Introduction to Social Philosophy, Lecture 9
John Dupré
Interpretation and Empathy vs. D-N Explanation
A radical rejection of the scientific model of explanation for social phenomena comes from the claim
that human actions must be understood 'from the inside', i.e. in terms of the agent's reasons, and that
this is quite distinct from the subsumption of an event under laws. This idea was particularly clearly
and forcefully articulated in the mid-twentieth century by philosophers of history R. G. Collingwood
and William Dray. (The further readings in Martin and Mcintyre, especially Taylor and Geertz
developing the interpretational perspective, and Follesdal criticising it, are recommended as more
recent contributions to this continuing debate.)
Events vs. Actions
Collingwood distinguishes events from actions in terms of the inside (action) and outside (event) of
what people do. Actions are things done by human agents for reasons. The same event may constitute
different actions according to the psychological situation. E.g. waving my arm in the air may constitute
drawing attention to myself, waving goodbye to a friend, signalling the beginning of the attack, etc.
This suggests that the external perspective cannot even say what action is being performed.
Collingwood makes a related claim: once we have identified the action, which involves identifying the
reasons for the action, it is already explained, and there is no further need for a D-N explanation.
The Belief-Desire Model of Action Explanation
The rational explanation of an action is generally understood as involving two elements: the goal of the
agent and the beliefs of the agent about the circumstances relevant to the action. E.g., Why are you
walking in that direction? I want a Mars bar, and I believe there's a sweet shop over there (and that
sweet shops usually sell Mars bars). This is often referred to as the belief-desire model. A
sophisticated elaboration of the model is rational choice theory, to which we shall turn next semester.
What is the Relation of the Rational Explanation of an Action to the D-N Explanation of the
Event that Constitutes it?
According to Hempel, the internal perspective is simply a heuristic device for suggesting explanatory
generalisations. Dray's response is that D-N explanation of an action is insufficient. This is relate to
the underdetermination of the action by the event. However, the D-N theorist may reply that if we
provide sufficient elaboration of the causal context we will finally provide sufficient information to
uniquely identify the event. Here we approach issues connected to the Mind-Body problem: are mental
entities (beliefs, desires) ultimately constituted by physical things (e.g. states of the brain)?
Empathy
Collingwood and Dray defend the methodological claim that in history explanation requires empathic
understanding of the historical agent's action. We must imaginatively put ourselves in the situation of
the agent and see how that situation would have made the action undertaken reasonable. We do not (of
course) have to accept the motives and beliefs of the agent. This raises two kinds of concerns:
1.
2.
Is this kind of empathetic identification possible? Can we really know what it was like to be Julius
Caesar, or Adolf Hitler?
Is it necessary. If we know psychological laws that determine that people in such and such
circumstances will behave in such and such a way, does it matter whether we can imagine what it
would be like to be in that situation? One response to this question would be to nsist on the
distinction between explanation and understanding, and claim that we cannot have the latter until
we can imagine what it would be like to be in the situation we are claiming to explain.