Week 3 Root Questions
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Has conflict increased since the end of the Cold War?
o What was the prevalent type of conflict
 Post WWII, but prior the end of the Cold War
 Post Cold War
o What areas are most prone to conflict?
 What are the driving causal factors in those conflicts?
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What is nationalism?
o Is it good or bad?
o Is ‘religious fanatacism’ another form of nationalism?
 If so, how do we change our approach to combating violent forms of it?
o Does the US truly have a blind spot with regard to its own nationalistic attitude that
makes it more difficult to deal with conflict in the rest of the world?
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What are some of the causal factors for internal conflict?
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Do ‘ancient hatreds’ exist as uniform motivating forces within an ethnic or religious group?
o How do ancient hatreds become identified as the source of conflict?
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Is genocide preventable?
o What causes it?
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Given the types of conflicts that have occurred, what can we learn from them and apply in
the form of policy or action to reduce the number of future conflicts?
- Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 39, no. 5, 2002, pp. 615-637
Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Wallensteen, Peter; Eriksson, Mikael; Sollenberg, Margareta;
Strand, Havard
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The overall probability of conflict rose slowly in the last two decades of the Cold War
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The recent decline after the end of the Cold War has brought the probability of a country
being in conflict to a level corresponding to the 1950s and lower than at any later time during
the Cold War
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The probability of a country being involved in a conflict has been on a steady decline
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The hazard of armed conflict was reduced by the ending of the Cold War
o But, the total number of conflicts in the world is twice as high as at the end of the
Cold War
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Internal conflict has been the dominant form of conflict throughout most of the post WWII
period
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John Mueller argues that the institution of war is in decline
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Clustering of conflict
o Post WWII
 Central America, Caribbean, South America
 East Central Europe, Balkans, Middle East
 Africa
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Collecting data on wars is hard
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Categorization of type of conflict is hard
o Two non-gov’t warring entities is not covered (inter communal war)
Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 45, no. 5, 2008, pp. 697-710
Harbom, Lotta: Melander, Erik; Wallensteen, Peter
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Basic unit of any conflict is a dyad
o A pair of primary warring parties
o Interstate = gov’t vs gov’t
o Intrastate = gov’t vs rebel group
 Can have multiple dyad
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Findings
o Third part mediators biased toward the gov’t have a positive effect on a negotiated
settlement
o Conflicts involving dyads with religious claims are less likely to be settled through
peace agreements
o The durability of peace agreements between signatories to a peace agreement is not
affected by excluding other rebel groups
o The number of conflicts with multiple dyads has risen from 1970s levels and has
stayed high
 May be due to the exit of colonial powers
 Now, more groups fighting each other instead of combining to fight
the colonial power
 Surmise that the relative proliferation of conflicts with more than one active
rebel group is connected to outside interference in internal conflicts in weak
states
o Rarely do more than 3 rebel groups clash with the gov’t over the same issue at the
same time
o The average number of dyads active in the same conflict has increased, but not to the
level expected
o The major shift toward dyadic complexity occurred in the early 1970s and appears to
have more to do with Cold War dynamics and decolonization than with the ending of
the Cold War
Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of Contemporary Deadly Conflict
Security Studies 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998), 1-50
Byman, Daniel and Van Evera, Stephen
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Main point: Conflict has not increased since the end of the Cold War
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7 causes of civil violence stand out in importance in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods
1. Collapse of the post-WWII empires
2. A lack of regime legitimacy
3. State weakness
4. Communal hegemonism
5. Revolutionary ideology
6. Aristocratic intransigence
7. Superpower proxy wars
1. Collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia example
- Illegitimate regimes
- Commingled hostile populations
- Contested borders
- Outside interference
2. Lack of regime legitimacy
- Rise/growth of restive middle class in authoritarian states
- Lack of regime accountability
- Move to democratization may spark war
 Old elites manipulate hatreds to gain/maintain power
 Gives political space to hardened extremists who won’t compromise
- ***Democratization causes peace between mature democracies, but can trigger war in
multi-ethnic authoritarian states
- Loss of legitimacy of the Soviet model
3. State weakness
- Spread of small arms to rebel groups
- Lack of superpower aid
4. Communal hegemonism
- Aspiration of religious, ethnic, clan or class groups for hegemony over others
- More likely when one of the first three cases above happens
5. Revolutionary idealism
- Groups adopt extreme goals and tactics that preclude compromise (i.e.
Marxism/Leninism or extremist Islam)
6. Aristocratic intransigence
- Refusal of elites in some steeply stratified states to share power and wealth
 Nicaragua, El Salvador
7. Cold War proxies
- Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, etc.
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Since 1989, the loss of gov’t legitimacy and communal hegemonism have been the most
important sources of conflict
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FIRST CONCLUSION: Civil wars will diminish in the decades ahead, BUT,
democratization in multiethnic states will raise serious risks of conflict
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In recent years, civil war has replaced international war as the dominant form of war and
nearly replaced it as the only form of war
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Democratization is inevitable, but it will often happen in multiethnic states where it will
unleash the dogs of war
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3 prescriptions
1. Democratize deliberately
- Don’t try it everywhere
- OK with legitimate regimes or when intransigent aristocrats are in power
2. Foster power-sharing in democratizing states
- A mixed record of success, but should help the rate of success
3. Consider partition as a last resort
- Separate into homogeneous groups only if absolutely necessary
America’s Uncomfortable Relationship With Nationalism
The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, July 2006
Fuller, Graham E.
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US – Very nationalistic, but uncomfortable with others’ nationalism
o Regularly miscalculates the force of nationalism abroad
o Blindness to its effects is a serious vulnerability in foreign policy
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US ‘patriotism’ is a form of ‘nationalism’
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We are deeply rooted in our European/Anglo-Saxon identity, despite protestations to the
contrary
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The US has had trouble integrating, and the process is ongoing
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***The US is unique in that at the national level, elements of ethnicity are ignored
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US ‘race blindedness’ makes us think we have developed a ‘universal culture’
o We’re uncomfortable when foreigners identify an American ‘national character’
o We need to understand the outside views of ourselves in order to operate in the real
world
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Great powers aspire to hegemony
o Free trade is in a Great Power’s interest
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Globalization helps Great Powers
o It brings cheap goods to market
o However, it can make it hard for smaller powers to compete
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US selectively champions ‘universal values’
o Democratization and human rights
o Leads to dangerous national self deception
o We must be careful how we try to implement these ‘values’
 We use them as tools of our own national interest
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Identity politics
o Any group gravitates toward whatever identity is the most meaningful, potent,
serviceable, mobilizable, and actionable in the face of a challenge
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‘Nationalism as resistance’—2 US foreign policy concerns
o Rogue nations
o Islamism (radical)
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‘Objective reality’ is unimportant
o Subjectivities represent the force of nationalism at work
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Nationalism – seeks maximum independence to develop and pursue own national goals
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The US has moved away from interfacing with other cultures
o Prefer a ‘scientific’ approach
o Doesn’t allow us to ‘empathize’ or understand the roots of nationalism
The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism’s Primordial Roots
Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 1993
O’Brien, Conor Cruise
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Arguments that infer that Nationalism started with the French Revolution and continued with
a Central European reaction to the French Enlightenment in the 18th century are wrong
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Nationalism existed long before the French Revolution, but was fused with religion
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With the French Revolution, nationalism and religion were separated (but not in all cases)
o Nationalist ideology started in the 18th century as cultural nationalism
 Central European reaction to French ‘culture’
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Nationalism has racist roots
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Nationalism, at moderate levels, is a needful form of social bonding and should not be treated
as an enemy of humanity
o The enemy is manic, xenophobic nationalism
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“The strength of nationalism is that it is something for which people are prepared to kill and
die in large numbers…”
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“The nation exists before all, it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal, it is the
law itself.” Abbé Sieyes
o French Revolutionary Terror
o The Third Reich
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BOTTOM LINE: Military intervention where no national interests are involved is useless
against a nationalist-motivated foe
The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997, Brown, Michael E. et.
al., eds
Brown, Michael E.
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Rejects the idea that internal conflict is caused by ‘ancient hatreds’
o It cannot explain why violent conflict breaks out in some places but not in others
o It is insufficient as a single-factor explanation
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Conditions that make some places and situations more predisposed to violence than others
o Structural factors
 Weak states, intra-state security concerns, ethnic geography
o Political factors
 Discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, intergroup politics, elite politics
o Economic/social factors
 Economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, the trials and
tribulations of economic development and modernization
o Cultural/perceptual factors
 Cultural discrimination against minorities, group histories and their perception
of themselves and others
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Catalytic factors/proximate causes of internal conflicts
o Internal, mass-level factors
 Bad domestic problems
o External, mass-level factors
 Bad neighborhoods
o External, elite-level factors
 Bad neighbors
o Internal, elite-level factors
 Bad leaders
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Domestic elites can play a role in turning potentially violent situations into deadly
confrontations
o Ideological conflicts
o Criminal assaults on state sovereignty
o Raw power struggles
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Many different types of internal conflict, caused by many things
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Why do followers follow?
o Existence of antagonistic group histories
o Mounting economic problems
Policy Implications
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Conflict prevention should be guided by a 2-track strategy
o A series of long-term efforts aimed at the underlying conditions that make violent
conflict likely
o Focus on the proximate causes of internal conflict, the catalytic factors
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Conflict prevention efforts need to take into account the fact that internal conflicts can be
triggered by any one of 4 sets of proximate causes:
o LISTED ABOVE
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Conflict prevention efforts should focus very aggressively on the decisions and actions of
domestic elites
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BOTTOM LINE: Distant powers and the international community are not as helpless as they
think
Final Solutions: The Causes of Mass Killing and Genocide
Security Studies, no. 9, Spring 2000, pp. 1-59, Frank Cass Publishing
Valentino, Benjamin
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The causes of mass killing are best understood when studied from a strategic perspective
o Mass killing is a goal-oriented policy
 Brutal policy designed to achieve a leader’s most important objectives,
counter their most dangerous threats, and solve their most difficult problems
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Most explanations of mass killing/genocide look for causes in:
o The structure, form of gov’t, or collective psychology of the societies in which they
take place
o Focus on:
 Dangers of deep cleavages or dehumanizing attitudes between groups
 Psychological and political consequences of crises such as wars or revolutions
 High concentrations of power in non-democratic political systems
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The impetus for mass killing usually originates from a relatively small group of political or
military leaders, not from the desires of the broader society
o Broader public sometimes approves, but often does not
o Active support of a large part of the public is not required
o Killing is almost always done by military or paramilitary forces
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Genocide – limited to killing of ethnic or national groups
o It is a subset of mass killing
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Intervening to prevent mass killing
o 3 objectives
 Seek to bring about change in the leadership of potential perpetrator groups
 Seek to strengthen target groups so they can defend themselves and make the
potential cost of mass killing as a strategy too high
 Provide victims increased options for flight or refuge
The Banality of Ethnic War
International Security, vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 42-70
Mueller, John
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The whole concept of ‘ethnic war’ may be severely misguided
o A condition in which every member of one ethnic group becomes the enemy of
everyone in another ethnic group does not exist
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Ethnic warfare resembles non-ethnic warfare because it is waged by small groups of
combatants, groups that purport to fight and kill in the name of some larger entity
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“Ethnic war” is a condition in which a mass of mild, ordinary people can unwillingly and in
considerable bewilderment come under the vicious and arbitrary control of small groups of
armed thugs
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Bosnia/Croatia – Caused by small bands of marauders controlled by political leaders
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Rwanda – relatively small number of trained Hutu did most of the killing
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Ethnicity was simply the characteristic around which the perpetrators and politicians who
recruited and encouraged them happened to array themselves. It was important as an
ordering device or principle, not as a crucial motivating force.
The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict
Survival, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27-47
Posen, Barry
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Anarchy make security the first consideration of states
o There will be competition for power
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The Security Dilemma
o Actions taken by one state to increase its security may cause another state to feel
insecure, and thus take action to counter the move. This, in turn, reduces the security
of the original state. The first move to increase security inadvertently resulted in
decreased security.
o Particularly intense when:
 Offensive and defensive forces are basically the same. It is difficult to
communicate intent.
 Effectiveness of offense vs defense. If offensive action is the best path, other
states may preemptively attack to increase their security.
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The process of imperial collapse produces conditions that make offensive and defensive
forces capabilities indistinguishable and make the offensive superior to the defense
o Also, windows of opportunity will open
o These strategic problems show that very little nationalistic rabble rousing or
nationalistic combativeness is required to generate very dangerous situations
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2 factors affect strength of offense or defense
o Technology
o Geography
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The Security Dilemma and realist theory in general have considerable ability to explain and
predict the probability and intensity of military conflict among groups emerging from the
wreckage of empires
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The Security Dilemma suggests that these risks are quite high
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If outsiders want to understand and reduce the odds of conflict, they must assess the local
groups’ strategic view of their situation
o Who fears for their security and why?
o What military options are open?
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 75-90
Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David
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The current prevalence of internal war is mainly the result of a steady accumulation of
protracted conflicts since the 1950s and 1960s rather than a sudden change associated with a
new, post-Cold War international system
o Decolonization from 1940s to 1970s created a number of financially, bureaucratically
and militarily weak states
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More ethnically or religiously diverse countries are no more likely to experience conflict
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The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not ethnic or
religious characteristics, but rather the conditions that favor insurgency:
o Poverty
 Financially and bureaucratically weak states
 Favors rebel recruitment
o Political instability
o Rough terrain
o Large populations
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Policy makers should not assume that civil wars and ‘failed states’ are a temporary
phenomena of the post-Cold War world
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Preventing civil war
o Economic growth may correlate with fewer civil wars
o More likely a well-financed and administratively competent gov’t will be
preventative
Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 45–86
Kaufman, Stuart J.
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Symbolic Politics Theory
o The critical causes of extreme ethnic violence are:
 Group myths that justify hostility
 Fears of group extinction
 A symbolic politics of chauvinist motivation
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The weakness of rational choice theories of ethnic war, in sum, is that they must either
explicitly assume or implicitly smuggle in two factors that most need explaining: the political
coherence of ethnic groups and their adoption of predatory goals.
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Policy recommendations
o The symbolist argument suggests attention to a broader range of options in addition to
mediation, outside guarantees, and institution building.
o More effort needs to go into promoting reconciliation between the groups in conflict,
roughly according to the model of the French-German reconciliation after World War
II
o The logic is that new institutions can remain effective only if the sides reconcile
themselves to the goals they can achieve through cooperation. Both of these
options—partition and reconciliation—require more attention than they have received
if conflict resolution practice is to improve its track record in ethnic wars.