Epistemology, Knowledge Production, and Social Change
Raymond V. Padilla
University of Texas at San Antonio
Paper presented at the conference Abriendo Brecha/Opening a Path: A Workshop & Conference
on Activist Scholarship in the Humanities and Social Sciences held at the University of Texas
at Austin, February 26-27, 2004.
Email: rpadilla@utsa.edu
Webpage: http://coehd.utsa.edu/users/rpadilla
Copyright © 2004 Raymond V. Padilla
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The intellectual malaise that persisted throughout the twentieth century in the Western
world in part reflected an ongoing crisis in epistemology. The arrival of the Einsteinian
revolution (Einstein, 1961; Russell, 1959) during the early part of the century, together with the
ensuing development of quantum physics, with its strange new worlds of probability and
uncertainty, brought a severe challenge to the classic Cartesian foundationalist view of
knowledge (Phillips & Burbules, 2000; Prigogine, 1996). How can one produce certain
knowledge, knowledge beyond doubt, in a universe that according to the physicists no longer can
be seen as having an absolute space or time? If space and time are relative, how can our
knowledge of the universe, and especially of the social world, aspire to certainty? If we take all
knowledge to be uncertain, or certain only within a relative frame of reference, how are we now
to determine the credibility of any knowledge claims? Who is credible and what is true became
increasingly problematic throughout the twentieth century as the absolute frames of reference of
the classical and the Newtonian worlds crumbled (Deutsch, 1997; Rosaldo, 1993).
As luck would have it, when Chicanas and Chicanos finally got access to academia during
the second half of the twentieth century, the intellectual malaise had quickened and the
postmodernist crisis was in full swing. The critique of classical epistemology made by the
postmodernists argued that no knowledge claims can be sustained absolutely (Featherstone,
1988; Fox & Miller, 1995; Turner, 1990). If this argument is accepted, does it mean that
knowledge producers are now trapped in a relativist limbo where knowledge claims must remain
indefinitely, vainly waiting for a universal warrant to come to the rescue? Should we declare
"the end of knowing" for Western culture, at least for the kind of knowing that claims to be
objective and universal? If such knowing is at an end, or even just in considerable doubt, what
does it mean to advocate for social change, given that social change always requires some
knowledge to drive it? In other words, social change inevitably entails specific knowledge
claims. How are those knowledge claims to be warranted (Fischer, 1985)? It is time to look
more deeply into the idea of knowing and to put it in a cross-cultural perspective.
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The current epistemological impasse in Western thought can not be effectively
circumvented strictly in terms of the English language. In English to know is to know is to
know. To know is to know positively and absolutely. However, switching to the Spanish
language opens epistemological spaces that are difficult to think about in English alone. This
point can be illustrated with an example.
Suppose that a visitor is looking to find someone named Juan García in some Mexican town
and the visitor does not know where Juan García lives. The visitor might go to any
neighborhood, meet a vendor in the street, and ask: “¿Dónde vive Juan García?” (Where does
Juan García live?) The answer might come back: “Se de él pero no lo conozco”. Now what are
we to make of this response if we translate it into English? Surely it would not be an accurate
translation to say, “I know him but I do not know him”. What’s going on here? The translation
problem appears to be that Spanish distinguishes between two quite different ways of knowing,
which are referenced by the words saber and conocer. Saber can be translated accurately into
English by the verb “to know”. What about conocer?
Conocer implies an interpersonal and a relational kind of knowing; a situated knowing that
depends on personal experience and interaction. To hear about someone or something is to know
(in the sense of saber) about the person or the thing, but it is not conocer. In the case of people
knowing each other, conocer implies a mutuality of knowing, a knowing that is achieved in a
relationship that is reciprocal between the knowing parties. Thus, conocer fundamentally can
not be absolute knowing because it is premised on a relationship between the knower and the
known and such a relationship can not be one of objectivity; it must be one of interconnectivity
and mutuality. Conocer thus opens a new epistemological space that is outside the postmodern
critique of universal knowledge (saber) because conocimiento, the knowledge produced by
conocer, makes no claim to objectivism or universalism. Nomothetic knowledge is outside the
scope of conocer. Yet, in one of those quirks of language, knowledge acquired through conocer
may be used to warrant knowledge derived through saber as in the expression: Se donde vive
porque lo conozco. (I know where he lives because I am acquainted with -- i.e., I know -- him.)
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The epistemological crisis of postmodernism thus acquires a different character when
considered across languages and cultures. Likewise, knowledge claims that drive social change
can not be viewed as epistemologically determined strictly within the English “to know” (saber).
The presence of the Spanish language in the Chicano community (as well as the larger Latino
community) opens a bifurcated epistemological space. In such a community, one should be able
to know abstractly (saber) as well as to know relationally (conocer). This epistemological
bifurcation, which is difficult to discern in English, has implications for creating a meaningful
relationship between knowledge production and social change. For surely it would not be wise
to predicate social change on knowledge that only attends to saber and that neglects conocer. In
promoting social change from the perspective of the Chicano community, the knowledge that
drives such change needs to be responsive to culture and context and should pay attention to both
knowing in the abstract (saber) and to knowing relationally (conocer).
From a strategic point of view, it appears that social change (what might be called lucha or
struggle) is more amenable to conocer than to saber type of knowing, even though there is a
dialectical relationship between the two. Figure 1 attempts to bring together saber and conocer
types of knowledge and their connection to the representation of self and social reality in the
context of stability and change. Stability is associated with saber and is epistemologically linear
and unidimensional. Saber type knowledge treats the self and social reality as “data”, i.e. as
given. What is given can not be questioned or changed because once revealed through saber, the
meaning and representation of the given are simply “handed down” by those who know (saber)
to those who do not know. Saber is collapsed epistemological space in which those who claim to
know base their knowledge claims on universal truths and objective reality which they alone can
access. Conocer knowledge, which is inherently local, becomes irrelevant for the savants who
prefer "objective knowledge" that is revealed through saber. Los que saben (those who know)
get to rule because they "discover" and uphold the rules while los que no saben (those who do
not know) must obey those who know and can not question the rules.
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Yet, conocer, because of its relational nature, is a way of knowing that can lead to the
construction and reconstruction of both self and social reality. In other words, social change can
be seen as a constructivist process that entails conocer. Figure 1 shows that conocer uncollapses
epistemological space by replacing the data or “given” character of universalist (saber) social
reality with relationally constructed (conocer) social reality. Figure 1 also shows that within
conocer the self and the social are seen as situational, whereas saber creates these as artifacts
produced with knowledge from the given.
Within the conocer epistemological space, social change can be approached from two very
different angles: By reconstructing the actual self and the social (i.e., by reworking the self and
social relations) or by reimagining the representations of the self and the social (Freire, 1970).
The movimiento Chicano attempted to do both. Moreover, there is a tetradic dialectic between
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the self, the social, and their respective representations. To change the social sooner or later, but
inevitably, leads to some kind of change in the self, and vice versa. To change the self or the
social inexorably leads to some kind of change in their representations as well, and vice versa.
This means that to become involved in changing representations is to become involved in social
change; to change the self is also to engage in social change (for better or for worse); and to
change the social is to expect change in the self.
Beyond the bifurcation of knowing and its connection to social change, one also must be
concerned with the production and application of knowledge. Within a bifurcated
epistemological space, to produce knowledge is to produce it in the service of stability or change.
Social stability is necessary for society in order to consolidate its goals and activities and to
reenergize itself. Social change is essential when social activity has become stagnant, when
injustice affects a significant portion of the population, or when truth has given way to
appearances and self interest.
Figure 2 presents a view of knowledge production in the service of both lucha, or struggle
for social change, and personal liberation or enlightenment. In Figure 2, the dialectic of stability
and change already discussed is assumed to subtend lucha and liberación. The goal and manner
of knowledge production and its relation to lucha and liberación also are shown in Figure 2. In
this model, personal liberation entails enlightenment. Enlightenment can be achieved as the
result of a personal quest for truth. To be enlightened is to know (saber) by being plugged into
the eternal truths that are stable over time and across space. The quest for truth requires
reflection and the setting of self determined goals and learning activities by the individual.
Lucha, on the other hand, entails distributed cognition (Putnam & Borko, 2000). It implies
the quest for justice which is achieved through knowing (conocer) and social change. The locus
of conocer is discourse communities that are able to establish collective goals and learning
activities. The dialectic between reflection and dialogue creates the possibility for the production
of knowledge that is socially conscious. The dialectic between saber and conocer gives rise to a
creative tension between the given (“data”) and the constructed, between stability and change.
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The application of knowledge moves in two directions: One focuses on the individual and
the other on the collectivity. Figure 3a shows the application of knowledge with the individual
as the focus. In this figure, the production of knowledge, as already described, is represented by
the icon on the right hand side of the figure. The application of saber knowledge is mediated by
the practice of self discipline. Self discipline is a prerequisite for the inculcation of professional
behaviors and for creating a person of knowledge. The knowing person is able to explore nature
in a disciplined manner and to establish a relationship with it. It is within this consciously
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developed relationship to nature that specific issues are engaged, such as the nature of space,
time, energy, life, creation, spirit, etc., issues dealing with science and spiritual life.
Figure 3b shows the application of knowledge with the collectivity as the focus. Here
knowledge application entails the practice of citizenship. Citizenship includes the cultivation of
civic life and the creation of leaders as public servants (Greenleaf, Frick, & Spears, 1996).
Through the practice of leadership and civic life, a set of relations is established by each
individual with society. It is within this set of social relations that specific collective issues can
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be explored, such as justice, ethics, philanthropy, politics, etc., issues having to do with our need
to get along with others and to lead productive lives.
To conclude, we have seen that the intellectual malaise of the twentieth century and the
postmodern crisis in epistemology can not be overcome within a unitary knowing based
exclusively on saber. On the other hand, the bifurcated epistemological space that is
characteristic of Spanish and Hispanic culture opens up conocer knowing which can be used to
rearticulate the connections between social stability and change, the search for truth and personal
enlightenment, and the collective search for justice and positive social change.
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