Diversity in Opposition: Some Observations on Arguments Opposing the
Libyan Intervention
Abstract
Using submissions to electronic fora as data, this study compares and contrasts arguments
members of the US general public utilized to critique proposals for the recent US intervention in
Libya. This survey suggests that American understandings are more diverse and nuanced than
are generally depicted in current and popular analyses of foreign policy opinion. Failing to grasp
such diversity, I argue, may lead to a misunderstanding of the public’s views in this post-Cold
War era. Scholars should examine closely foreign policy arguments, paying particular attention
to their differences and variety.
1
Introduction
On March 16, 2011, after several weeks of discussion and the passage of UN resolutions
supporting international action, the United States announced that it would participate in a multilateral military intervention in the ongoing crisis in Libya, where insurgents sought to overthrow
the government of Muammar Gaddafi. The debate in the US leading up to and in response to this
decision was surprisingly lively given Gaddafi’s unpopularity. What might we learn from the
arguments members of the American public utilized to oppose that intervention? I suggest that
we uncover something quite valuable—the complexity, variety and nuances of arguments the
public uses to oppose foreign ventures. This finding suggests that the most popular academic
depictions of foreign policy opinion, which tend to depict public opinions as exhaustively falling
into a few broad categories, mask important differences in the ways the American public
understands and assesses foreign policy
The Scholarship on the Public’s Foreign Policy Views
The predominant way of understanding opposition to foreign policy projects among the
American public is to locate that position structurally within a larger framework of foreign policy
views. At least since the end of the 1970s, most scholars have rejected the Lippmann, Almond
and Kennan contention that the general public’s views on foreign policy are incoherent, volatile
and amorphous in favor of a systematic conception.1 While differences exist regarding the role
elites play in leading public opinion on foreign affairs2 and on whether foreign policy views have
vertical coherence or horizontal connections with domestic policy understandings,3 many
scholars maintain that the public’s views on foreign policy are strongly patterned. Patterns are
said to go beyond those created by partisan understandings.4 An underlying system or logic that
connects different positions, researchers claim, allows us to group various arguments into
2
amalgamated categories. The system or logic that is said to underpin these positions varies
among scholars, due in part to attempts to account for changes brought about by the end of the
Cold War.5 The results of many these analyses, however, are similar in that they are reported by
reference to an underlying binary structure. That is, scholars analyze foreign policy views into a
few sets of binary propositions that describe modes of preferable engagement in the world,
general orientations towards activist policies, and understandings of the US. The key to this type
of analysis is the identification of the most salient and decisive binaries, then their deployment as
the foundation for categorization or spatial location of positions or views.
While some of the more recent studies attempt to complicate the structure in which
foreign policy views have historically been located,6 the influence of the more reductive models,
particularly the MI/CI model established by Wittkopf, Holsti and Rosenau, is still strong, leading
scholars to refer to the ongoing determinative role played by such binaries as
activism/isolationism, unilateral/multilateral, realism/liberal internationalism and
neutralist/aligned. At their most reductive, such studies reference as few as two basic positions.7
In general, views that resist activist policies are usually located within a single “isolationist”
category, a construct often defined by reference to a simple structure. For example, Nordlinger
describes isolationism in terms of accepting the position that “Going abroad to insure America’s
security is unnecessary; doing so regularly detracts from it”.8 For Johnstone, isolationism is
made up of preferences for narrowly defined conceptions of either non-interventionism or
unilateralism, conceptions that find their natural binary partners in the activist concepts of
interventionism and multilateralism.9
The contemporary focus on simple structures is puzzling. Even granted that the universe
of foreign policy views in the US was probably constricted considerably under the pressures of
3
the Cold War, is it safe to assume the same now? Or is it more reasonable to expect that the
views expressed are more varied and complex in this post-Cold War era?10 Are we not running
the risk of missing important insights by attempting to understand the public’s views in terms of
a truncated and highly structured menu of positions?
A deeper and more theoretical reason for questioning the use of such simple structures
would refer to the minimalist view of American political culture such structures assume. For
example, the dominant MI/CI scheme first formulated by Wittkopf refers a cultural foundation
for foreign policy opinion that is exhausted by a basic division of Americans into followers of
either realist or idealist worldviews. For Monten, Pateman, and Davis and Lynn-Jones, it is the
presence and various interpretations of exceptionalism that inform American understandings.11
However, the proposition that American political culture is completely captured by such simple
references alone is generally unsupported in the relevant literature. Not even scholars who view
that culture in terms of a single liberal tradition understand it as an uncomplicated entity. Rather,
they hold it to be complex and creative.12 If we turn to the multiple traditions literature on
American political culture, we find an even richer description of the diversity of political views
that are extent in the US, with references to the wide assortment of ways in which liberalism,
civic republicanism, Christianity, socialism and racist narratives portray the US and the world
and to the various political projects and agendas those traditions generate.13 Debates over the
meaning, potency, continuity and changes in various foreign policy traditions in American
history also point to a complex background of political culture and a correspondingly vast array
of foreign policy views.14 These portrayals of American political culture as complex encourage
us to view skeptically the proposition that we most usefully grasp foreign policy views by
reference to a simple structural understanding that generates a small number of broad categories.
4
The arguments we examine here are particularly relevant to thinking about the diversity
of foreign policy views given that their authors opposed this intervention despite the “second
opinion” provided by UN approval that Greico et al. argues provides a strong rationale for
supporting interventions.15 But more importantly, these arguments are important because they
are not responses to survey questions, but rather the arguments that citizens themselves supply. I
follow here Kegley’s implicit call to examine and pay close attention to the content of such
arguments in order to avoid mistakenly attributing to the public a structure of views that is
actually a construct of survey instruments.16 I do so by comparing and contrasting arguments and
assessing how well these arguments fit into several higher and intermediate level attempts to
account for foreign policy opinion. I conclude by exploring the implications of that assessment.
Gathering and Analyzing Arguments
The broader social sciences literature has identified the internet in general and online fora
in particular as important sources of data regarding political views and arguments. Scholars have
used these sources, for example, to study health policy debates among the public17 and to grasp
the possibilities for deliberative democracy in modern conditions.18 Importantly for this project,
the internet and electronic fora have also been identified as spaces in which people potentially
encounter and contribute diverse views on a variety of political subjects.19
The opportunity to construct a robustly representative and random sample using one of
various strategies found in the literature20 was limited for this project given the narrowness of the
topic the public discussed and the debate’s short timeline. This sample was constructed by
entering search terms into Google (Libya, Libya and Arab Spring, Libyan Conflict, Libyan
Intervention), then visiting selected websites on the resulting list and gathering all the substantive
comments left on the relevant thread. These websites, chosen for their prominence, promise of
5
large numbers of participants and collective mix of political positions, were those hosted by The
Washington Post, The New York Times, Fox News, The Daily Show, The Orange County
Register, CNN, Huffington Post.com, The Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Tribune,
Yahoonews, USA Today, The Houston Chronicle, (Iowa) Press-Citizen, The Des Moines
Register, The Tennessean, The Nation and PennLive.com. The contributions gathered were
posted to these sites between March 5 and April 3, 2011. In all, 208 arguments were collected
from 170 contributors, of whom 34 favored and 136 opposed intervention.
I confine myself to a philosophical analysis of the 171 arguments in the sample that the
136 opponents of the intervention provided. Obvious reasons for this approach are the nature of
the sample and the sample size. First, these data are not drawn from a random sample of internet
contributions, but rather were gathered by a deliberate selection of internet sites. The sites from
which arguments were gathered may also be tilted to the liberal side of the political spectrum,
though self-identified conservatives contributed to what are considered liberal sites. The host
sites do not appear to have edited or winnowed these contributions in any way other than for
conformity with community standards regarding abusive language.21 Second, rather than a
random sample of the public, those who authored these arguments are self-selected contributors
who probably resemble in their active character and possession of fixed political views the
readers of political blogs that Lawrence has described.22 Third, the sample size is too small to
generate descriptive statistics applicable to the US population within normal error margins.
Insofar as this project only makes preliminary claims, the use of this type of sample is
appropriate. 23 Moreover, the conclusions this study draw do not depend on any strictly
representative character of the sample with regard to the general US population. We are not
attempting to derive from those arguments a rigorous, comprehensive and detailed profile of the
6
views of the general population, but rather to understand and explore the variety and nuances of
the arguments that are used in public spaces. We want to know what types of arguments
Americans24 employed in this debate, the differences among those arguments, and whether
established ways of describing and accounting for foreign policy opinion can account for these
arguments. The data generated by gathering a larger and more representative sample would
provide us with more arguments in categories that have been identified in particular studies
found in the literature, and/or with more examples of arguments that lie outside those categories,
but the absence of either or both types of additional data does not affect the conclusions we draw.
One possible objection to the use of these data would hold that electronic postings are
inherently unreliable because people are less than truthful when stating their arguments in such
fora. In the literature, the most egregious example of this phenomenon appears to have occurred
in Hong Kong, where “professional writers” have appeared on internet fora in the guise of
ordinary citizens to push government views.25 Such a possibility is not relevant here, given that
we examine arguments critical of government policy and the fact that there are no indications
that Libyan agents were involved in these discussions. Alternately, while Black provides
evidence that respondents in the US do sometimes intentionally lie to pollsters for a variety of
reasons, including a desire to escape from polling calls and the reluctance to express true
convictions, those motivations do not apply to these submissions.26
Another possible issue regarding these data is the observation that their contributors do
not collectively mirror the broader public’s judgment on the intervention. Contemporaneous
polls revealed that the general public was either evenly split or slightly favorable towards the
intervention.27 In contrast, 80% of the contributors to this sample opposed the intervention. Yet
there is not much difference of attitude between those who contributed these arguments and the
7
general public on relevant underlying issues. Many of those in this sample who opposed the
intervention did so by rejecting the proposition that the US should engage in a ground war and/or
a long-term, nation-building exercise. Likewise, large majorities among those who were polled
also opposed sending ground troops to Libya and opposed the proposition that the US should
engage in democracy-building. For example, in the AP-GfK poll, 64% of those surveyed
opposed the project of democracy building and 78% opposed sending of troops to Libya; in the
CNN poll, 70% opposed the sending of ground troops; in the Fox poll, 68% opposed military
involvement. Moreover, because this study focuses only on assessing the substance of the
arguments opposing the intervention, the mix of supportive and oppositional viewpoints in the
sample is irrelevant to its analysis.
Ways of Categorizing and Understanding Foreign Policy Opinion
In analyzing these data, the unit of analysis used is an “argument,” i.e., a connected set of
reasons supporting a judgment or proposition. Each argument is subjected to an analytic and
comparative examination focusing on its important components (including their depictions of the
US, of the world, activism, etc.), differentiating among arguments that support similar policies
and categorizing similar arguments on the basis of their similar components. The use of such a
method is not always the norm; indeed, part of the purpose of this project is to see whether such
a close focus on arguments complicates the results other methods generate. Scholars working
with polling data and other sources have generally employed one of two levels of analysis. The
first level is the schematic attempt to classify foreign policy positions. The most prevalent of
these is the MI/CI analysis derived from the work of Wittkopf, Holsti and Rosenau. For the
purposes of determining whether such analyses can help us make sense of the Libyan arguments,
we use here the revised, more complex version of MI/CI put forward by Urbatsch. We also use
8
Johnstone’s account of isolationism.28 The second level is the attempt to identify and classify
types of arguments. We use here accounts provided by Mead, Dumbrell and Davis/Lynn-Jones.
Classifications of Foreign Policy Positions
The MI/CI classification scheme that comes from Wittkopf’s influential initial studies
and Holsti and Rosenau’s confirmatory study attempts to account for the substance and structural
relations among American foreign policy positions. Most important to this classification in its
original form is the proposition that Americans assess foreign policy proposals by reference to
either realist or idealist theories as revealed by the positions they take on the activist/isolationist
and militaristic/conciliatory binaries, positions conceptualized as orientations towards Militant
Internationalism and Cooperative Internationalism. This is a policy-oriented system of
differentiation that amalgamates the judgments specific arguments and their cultural, ideological
or historical backgrounds generate into larger policy stances. Thus, Holsti and Rosenau put under
the Isolationist position the following, seemingly quite different, arguments: “concentrate more
on our own national problems, scale down our leadership role, the best hope for U.S. influence in
the Third World is to solve our own problems…. international commitments carry more costs
than benefits”.29
The mature result of this initial set of studies was a 2 x 2 typology yielding four basic,
internally consistent and mutually exclusive orientations, in which people are said to support
Cooperative Internationalism (Accomodationists), support Militant Internationalism (Hardliners), support both (Internationalists), or support neither (Isolationists). This structure has been
subsequently refined by Urbatsch, who seeks to deepen and add clarity to this scheme by arguing
that isolationist position-taking may be tactical. The result is an attempt to differentiate within
the original Isolationist and Internationalist categories and provide narrower and more textured
9
categories in general by introducing within each a rank ordering of the three basic orientations
assumed in the original scheme (Isolationism, Cooperation and Militarism). Thus, the scheme
retains the original MI/CI structural assumptions and the focus on general foreign policy
positions by referring back to the militaristic/conciliatory and activist/isolationist binaries. Six
foreign policy positions result: Cooperative Isolationists most prefer isolationism, but otherwise
prefer diplomatic approaches to militaristic policy orientations. Militaristic Isolationists also
most prefer isolationism, but otherwise prefer militaristic policies to cooperative policy
orientations. Accomodationists most prefer an active and diplomatic orientation, but otherwise
prefer isolationism to a militant policy stance. Hard-liners most prefer a militant policy stance,
but otherwise prefer isolationism to a multilateral and diplomatic stance. Cooperative
Internationalists most prefer diplomacy, but otherwise prefer a militant stance to isolationism.
Militant Internationalists most prefer a militant orientation, but otherwise prefer diplomacy to
isolationism.
Johnstone’s deconstruction of the concept of isolationism provides a different approach
to mapping positions. His approach is narrower and more historical than the MI/CI scheme,
involving the investigation of arguments Americans have used through time to resist engaging in
an activist foreign policy. He identifies two components of a general “isolationist” position. Noninterventionism is resistance to “political entanglements and military engagements”. Johnstone
does not view this component as completely opposed to involvement in foreign relations, but
rather a position that emphasizes “the threat and potentially negative impact of war on the United
States”. Unilateralism, in contrast, is resistance to becoming tied to alliances and bound by
international laws and treaties. Its focus is on freedom of action, a goal, Johnstone argues, that is
connected with positive conceptions of American exceptionalism. Such exceptionalism must be
10
safeguarded through the assertion of national sovereignty. Thus for Johnstone, isolationism is
connected either with shielding the US from harm caused by war or with preserving the
autonomy the US is seen rightfully to possess due to its extraordinary character.
Typologies of Foreign Policy Arguments
Next, we turn to analyses of foreign policy opinion that construct typologies of
arguments, represented by the work of Mead, Dumbrell, and Davis and Lynn-Jones. The purpose
of this step is to provide a framework that samples the intermediate level of analysis in the
literature.
Mead’s contribution to the literature on foreign policy opinion in Special Providence
holds that the arguments American foreign policy elites and others deploy must be understood in
terms of particular indigenous political traditions. What makes Mead’s study particularly
relevant here is the fact that the categories he uses to classify arguments differentiate more finely
among some positions on the activist/isolationist binary the MI/CI schemes employ. While Mead
also identifies four positions, he thinks of them as independent rather than as part of a 2 x 2
matrix formed by the crossing of two binaries.
Hamiltonians in Mead’s parlance place importance on defending America’s economic
interests and using power to promote trade and commerce. Thus, they would support agreements,
alliances, memberships and interventions that safeguard economic interests or promote trade,
oppose policies that would endanger trade and economic interests and display skepticism
towards ventures that do not have economic interests as their basis. Wilsonians favor the spread
of democracy and freedom and the use of multilateral means. They are in favor of building and
maintaining international institutions to help preserve order and peace. Thus, they would base
their judgment regarding intervention on its potential to promote democracy and its multilateral
11
and internationalist character. Jeffersonians are skeptical of government-led foreign involvement
in general because they deeply fear that republican institutions will be harmed by a turn towards
imperial ambitions. Jacksonians, who resemble the realists Drezner describes,30 are reluctant to
engage in foreign interventions unless US national security is directly involved, but then support
the full and unilateral unleashing of American military power if security interests are at risk.
In contrast to Mead’s efforts, Dumbrell’s study concentrates on isolationism, though it
also points to a realist/idealist binary.31 The result is a four-part typology of isolationist
arguments, in which Unilateralists emphasize interests, the safeguarding of American
sovereignty and a distrust of international organizations and allies; New Populist America
Firsters focus on the need to address American problems rather than engaging in foreign policy
ventures, particularly those involving foreign aid and other uses of American resources; AntiGlobalizationists resist free trade agreements and decry the effects of globalization on the United
States as a way of defending American exceptionalism, and Anti-Imperialists resist the role of
the US as an enforcer of post-Cold War peace and order. Thus, Dumbrell emphasizes the
importance of interests and sovereignty, attention to domestic problems, defense of America
against harm and anti-imperialism.
The third argument-focused study we consider here is derived from the work of Davis
and Lynn-Jones.32 Their work hypothesizes that American foreign policy oscillates between
activist and isolationist stances associated with different understandings of the meaning and
implications of American exceptionalism. While not cited as extensively as the other schemes,
this account importantly engages with conceptions of exceptionalism that have been identified as
playing an important role in foreign policy arguments.33 The authors hold that even though
various arguments agree that the U.S. is special and unusual, they demonstrate that variations of
12
those arguments draw different foreign policy conclusions. As such, this model focuses on
arguments in a more general and structural fashion than does Meade or Dumbrell.
In the original model, the authors identify one rendering of exceptionalism that takes the
US a “city upon a hill” with a mission of spreading American values throughout the world. Here,
America’s perceived difference from the rest of the world informs a messianic mindset that
promotes activism. The world should be converted to American values through American efforts.
This understanding of Offensive Exceptionalism, so to speak, resembles the description of an
activist position described by Pateman and McCartney.34 In the contrary rendering,
understandings of what we might call Defensive Exceptionalism make Americans wary of
contamination by the rest of the world. In this understanding, the difference between the US and
the world in terms of cultural values creates anxieties lest that difference be lost through contact
with inferior ways of life. This understanding would resist most foreign interventions. In addition
to these conceptions of difference, Davis and Lynn Jones also note another form of difference
discourse, in the guise of Vietnam-era arguments that paint the US as uniquely aggressive in its
interactions with the world (Malignant Exceptionalism). This position would oppose foreign
interventions on the grounds that American motives in engaging in such activities are suspect,
being the product of economic or political imperialism.
In critiquing and augmenting this model elsewhere, I have shown that various foreign
policy positions can be justified by positing a non-exceptionalist view. In such arguments, some
people will justify foreign endeavors on the assumption that problems in the world are
susceptible to the same policies and practices that have been successful at home because the US
and the world are ultimately similar, thus positing an Offensive Universalist understanding
supportive of activism. This position is quite similar to some neo-conservative justifications of
13
the G.W. Bush administration’s foreign policy stance.35 This position would support
interventions in support of democracy on the grounds that the US has an obligation to help others
exercise and realize common values by sharing its experiences and resources. In turn, nonactivist arguments, in the form of a Laissez-faire Universalism, can also be derived from
understanding the world as similar to the home country. In this argument, however, if the world
is similar to the US, then there is no need for an activist foreign policy to spread values and
institutions. Other countries are just as capable as the US of embracing and developing those
good things without outside help or interference.
Amalgamated Typology of Arguments
We see from even this limited survey that scholars have put forward a variety of
typologies, though they also identify several similar themes. After consolidating overlapping
categories and taking into account the fact that the Libyan intervention involved military forces
and was sanctioned by international bodies, we can combine the results of these three
intermediate analyses into a list of eight types of relevant arguments that opponents of the
Libyan intervention could potentially use:
Jacksonian: This argument could be used to oppose the intervention on the grounds that
no vital US security interests are implicated. Unilateralist: This argument would be used to
oppose the intervention based on suspicion of UN involvement. Jeffersonian: This argument
could be used to resist the intervention on the grounds of the harm that would be inflicted on US
institutions. Defensive Exceptionalist/Anti-Globalization: This argument would oppose the
intervention on the grounds of the interaction with the world that it entails, which poses dangers
to a uniquely American way of life. Hamiltonian: This argument could be used to oppose the
Libyan intervention on economic grounds. Laissez-faire Universalist: This argument would
14
oppose this intervention on the grounds that the Libyans, being similar to Americans, can sort
out their own problems in the same way as could Americans. Malignant Exceptionalist/AntiImperialist: This argument would reject the intervention on the grounds that it represents another
episode of American imperialism. America First: this argument would oppose the intervention
by arguing that it deflects attention and resources away from domestic problems.
How well do these conceptions (both the positional schemes and the consolidated list of
possible arguments) account for actual foreign policy arguments? We explore this question by
examining the types of arguments used to oppose the Libyan intervention.
Opposition to the US Intervention in Libya
As noted above, the debate over the proposed Libyan intervention on electronic fora was
surprisingly vigorous. In this particular sample, oppositional arguments were dominant and, as
measured by the reasons given for opposing this intervention, quite varied. In all, eight types of
argument were found, in addition to two variations of argument types.36
(1) America First
The first argument against intervention holds that the US should attend to its own
problems rather than intervene in Libya. To intervene means to divert essential time, energy and
expertise away from addressing domestic troubles. The problems described are often economic
in character, in the form of the financial crisis, federal and state budget deficits, long-term
national debt and the ongoing recession, and the failure of institutions to deal with them.
Some adherents of this argument employed it as part of an allegation that the Libyan
gambit is a diversionary tactic meant to distract the public from the failure of the Obama
administration to fix economic and fiscal problems. For these commenters, opposition to the
Iraqi venture is a way of critiquing from the left the administration’s perceived reluctance to
15
fundamentally reform the economy. However, most deployed a more straightforward contention
that the policy decision itself would result in the expenditure of resources (material and
administrative) better utilized to solve domestic problems and that attempting to address both
Libya and domestic issues will result in all-around failure. American institutions do not have the
capacity to address both. These arguments appear to come mostly from the left, given their
criticisms of conservatives and arguments for attention to social programs.
(2) Universal Realpolitik
This argument takes a particular kind of counter-exceptionalist position in opposing the
intervention, in that it sees all countries, including the US, as operating according to the amoral
rules of realpolitik. The US is no shining “city on a hill” because it is no different from other
countries; everyone necessarily uses force to quell disorder and put down rebellions. As such, this
argument discourages activism in general on the grounds that activism implies a moral superiority
that is absent.
Sometimes this argument takes the form of explicitly equating the US with Libya, as does
a contributor to the New York Times when he argues that the US should not interfere with
Gaddafi’s military actions because the US government would likewise kill rebels who attacked
Chicago.37 Others make the point by critiquing attempts to demonize the Libyan leadership. The
empirical basis for such a demonization, they argue, is absent because the US is necessarily no
different in terms of its actions. Both variations question US exceptionalism and moral
superiority. If the world is complex and requires that governments impose order by use of force,
then the US should hesitate to accept clear-cut depictions of “others” as evil or be quick to
condemn actions that are part of the messy, though normal, course of politics.
(3) Interventions Harm US Institutions
16
These arguments hold that military interventions generally erode Constitutional
standards. The argument is that, in their eagerness to involve the US in foreign affairs, presidents
and members of Congress violate the Constitution and corrupt the government. In particular,
writers berated Obama for not obtaining explicit Congressional approval for any military
activity. “This is the United States, not the Roman Empire,” argues James Dorn.38 The ethos of
these arguments can sometimes be paranoid, with one contributor hinting darkly that this is part
of a larger plot that will result in the cancellation of the 2012 elections.39 While this argument
has been used across the spectrum, these examples came mostly from people who self-identified
as on the right.
(4) The World is a Jungle
Arguments here emphasize the problematic nature of the world while supplying several
complementary propositions. The first proposition is that problems are all around us and will
always be with us. There are lots of bad people in the world and there is no way the US can
resolve all the problems they create. Second, arguments often point to problematic areas in which
the US did not or has not intervened in the past and assert that intervening in Libya will create a
policy precedent by which the US will be endlessly dragged into similar situations.
In one example, “Alley Oop” voices his complaint in his March 28, 2011 contribution to
the New York Times website as follows: “Does [Obama] really think there are not already
countless serious problems just about everywhere…does he not know that following the implied
principle here would require Americas' (sic) constant, disastrous overcommitment to solving
those problems?”40 This slippery slope logic fits with other contentions that problems are
unsolvable given the nature of the people in question, exemplified in the argument that “We
cannot help people that don't want help to be normal, tolerant and democratic”.41
17
These arguments collectively point to a different foundation for reluctance to be involved
in the world. The obstacle to action here is not the lack of American moral superiority, harm to
domestic institutions or the limited capacity of institutions, but the nastiness of the world outside
the US. Even if the US is different, it cannot save the world because the world is far from being
salvageable, and if it were to engage in such a task, it would find itself flailing helplessly in the
thickets of violence and hatred. There is no justification for entering into an activist policy given
that no action will ever set the world right.
(5) Oil and Corporate Interests
These arguments hold that the only reason for the US intervention in Libya is the
presence of oil reserves and/or the influence of corporate interests. This judgment renders the
endeavor illegitimate. These arguments take two forms. Argument 5(a) holds that the US
government is the actor, pursuing a realist but immoral policy to secure energy supplies. For
“alance,” the explanation for the administration’s decision is simple: “Why did Obama decide to
invade Libya in the first place? This illegal invasion has been in the planning stage for over [a]
year. It was designed to discourage nations from advocating nationalization of their oil industry.
In the Middle East everyone knows we only invade nations rich in oil”.42 Argument 5(b), in
contrast, holds that the government is no more than a puppet of Big Oil and other corporate
entities. In one revealing example, military contractors as well as oil companies are to blame
because they are said to drive this initiative as part of a scheme to make money: “Washington
weapons lobbyists and their war profiteering clients…are pushing for more aggressive support
by the US. These people are primarily interested in making profits.... The kicker in this situation
is the Libyan oil fields”.43
For all those who deploy these arguments, the correct answer to the question of
18
intervention is self-evident. If oil is involved, either as a strategic interest or as a commodity,
intervention is morally unjustifiable. These arguments again differ from previous rejections of
military intervention. It is not the case that the world is to blame due to its recalcitrant nature or
corrosive influence. American values and institutions are already corrupt and the object of
opposition is to prevent that corruption from further harming the world.
(6) Irony
Irony arguments hold that US intervention will produce results directly opposed to US
intentions. Again, there are two variants of this argument here. The first variant (6a) holds that
in assisting the Libyan rebels, the US will not be furthering democracy and freedom, but arming
and placing into power Islamic terrorists. This Blowback argument is often tied to narratives in
which US aid to the Afghan resistance in the 1980s resulted in the triumph of the Taliban and the
rise of Al Qaeda (for example: “We arm them, support them, assist them with money, then years
later they are trained terrorists who kill thousands of us as they did on 9-11”).44 This argument
may have been reinforced by newspaper reports and talk radio hosts who asserted that Islamic
militants were involved in Libya.45 The second variant (6b) holds that military intervention in
Libya is ironic because such an intervention, if it is meant to save lives, will only result in the
loss of more lives. Some arguments make their point by asserting that using the military to kill
people as a way of saving lives makes no sense; others provide a more sophisticated analysis by
referencing the perils of dragging out a war in which the rebels are likely to lose.46
Irony plays out in different ways in these two variants. The first betrays a suspicion of
helping insurgents. The character of particular elements of the outside world does not make
intervention merely ineffective, but harmful to US security. The second variant is used by a
variety of actors. It has been used on the left as part of an anti-military position, particularly to
19
discredit NATO’s intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s. But it has also been used by
conservative followers of Ron Paul, who regard the results of much government activism in
general as productive of unintended and harmful consequences.
(7) The US is a Hegemon
Hegemon arguments hold that the Libyan intervention is part of a series of operations in
which the US pursues, consolidates and exercises its power; therefore, this action should be
opposed. Many commenters point to the overall US dominance in the world, and some portray
the US as a colonial power. As with the Corporate and Oil arguments, the problem here is not the
world, but the US, as a reader makes clear in responding to an opinion piece by Nicholas Kristof,
holding that “America sends in bombs and troops only to gain or secure geopolitical
advantage”.47 Where this argument differs from the latter arguments is its attribution to the
government of a comprehensive plan for world dominance. It is not just oil, but geostrategic
superiority that the US government seeks. Thus, these arguments assume that such interventions
are part of a larger, coherent, imperialist and immoral strategy on the part of the US.
(8) Intervene Only to Defend US Security
These arguments place US security as the sole criterion justifying intervention. If an
intervention is not directly connected with security, then the intervention is not warranted: “The
only condition I would support a war is if our country is attacked directly and our military has to
fight to defend us”.48 By itself, this realist argument’s objection to intervention is contextual
because it depends on interpretations of whether or not national security is at stake. Given
circumstances in which US security is at stake, those who deploy this argument could support
other military interventions, and given different interpretations of the Libyan situation, it could
also be used to justify the intervention (as did several people in this sample).
20
Discussion
Starting with the higher level of analysis, we now explore whether these arguments can
be located within the schemes discussed above and whether that location does important work.
[Table 1 here]
We find that the modified MI/CI scheme identifies 6(a) and 8 as Hard-liners,
emphasizing rightly the fact that those who make such arguments favor action only on narrow
realist terms that were not met in Libya. It also locates argument 6(b) in the Cooperative
Isolationist category, again correctly emphasizing that argument’s rejection of military projects.
However, the attempt to create greater nuance in the Isolationist category fails to account for
most arguments here. The means by which the scheme attempts to differentiate among the
arguments that the original MI/CI scheme would place in the Isolationist category (1, 2, 4, 5 (a),
(b) and 7)—by re-introducing the original militaristic/conciliatory binary into the isolationist
category—is not relevant to many of these arguments. Their focus is not militarism or
cooperation and, thus, they are not associated with either realism or idealism, but with other
understandings of the world and political projects.
[Table 2 here]
We see that Johnstone’s conception accounts for several arguments, thus revealing that
some arguments do privilege harm to the US and concerns for freedom of action. With regard to
arguments not accounted for, two (6(b) and 8) would not fit any accepted definition of
isolationism. Such, however, is not the case with the rest. The Universal Realpolitick, The World
is a Jungle, and the Oil, Corporate and Hegemon arguments are isolationist, but not captured by
this scheme because their analysis is not focused on the US. Rather, they betray anxieties
regarding the nature of the world and US intentions towards the world.
21
Turning to the intermediate level of analysis, the table below maps these arguments onto
the consolidated list of argument classifications we earlier constructed:
[Table 3 here]
This scheme fares better than the upper level analyses, accounting for eight of the ten arguments
we found in this sample. In addition to single Jeffersonian, America First and Laisez-Faire
universalist arguments, two types of Jacksonian and three types of “Malignant Exceptionalist”
argument are present. The latter serve to complicate their respective categories. Of the two
arguments not accounted for here, one (argument 4) was also unaccounted for by the modified
MI/CI classification and by Johnstone’s scheme.
Addressing first the arguments that are not accounted for in this consolidated list, The
World is a Jungle argument, deploys a Hobbesian view of the world. But unlike the antiexceptionalist arguments that also employ such a view, it does not argue that either actions or
interactions are harmful to the US or to the world; rather, the thrust is pragmatic, arguing that
action is futile and endless. In emphasizing the world’s Hobbesian character by marking the
failure of governments to create order and portraying as hopeless the task of transforming the
world in the American image, it rebuts Offensive Exceptionalism and contains close affinities
with the critique that Fukuyama has supplied of current neo-conservatives.49 Second, the Irony of
Military Intervention argument (coded as Cooperative Isolationist in the modified MI/CI
scheme) disputes the proposition that military ventures constitute a proper foreign policy tool.
Implicit is a condemnation of the government for employing military means. There is some
kinship here with anti-imperialist arguments that paint the US as the source of problems, with the
latter differing from this argument in their deeper critique.
With regard to variations within categories, while the Intervene Only to Protect the US
22
and the Blowback arguments are realist (and placed in the Hard-Liner category in the modified
MI/CI scheme and Unilateralist category in Johnstone’s classification), the latter are subtly
different from most arguments in that category. Blowback arguments do not condemn the
venture because it is unrelated to national security, but because it is negatively related. They
make the vital interest case by holding that actions either mistakenly benefit unfriendly forces or
turn populations against the US, thus making the US less rather than more safe. Thus, this
argument combines a focus on action, the outside world and unintended consequences.
We also see important variations among Malignant Exceptionalist/Anti-Imperialist
arguments (all of which unaccounted for by the modified MI/CI and Johnstone’s schemes). The
Corporate Interests argument is anti-Hamiltonian. It condemns the attempt to defend and further
trade and economic interests through military action and sees the impetus for such projects as
residing in the control commercial entities exercise over political institutions. The Government
Targets Oil and the Hegemon arguments impute to American institutions the policy of imposing
America’s political and economic will on the rest of the world. They are neither as narrow as the
Corporate Interest argument, nor do they contain any hint that the government is weak or a
puppet of other forces. They instead identify the government as a powerful actor that poses a
threat to other countries. Thus, the malignancy these arguments identify is more deeply
associated with the US as a whole in terms of its population and political culture.
Universal Realpolitik argument also is a variation of the Laissez-faire Universalist
argument. Unlike the initial definition of the latter presented here, the anti-exceptionalism of
Universal Realpolitik does not involve the judgment that the US and the world are the same in
accepting desirable values, but that all governments necessarily operate in accordance with the
same amoral rules. Universal Realpolitik holds that political life in general is not about spreading
23
or recognizing similar values in other nations. Rather, politics is about order and the necessary
and messy means by which all governments create and keep order in a Hobbesian world. The US
should refrain from interfering in that process no matter how disgusted its citizens feel when
witnessing it.
Finally, a note about the America First Argument (which is left out of the modified MI/CI
format and classified as Non-Interventionist in Johnstone’s scheme) given that it is quite
numerous in this sample and appears to resemble several other types of argument. It initially
appears to be a kind of Defensive Exceptionalist argument, but it does not see the outside world
as an active source of threat, but rather as a troublesome source of competition for attention and
resources. As such, it resembles a Jeffersonian argument in that it puts emphasis on the harm that
results from action rather than that which comes from interaction (and, thus, both are classified
as Non-Interventionist in the modified MI/CI scheme). However, where the Jeffersonian
argument has it that action results in the perversion of institutions, America First arguments tend
to hold that action results in the overloading of institutions, thus positing a zero-sum game
between domestic and foreign affairs that is framed by an assumption of limited capabilities.
The main argument in these contributions is that foreign ventures stretch American institutions
beyond their capacities, thus pointing to the mismatch between those institutions and
interventionist policies.
In summary, the arguments we find evidence of a rich assortment of ways in which
commenters opposed this particular foreign policy project. Some arguments display fear of the
harm that will come to the US; others believe that the US will damage Libya. Some reject this
project because they believe it will be ineffective in furthering American goals, while others pose
moral objections. Some mistrust the Libyans, while others mistrust the government or
24
corporations. Neither the MI/CI scheme nor Johnstone’s analysis account well for the variety
these arguments display. The consolidated argument category list does a better job, but is unable
to account for all arguments; we also see that some categories contain important variations. Most
importantly, to understand foreign policy opinion by referring to any one of these schemes is to
risk passing over this diversity.
Conclusion
Simply put, we find that the Libyan intervention was opposed by arguments that reveal a
variety of ways of viewing and evaluating foreign policy. While these findings are only
suggestive, this variety in itself appears meaningful, derived as it is from a limited sample of the
activist portion of the general population addressing a particular topic. The types and nature of
the diversity we found extend beyond the boundaries of any particular categorizing scheme we
examined. These findings suggest that the US public may be more fragmented in terms of
foreign policy opinion than one would assume by referencing most existing categorization
schemes.
In particular, we see that the presence and nature of these arguments opposing the Libyan
intervention pose two types of problems for current ways of accounting for foreign policy views.
The differences among arguments that superficially appear to be similar point to the original
MI/CI and Johnstone schemes’ lack of sensitivity to variety. In turn, the range of arguments
leads us to recognize that the modified MI/CI scheme, Johnstone’s scheme and the studies that
contributed to the consolidated list of arguments lack sufficient breadth when taken individually.
Where the first problem is a failure to correctly describe arguments, the second is a failure to
recognize types of arguments.
The crucial question is whether these conclusions are significant. Does it matter that
25
arguments are either conflated or unrecognized by existing schemes? Are the types and range of
differences among these arguments important? Are the arguments in fact very diverse? Do we
miss something important by not recognizing their character and diversity? I suggest that the
answer to all these questions is yes. The arguments are importantly diverse, and the failure to
correctly recognize and describe arguments in their diversity misleads us regarding the content of
public opinion on foreign policy matters. If we fail to appreciate the complexity and nuances of
the public’s positions, we end up portraying the public as divided along a few basic lines in terms
of foreign policy when, in fact, it is divided along many and complex lines.
We can defend these answers in several ways. The first is to underline the significance of
the differences among the arguments we find here. Note that in the attempt to account for these
arguments we added (through consultation with the literature) a number of additional dimensions
to those found, for example, in the original MI/CI scheme. Such dimensions include various
understandings of exceptionalism, universalism, institutions, harm and anti-imperialism. These
additions led us to significantly expand the list of possible and relevant categories. It was only
the greatly expanded argument list that was able to account for most arguments, but even it was
unable to account for all. Note again that most of these arguments would be shuffled into a
generic Isolationist category by the original MI/CI scheme as well as go unrecognized by the
modified MI/CI scheme.
Of particular interest are the arguments that were left out of the modified MI/CI scheme
but accounted for by either the Johnstone scheme or the argument list, and those that were left
out of all the schemes. In accounting for the America First and Intervention Harms American
Institutions arguments, the Johnstone scheme (as does Mead’s understanding of Jeffersonianism)
injects an understanding of the importance of protecting the US from the harm wrought by
26
foreign policy activism into our understanding of foreign policy opinion. In accounting for the
Government Seeks Oil and the Corporate Interests arguments, the argument list further
incorporates various views of American institutions and the US in general as agents of harm.
Likewise, the fact that The World is a Jungle argument cannot be located in either of the higher
level schemes or in the argument list we constructed tells us about the shortcomings of all three.
None can account for that argument because it combines a Hobbesian view of the outside world
with understandings of exceptionalism and universalism. Whereas the Johnstone scheme and the
argument list reference aspects of the exceptionalism/universalism binary, they do not adequately
address the Hobbesian dimension.50 The modified MI/CI model, of course, includes neither
dimension.
We can further push this point by surveying the various conceptions these arguments
deploy to oppose interventionism. This sample reveals conceptions and ways of understanding
and using those conceptions that are obscured when understanding foreign policy opinion
through the paradigm of positions or through broad argument categories:
a) With regard to harm: that which comes from actions versus that which comes from
interactions; that which the world inflicts on the US versus that which the US inflicts on the
world;
b) With regard to exceptionalism: as a quality that must be guarded by refusing
engagement with the world versus a quality that signals the incapacity of the US to recreate the
rest of the world in its image, versus a characteristic that makes the US unfit to engage with the
world, versus a mistaken understanding of America’s relationship with the world;
c) With regard to US institutions: as a set of good but endangered entities versus entities
with limited capacities, versus a set of institutions that are the puppets of large economic
27
interests, versus powerful, autonomous and sinister institutions;
d) With regard to Hobbesian violence: as a characteristic that marks the world as
unredeemable versus an environmental characteristic that every effective government must
ruthlessly confront, versus an undesirable characteristic of particular policies;
e) With regard to the primary focus of analysis: the US versus the outside world;
f) With regard to the type of objection: moral versus pragmatic.
The second argument for the importance of this diversity has simply to do with the
different trajectories these arguments pursue in terms of foreign policy analysis even though all
join in opposing this project and even though many would be included in the MI/CI Isolationist
category. For example, to oppose the Libyan intervention due to the belief that all governments
employ violent realpolitik policies would lead one to assess future policy ventures in ways
differently than would opposition to that intervention on the grounds activist policies overstretch
American institutions. Both, of course, oppose this particular project and both might be placed in
the “Isolationist” group in the MI/CI classification scheme. Yet it would be a grave
misunderstanding to hold that they otherwise agree on foreign policy issues.
The third argument points to the various and larger political goals and projects these
arguments assume. It is not the case that foreign policy views only indicate a judgment regarding
a particular foreign policy venture, nor even a general foreign policy position. Rather, they often
reveal larger political agendas. Thus, those who argue that Military Intervention Harms
Institutions are happy with US institutions and wish to protect them, while America Firsters are
worried by institutional overstretch and wish to protect citizens. Anti-Imperialists who draw
upon radical arguments to hold that the US is a Hegemon, that the Government is Pursuing Oil,
or that the government is controlled by Corporate Interests are attempting to protect other
28
nations from the US, are unhappy with American institutions and are communicating their
normative desire to engage in fundamental reform. That position is somewhat different from
those who draw upon the doctrine of unintended consequences to identify the Irony of Military
Intervention and Blowback and seek to change militaristic policies for moral or pragmatic
reasons. In turn, those who draw upon Hobbesian and realist understandings to depict the World
is a Jungle, point to Universal Realpolitik and believe that the US Should Intervene Only to
Protect Vital Interests have no problems with the character of American institutions, but
pragmatically strive to prevent those institutions from engaging in what their authors view as
Quixotic adventures. Note that these agendas are as diverse as the arguments that support them.
Much more is needed in terms of exploring the diversity of oppositional arguments we
found here. This study obviously suggests the need for attending to the kinds and variety of
actual arguments the general public uses. It also suggests that large-scale survey instruments
should be informed by a recognition of the variety of arguments at hand and include far more
options from which respondents may select when responding to foreign policy questions than is
now generally the case.
From a practical point of view, this evidence points to future diversity of complications
for the project of selling a foreign policy venture. The Libyan intervention is an apt illustration.
We find that it was a more controversial intervention than one would expect given the general
antipathy to Gaddafi in the US, revealing that a wide variety of arguments appears to have been
freed from the political constraints imposed by the Cold War and are now available to oppose the
propensity of the US to engage in overt military conflicts.51
29
1
Ole Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann
Consensus,” Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates, International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec. 1992) and Miroslav Nincic, “A Sensible Public: New
Perspectives on Popular Opinion and Foreign Policy,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.
36, No. 4 (Dec.1992), but also see Richard Clark and Kenneth Dautrich, ISP Forum and Debate:
“Who’s Really Misreading the Public? A Comment on Kull and Ramsay’s ‘Challenging U.S.
Policymakers’ Image of an Isolationist Public’,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 1, Issue
1 (2000).
2
E.g., Douglas Foyle, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating
Variable,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March1997), and Garry Young and
William Perkins, “Presidential Rhetoric, the Public Agenda, and the End of Presidential
Television's “Golden Age,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Oct. 2005).
3
E.g., Ole Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy: Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1996 and Brian Rathbun, “Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad:
Evidence of a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs in American Elites,”
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 3 (June 2007).
4
Though see Shoon Murray, ISP Forum and Debate: “Bringing the Majority Back In,”
International Studies Perspectives, No. 1 (2000).
5
Eugene Wittkopf, “On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and
Some Evidence,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec.1986); Jon Hurwitz and
Mark Peffley, “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model,” The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec.1987); Ole Holsti and James Rosenau.
“The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders,” The Journal of Politics,
30
Vol. 52, No. 1 (Feb.1990); 1990; Eugene Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion
and American Foreign Policy, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990; Daniel Drezner, “The
Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March
2008); Bruce Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the
Use of Military Force,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March1992); William
Chittick, Keith Billingsley and Rick Travis, “A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign
Policy Beliefs,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Sept.1995).
6
Walter Mead. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003; Rathbun, “Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad”;
Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011
7
Drezner, “The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion,” and Joseph Grieco, Christopher
Gelpi, Jason Reifler, J. and Peter Feaver,” Let’s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions
and American Public Support for War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55 (May 2011).
8
Eric Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, 6.
9
Andrew Johnstone, “Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign Relations,”
Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (2011).
10
For a study that holds that the politics of foreign policy in general is now more complex, see
Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in
the United States,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007) as well as the exchange
between Kupchan and Trubowitz, “Illusion of Liberal Internationalism’s Revival,” International
Security, Vol. 35. No. 1 (Summer 2010) and Stephen Choudin, Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley,
31
“The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives,” International Security, Vol. 35, No.
1 (Summer 2010).
11
Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy
Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005); Robert
Pateman, “Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror,” Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 6 (2006); Tami Davis and Sean Lynn-Jones, “Citty Upon a Hill,”
Foreign Policy, No. 66 (Spring 1987).
12
Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Thought Since
the Revolution, New York: Harcourt Brace 1955 and Philip Abbott, “Still Louis Hartz After All
These Years: A Defense of the Liberal Society Thesis,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1
(March 2005).
13
Rogers Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,”
American Political Science Review, Vol. 87 Issue 3 (1993); Rodney Hero, “Multiple Theoretical
Traditions in American Politics and Racial Policy Inequality,” Political Research Quarterly vol.
56, no. 4 (December 2003); Deborah Schildkraut, “Defining American Identity in the TwentyFirst Century: How Much ‘There’ is There?” Journal of Politics Volume 69, Issue 3 (August
2007)
14
See Brendon O’Connor, “American Foreign Policy Traditions: A Literature Review,” The
United States Studies Centre at the University of Sidney Working Papers (October 2009).
15
Greico et al., “Let’s Get a Second Opinion,” 564.
16
Charles Kegley, “Assumptions and Dilemmas in the Study of Americans' Foreign Policy
Beliefs: A Caveat,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec.1986). See also Philip
Powlick and Andrew Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,”
32
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 (May 1998); Murray, “Bringing the
Majority Back In,” and Kull and Ramsay’s remarks in Richard Clark, et al., “Rereading the
Public: Isolationism and Internationalism Revisited,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 1,
Issue 2 (August 2000).
17
Jennifer Keelan et al., “An analysis of the Human Papilloma Virus vaccine debate on
MySpace blogs,” Vaccine, Vol. 28, Issue 6 (February 2010)
18
Liza Tsaliki, “Online Forums and the Enlargement of Public Space: Research Findings from a
European Project,” The Public, Vol. 9, No. 2. (2002).
19
Jennifer Stromer-Galley, “Diversity of Political Conversation on the Internet: Users’
Perspectives,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2003); Peter
Dahlgren, “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and
Deliberation,” Political Communication, Vol. 22 (2005); Tamara Witschge, “Examining Online
Public Discourse in Context: A Mixed Methods Approach,” The Public, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2008).
20
See Christopher Weare and Wan-Ying Lin, “Content Analysis of the World Wide Web:
Opportunities and Challenges,” Social Science Computer Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2000).
21
For related issues, see Witschge, “Examining Online Public Discourse in Context”.
22
Eric Lawrence, et al.,“Self-Segregation or Deliberation? Blog Readership, Participation, and
Polarization in American Politics,” Perspectives in Politics, Vol. 8, No.1 (March 2010).
23
See Scott Gartner, “The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An
Experimental Approach,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, Issue 1 (2008) for
the use of a convenience sample for preliminary purposes.
24
The assumption in the literature is that contributors to websites within a country are nationals
unless they otherwise self-identify. See Tsaliki, “Online Forums and the Enlargement of Public
33
Space”.
25
Anthony Fung, “One city, two systems: Democracy in an electronic chat room in Hong Kong,”
The Public, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002).
26
Joan Black, “Presidential Address: Trashing the Polls,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 55,
No. 3 (1991)
27
AP-GfK Poll, Pew Research Center, March 30-April 3, 2011; USA Today/Gallup Poll, March
25-27, 2011; CBS News Poll, March 2011; CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, March 1820, 2011; Fox News Poll conducted by Anderson Robbins Research and Shaw & Company
Research, March 14-16, 2011.
28
R. Urbatsch, “Isolationism and Domestic Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 54,
No. 3 (2010); Johnstone, “Isolationism and Internationalism”.
29
Holsti and Rosenau, “The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes,” 118-9
30
See Drezner, “The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion”.
31
Dumbrell, “Varieties of Post-Cold War American Isolationism”.
32
Davis and Lynn-Jones, “Citty Upon a Hill”.
33
Hurwitz and Peffley, “How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured,” also employs a type of
exceptional/non-exceptional factor in their model, as does Dumbrell.
34
Robert Pateman, “Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror,” Third
World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 6 (2006); Paul McCartney, “American Nationalism and U.S.
Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 3
(Fall 2004)
35
See Michael Desch, “America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction
in U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2008).
34
36
The following lists the oppositional arguments deployed in terms of raw numbers: America
First (30), Universal Realpolitik (10), Interventions Harm US Institutions (10), The World is a
Jungle (28), Oil and Corporate Interests (32), Irony (44), US a Hegemon (10) and Intervene Only
to Defend US Security (7).
37
http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/reader-comments-on-my-libya-column/ (accessed
April 8, 2011).
38
http://letters.ocregister.com/category/international/ (accessed March 23, 2011).
39
dianatx, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/05/qaddafi-ready-discuss-govt-changes-
rebels-advance/#comment (accessed April 6, 2011)
40
http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy
.html (accessed March 29, 2011).
41
Jeff Gabel, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/05/qaddafi-ready-discuss-govt-changes-
rebels-advance/#comment (accessed April 6, 2011).
42
“alance,”http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/does-the-us-really-want-to-own-
libya/2011/03/30/AFV4QA5B_allComments.html#comments (accessed March 31, 2011).
43
mlkwek,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/does-the-us-really-want-to-own-
libya/2011/03/30/AFV4QA5B_allComments.html#comments (accessed March 31, 2011).
44
“tommy thek50”, http://discussions.latimes.com/20/lanews/la-naw-obama-analysis-
20110329/10 (accessed March 29, 2011)
45
Rush Limbaugh, “Regime Credits Obama's Words for Inspiring Middle East Uprisings,”
radio program transcript (March 29, 2011), and “Barack Obama, Citizen of World, is Undoing
American Sovereignty,” radio program transcript (March 29, 2011). See also David Barker, and
Kathleen Knight, “Political Talk Radio and Public Opinion,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.
35
64, No. 2 (Summer 2000).
46
“TXCOL47,” March 31, 2011 http://www.chron.com/disp/discuss.mpl/nation/7498627.html
(accessed April 6, 2011)
47
“D,” April 3, 2011, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/reader-comments-on-my-
libya-column/ (accessed April 8, 2011)
48
“Zell,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/29/scarborough-libya-
hypocrisy_n_842034.html (accessed March 30, 2011)
49
See Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neo-
Conservative Legacy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
50
Meade argues that Jacksonians assume a Hobbesian view of the world, but generally
subordinates this characteristic to others in his construction of the Jacksonian category.
51
See Robert Jervis, “Force in Our Times,” International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec. 2011).
36
TABLE ONE: The Modified MI/CI Scheme and Anti-Libyan Arguments
Position
ARGUMENT
Position
ARGUMENT
Cooperative
Accomodationists Cooperative
Internationalists
Isolationists
6 (b)
Militaristic
Hardliners
Militaristic
Internationalists
Isolationists
6 (a), 8
37
Other
Arguments
1, 2, 3. 4, 5 (a),
(b), 7
TABLE TWO: Johnstone’s Conception and Anti-Libyan Arguments
Position
Non-Interventionism
Unilateralism
ARGUMENT
1, 3
6(a)
38
Other
Arguments
2, 4, 5(a), (b),
6(b), 7, 8
TABLE THREE: Types of Arguments and Anti-Libyan Arguments
Argument
Type
Jacksonian
Jeffersonian
ARGUMENT
Argument
Type
6(a), 8
Unilateralist
3
Hamiltonian
ARGUMENT
Defensive
New Populist
Other
Exceptionalist/ America First Arguments
AntiGlobalizationist
1
Laissez-faire
Malignant
Universalist
Exceptionalist/
AntiImperialist
2
5(a), (b), 7
4, 6(b)
39