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CHAPTER 2
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FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS
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In the force projection era, the Army relies largely on a CONUS-based force with a relatively
small forward presence that can rapidly project combat power anywhere in the world. ISR
provides the commander with the intelligence he needs to successfully plan and to execute
force projection operations. As stated in Chapter 1, ISR support to force projection operations
rests on the understanding of five principles: the commander drives intelligence, intelligence
synchronization, split-based operations, tactical tailoring, and broadcast dissemination. These
principles, executed in joint, combined, or interagency environments, are critical to successful
force projection operations.
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SECTION I – MISSION
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2-1. The JCF supports the projection of US combat power through the eight stages of force
projection operations
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SECTION I I – EXECUTION
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PEACETIME ISR OPERATIONS
2-2. Successful ISR support during force projection operations relies on continuous peacetime
information collection and intelligence production. Peacetime ISR operations support
contingency planning and develop baseline knowledge of multiple potential threats and
operational environments. They engage and challenge the Intelligence BOS to respond
effectively to the commanders' contingency planning intelligence requirements. During
peacetime, commanders conduct critical examinations of MI force structures, operations, and
training. These examinations ultimately lead to a mission-ready ISR force, which supports the
needs of the commander, and meets the key force projection imperatives of flexibility,
scalability, and tailorability.
2-3. Peacetime ISR operations are particularly important to corps and division commanders. In
force projection operations, the Army force (ARFOR) in the joint force will be drawn largely from
CONUS-based corps and divisions. In addition, a corps or division commander could also be
appointed the ARFOR or JCF commander. Corps and division commanders must, therefore, be
prepared not only to provide the ARFOR to the JCF but also to assume the duties of the
ARFOR or JCF commander. Both responsibilities require the commander to place additional
emphasis on intelligence readiness. The corps and division commanders need intelligence to
support contingency-based training and planning. They need the broad understanding of the
operational environment of the contingency area that comes from continuous interaction with
higher echelon and joint intelligence organizations. Commanders must focus and drive the
intelligence system daily to ensure this support is available and that their forces and staffs are
ready to conduct force projection operations.
2-4. ISR operations must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all potential threats to the
force as a whole throughout force projection operations. This is especially critical during the
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deployment and entry operations stages of force projection. During these stages, US Forces
are particularly vulnerable to threat actions. Intelligence personnel must, therefore, emphasize
the delivery of ISR products that indicate a basic change to the nature of US operations in
theater.
EIGHT STAGES OF FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS
2-5. The JCF supports the eight stages of force projection operations.

Mobilization.

Pre-deployment activity.

Deployment.

Entry operations.

Operations.
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War termination and post-conflict operations.

Redeployment and reconstitution.

Demobilization.
These stages are not necessarily distinct or sequential and therefore present the commander
with planning and execution challenges. Intelligence personnel and organizations must be
prepared to assist the commander in overcoming these challenges.
MOBILIZATION
2-6. Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a
state of readiness for war or other national emergency. The Army Mobilization and Operations
Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) and FM 100-17 provide guidance for mobilization of
assets for contingencies and large protracted conflicts or wars. To prepare for and execute
mobilization, commanders and G2s (S2s) should consider the following:

In peacetime, Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) units' plan, train, and
prepare to accomplish mobilization and deployment tasks. MI units establish habitual
training relationships with their supported AC and RC units as well as higher echelon
intelligence organizations as identified in existing OPLANs.

Force requirements are identified in OPLANs and concept plans. Reserve augmentation
programs organize and integrate AC and RC MI units to meet the requirements in these
plans. Individual manpower requirements for military, civilian, and contractor personnel are
also identified.

Selected RC MI units and individuals are alerted then proceed to designated mobilization
stations.
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At higher echelons, mobilization prompts MI units that are consolidated for training to detach
their assets to deploying forces.
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Mobilization stations and parent units will begin providing current intelligence to their RC
units as mobilization begins.
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2-7. During the mobilization phase, the S2 should—
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Assist the mobilizing RC unit by preparing and conducting intelligence training and threat
update briefings and by disseminating intelligence.
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Identify force requirements for the different types of operations and Contingency Plans
(CONPLANs).
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If possible, use prior coordinated Individuals Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) to fill gaps
created by personnel shortages. These IMAs should already have a working knowledge of
unit SOPs and understand the mission.
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Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and Indications and warning (I&W) data.
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Conduct or coordinate CI and OPSEC training and operations.
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Manage IR and RII from their unit and subordinate units.
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Evaluate reporting.
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Update collection planning.
PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY
2-8. Predeployment activity provides the foundation for subsequent force projection operations.
During this stage, commanders ensure AC and RC MI organizations are trained and equipped
to conduct ISR operations. Commanders integrate mobilization and deployment tasks into unit
Mission Essential Task List (METL) and training. Commanders also emphasize and integrate
critical aspects of force projection into battle tasks and planning.
2-9. In planning force projection operations, the commander establishes intelligence
requirements, which direct peacetime intelligence operations supporting contingency planning.
Key contingency planning ingredients are to stay out front in intelligence planning by developing
broad baseline knowledge on contingency areas, and to understand how to get intelligence
support. As OPLANs are activated, the commander focuses on intelligence to support specific
mission decisions and planning requirements. In addition, the commander begins planning for
the crossover point in intelligence when tactical ISR assets within the AO replace initial reliance
on higher echelon intelligence.
2-10. The G2 (S2) supports peacetime contingency planning with Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (IPB) products and databases on likely contingency areas. The OPLAN identifies the
ISR requirements supporting that plan, to include:
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Identification of MI units providing ISR support, both in and outside the AO.

Command and support relationships of collection assets (agencies and systems) at each
echelon.
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Report and request procedures not covered in unit tactical standing operating procedures.

Sequence of deployment of MI personnel and equipment. Early deployment of key MI
personnel and equipment is essential for force protection and combat readiness.
Composition of initial and follow-on deploying ISR assets is influenced by METT-T,
availability of communications, availability of lift, and ability of the national collection system
to support the operation.
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Communications architecture supporting both intelligence staffs and collection assets.
Signal commands must be involved in communications planning.
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Friendly vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence threats and plans for conducting OPSEC,
deception, and other force protection measures. Counterintelligence (CI) personnel must
begin this type of planning as early as possible to ensure adequate CI support to force
protection of deploying and initial entry forces.
The OPLAN also establishes collection strategies and plans that will activate upon alert
notification. For smooth transition from predeployment to entry, intelligence staffs must
coordinate collection and communications plans before the crisis occurs.
2-11. The G2 (S2) and MI units must continually monitor and update their OPLANs to reflect the
evolving situation, especially during crisis situations. National intelligence activities monitor
regional threats throughout the world and can answer some intelligence requirements
supporting the development of OPLANs. The commander and G2 (S2) must be proactive in
focusing national and theater intelligence on emerging requirements.
2-12. Upon alert notification, intelligence staffs update estimates and IPB products needed to
support command decisions on force composition, deployment priorities and sequence, and the
AO. At the strategic level, planners use the updated IPB products to assist in developing the
logistics preparation of the theater plan, which attempts to minimize requirements for strategic
lift and maximize the in-theater support capabilities. MI organizations at all echelons reassess
their collection requirements immediately after alert notification. Collection managers begin
verifying planning assumptions within the OPLANs. MDCI and other ISR personnel provide
force protection support to optimize OPSEC and antiterrorism measures.
2-13. Throughout the predeployment and deployment stages, intelligence activities provide
deploying forces with the most recent intelligence on the AO. G2 (S2) and MI units also update
technical databases and situation graphics. The S2 must
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Perform IPB early and continuously. (See FM 33-1, FM 34-130, FM 41-10.)

Establish appropriate relationships; establish higher, lower, and lateral coordination points of
contact.
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Continuously conduct and update Collection Management (CM), Intelligence Operations
(IO), and ISR synchronization planning.
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Plan imagery coverage for target nomination, validation, and BDA.
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Require from collection assets, timelines for preplanned and dynamic collection
requests.
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Plan synchronization through all five steps of the intelligence cycle.
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Ensure each PIR is related to a specific operational decision. (See FM 34-2 and
FM 100-6.)
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Prepare an Intelligence Synchronization Matrix (ISM) and backward plans so collection
production efforts are executed with the operation; deliver focused intelligence to support
operational decisions.
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Coordinate with the S3 and signal officer for Electronic Warfare (EW) offensive and
electronic deception operations, specifically for target nomination, no-fire target criteria,
protected frequencies, and synchronized EW effort during all phases of the operation.
Plan BDA requirements.
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Refine, manage, and update Specific orders and requests (SOR). Monitor and maintain
synchronization.
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Anticipate and initiate collection early against long lead-time requirements.
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Ensure CCIR process is continuous and the intelligence cycle and IEW operations remain
tied to the commander's decisions and concept of operations.
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Identify collection gaps after synthesizing available information on the AO and coordinate
the collection efforts of existing intelligence organizations. (Consider national, echelon
above corps (EAC), other US forces and services, and host nation (HN) support.)
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Develop a collection strategy and plan that factors in PIR, IR, and METT-TC.
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Submit RII and other requests for support to adjacent, higher, and HN units.
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Develop the intelligence team. A unit may need to augment its S2 staff to include area
experts, TECHINT LNOs, linguists, HUMINT collectors, intelligence analysts, PSYOP, CA,
and CI agents. Tailor the size and sophistication of the deploying unit’s intelligence staff to
the mission.
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Determine the degree of support available from higher. Clearly define inter-relationships
between maneuver brigade, ARFOR, and JCF intelligence organizations. If a division
intelligence support element (DISE) is formed determine its capabilities, location,
connectivity requirements. Determine if DISE will expand to a full ACE as lodgment
operations are completed.
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
Develop intelligence and intelligence related communications architecture. Build the
supporting hardware systems around the Army’s ASAS and integrate them with other Army,
joint intelligence, and communication capabilities.
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Plan on requirements to support the 24-hour operations. Plan the automation,
communications capacity, and personnel necessary to provide continuous intelligence
requirements management, collection, processing, and reporting.
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Plan all procedures to "pull" specific intelligence products and reports, obtain status of
collection, and "push" the current intelligence picture from the lodgment back to the ARFOR
and JCF commanders if not in theater.
 Plan all links to higher intelligence organizations, including the Joint Intelligence Center
(JIC) and the elements designed to leverage theater intelligence
 Coordinate with and understand the capabilities of the JCF to include the National
Intelligence Support Team (NIST) if formed.

Determine transportation availability (aircraft or naval vessel) for deployment.
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Determine all sustainability requirements.
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Determine transportation requirements/availability when deployed
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Determine intelligence release requirements and restrictions (Releasability to allies, host
nation)
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Review Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Rules of Engagement (ROE), international
laws, and other agreements with particular emphasis on the effect that they have on
intelligence collection operations (Coordinate with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) on these
issues.)
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Establish force deployment priorities to support intelligence collection and analysis
operations based upon METT-TC. Sequence initial required forces and capabilities, build-up
priorities, and follow-on forces to ensure a sequenced plan, a tailored force, and established
command and support relationships. Consider sensors, processors, preprocessors,
HUMINT and CI. Maintain unit integrity. Plan phased communications architecture (build
redundancy when possible).
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Ensure intelligence links provide the early entry commander vital access to multi-source
Army and joint intelligence collection assets, processing systems, and databases. Ensure
collection is synchronized with production, and intelligence is synchronized with operations
(specify reporting procedures and timelines). Finalize the IEW OPLAN (terrain and
communications deconfliction).

Coordinate with the MI commander on his tactical decision making process.
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Understand the MI commander's specified tasks, implied tasks, task organization, concept
of operation (the organization, deployment, allocation, and employment of subordinate MI
units), and coordination requirements with forward maneuver units.
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Establish the intelligence crossover point. Estimate the time and establish measurable
criteria to indicate when you have reached that point. Intelligence crossover occurs when
enough tactical collection assets are in theater to reduce the dependency upon strategic or
national assets. (See FM 34-1, Chapter 3.)
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Incorporate all augmentation and support elements quickly within your unit, SOP, and
training.
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Update databases to support the IPB process that will follow. Practice using INTELLINK.
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Support force protection. Intelligence operations identify, locate, and target an enemy's
ability to target and affect friendly forces, facilities, and operations. Intelligence support must
conduct threat and risk assessment. Develop a counter-reconnaissance plan.
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Develop a familiarity with supporting units.
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Using the Multi-discipline Counterintelligence (MDCI) process, assess and review friendly
vulnerabilities and the threat's ability to exploit them. Inform commanders and operators on
MDCI analysis. Train your MDCI analysts to conduct reverse IPB and think like the enemy
S2, to include the enemy's perception of friendly centers of gravity and how he will attack or
influence them. Incorporate your MDCI analysis into the situation and decision briefings and
all planning (especially deception planning). Assign CI sections appropriate missions and
analytical responsibilities, such as threat analysis, vulnerability assessments and OPSEC
assessments.
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Establish access to national SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT and CI databases, automated links to
joint service, coalition, and HN sources
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Support further CONPLAN and OPLAN development. MI units continually monitor and
update their CONPLANs to reflect the evolving situation, especially during crises.
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Immediately before deployment, update deploying forces with the most recent intelligence
on the AO and update your technical databases and situation graphics.
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Develop contingency tailored packages that allow the G2/S2 to place the right force support
teams in a deployable posture with an adequate amount of training.
DEPLOYMENT
2-14. Success in force projection operations hinges on the capability of airlift and sealift assets
to move forces to the AO, as well as on the timely deployment of air and seaport transportation,
terminal, and deployment control units. The size and composition of forces requiring lift are
based on METT-TC, the availability of pre-positioned assets, the capabilities of host nation
support, and the forward-presence of US Forces. Force or tactical tailoring is the process used
to determine what is the correct mix and sequence of deploying units.
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2-15. One of the first tailored ISR assets to deploy with the force G2 or the brigade S2 is the
Division Intelligence Support Element (DISE). The DISE is the initial forward intelligence
support team of split-based operations. The mission of the DISE is to provide the deployed
commander accurate, detailed, continuous, and timely intelligence in support of the rapid
introduction of US Forces. Depending on the size and mission of the deployed force, the DISE
may be the only MI asset actually deployed in country to support the G2 (S2). In large
operations, the DISE may deploy with and support the early entry force G2 (S2) until the
complete processing capability of the unit’s Analysis and Control Element (ACE) arrives. Once
the ACE is in place, the DISE rejoins the ACE, moves forward to support the tactical command
post, or moves to wherever its capabilities may be required. The two types of tailorable DISE
configurations are the Mini-DISE (manportable packages), and DISE (vehicular). Together,
these DISE configurations provide the commander with a robust intelligence capability in
support of a deploying force.
2-16. During deployment, intelligence organizations in the rear such as the Corps Military
Intelligence Support Element (CMISE) and the ACE of the theater MI brigade take advantage of
modern satellite communications (SATCOM), broadcast technology, and automatic data
processing (ADP) systems to provide graphic and textual intelligence updates to the forces en
route. En route updates help eliminate information voids and allow the commander to adjust the
OPORD prior to arrival in theater.
2-17. Intelligence units extend established networks to connect intelligence staffs and collection
assets at various stages of the deployment flow. Where necessary, units establish new
communications paths to meet unique demands of the mission. The theater ACE and the
CMISE play a critical role in making communications paths, networks, and intelligence
databases available to deploying forces.
2-18. Space-based systems play an important part in supporting ISR during the deployment and
the subsequent stages of force projection operations by:

Providing communications links between forces en route and in CONUS.

Providing I&W information from national intelligence systems and organizations.

Permitting MI collection assets to accurately determine their position through the Global
Positioning System (GPS).

Providing timely and accurate weather information to all commanders through the Integrated
Meteorological System (IMETS).
ENTRY OPERATIONS
2-19. Force protection and situation development dominate ISR activities during initial entry
operations. Intelligence staffs attempt to identify all threats to arriving forces and assist the
commander in developing force protection measures. During initial entry operations, EAC
organizations provide major intelligence support. This support includes providing access to
departmental and joint intelligence, and deploying scalable EAC intelligence assets. The entire
effort focuses downwardly to provide tailored support to deploying and deployed echelons in
response to their commanders' PIR and IR.
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2-20. Collection and processing capabilities are enhanced as ISR assets build up in the
deployment area. Particular attention is given to the buildup of the in-theater capability required
to conduct sustained ISR operations. As the buildup continues, intelligence staffs strive to
reduce total dependence on extended split-based "top-driven" intelligence from outside the AO.
As organic ISR assets flow into the theater, intelligence staffs begin to rely on them for tactical
intelligence although national and theater organization remains a source of tactical and
operational intelligence.
2-21. Intelligence staffs provide the commander support in planning the composition and
deployment of follow-on combat, CS, and CSS units. As ARFOR enter the theater of
operations, the JCF J2 implements, and where necessary, modifies the theater intelligence
architecture planned during predeployment. Deploying intelligence assets establish liaison with
staffs and units already present in the AO. Liaison personnel and basic communications should
be in place prior to the scheduled arrival of parent commands. MI units establish intelligence
communications networks to support combat commanders. Coordinating staffs at all levels
establish reporting and request procedures to ensure the timely receipt of intelligence.
2-22. CONUS and other secure intelligence support bases outside the AO continue to support
deployed units. In a mature theater, as systems such as Joint Surveillance, Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) begin operating, units equipped with the JSTARS ground station
module (GSM) or the common ground station (CGS) will be able to receive downlink data in
near real time (NRT) tailored to each unit's area of operation. Systems capable of rapid receipt
and processing of intelligence from national systems and high capacity, long-haul
communications systems are critical to the success of split-based support of a force projection
operation. These systems can provide a continuous flow of intelligence, including annotated
imagery products, to satisfy many operational needs. Examples of these type systems are the
Imagery Processing and Dissemination System (IPDS), the Electronic Processing and
Dissemination System (EPDS), TROJAN SPIRIT, and SUCCESS radio.
2-23. Intelligence staffs help plan friendly deception, deep attack, and other operations that
create conditions for decisive operations. They also adjust collection activities to look deeper
into the battle space as combat strength builds and begin to concentrate on situation and target
development.

Continue to conduct force protection planning.

Monitor the buildup of the in-theater capability required to conduct sustained IEW operations
and to reduce dependence on split-based, "top driven" intelligence from outside the AO. As
organic IEW assets flow into the theater, assess their reliability for tactical intelligence.
(National and theater organizations will still remain sources of strategic intelligence.)

Determine intelligence crossover point.

Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W data.
— Routinely debrief troops.
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— Use local nationals employed by or in frequent contact with your force to provide information
(area experts must analyze it).

Ensure liaison personnel and basic communications are in place prior to the scheduled
arrival of parent commands.
 Deploy HUMINT forces into theater as early as possible.
 Contact HN or civil authority. (Contact CA units; see FM 41-10.)
 Contact other services.
 Contact lateral units.
 Coordinate with supporting CI unit for CI support to force protection.

Emplace ACT, DISE, NIST, and other elements.
 Establish security.
 Establish communications.
 Establish analytical capability.
 Perform IPB.
 Continue to conduct CM and intelligence synchronization planning. Recommend revised
PIR and IR. Refine, manage, and update SOR.

Evaluate reporting.

Consider space requirements, power, and logistical support for high use or unique items.

Conduct situation development, target development, and support to targeting. During this
stage as combat strength increases, the unit's organic tactical systems will conduct situation
and target development (intelligence crossover point).

Develop measurable criteria to evaluate the results of the collection plan. Reassesses—
 "Push" versus "pull" requirements.
 Communications architecture.
 Reporting procedures and timelines.
 Crossover point in intelligence.
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 Intelligence support to OPLANs and OPORDs, branches, and sequels (to include
planning follow-on forces).
OPERATIONS
2-24. With sufficient combat power and resources in place, the commander shifts his focus from
ISR support for deployment to support required for sustained operations. At the beginning of
the operations stage, intelligence reaches the crossover point where tactical intelligence
becomes the commander's primary source of support, replacing top-driven national and theater
intelligence. The commander uses both tactical and operational intelligence to decisively
engage and defeat the enemy in combat operations. In Stability Operations and Support
Operations the commander may use all levels of intelligence to accomplish his mission.
2-25. During operations, intelligence staffs and units support the development and execution of
plans by identifying threat centers of gravity and decisive points on the battlefield. The G2 (S2)
ensures the collection management and synchronization processes focus on the commander's
PIR. MI units continually evolve their concepts of employment to reflect changes in the
operation.
War Termination and Post-conflict Operations
2-26. Upon cessation of hostilities or truce, deployed forces enter a new stage of force
projection operations. Post-conflict operations focus on restoring order, reestablishing host
nation infrastructure, preparing for redeployment of forces, and planning residual presence of
US Forces. While post-conflict operations strive to transition from war to peace, there remains a
possibility of resurgent hostilities by individuals and forces. As during deployment, this stage
and the next will place renewed emphasis on force protection. During this stage, commanders
redirect their PIR and IR to support units conducting restoration operations. These might
include:

Engineer units conducting mine clearing or infrastructure reconstruction operations.

Medical and logistics units providing humanitarian relief.

Military police units providing law and order assistance.
REDEPLOYMENT AND RECONSTITUTION:
2-27. As combat power and resources decrease in the AO, force protection and I&W become
the focus of the commander's intelligence requirements. This in turn drives the selection of
those MI units that must remain deployed and those, which may redeploy.

Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W data.

Continue to conduct intelligence support to force protection planning.

Request intelligence BOS support (theater and national systems) and provide intelligence in
support of redeployment and reconstitution (reverse intelligence crossover point).
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DEMOBILIZATION
2-28. Demobilization is the stage where MI individuals and units return to pre-mobilization
posture or predeployment activities. MI units resume contingency-oriented peacetime ISR
operations. RC MI units deactivate and return to peacetime activities. S2 requirements include:

Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W data.

Capture consolidated databases.

Capture lessons learned via AARs (doctrine and TTP).

Maintain intelligence readiness (e.g., training).

Adjust MTOEs and evaluate the need for IMAs.
INTELLIGENCE READINESS
2-29. In a JCF force projection operation, higher echelons will provide intelligence for situation
and target development to lower echelons (top down) until the tactical ground force completes
entry and secures the lodgment area. The JCF J2 may be reluctant to push everything down
through tactical intelligence channels due to the volume of the intelligence information available.
The S2 may receive support on a “smart push” basis, and needs to know his requirements to be
able to do a “smart pull.”
2-30. The most significant change in the evolution of force projection operations is the enhanced
information flow through hierarchical and non-hierarchical networks (computer, communications,
and personal). The S2 should—

Review available databases on assigned contingency Areas of Interest (AI); conduct IPB on
these AIs; and develop appropriate IPB products.

Be aware of higher HQ SOPs and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) manuals for specific
CM guidance.


Prepare, practice, and conduct information collection activities as part of
in-garrison IO rehearsals.

Preplan and practice an intelligence "surge" on likely contingency crises.

Prepare and practice coordination from pre-deployment through redeployment with
personnel from IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, Staff Weather Officer (SWO), Civil Affairs (CA),
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Special Operations Forces units, to include
databases and connectivity.
Ensure the following are a part of the daily operating environment:
 Reserve Component (RC) and other augmentation.
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 Line numbers and SOPs including a linguist plan with proficiency requirements (alert
through early entry phases of deployment).
 Training (individual and collective).

Form ad hoc intelligence links and networks early on to meet a developing contingency.

Incorporate, request, and receive intelligence from unfamiliar sources (linguists, MI
augmentation, other services); exploit Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private
Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) once a crisis emerges.

Exchange communications protocols with theater, higher HQ, subordinate, and lateral units.

Forward all RIIs to the higher HQ IAW SOPs.
2-31. The J2, G2, and S2 can focus intelligence downward based on the commander's needs.

Understand the JCF J2's multiple echelon and broadcast dissemination capability to ensure
near real time reporting to all deployed, in transit, or preparing to deploy forces.

Maintain an intelligence database on the battlefield environment and threats for each
contingency. The S2 must state and record the CCIR as PIR, subordinate SOR and SIR,
and include the following:
 For the battlefield environment, the commander's approval of the AI, to include separate
ground, air, littoral waters, and political AIs.
 Maps, terrain, and weather products. Request from National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) hard copies (unclassified or at the lowest classification). Request
authority to declassify these products locally.
 Digitized products (map sheets for ASAS, terrain data, and imagery).
 Physical environmental information. The TERRA BASE program allows S2s to template
the effects of terrain on communications and direct fire. During mission analysis, TERRA
BASE or other automated terrain products (WINCATS, TOPOSKINNER) provide the S2
a tool to help the commander visualize how terrain can affect friendly and enemy forces.
These products can illuminate terrain effects for subordinate commanders in the
OPORD brief. [Technique: Use the program at Home Station to develop and sustain
proficiency.] The supporting engineer staff officer may also have terrain visualization
products.
 Threat or potential threats. The intelligence community, primarily the National Ground
Intelligence Center (NGIC) and open sources produce products useful for intelligence
readiness. These products can be tailored to best support the commander. (See FM 343 for information on intelligence analysis.) INTELLINK will be an S2's primary access to
any type of requested strategic intelligence. Examples of strategic level products
include—
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Global security forecast.
Battlefield development plans.
Automated and hardcopy databases.
Arms proliferation and military power studies related to the weapons acquisition
strategies and the overall military power and potential of selected foreign military
forces.
TECHINT and User Bulletins.
CIA World Fact Book and DIA country studies.
Open source studies and articles.
Other services.
INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS
2-32. Theater and national intelligence units monitor regional and global threats to provide I&W
intelligence to the National Command Authority (NCA) and military commanders. I&W
intelligence flows to strategic, operational, and tactical commanders; it prevents surprise,
reduces risk, and supports development and refinement of CONPLANs. The S2 must ensure
the commander identifies PIR, IR, and targeting requirements for each assigned contingency
area. The S2 should—

Conduct CM and synchronization planning on I&W requirements.

Review and refine unit collection plans and preplanned SOR for each contingency area.

Review and modify reporting procedures for I&W contingency areas. This may involve
changing intelligence reporting (e.g., increasing reporting on one area and decreasing
reporting on another) and message routing addresses and precedence (e.g., FLASH
designation).

Prioritize and forward SOR to higher headquarters.

Disseminate intelligence and information to the commander, staff, and subordinate units.

Coordinate for direct dissemination when possible.

Recommend to the commander whether to maintain or increase unit readiness levels; plan
and surge the intelligence effort for the impending operation; or move the unit from its
current mission to contingency, branch, or subsequent operations.

.
Adjust intelligence readiness steps according to pre-crisis I&W.
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