planners. The demilitarization of
Sinai, which is the strategic cornerstone of the peace treaty, provides strategic stability because it
creates a situation whereby surprise attacks are unlikely, thus reducing the need for preemptive
strikes. Basically with Egypt outside the circle of active military belligerents, the option of waging
large-scale war against Israel has, to a large extent, been lost to the Arab world. Indeed, the 1973
October War was the last round of high-intensity military conflict between Israel and its neighbors.
At the same time, Egypt provided the “cold peace” model for future Arab-Israeli relations. This
means an oscillating level of formal diplomatic relations coupled with an ongoing diplomatic
offensive against Israel at all international forums. The peace treaty entails little bilateral trade,
just a trickle of tourism, while people-to-people interactions are discouraged. The area of greatest
concern is the lack of any changes in the Egyptian educational system, breeding the same
hostility toward Israel into the new generations of Egyptians as before 1979. This socialization
pattern allows the Egyptian leadership to return to the pre-1979 relations without having to
provide its people with any serious explanation for its strategic reversal.
There are additional political implications resulting from the 1979 peace treaty. It proved that it is
possible to reach a separate peace with one Arab actor, rather than trying to bring about a
comprehensive settlement with all parties involved. The incremental step-by-step approach
promoted by the conservative US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is probably still the best way
to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly in light of the failed attempts to solve all
outstanding issues at once.
The peace treaty also signaled the limited importance of the American role in the peace process,
which should not be exaggerated. While the Sadat trip to Jerusalem and his bold attempt to
change the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict did not result from American pressure, it was the
American prodding and guarantees that smoothed the way to reach a deal. Thus, the pattern for
American compensation to the Arab side who makes peace with Israel, in the form of economic
and military assistance, was established. Today, as the US becomes the hegemonic power in the
contemporary international system such a carrot becomes even more appealing.
The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty format land-for-peace also provided an ominous precedent for
the return to the 1967 borders and the dismantling of all settlements in future treaties, which
haunts Israeli foreign policy to this day. It was a terrible blow to the Israeli notion of “defensible
borders” and to the Israeli rejection of the 1967 lines as being indefensible. Moreover, the
Egyptians did not undertake any commitment to ease the situation of the Palestinian refugees
under their control, making sure this issue continues to be a festering problem to be laid at
Israel’s door.
By leaving Gaza in Israel’s hands, the peace treaty also crystallized the linkage between Gaza
and the West Bank, which have been prior to 1967 under separate control (Egyptian and
Jordanian, respectively). Paradoxically, Menachem Begin’s decision to keep Gaza gave greater
coherence to the Palestinian identity and an impetus to the rationale for having a Palestinian
state, which turned out to be a dubious idea.
It is no wonder that Egypt became the champion of this idea, which is a recipe for the
continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite the peace treaty, Egypt continues to see Israel as
a mighty competitor for hegemony in the Middle East. It has been critical of the Israeli-Turkish
entente that strengthened Israel. Cairo is not averse to the Palestinian quest of bleeding Israel,
occasionally influencing the Palestinians to harden their positions versus Israel. It is even ready to
lend legitimacy to Hamas by meeting the representatives of this radical Islamist organization in
order to prolong the violence against Israel. Nevertheless, Egyptian-Israeli relations are better
today than before 1979, serving as a reminder of the nature of international relations in the Middle
East and particularly to the limits of Arab-Israeli rapprochement.