Running head: UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS
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The Case for Unconscious Emotions
Vincent Abruzzo
Georgia State University
Department of Philosophy
Neuroscience Institute
Abstract
The notion of an unconscious emotion is often thought to be untenable. The reason for
this is that if an emotion is a feeling, and if a feeling is conscious, then an unconscious emotion
is a contradiction in terms. However, the concept of consciousness in the emotion theory
literature is ambiguous. In this paper, I argue that if we allow for the Blockian distinction
between phenomenal and access consciousness, then we can clearly conceptualize an
unconscious emotion. After doing so, I examine some relevant behavioral evidence gleaned from
subliminal affective priming studies to determine if there are instances of these emotions. I will
conclude that the best explanation of the evidence is that there are unconscious emotions.
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The Case for Unconscious Emotions
Philosophers and psychologists have argued that the notion of an unconscious emotion is
untenable. For example, Gerald Clore (2005) writes that, “although most emotional processes are
unconscious, properly speaking, there are not unconscious emotions” (pp. 403-4). In a similar
vein, Anthony Hatzimoysis (2007) writes that, “a careful consideration of the relevant evidence
falls short of supporting the claim that there are unconscious emotions” (p. 292). These two
quotes characterize two arguments against unconscious emotions: the definitional argument and
the evidential argument, respectively. The former holds that an emotion, by definition, is
conscious. The latter holds that even though an emotion can be unconscious, there is no evidence
that they ever are. In this essay I will show that the definitional argument reduces to the
evidential argument upon a disambiguation of the concept of consciousness. I will then argue
that the best explanation of the relevant evidence is that there are unconscious emotions. I will
begin by exploring the concept of an emotion.
1. What is an Emotion?
Different emotion theorists hold that different aspects of an emotional experience are
necessary and sufficient for the instantiation of an emotion. These aspects include: the subjective
experience of the emotion, the physiology associated with the emotion such as the change of
heart rate or skin conductance response, the behavioral response associated with the emotion,
and the appraisal of the emotion-elicitor.
Take the case of fear. When an individual experiences fear there is thought to be a whatit’s-likeness of the experience. That is, she feels afraid. Some theorists hold that this subjective
experience is the emotion (Freud 1915; Clore 2005). According to others, the emotion just is the
individual’s perception of her physiological changes (James 1884; Prinz 2004). One of the
changes associated with fear is a heightened heart rate. These physiological changes occur in
order to prepare the individual for the appropriate behavioral responses to the fear-elicitor. That
is, the heightened heart rate will better enable the individual to address the fearful situation by
either fighting or fleeing. Some theorists hold that this behavior associated with fear or the
disposition to behave in these ways is the emotion (Ryle 1949). The subjective experience,
physiological change, and behavioral response associated with fear are the effects of the
appraisal that something in the individual’s environment is dangerous and should be avoided or
overcome. An appraisal can be either primitive and reflexive or sophisticated and cognitive
(Scarantino, forthcoming). Some theorists hold that this appraisal or judgment is the emotion
(Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 1993).
I will not attempt to decide which of these theories of emotion is correct. Rather, I will
determine which theories the arguments against unconscious emotions assume. I will then
examine the possible evidence of unconscious emotions. However, I must first differentiate
between two types of consciousness.
2. Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness
Many theorists have argued that consciousness is an ambiguous term, i.e. there is more
than one type of consciousness (Block 1995; Lambie and Marcel 2002; Lane 2000; Natsoulas
1999; Nelkin 1993). Ned Block (1995) distinguishes between phenomenal consciousness (P-
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consciousness) and access conscious (A-consciousness).1 A mental state is P-conscious if there is
something that it is like to be in that state. Put another way, if a state has experiential properties
then that state is P-conscious. A mental state is A-conscious, according to Block, if “in virtue of
one's having the state, a representation of its content is (1) inferentially promiscuous, i.e. poised
to be used as a premise in reasoning, and (2) poised for rational control of action and (3) poised
for rational control of speech” (“ACCESS-CONSCIOUSNESS,” para. 2).
For example, if an individual looks at a red balloon then she is P-conscious of the red
balloon in virtue of the visual experience of the balloon. There is something it is like to visually
experience a red balloon. She is A-conscious of the red balloon if she is able to reference the red
balloon in reasoning, action, or speech. When she says, “I see a red balloon” we can infer that
she is A-conscious of the balloon because she is able to verbally report the visual experience.
Block (1995) puts forth one scenario that he suggests is a case of P-consciousness
without A-consciousness. Suppose that you are studying for an exam all morning. At noon, you
sit back in your chair to take a rest from studying and at that moment begin to notice the sound of
drilling outside your window. The drilling was occurring the entire time that you were studying.
There was something it was like to experience the sound of the drill. However, because you were
intensely focused on the material you were studying, you didn’t notice the auditory properties of
the experience. You were P-conscious of the drill without being A-conscious of the drill, until
noon, at which point you became both P-conscious and A-conscious of the drill. Even if we think
that this scenario fails to establish that P-consciousness and A-consciousness are dissociable, it at
least makes clear the conceptual possibility that they are. The importance of Block and other’s
work is that they’ve established that it is not an a priori matter. Rather, it is an empirical matter
open to investigation.
3. Varieties of Emotional Consciousness
One possible combination of emotional experience is P-conscious and A-unconscious. In
these instances there is something that it is like to be in the particular emotional state. However,
the individual in that state is not accessing those experiential properties. That is, she is not able to
refer to those properties in reasoning, action, or speech. The contents of P-consciousness could
be either the perception of the physiology associated with the emotion or the subjective
experience of the emotion. For example, it could be the heightened heart rate associated with fear
or the irreducible feeling of fear itself, depending on one’s conception of an emotion. Whatever
the case may be, it is important to leave open the possibility that phenomenality does not entail
access. Accepting Block’s analysis of consciousness is to accept that whether or not there are
cases of P-consciousness without A-consciousness is an empirical matter.
Another possible combination is P-unconscious and A-unconscious. In these instances
there is no subjective experience and the individual cannot reference the state in reason, action,
or speech. Many mental processes involve no subjective experience and cannot be referenced in
this way. For example, when trying to solve an equation it may be the case that the solution or
proper strategy pops into mind (Block 1995). In these cases there must have been mental states
that were both P-unconscious and A-unconscious. The result of these states becomes P-conscious
and A-conscious when it pops into mind but the process leading up to that result was not.
1
While others have made the same distinction, the terms often differ. For example, Lane (2000) distinguishes
between phenomenal and reflective consciousness, Nelkin (1993) distinguishes between phenomenality and
introspectibility, and Lambie and Marcel (2002) distinguish between 1st order phenomenology and 2nd order
awareness.
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I have briefly discussed two possible conceptualizations of an unconscious emotion: Pconscious and A-unconscious, and P-unconscious and A-unconscious. However, some theorists
argue that these conceptualizations are not emotions at all while other theorists argue that we
don’t have any evidence for their existence. I will now consider these arguments against
unconscious emotions.
4. The Case against Unconscious Emotions
The distinction between A-consciousness and P-consciousness is often neglected in the
emotion theory literature. Because of this, the notion of an unconscious emotion is thought to be
untenable. There are two types of arguments employed in making the case against unconscious
emotions: the definitional argument and the evidential argument.
4.1. The Definitional Argument
According to some theorists an emotion, by definition, is a feeling (Freud 1915; LeDoux
1994; Öhman 1999). That is, if there is no feeling or subjective experience then there is no
emotion. And if a feeling implies consciousness then an unconscious emotion is nonsensical, in
the same way that a married bachelor is. For example, according to Arne Öhman (1999), “[The
concept of an unconscious emotion] becomes logically impossible because it provides a
contradiction in terms” (p. 334).
The problem with the definitional argument is that those who employ it don’t make clear
what they mean by conscious. If a feeling is necessary for an emotion then it is P-consciousness
that is necessary because P-consciousness is the what-it’s-likeness or experiential aspect of the
emotion. If a state is P-conscious then the state feels a certain way but the individual might not
be aware of this feeling. If this is the case then, as we have seen, it is possible that a state is Pconscious and A-unconscious. The emotion involves a feeling or subjective experience but it is
nonetheless unconscious in virtue of being A-unconscious. If the opponent of unconscious
emotions argues that an emotion must be conscious because, if a state is an emotion then it must
be P-conscious, then she has not provided sufficient reason for rejecting the possibility of
unconscious emotions. This is the case because the necessity of P-consciousness does not entail
the necessity of A-consciousness. This argument collapses and it becomes an empirical matter
whether or not there are unconscious emotions in the form of emotions that are P-conscious and
A-unconscious.
The opponent of unconscious emotions may object to this characterization of the
definitional argument. He may assert that an emotion is something that by definition feels a
certain way such that the individual is aware of the feeling. That is, according to the definitional
argument an emotion cannot be unconscious because if a state is an emotion then it is both Pconscious and A-conscious. For example, according to Robert Solomon (2003), “in the sense of
consciousness as awareness, every emotion is necessarily conscious” (p. 5). However, the
definitional argument is misleading precisely because the distinction between P-consciousness
and A-consciousness is ignored. Assuming that emotions are necessarily P-conscious and Aconscious or that P-consciousness entails A-consciousness has the undesirable effect of
preventing us from explaining relevant experimental data as well as some cases of seemingly Aunconscious emotions. For these reasons I reject the claim that emotions are necessarily Pconscious and A-conscious.
According to the definitional argument, an emotion is necessarily P-conscious. This
leaves open the possibility that some emotions are unconscious in virtue of being A-unconscious.
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However, just because unconscious emotions are possible does not mean that they actually exist.
It is to this point that I now turn.
4.2. The Evidential Argument
Accepting the possibility of unconscious emotions is not making the case for them. The
opponent of unconscious emotions can grant their conceptual possibility and deny that there is
any evidence of their existence. Anthony Hatzimoysis (2007) makes this move when considering
subliminal affective priming studies. Subliminal affective priming is a phenomenon wherein
subjects are exposed to emotional imagery or concepts for a fraction of a second. The studies that
Hatzimoysis (2007) considers use fearful imagery. The subjects don’t report any experience of
fear but they do exhibit physiological responses characteristic of fear such as a skin conductance
response. Some proponents of unconscious emotions claim that this is evidence of unconscious
fear. Hatzimoysis argues that it is not.
The subjects in the subliminal affective priming studies are not experiencing unconscious
emotions, according to Hatzimoysis (2007), because they are not experiencing any emotion at
all. If there is no emotion then there is no unconscious emotion. And there is no emotion in these
instances because the physiological response associated with fear is not sufficient for fear. The
question of whether or not subliminal affective priming studies is evidence for unconscious
emotions turns into the question of whether or not these physiological responses are experiences
of emotion. As Hatzimoysis (2007) writes, “it is not clear why changes such as skin-conductance
amount to an emotional response in the absence of any other relevant considerations” (p. 297).
This is an important point. The proponent of unconscious emotions does not want to claim that if
there is physiological response X then there is emotional experience Y. It could be the case that
the same physiological response is caused by a change in temperature or the fabric of one’s
clothing and not by any of the eliciting conditions associated with an emotion. I agree with
Hatzimoysis (2007) that physiological responses alone do not constitute emotions.
However, I do not think that he has made the case against unconscious emotions. The
relevant information is not exhausted by the fact of the physiological response because it is not
the only response that we have evidence of. That is, even if we grant that a physiological
response alone is not an emotion experience, we can still show that there are unconscious
emotions because there is evidence for more than just physiological responses. I will now
consider this evidence.
5. Subliminal Affective Priming
In addition to physiological responses, subliminal affective priming studies have found
evidence of emotion experience in the form of robust behavioral responses.
For example, there is evidence that specific emotions can be induced in subjects via
subliminal affective priming. Zemack-Rugar et al. (2007) have shown that subliminally priming
subjects with guilt concept words as opposed to sadness concept words will affect their behavior
in ways stereotypical of guilty emotional experience. Yet these subjects report no subjective
change of mood or emotional experience. For example, if a subject is primed with a guilty word
they are more likely to behave in a less indulgent manner. Indulgent behavior was assessed by
the subject’s consumption behavior when deciding how to allocate spending money between
recreational activities such as video games and academic supplies such as books. Subjects
primed with guilt concept words were also more likely to help individuals in need. Subjects who
were primed with sadness concept words did not exhibit these behavioral changes.
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Zemack-Rugar et al. (2007) have shown that subliminally primed, affectively charged
stimuli can affect an individual’s behavior even though the individual is unaware of the stimulus
and reports no emotional change. They have shown that not just positively valenced as opposed
to negatively valenced behavioral changes are possible, but also that behavior associated with
specific emotions is possible even when contrasted with stimuli that have the same valence.
Because guilt and sadness are both negatively valenced, these results indicate that a specific
emotional experience occurs in these subjects without their awareness of the experience.
Recall that Hatzimoysis’ (2007) argument assumed that physiological changes don’t
suffice as experiences of emotion. From this assumption it was concluded that subliminally
primed physiological changes do not count as unconscious emotions. “We have not been offered
an argument,” he writes, “that would establish that the occurrence of physiological alterations
induced in an experimental setting would amount to an emotional experience” (p. 297-8). I
believe that this evidence of subliminally primed behavioral changes is evidence of emotion
experience in a way that just a physiological response is not because the behavioral response is
characteristic of the emotion. The physiological response, as we have seen, could have been
caused by non-emotional stimuli. But these behavioral responses are usually caused by stimuli
that reliably cause the emotions. And because the subjects are not aware of changes to their
emotional state, we can ascribe to them unconscious emotions. Hatzimoysis (2007) argues that
physiological responses do not constitute emotional experiences. I have shown that subliminal
affective priming can cause behavioral responses and I have argued that these behavioral
responses are emotional experiences.
The opponent of unconscious emotions could object that this is still not evidence of
unconscious emotions because it is unclear in what sense the experience is unconscious. That is,
it is not clear whether these experiences are P-conscious and A-unconscious, or P-unconscious
and A-unconscious. Recall that according to the definitional argument, if an experience is an
emotion then it is P-conscious. I rejected the claim that if an experience is an emotion then it is
P-conscious and A-conscious but left open the possibility that emotions require P-consciousness.
I concede that the inference from the behavioral evidence to the existence of P-conscious and Aunconscious emotion states is weak. However, there is some preliminary neurobiological
evidence that suggests that subjects in subliminal affective priming studies are in P-conscious
and A-unconscious emotion states.2 I believe that the best explanation of the behavioral and
neurobiological evidence is that some emotions are unconscious insofar as they are P-conscious
and A-unconscious.
Conclusion
I have shown that denying the possibility and existence of unconscious emotions requires
much more than the simple assertion that an unconscious emotion is nonsensical. One must first
take into account the possible dissociation of phenomenal consciousness and access
consciousness. With this distinction in mind there are various ways in which an emotion can be
unconscious.
According to the definitional argument, an experience is an emotion only if it is Pconscious. Therefore, only P-conscious, A-unconscious emotions are unconscious emotions
according to this argument. The evidential argument against unconscious emotions holds that the
relevant information is not enough to demonstrate the existence of unconscious emotions.
2
E.g., Schutter (2004) found that subliminally primed affectively charged stimuli have EEG recordings consistent
with P-conscious emotion experience in the absence of A-consciousness.
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However, when this argument is employed, as when Hatzimoysis (2007) employs it, the relevant
information is not considered. Upon a consideration of the behavioral evidence the best
explanation is that some emotions are either P-unconscious and A-unconscious or P-conscious
and A-unconscious. If we assume, as the definitional argument does, that emotions require Pconsciousness, then there is possible evidence of their existence in subliminal affective priming
studies. These studies have found behavioral and neurobiological evidence that together supports
the existence of unconscious emotions.
By reframing the debate and sketching a precise taxonomy of unconscious emotions I
have demonstrated that there is some evidence of unconscious emotions. Further research is
necessary to determine which cases of unconscious emotions exist.
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