NDIA/USMC 2006 War Game
Humanitarian Relief / Disaster Assistance
Read-Aheads
1. Introduction
This read-ahead on Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance is taken from the recent
Emerald Express seminar and the Homeland Defense section of the Joint Urban Warrior
Wargame. The results of these Wargames / Seminars will be briefed and reviewed at the
NDIA 2006 Wargame.
2. Key Terms
Catastrophic Incident: “Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results
in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government
functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged
period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local,
tribal and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts
governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security
could be threatened. All catastrophic events are Incidents of National Significance.”1
Civil-Support: “Defense support of civil authorities, often referred to as civil support, is
DoD support, including federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and
contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and
for designated law enforcement and other activities. The Department of Defense provides
defense support of civil authorities when directed to do so by the President or Secretary of
Defense.”2
Emergency: “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President,
federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives
and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a
catastrophe in any part of the United States.”3
Homeland Defense: “...is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population,
and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as
directed by the President. The Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense.”4
Homeland Security: “Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and minimize
the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”5
Incident: “An occurrence or event, natural or human-caused, that requires an emergency
response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters,
emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous
materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes,
1
National Response Plan, December 2004, 63.
Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, 5.
3
The Stafford Act as quoted in the National Response Plan
4
Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, 5.
5
Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security
2
2
tropical storms, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other
occurrences requiring an emergency response.”6
Incident Command System (ICS): “A standardized on-scene emergency management
construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational
structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without
being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment,
personnel, procedures, and communications operating with a common organizational
structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. ICS is used for
all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents.
ICS is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, or
organized field-level incident management operations.” 7
Incident of National Significance: based upon one or more of the following criteria:
(1)
a federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the
assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security
(2)
the resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and federal assistance
has been requested by the appropriate state and local authorities
(3)
more than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in
responding to an incident
(4)
the Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed to assume responsibility for
managing a domestic incident by the President.8
Major Disaster: “any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high
water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide,
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any
part of the United States, which the President determines causes damage of sufficient severity
and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the Stafford Act to supplement the
efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations
in alleviating damage, loss, hardship, or suffering.”9
National Incident Management System (NIMS): A system mandated by HSPD-5 that
provides a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, State, local, and tribal governments;
the private sector; and NGOs to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To
provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, local, and tribal
capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, and terminology. HSPD-5
identifies these as the ICS; multi-agency coordination systems; training; identification and
management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualification
and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and
incident resources.”10
6
National Response Plan, December 2004, 66
National Response Plan, December 2004, 66-67
8
HSPD-5 as cited in the National Response Plan
9
The Stafford Act as cited in the National Response Plan
10
National Response Plan, December 2004, 69-70
7
3
Unified Command: An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with
incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together
through the designated members of the Unified Command to establish their designated
Incident Commanders at a single ICP and to establish a common set of objectives and
strategies and a single Incident Action Plan.
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3. Emerald Express 06-1 Take-Aways
What follows below are excerpts of notes taken from the Emerald Express 06-1 Workshop, held
on 14-15 February by the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and US Joint Forces
Command. That event focused on Hurricane Katrina disaster response and recovery operations
as well as recent humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations outside the
continental United States.
These excerpts, grouped thematically, are not intended to provide a comprehensive summary of
the event, but rather to highlight some facts, observations, and discussion points relevant to the
JUW HLS/HLD Seminar. They are not necessarily representative of the views of the JUW
sponsors. For additional information on Emerald Express 06-1, please refer to the US Marine
Corps Warfighting Lab website at: http://www.wargaming.quantico.usmc.mil/.
Command & Control / Incident Management

The Incident Command System evolved from efforts of fire departments across the
country to coordinate their operations across small, medium, and large scales of disasters.
The Incident Command System is what the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) is built around and is now the mandated domestic-incident-response system for
both DHS and the DoD. NIMS also includes the Multi-Agency Coordination System
(MACS) and the Public Information System.

The first principle of Incident Command is that there is only ever one incident
commander on the ground and operations are always conducted at the lowest tactical
level. “Area Command” is a coordinating function, supporting multiple command posts
with differing operations, resources and priorities. It does not have an operations center.
“Unified Command” is a new addition and substitutes a committee or a coalition for the
single Incident Commander.

In HA/DR operations, while there are a lot of commanders out front doing stuff, there
needs to be an effort to keep the staffs informed so they can backstop commanders with
plans.

In Hurricane Katrina, the military was new to this type of mission. Task organization
was unclear and very changeable. Commanders did not utilize staff or keep their
subordinates sufficiently informed. Moreover, there were too many Joint Task Force
(JTF) headquarters and poor integration with FEMA.

The “keep-it-simple, stupid” rule should be maintained for ground organization and
efforts. Web-based communications, centralized information management, and cell
phones are a must. Public affairs, information operations, and staff judge advocates (i.e.,
military lawyers) are critical enablers. There is also a need for centralized logistics and
request for assistance (RFA) processes.

The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the right size with the right capability balance
for HA/DR operations. If the Marine Corps is to be tasked similarly in the future, it
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needs a designated General Officer with a small staff as well as continuous assessment
capabilities and permanently-assigned liaison teams. [Note: The need for better
assessment training and some standardization of reporting is a continuing theme, as is the
need for a coordination center that can fuse assessments into a coherent picture of
requirements and capabilities.]
Logistics/“Push-Pull”

The current process for getting DoD assets deployed for national consequence
management is very long, taking 21 steps. The multiple different methods of requesting
National Guard support also contributed to problems during Katrina.

Planners need to think ahead about enablers for distribution. Simply pushing assets to
pre-staged areas is not enough. It is really only about 40% of the solution.

In the tsunami relief operation, US forces never got a proper “needs” assessment. We
“pushed” everything. We would ask “what do you need” and the answer was always
“give us everything you got.” Initial operations required “push” and it was very effective
in the early stages. Was it inefficient? Yes? Was there a backlog? Yes. But it was
necessary. USAID developed the first “pull” requirement on the 26th of January, after a
full month of “push”.

The military was deployed to the Katrina region with a “general purpose toolbox” which
caused some consternation, but was hard to avoid due to the initial lack of a defined
mission. Not all units remained in their area of operations; if they had unique
capabilities, they could be used elsewhere. Requirements never come perfect, you have
got to dig around for what is really needed. It is also important to distinguish between the
push/pull flow for logistics (which provides additional supplies) and the push/pull flow
for units (which creates additional demands).
Medical Response

Most medical infrastructure is local and appropriate for the environment on a day-to-day
basis. Military support should only provide what the disaster took away [in the context of
foreign HA/DR operations]. The assessment of what the disaster destroyed of the local
infrastructure should drive the medical operation, not an idealized view of what would be
nice for the community to have. The precision in matching what a situation needs with
the resources provided is vital to fulfilling this mission.

Epidemics do not occur spontaneously. Dead bodies do not generate outbreaks merely
because they are dead, it is the living bodies that capture and generate disease. The key
to preventing disease is improving (or reconstructing) sanitation and public health
education.

Disasters are not equal opportunity killers. They always strike vulnerable groups the
hardest. These are the poor, the old, the disabled, women & children, etc...
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
The importance of “pull” to the appropriate matching of medical response and aid to local
needs is a theme that recurs after every major US humanitarian intervention. By bringing
in state-of-the-art equipment that can’t be replicated under normal local conditions after
US military personnel depart, we stand the chance of undermining local authorities. This
much less true for domestic disasters, but the point remains that introducing “foreign”
medical capabilities into an area can have secondary effects well beyond medical
response.
Public Affairs/“Words Matter”

Public Affairs is not so much a question of achieving measurable positive effects, but
avoiding inevitable and powerful negative effects resulting from a communications
vacuum and those who will take advantage of it.

Always be aware that the media’s job is to get the information and news first, not to be
the most accurate.

An effective communications strategy was missing in the national response to Katrina.
The public should have been viewed as a partner in any information campaign. Problems
included: the lack of a Joint Information Center, the emergency alert system was not
used, no credible public spokesperson was appointed at the national level, and after
landfall, state and federal officials did not have any on-the-ground sources for
information on the extent of the catastrophe, and thus, the media was allowed to set the
tone.

In some instances, notably the Pakistan earthquake and the tsunami relief operations, the
deliberate de-militarization of some organizational terms helped to emphasize the
humanitarian nature of the effort. For example, for the tsunami the Joint Task Force was
renamed the “Combined Support Force” and the Civil-Military Operation Center
(CMOC) the Combined Coordination Center.
Civil-Military Coordination

The CMOC/coordination center function, while sometimes inefficient, is an absolutely
necessary component of HA/DR operations.

For HA/DR operations, there is a need to have liaison officers (LNOs) at local
Emergency Operations Centers, which are often chaotic and disorganized. LNOs can
help bring discipline and planning guidance, while leaving the locals in charge.

According to the Stafford Act, Title 10 personnel can operate on private/public land when
doing emergency work essential to preserve life and property.

In the Katrina aftermath, pairing National Guard and Title 10 units was an overall force
multiplier. It might also be a way of tackling “grey missions” where Title 10 authorities
and legality is dubious. The same goes for pairing them with local officials. However,
there are often unexpected difficulties, both organizational and technical. For example,
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the National Guard used commercial internets and could not access .mil sites to gain
information.

In the view of one Emerald Express presenter, the US Coast Guard might be ideally
situated to act at the intersection of military and civilian response, avoiding Posse
Comitatus issues.

Civil Affairs Groups were critical units in the Marine Corps’ Katrina response. More are
needed, and not all should necessarily be located in the reserves. The demand is such that
artillery regiments are being trained for this currently.

Multiple Emerald Express attendees commented that the Marine Corps should put
together a handbook for domestic HA/DR, and that it should specifically address
interagency cooperation.

The essential criteria for transitioning from military to civilian leadership of relief
operations are hard to pin down. It is more an art than a science and there are no easy
metrics. However a good objective is “to get off the stage while the audience is still
clapping.”

In the view of one Emerald Express presenter, the transition from in-extremis relief to
long-term recover should begin almost immediately. The military should make the
identification of the agencies that will relieve them of emergency relief functions an early
priority. The conditions under which that transition will be made should be mutually
agreed upon upfront, whenever possible.
Public/Private/NGO Coordination

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) do
not have command and control structures or capabilities comparable to the military; it is
important to keep this in mind when coordinating with them. Pre-coordination of
business practices with NGOs is thus, very desirable. [Note: The recommendation for
coordinating business practices with relevant NGOs prior to operations corresponds
almost precisely to a finding of the Emerald Express ’95 report.]

Corporate and private donations, especially in-kind and “cast-offs” can create large
logistical demands of their own, as well as requiring coordination with the official
military and civilian response efforts.

The American Red Cross was chartered by Congress in 1906 and is an integral part of the
National Response Plan. Its responsibilities are shared with FEMA. While it conducts
many of the same missions as the International Committee of the Red Cross it is also, by
statute, required to provide disaster services, bio-medical services, international services,
services to the armed forces, and health and safety services in the US.
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4. Preparatory Reading
The following are some recent articles in the Washington Post related to hurricane disaster relief
and lessons learned. The views expressed in these articles are not necessarily endorsed by the
JUW HLS/HLD Seminar sponsors.
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Katrina Report Spreads Blame
Homeland Security, Chertoff Singled Out
By Spencer S. Hsu
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, February 12, 2006; A01
Hurricane Katrina exposed the U.S. government's failure to learn the lessons of the Sept. 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, as leaders from President Bush down disregarded ample warnings of the
threat to New Orleans and did not execute emergency plans or share information that would have
saved lives, according to a blistering report by House investigators.
A draft of the report, to be released publicly Wednesday, includes 90 findings of failures at all
levels of government, according to a senior investigation staffer who requested anonymity
because the document is not final. Titled "A Failure of Initiative," it is one of three separate
reviews by the House, Senate and White House that will in coming weeks dissect the response to
the nation's costliest natural disaster.
The 600-plus-page report lays primary fault with the passive reaction and misjudgments of top
Bush aides, singling out Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, the Homeland Security
Operations Center and the White House Homeland Security Council, according to a 60-page
summary of the document obtained by The Washington Post. Regarding Bush, the report found
that "earlier presidential involvement could have speeded the response" because he alone could
have cut through all bureaucratic resistance.
The report, produced by an 11-member House select committee of Republicans chaired by Rep.
Thomas M. Davis III (R-Va.), proposes few specific changes. But it is an unusual compendium
of criticism by the House GOP, which generally has not been aggressive in its oversight of the
administration.
The report portrays Chertoff, who took the helm of the department six months before the storm,
as detached from events. It contends he switched on the government's emergency response
systems "late, ineffectively or not at all," delaying the flow of federal troops and materiel by as
much as three days.
The White House did not fully engage the president or "substantiate, analyze and act on the
information at its disposal," failing to confirm the collapse of New Orleans's levee system on
Aug. 29, the day of Katrina's landfall, which led to catastrophic flooding of the city of 500,000
people.
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On the ground, Federal Emergency Management Agency director Michael D. Brown, who has
since resigned, FEMA field commanders and the U.S. military's commanding general set up rival
chains of command. The Coast Guard, which alone rescued nearly half of 75,000 people
stranded in New Orleans, flew nine helicopters and two airplanes over the city that first day, but
eyewitness reconnaissance did not reach official Washington before midnight.
At the same time, weaknesses identified by Sept. 11 investigators -- poor communications
among first responders, a shortage of qualified emergency personnel and lack of training and
funding -- doomed a response confronted by overwhelming demands for help.
"If 9/11 was a failure of imagination then Katrina was a failure of initiative. It was a failure of
leadership," the report's preface states. "In this instance, blinding lack of situational awareness
and disjointed decision making needlessly compounded and prolonged Katrina's horror."
Chertoff spokesman Russ Knocke said, "every ounce of authority" and "100 percent of
everything that could be pre-staged was pre-staged" by the federal government before landfall
once the president signed emergency disaster declarations on Aug. 27. Brown had "all authority"
to make decisions and requests, and his "willful insubordination . . . was a significant problem"
for Chertoff, Knocke said.
White House spokesman Trent Duffy said Bush had full confidence in his homeland security
team, both appointed and career. "The president was involved from beginning to end,"
implementing emergency powers before the storm and taking responsibility afterward, Duffy
said.
Duffy objected to a leaked draft of an unpublished report, and said the White House is
completing its own study. "The president is less interested in yesterday, and more interested with
today and tomorrow," he said, "so that we can be better prepared for next time."
The report puts the government response in a larger context and offers a few new details. In
months of hearings, House and Senate investigative committees have already revealed the lack of
White House awareness of events on the ground, political infighting between federal and state
leaders, delays in ordering evacuations and the meltdown of FEMA operations.
The review, launched Sept. 15, suggests that federal funding be used to update state evacuation
studies. It proposes making commercial airliners available in an emergency and creating a
database to provide a national clearinghouse of shelter data. It also suggests naming a
professional disaster adviser to the president, akin to the military's chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Democrats, whose leaders considered the investigation a partisan whitewash and boycotted it,
called for Chertoff's removal. Reps. Charlie Melancon (D-La.) and William J. Jefferson (DLa.),who informally participated in the inquiry, renewed calls for an independent commission
styled after the one that investigated the Sept. 11 attacks, saying that the investigation, while
comprehensive, was rushed, failed to compel the White House to turn over documents and held
no administration officials accountable.
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House investigators acknowledge that after reviewing nine hearings, scores of interviews and
500,000 pages of documents, they "will never know" what would have happened had federal,
Louisiana and New Orleans officials activated plans and called on the military before the storm,
and evacuated the city sooner than Aug. 28. However, the committee found U.S. disaster
preparedness -- individual, corporate, philanthropic and governmental -- remains dangerously
inadequate.
"All the little pigs built houses of straw," it wrote. "Katrina was a national failure, an abdication
of the most solemn obligation to provide for the common welfare."
The report reconstructs a chronology of events over a three-week span from Aug. 22 to Sept. 12.
It focuses primarily on failures by Chertoff and the rest of the administration to execute a yearold National Response Plan and set up a related command structure, designed to marshal
resources in the critical first 72 hours after a catastrophe.
The report said the single biggest federal failure was not anticipating the consequences of the
storm. Disaster planners had rated the flooding of New Orleans as the nation's most feared
scenario, testing it under a catastrophic disaster preparedness program in 2004.
About 56 hours before Katrina made landfall, the National Weather Service and National
Hurricane Center cited an "extremely high probability" that New Orleans would be flooded and
tens of thousands of residents killed.
Given those warnings, the report notes Bush's televised statement on Sept. 1 that "I don't think
anybody anticipated the breach of the levees," and concludes: "Comments such as those . . . do
not appear to be consistent with the advice and counsel one would expect to have been provided
by a senior disaster professional."
As the president's principal disaster adviser, Chertoff poorly executed many decisions, including
declaring Katrina an "incident of national significance" -- the highest designation under the
national emergency response plan and convening an interagency board of experienced strategic
advisers on Aug. 30 instead of Aug. 27; designating an untrained Brown to take charge of the
disaster; and failing to invoke a federal plan that would have pushed federal help to
overwhelmed state and local officials rather than waiting for them to request it.
The report said Chertoff was "confused" about Brown's role and authority, and that it was
unclear why he chose him, given his lack of skills and his hostility to FEMA's downgrading
under new plans.
After failing to foresee the need to muster buses, boats and aircraft, the next critical federal
mistake was failure to confirm catastrophic levee breaches, the report asserts.
Despite a FEMA official's eyewitness accounts of breaches starting at 7 p.m. on Aug. 29, the
president's Homeland Security Council, led by homeland security adviser Frances Fragos
Townsend and her deputy, Ken Rapuano, did not consider them confirmed until 11 hours later,
on Aug. 30.
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The first federal order to evacuate New Orleans was not issued until 1:30 a.m. Aug. 31, and
came only after FEMA's ground commander in New Orleans, Phil Parr, put out a call for buses
after finding water lapping at the approaches to the Superdome, where about 12,000 victims were
camped.
The council's "failure to resolve conflicts in information and the 'fog of war,' not a lack of
information, caused confusion," the House panel wrote. It added that the crisis showed the
government remains "woefully incapable" of managing information, much as it was before the
2001 attacks.
The summary obtained by The Post generally praises pre-storm evacuations by Gulf Coast
leaders, but it criticizes preparations and decisions by Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Babineaux
Blanco (D) and New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin (D), who knew that 100,000 city residents
had no cars and relied on public transit. The city's failure to complete its mandatory evacuation,
ordered Aug. 28, led to hundreds of deaths, the report said.
Neighboring Plaquemines Parish, by contrast, issued its order Aug. 27, helping to hold the
number of storm deaths there at three. Nursing homes outside New Orleans were able to find
special transportation for patients, while at least one in the city could not find bus drivers by the
time people were told to leave.
The investigation also condemned "hyped media coverage of violence and lawlessness,
legitimized by New Orleans authorities," for increasing security burdens, scaring away rescuers
and heightening tension in the city.
It faulted Nagin for repeating, in an interview with Oprah Winfrey, rumors of armed gangs
committing rapes and murder in an "almost animalistic state." The report said few cases of
gunshots or violence were confirmed, although it acknowledged that few police were able to
investigate and victims may have had little incentive to report crime.
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The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned
The White House
Thursday, February 23, 2006; 9:07 AM
Today, The Administration Released Its Review Of The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina.
The President's charge to evaluate the Federal government's response to the storm resulted in the
report and recommendations released today by the Administration, The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. The product of an extensive review, led by the President's
Homeland Security Advisor Fran Townsend, the Report identifies deficiencies in the Federal
government's response and lays the groundwork for transforming how the Nation -- from every
level of government, to the private sector, to individual citizens and communities -- pursues a
real and lasting vision of emergency preparedness and response.
The Lessons Learned Report Assesses The Federal Response, Identifies Lessons Learned, And
Recommends Appropriate Corrective Actions. The Report identifies the systemic problems in
Federal emergency preparedness and response revealed by Hurricane Katrina -- and the best
solutions to address them. Where actions at the State and local level had bearing on Federal
decisions or operations, they are included in order to provide full context. The Lessons Learned
report includes:
* 17 lessons the Executive Branch has learned after reviewing and analyzing the response to
Katrina;
* 125 specific recommendations to the President, which have been reviewed by relevant Federal
departments and agencies, and will now enter an implementation process; and
* 11 critical actions to be completed before June 1, 2006 -- the first day of the next hurricane
season. The President's Charge: The Government Will Learn The Lessons Of Hurricane Katrina
President Bush Ordered A Comprehensive Review Of The Federal Response To Hurricane
Katrina. In his September 15, 2005, address to the Nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans,
the President made clear that the Federal government would learn the lessons of Hurricane
Katrina so we as a Nation can make the necessary changes to be "better prepared for any
challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could threaten our people."
Hurricane Katrina Was A Deadly Reminder That We Can And Must Do Better In Responding
To Emergencies. Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent sustained flooding of New Orleans
exposed significant flaws in our national preparedness for catastrophic events and our capacity to
respond to them. Emergency plans at all levels of government -- including the 600-page National
Response Plan that set forth the Federal government's plan to coordinate all its departments and
agencies and integrate them with State, local, and private sector partners -- were put to the test
and came up short.
The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned
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We Are Not As Prepared As We Need To Be At All Levels: Federal, State, Local, Community,
And Individual. Hurricane Katrina obligates us to re-examine how the Federal government is
organized to address the full range of potential catastrophic events -- both natural and man-made.
Hurricane Katrina And Its Aftermath Provide Us With The Imperative To Design And Build A
Unified System. The Lessons Learned Report confirms the imperative of integrating and
synchronizing the Nation's homeland security policies, strategies, and plans across Federal, State,
and local governments, as well as the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
faith-based groups, communities, and individual citizens. To achieve this, the Report identifies
three immediate priorities:
First, we must implement a comprehensive National Preparedness System to make certain that
we have a fully national system that ensures unity of effort in preparing for and responding to
natural and man-made disasters;
Second, we must create a Culture of Preparedness that emphasizes that the entire Nation -- at all
levels of government, the private sector, communities, and individual citizens -- shares common
goals and responsibilities for homeland security; and
Third, we must implement corrective actions to ensure we do not repeat the problems
encountered during Hurricane Katrina.
A Comprehensive National Preparedness System
The Existing National Preparedness System Must Be Improved To Minimize The Impact Of
Disasters On Lives, Property, And The Economy. Pursuant to the National Strategy for
Homeland Security, the President directed the creation of a comprehensive national preparedness
system in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), starting with a national
domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. In response, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has developed an Interim National Preparedness Goal. We must now translate this Goal
into a robust preparedness system that includes integrated plans, procedures, training, and
capabilities at all levels of government. The System must also incorporate the private sector,
NGOs, faith-based and other grassroots groups, communities, and individual citizens. The
objective of our National Preparedness System must be to achieve and sustain risk-based target
levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major natural
disasters, terrorist incidents, and other emergencies.
The Response To Hurricane Katrina Revealed A Lack Of Familiarity With Incident
Management, Planning Discipline, And Field-Level Crisis Leadership. Going forward, the
Federal government must clearly articulate national preparedness goals and objectives. It must
create the infrastructure for ensuring unity of effort. The Federal government must manage the
National Preparedness System for measuring effectiveness and assessing preparedness at all
levels of government. The Lessons Learned report outlines five elements that are critical for a
National Preparedness System:
1. Building and integrating the Federal government's operational capability for emergency
preparedness and response;
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2. Strengthening DHS's capacity to direct the Federal response effort while providing resources
to responders in the field;
3. Ensuring unity of effort and eliminating red tape and delays in providing Federal assistance to
disaster areas;
4. Strengthening homeland security education, exercises, and training programs; and
5. Ensuring that homeland security assessments, lessons learned, and corrective action programs
are institutionalized throughout the Federal government.
Creating A Culture Of Preparedness
The Creation Of A Culture Of Preparedness Will Emphasize That The Entire Nation Shares
Common Goals And Responsibilities For Homeland Security. A Culture of Preparedness must
build a sense of shared responsibility among individuals, communities, the private sector, NGOs,
faith-based groups, and Federal, State, and local governments. Our homeland security is built on
a foundation of partnerships. The Lessons Learned Report outlines four principles to guide the
development of a Culture of Preparedness:
1. A prepared Nation will be a long-term continuing challenge;
2. Initiative and innovation must be recognized and rewarded at all levels;
3. Individuals must play a central role in preparing themselves and their families for
emergencies; and
4. Federal, State, and local governments must work in partnership with each other and the private
sector.
Ensuring That The Federal Government Does Not Repeat Problems Encountered During
Hurricane Katrina
Changes Must Be Made Immediately To Prepare For The 2006 Hurricane Season. The 2006
hurricane season is just over three months away. Even while the process to implement the
lessons learned from Katrina is underway, there are specific steps the Federal government can
and should take now to be better prepared for future emergencies. The Lessons Learned Report
recommends 11 critical actions to strengthen Federal response capabilities before June 1, 2006,
many of which the Administration has already begun to implement:
1. Ensure that relevant Federal, State, and local decision-makers, including leaders of State
National Guards, are working together and in close proximity to one another in the event of
another disaster;
2. Ensure that for events preceded by warning, we are prepared to pre-position an interagency
Federal Joint Field Office (JFO) to coordinate and, if necessary, direct Federal support to the
disaster;
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3. Ensure situational awareness by establishing rapid deployable communications, as well as
instituting a structure to consolidate Federal operational reporting with DHS;
4. Embed a single Department of Defense point of contact at the JFO and FEMA regional offices
to enhance coordination of military resources supporting the response;
5. Designate locations throughout the country for receiving, staging, moving, and integrating
military resources to ensure the most effective deployment of Federal disaster relief personnel
and assets;
6. Identify and develop rosters of Federal, State, and local government personnel who are
prepared to assist in disaster relief;
7. Employ all available technology to update and utilize the national Emergency Alert System in
order to provide the public with advanced notification of and instruction for disasters and
emergencies;
8. Encourage States to pre-contract with service providers for key disaster relief needs, such as
debris removal and the provision of critical commodities;
9. Enhance the mechanism for providing Federal funds to States for preparations upon warning
of an imminent emergency;
10. Improve the delivery of assistance to disaster victims by streamlining registration, expediting
eligibility decisions, tracking movements of displaced victims, and incorporating safeguards
against fraud; and
11. Enhance ongoing review of State evacuation plans and incorporate planning for Continuity of
Government to ensure the continuation of essential and emergency services.
Transforming The Federal Response To Future Emergencies
Acting On The Recommendations In The Lessons Learned Report Will Enable The Federal
Government To Respond To Natural And Man-Made Disasters More Effectively And
Efficiently. The lessons of Hurricane Katrina cannot be learned and put into action without
change. As the Federal government works to implement the near-term critical activities and 125
recommendations, State and local governments, the private sector, NGOs, faith-based and
community organizations, the media, communities, and individuals should undertake a review of
their respective roles and responsibilities in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events.
Together, We Will Strengthen Our Ability To Prepare For, Protect Against, Respond To, And
Recover From Catastrophic Events. The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and the
recommendations set forth in today's Report will yield preparedness dividends that transcend
Federal, State and local boundaries. Their full implementation will help the entire Nation achieve
a shared commitment to preparedness.
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Multiple Layers Of Contractors Drive Up Cost of Katrina
Cleanup
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, March 20, 2006; A01
NEW ORLEANS -- How many contractors does it take to haul a pile of tree branches? If it's
government work, at least four: a contractor, his subcontractor, the subcontractor's subcontractor,
and finally, the local man with a truck and chainsaw.
If the job is patching a leaking roof, the answer may be five contractors, or even six. At the
bottom tier is a Spanish-speaking crew earning less than 10 cents for every square foot of blue
tarp installed. At the top, the prime contractor bills the government 15 times as much for the
same job.
For the thousands of contractors in the Katrina recovery business, this is the way the system
works -- a system that federal officials say is the same after every major disaster but that local
government officials, watchdog groups and the contractors themselves say is one reason that
costs for the hurricane cleanup continue to swell.
"If this is 'normal,' we have a serious problem in this country," said Benny Rousselle, president
of Plaquemines Parish, a hurricane-ravaged district downriver from New Orleans. "The federal
government ought to be embarrassed about what is happening. If local governments tried to run
things this way, we'd be run out of town."
Federal agencies in charge of Katrina cleanup have been repeatedly criticized for lapses in
managing the legions of contractors who perform tasks ranging from delivering ice to rebuilding
schools. Last Thursday, Congress's independent auditor, the Government Accountability Office,
said inadequate oversight had cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars, by allowing contractors
to build shelters in the wrong places or to purchase supplies that were not needed.
But each week, many more millions are paid to contractors who get a cut of the profits from a
job performed by someone else. In instances reviewed by The Washington Post, the difference
between the job's actual price and the fee charged to taxpayers ranged from 40 percent to as high
as 1,700 percent.
Consider the task of cleaning up storm debris. Just after the hurricane, the Army Corps of
Engineers awarded contracts for removing 62 million cubic yards of debris to four companies:
Ashbritt Inc., Ceres Environmental Services Inc., Environmental Chemical Corp. and Phillips
and Jordan Inc.
Each of the four contracts was authorized for a maximum of $500 million. Corps officials have
declined to reveal specific payment rates, citing a court decision barring such disclosures. But
local officials and businesspeople knowledgeable about the contracts say the companies are paid
$28 to $30 a cubic yard.
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Below the first tier, the arrangements vary. But in a typical case in Louisiana's Jefferson Parish,
top contractor Ceres occupied the first rung, followed by three layers of smaller companies:
Loupe Construction Co., then a company based in Reserve, La., which hired another
subcontractor called McGee, which hired Troy Hebert, a hauler from New Iberia, La. Hebert,
who is also a member of the state legislature, says his pay ranged from $10 to $6 for each cubic
yard of debris.
"Every time it passes through another layer, $4 or $5 is taken off the top," Hebert said. "These
others are taking out money, and some of them aren't doing anything."
Defenders of the multi-tiered system say it is a normal and even necessary part of doing business
in the aftermath of a major disaster. The prime contracts are usually awarded by FEMA or other
government agencies well in advance, so relief services can be brought in quickly after the crisis
eases. These companies often must expand rapidly to meet the need, and they do so by
subcontracting work to other firms.
The two federal agencies that administer most disaster-related contracts, FEMA and the Army
Corps of Engineers, say the system benefits small and local companies that do not have the
resources to bid for large federal contracts. At the top end, prime contractors must be large
enough to carry the heavy insurance burdens and administrative requirements of overseeing
thousands of workers dispersed across a wide area, agency officials say. They also note that
contractors have a legal right to hire subcontractors as they need them.
"Our purview of a contract goes to the prime contractor only," said Jean Todd, a Corps
contracting officer.
But watchdog groups that monitor federal contracting say Katrina has taken the contract tiering
system to a new extreme, wasting tax dollars while often cheating companies at the low end of
the contracting ladder. In some cases, the groups say, companies in the top and middle rungs
contribute little more than shuffling paperwork from one tier to the next.
"It's trickle-down contracting: You're paying a cut at every level, and it makes the final cost
exponentially more expensive than it needs to be," said Keith Ashdown of the watchdog group
Taxpayers for Common Sense. "And in almost every case, the local people who really need to be
making the money are at the bottom of these upside-down pyramid schemes."
The gap is particularly large for roof repairs. Four large companies won Army Corps contracts to
cover damaged roofs with blue plastic tarp, under a program known as "Operation Blue Roof."
The rate paid to the prime contractors ranged from $1.50 to $1.75 per square foot of tarp
installed, documents show.
The prime contractors' rate is nearly as much as local roofers charge to install a roof of asphalt
shingles, according to two roofing executives who requested anonymity because they feared
losing their contracts. Meanwhile, at the bottom of the contractor heap, four to five rungs lower,
some crews are being paid less than 10 cents per square foot, the officials said.
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At least the prime contractors for roofing and debris removal owned equipment that could be
immediately applied to the job at hand. In the world of Katrina contracting, this has not always
been the case.
For example, one company hired as an ice vendor owns no ice-making equipment. Landstar
Systems Inc., a $2 billion Florida company placed in charge of the bus evacuation of New
Orleans, is a transportation broker that specializes in trucking and has no buses of its own. In
2002, the company was awarded a $100 million contract to provide emergency transportation
services for the federal government during major disasters. The contract, which is administered
by the Federal Aviation Administration, was expanded in the fall to a maximum $400 million.
Landstar declined a request for an interview.
Thousands of New Orleanians had been stranded in the Superdome for more than 48 hours by
the time FEMA issued the first order for a bus evacuation early on the morning of Aug. 31. The
order was passed to Landstar, which then turned to other companies to locate buses, according to
an official chronology prepared by the Department of Transportation. Landstar hired Carey
International Inc., of Washington, which then hired the BusBank, of Chicago, and Transportation
Management Systems of Columbia, Md. Bus Bank and TMS called private charter-bus
companies -- some from as far away as California and Washington state -- asking them to send
buses and drivers to New Orleans.
More than 1,100 buses eventually responded, some arriving four days later, after traveling
hundreds of miles. Daily earnings averaged about $700 per bus, according to bus company
owners. Landstar's daily earnings were nearly $1,200 per bus, government records show.
"A lot of that money is going to brokers who didn't have to do anything," said Jeff Polzien,
owner of Red Carpet Charters, an Oklahoma bus company that sent coaches to New Orleans as a
fourth-tier subcontractor.
Lower pay is hardly the worst problem subcontractors face. With many tiers to navigate, money
trickles down slowly, delaying payment by weeks and months, and frequently imposing
hardships on the smallest firms.
Several bus company owners said they were still owed tens of thousands of dollars for work they
did in the fall. For some, the delays have been ruinous.
Thomas Paige, owner of Coast to Coast Bus Line of Dillon, S.C., laid off staff, and two of his
four buses were repossessed by creditors after payment for his New Orleans work fell behind by
three months.
"I went to New Orleans to help people -- and hopefully to help myself -- but now I feel like I've
dug a ditch and fallen into it," Paige said. "If I would have known what I know now, I never
would have gotten involved. It's just not worth it."
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FEMA's Katrina Report Details Failures
By LARA JAKES JORDAN
The Associated Press
Monday, April 3, 2006; 5:16 PM
WASHINGTON -- An internal FEMA report that calls for urgent reform after Hurricane Katrina
outlines old failures the disaster response agency was warned about five months before the storm
struck.
A Feb. 13 report assessing the Federal Emergency Management Agency's response to the storm
concludes FEMA suffered from confusing leadership roles, outdated or inadequate response
plans and inexperienced or under-trained staff during Katrina. It also details problems in tracking
supplies to disaster sites.
All of those findings were highlighted in a March 2005 consultant's analysis, titled "A Vision for
the Future," on how to revamp FEMA before the next disaster hit.
"For years FEMA has approached disasters almost timidly," the agency's post-Katrina report
found. "FEMA should be attacking with sledgehammers, not fly swatters. Specific changes in
logistics need immediate attention."
FEMA's internal review is the latest to surface in a series of studies about the government's
sluggish response to Katrina, and how to fix it before the 2006 hurricane season starts on June 1.
Katrina struck last Aug. 29.
Senate investigators are wrapping up their own inquiry of the Katrina response, following
findings by the House and the White House that concluded FEMA failed to learn from earlier
disasters.
FEMA acting director R. David Paulison said the agency is looking carefully at all post-Katrina
reports, and he described them as "helpful in rebuilding FEMA."
But Paulison, a former Miami-Dade County fire chief in Florida, acknowledged the government
is often slow to revamp itself, comparing the recommendations made after Hurricane Andrew in
1992 to Katrina more than a decade later.
"You could have taken 'Andrew' out and put 'Katrina' in," Paulison said in a brief interview last
week.
He added: "FEMA was a four-letter word when I was a fire chief during Hurricane Andrew, and
that's why I'm determined to make (changes) happen."
Many reforms following disasters are never enacted because of financial costs and power
struggles, said University of Pennsylvania scholar Donald F. Kettl, co-author of "On Risk and
Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina."
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"The big crises like Sept. 11 and Katrina challenge us and punish us for failing to adapt," said
Kettl, a political science professor. "But these reports call for really dramatic, radical change in
ways that disrupt the patterns of political power and standard operating procedure. So it's a lot
easier to let the day-to-day pressures rule instead of confronting the issues that we know we have
to deal with."
Former FEMA director Michael Brown said the two documents, taken together, raise concerns
that few of the lessons learned from Katrina will be heeded. Brown, who left the agency under
fire days after Katrina hit, is a top critic of the Homeland Security Department, FEMA's parent
agency.
"They are fighting an uphill battle," Brown said Monday. "They wouldn't give me the money and
resources to do it."
The new FEMA report was posted on the agency's Web site earlier this year. The agency pulled
it from the site after a reporter's inquiry. The 2005 analysis by the Mitre Corp., obtained by The
Associated Press, examined FEMA's performance during the 2004 Florida hurricanes.
Both reports describe FEMA's blunders in trying to communicate and coordinate with onsite
disaster responders, and get much-needed supplies like food, water and ice to victims.
Mitre, in early 2005, found FEMA was incapable of getting a clear picture of the disaster as it
unfolded because it did not have a system capable of sharing information from the ground-up. It
also concluded that FEMA could not track supplies as they were being distributed.
One unnamed employee interviewed for the Mitre report worried about holes in the tracking
system, noting: "White House is asking, `Where are the water trucks?' I didn't know. ... We don't
have confidence that the trucks have checked in, arrived at the destination. We have to rely on
third parties to tell us they have arrived."
The February report noted that responders in New Orleans were unable to communicate easily
and quickly with the emergency operations center in Baton Rouge because of inadequate phone
and data systems. It also said FEMA's tracking system "was of little use."
"Unfortunately, logistics personnel had a muddled picture," the report found.
Homeland Security has pledged to develop response systems before the next hurricane season
begins. They include better tracking of supplies, registering victims, approving debris removal
contracts and creating disaster teams to give the agency a real-time picture of unfolding
emergencies.
"There are a lot of things we can do between now and hurricane season," Paulison said. "But
there's stuff that's just going to take a couple of years to get in place.”
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More Devastating Hurricanes Possible
Complacency Worries Experts at Symposium in Laurel
By Jennifer Lenhart
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, April 19, 2006; B03
Enmeshed as they still are in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, disaster planners and
hurricane forecasters have no choice but to prepare for this year's possible foes: Alberto, Beryl,
Chris, Debby, Ernesto and the rest.
All signs point to another severe season, though the ferocity and number of hurricanes is
impossible to predict, top U.S. forecasters and emergency planners said yesterday at a
symposium in Maryland.
"I think a lot of people say you could never have the same death and damages as we did last
season," Max Mayfield, director of the National Hurricane Center and Tropical Prediction
Center, said during a break in the conference at the Johns Hopkins University campus in Laurel.
"I'm here to say it could happen."
Nature is signaling another active season. La Niña is back, judging by telltale cooler water on the
surface of the equatorial Pacific Ocean. Surface water in the Atlantic, meanwhile, is warmer.
Conditions are similar to those recorded ahead of last year's record-breaking string of named
storms, said David L. Johnson, assistant administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and director of the National Weather Service.
"I've got a bunch of hardworking scientists who are crunching those numbers right now" and
aiming to make their prediction public May 22, about a week before hurricane seasons officially
begins, Johnson said.
Confidence-boosting was the undercurrent of the day-long event, which drew about 300
emergency management workers from across the United States to sessions heavy on "lessons
learned" from last year. Several Marylanders said they welcomed the brief remarks by R. David
Paulison, nominated to replace Michael D. Brown as chief of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
"A person stepping in, experienced with emergency management and in working with local
emergency management, will be able to bring confidence," said John W. Droneburg III, director
of the Maryland Emergency Management Agency.
Only twice in recorded weather history has the Chesapeake Bay region taken a direct hit from a
storm that was still hurricane strength at landfall. Residents base evacuation decisions on
memories of past surges, most recently the eight-foot surge and inland flooding spawned by
Hurricane Isabel in 2003.
Complacency, development near coastal areas and millions of people living in the region concern
Mayfield.
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"I'm really worried about the mid-Atlantic and the Northeast because [a hurricane] is such a rare
event . . . and you all worry about a lot of things besides hurricanes," he said.
His agency will use a new tool this year, a 24-hour surge tracker to help emergency responders in
the expected path of a storm. A computer-generated model predicting the path of the storm and
the surge in the 24 hours before landfall will be available to state and local emergency
management officials, Mayfield said in an interview.
The idea, he said, is that officials in communities in the storm's path will be better able to predict
where to position emergency response teams, equipment and food. Gulf Coast communities did
not have such detailed information during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Mayfield said he hesitated before going public with the new tracking tool out of fear that local
officials would consider it etched in stone and plan evacuations accordingly -- and perhaps
erroneously. "I don't want local emergency managers to make evacuation calls based on that. It's
not going to be accurate," he said.
If a hurricane thrashed its way to the mid-Atlantic coast, forecasters still would not have the tools
to reliably predict its point of landfall.
"Do you think we're going to be able to tell if it's going to clip the Chesapeake Bay or crash into
Cape Cod?'' Mayfield said. "Nobody's going to be able to tell you where it's going to hit.
Nobody."
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5. References
Hurricane Katrina:
Government Accountability Office, David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States.
“Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery.” Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee. Washington D.C.: Government Accountability Office,
8 March 2006.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina. 109th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2006.
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. February 2006
Other:
Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Washington, D.C.:
Department of Defense, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nrp.pdf
* caution: 3.89MB
Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March 2004
http://www.nimsonline.com/nims_3_04/index.htm
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