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Emergence and Evolution of Early Palestinian and Zionist Identity
The Palestinian and Zionist nationalist movements, though constructed independently,
developed and evolved both despite of and in response to each other. The interplay between
these two senses of identity in a mutual homeland has, in some respects, fused the histories of the
Palestinian and Jewish people. The Palestinians and Israeli Jews not only exist within the same
borders, but also share a connection with the biblical land of Palestine and a common memory of
bloody battles waged on and over its soil. In addition, the duel nature of Palestine as the
birthplace of Palestinian identity and the focus of the Zionist movement has lead to the
construction of two narratives that often give completely different significance to the same
places, events and people (Scham 2006, 67-73).
One example of this phenomenon is the fact that both nations claim ownership over
Palestine, particularly its center in Jerusalem (in Arabic, al-Quds), for different reasons of
religious and political significance. Jerusalem, the disputed capital of the State of Israel, and the
Palestinians’ desired capital for a future Palestinian state (specifically in East Jerusalem), is the
site of both the Temple Mount and the Prophet Muhammad’s ascension to heaven. The Western
Wall, the only remnant of the Jewish Temple, is considered the holiest site accessible to Jews.
The Al-Aqsa Mosque, which lies just beyond the Western Wall, is considered Islam’s third
holiest site. Both the Jews and the Palestinians have religious and nationalist stake in this land.
Jerusalem is, for different reasons, integral to each nation’s sense of identity.
Another interesting component relating to the emergence and evolution of Palestinian and
Zionist identity is the two movements’ inherent similarities and differences. Notable, is the fact
that both the Palestinians and the Jews (before 1948) asserted their identity without access to an
independent state (Khalidi, 1997, 194). In addition, both movements emerged in response to
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great adversity. The Zionist movement developed as a remedy to the “Jewish problem,” which
resulted from internal dislocation within the countries of Europe, growing anti-Semitism, open
attacks, and hostile state policies (Migdal 2001, 53). In Odessa, the pogroms of 1871, 1881 and
especially 1905 triggered talk among Jewish intellectuals of a return to Israel, restoration of the
Hebrew language, and revival of Jewish culture (Brenner 2004, 55-56). Finally, mass migration
to Israel between 1933 and 1935 by refugees from Nazi-dominated Europe virtually doubled the
Jewish population of Palestine (Brenner 2004, 144-145).
The Palestinians, similarly, united in response to threats on their identity and collective
way of life. Early signs of Palestinian mobilization were seen with the revolts in 1834 against
Egyptian empire builders and between 1936 and 1939 against Britain’s imperial rule
(Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 5). Zionism, however, has proven to be the most significant force
in spurring the development of Palestinian nationalism. The Palestinians, who engaged in riots
against the Jewish immigrants beginning in 1881 (Brenner 2004, 88), mobilized further after the
events of 1947-49 (“al-Nakba”) and especially in the mid-1960s, when new middle class
leadership and organized political structures like Fatah and the Movement of Arab Nationalists
emerged. Setbacks among the Palestinians in the early history of the Israeli state seemed to fuel
and reinforce Palestinian identity, rather than hinder it. (Khalidi 1997, 27).
As shown, the Zionist and Palestinian nationalist movements share several important
similarities that are of particular significance. An underlying argument within this paper,
however, is that the differences between these two narratives, augmented by the nature of Israeli
rule over the Palestinians, have played an important role in the subsequent development of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. What follows, is a discussion of the emergence and evolution of these
two movements through the British Mandate period and the creation of the State of Israel. After
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each movement is presented separately, and in its own terms, an analysis of the intertwining
relationship between them will be presented.
I. The Emergence of Jewish Nationalism
Although the Zionist movement did not emerge until the era of European nationalism,
Zionist thought can be traced to the late 18th century. Two of the first known proponents of the
modern concept of a return movement to the Palestine were Rabbi Yehuda Alkalai (1798-1878)
of Serbia and Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (1795-1874) of West Prusian Thorn (Brenner 2003, 78). Alkalai, a Sephardic Jew of Spanish-Portuguese descent, wrote a series of appeals for the
Jews to return to the Holy Land. At the same time, Kalischer, an Ashkenazi, used biblical and
rabbinical sources to argue that the salvation of the Jews would result from human efforts and
not divine intervention in the Messianic Age (Brenner 2003, 8). It is necessary to point out that
the idea of a return movement was still grounded in religious rationale during this time period.
The modern Zionist movement that took shape during the British mandate period, in contrast,
was largely secular.
Moses Hess, an early Jewish nationalist, defended the legitimacy and necessity of
nations, especially the Jewish nation, in Rome and Jerusalem (1862). Hess argued that Jewish
nationality is “inseparable from the inheritance of [its] ancestors, the holy land, and the eternal
city, the birthplace of belief in the divine unity of life . . . (Seltzer 1980, 688).” He communicated
several elements that would later be espoused by founders of the Zionist movement: rediscovery
of Judaism, redefinition of Judaism as a nationality and not as a religion, recognition of the
Jewish struggle for recognition, and establishing a relationship with the Jewish tradition and
homeland in Palestine (Brenner 2003, 12).
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II. Zionism and its Competing Factions
“At Basle, I founded the Jewish state.”
- Political Zionist Theodore Herzl after the first world Zionist Congress in
Basle, Switzerland, in 1897 (Cohen 1992, 64).
“At Basle, I sat solitary among my friends, like a mourner at a wedding-feast.”
- Cultural Zionist Ahad Ha-am as a participant at the same Congress (Cohen
1992, 64).
Political Zionism
Political Zionism was born in the late 19th century as a movement for Jewish unification
through the process of immigration and the settlement in a Jewish state. Its eventual goal was the
creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine secured by public law (Cohen 1992, 68, 71). The
Zionist phenomenon emerged as one aspect of a larger trend towards Jewish politicization in
Europe, following incidents such as the Damascus Affair of 1840, the Mortara incident of 1858
(Brenner 2003, 16-17), the Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s and the ensuing anti-Semitic street riots
in Paris in December 1894 (Brenner 2003, 35). Many Jews, including Theodore Herzl, who
covered the Dreyfus trial and reported on French anti-Semitism for the Paris-based newspaper
Neue Freie Presse (Brenner 2004, 25, 37), felt advances toward Jewish emancipation in Central
and Western Europe after the French Revolution were largely unsuccessful (Seltzer 1980, 693).
Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, believed emancipation failed because the Jews retained
their individual rights but still had no collective rights as a people (Brenner 2003, 47).
The following passage exemplifies the sentiment that led Herzl to Zionism:
The Dreyfus case embodies more than a judicial error; it embodies the desire of
the vast majority of the French to condemn all Jews in this one Jew. “Death to the
Jews!” howled the mob as the decorations were being ripped from the captain’s
coat . . . Where? In France. In republican, modern, civilized France, a hundred
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years after the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The French people, or at any rate
the greater majority of the French people, [do] not want to extend the rights of
man to Jews. The edict of the great Revolution has been revoked.
Herzl describes in his book Der Judenstaat (“The Jewish State”), an independent state of
Jewish refuge as a proposed solution to the Jewish problem. His central argument was that the
Jews were vulnerable to persecution so long as they remained an unassimilated minority (Mahler
2004, 19). As Herzl came to realize, even those Jews who attempted assimilation were
susceptible to anti-Semitism. Herzl, himself, was an assimilated Jew who never had a barmitzvah and kept a Christmas tree in his home (Brenner 2004, 27-28). Ironically, Herzl is also
recognized as suggesting to the pope in 1895 that, in return for a struggle by the Church against
anti-Semitism, he would lead a mass conversion of Jews on the steps of St. Stephens in Vienna
(Cohen 1992, 66).
Knowledge of Herzl’s background helps one understand his vision for “The Jewish
State,” a social utopia lacking a strong culturally Jewish entity (Cohen 1992, 68). Herzl’s and
the political Zionists’ estatism placed the formation of a Jewish national homeland above all else.
This point is illustrated by Herzl’s openness to the possibility of founding the Jewish state in
Argentina (Brenner 2004, 42-43) and later, Uganda (Mahler 2004, 20) and his reluctance to
preserve Hebrew as the official language of the state (Cohen 1992, 68).
Cultural Zionism
Herzl’s opponent, Ahad Ha-am (“one of the people”), was critical of his ambition to
quickly fashion a political state that lacked a Jewish national culture. Ha-am, who would become
the founder of cultural Zionism, saw the creation of a movement that emphasized the national
cultural revival of the Jewish people at its center (Cohen 1992, 65; Seltzer 1980, 698). He felt the
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Jewish state should be a spiritual haven for the Jews and ought to be created in the Jewish
homeland of Palestine. As Brenner notes, “Herzl sought to save the Jews, Ahad Ha-am to save
Judaism.” Ahad Ha-am saw Herzl’s plan as assimilation of the Jews on a collective basis. He
posed the question: What is Jewish about Herzl’s Jewish state (Brenner 2004, 57)?”
Another important distinction between Herzl and Ahad Ha-am is their contrasting
opinions regarding the status of Arabs within the Jewish state. Herzl envisioned Palestine as a
country without a people for a people without a country (Khalidi 1997, 101). Although he
recognized there were Arabs living in Palestine, he did not see a reason why the Jews and Arabs
could not co-exist peacefully within a newly formed Jewish state. Moreover, he felt the Arabs
who did inhabit the land would welcome European immigrants who would teach them European
ways (Brenner 2004, 106).
Ahad Ha-am, in contrast, recognized from the start that the Jews might not be welcomed
by the Arabs in Palestine (Brenner 2004, 107). After a three-month visit to Palestine in 1891, he
wrote:
We abroad are used to believing Eretz Israel is now almost totally desolate, a
desert that is not sowed, and anyone who wishes to purchase land there may come
and purchase as much as he desires. But in truth, this is not the case. Throughout
the country, it is difficult to find fields that are not sowed. Only sand dunes and
stony mountains that are not fit to grow anything but fruit trees—and this only
after hard labor and great expense . . .” (Khalidi 1997, 101).
Ahad Ha-am’s fears were realized as early as 1891, when a group of influential
individuals within the Arab community in Jerusalem drafted an official letter to Istanbul,
protesting Jewish immigration and land purchases (Brenner 2004, 107). Subsequent protests
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would follow as immigration continued to increase. In addition, beginning in 1908, Arabiclanguage papers began to reflect escalating concerns regarding the Zionist movement. In a
survey of 22 newspapers and periodicals in Palestine, Cairo, Beirut and Damascus between 1908
and 1914, all but one was found to be anti-Zionist in nature (Khalidi 1997, 119-122).
Religious Zionism
A discussion of the emergence of Zionism would be incomplete without noting a third
important faction, the religious Zionists1. This faction is unique in that it was the only Zionist
bloc to uphold the Jewish claim to Palestine on religious, rather than political or historical
grounds. Like Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer in the 18th century, these Zionists cited the Bible as a
means to justify their claim to the Holy Land. The religious Zionists maintained that God
promised the land of Canaan to Abraham’s descendants and that Zionism was not a quickening
of redemption, as anti-Zionist Orthodox Jews had claimed, but a sign that redemption was near
(Brenner 2004, 114). In the eyes of the religious Zionists, Palestine rightfully belonged to the
Jewish people and the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine was merely the
realization of this right.
III. The Emergence and Evolution of Palestinian Identity
Palestinian2 self-determination has emerged in spite of great odds. Unlike the Zionists,
the Palestinians have never achieved a form of national independence in their own homeland.
1
The religious Zionist movement today is represented by Israel’s National-Religious political party. This party
comprises largely Modern Orthodox who supported the settlement movement in the occupied territories following
the Six Day War in 1967. Unlike some traditional Orthodox who discredited Zionism as a blasphemous movement
that is trying to achieve what should be reserved for the age of the Messiah, the National Religious regard Zionism
as a religious-messianic movement and Israel and a Jewish state (Brenner 2004, 120-121; class notes).
2
The term “Palestinian” is one that has been contested. Under the British mandate period from 1918 to 1948, the
term referred to anyone native to Palestine, regardless of religion. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, the
“Palestinians” are generally recognized as individuals living in the Palestinian territories within the Gaza Strip and
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From 1918 until 1948, the Palestinians were governed by the British Mandate, and from 1948
until 1967, those Palestinians residing in the West Bank and East Jerusalem lived under
Jordanian occupation. Following the Six-Day-War in 1967, the West Bank, Gaza Strip3 and East
Jerusalem have been occupied by Israel. In addition, during the accords of 1993 and 1995
between Israel and the PLO, sovereignty was explicitly denied to the Palestinian Authority of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
According to Paul Scham, the Palestinians developed all the attributes of a nation-state
except independence prior to 1948 (Scham 2006, 64). However, lack of sovereignty has kept the
Palestinians from gaining control of state mechanisms, in the form of museums, education, coins,
postage stamps, independent media and the like, limiting the development and dispersion of a
uniform “national” criteria of identity (Khalidi 1997, 10; Kook 1995, 317-323). Kook argues the
Palestinian ethnic minority within Israel, despite access to the democratic institution of
citizenship, has suffered from discrimination since Israel’s establishment in 1948 (Kook 1995,
309).
In her article “The Effect of Peace on the Palestinians in Israel,” Kook describes a
situation where Palestinian Israelis’ lack of corporate national identity has hindered the
movement’s evolution. She states, “The Palestinians in Israel are systematically written out of
both the commemorative and written symbols of the Israeli corporate national identity . . . There
is no representation in the entire Israeli symbolic matrix, of Palestinians: the flag, anthem, and
the West Bank. Those living within Israel proper are now identified as “Israelis.” The Palestinian National Covenant
defines Palestinians as those Arabs living in Palestine prior to 1947 and their descendents through the male line.
According to the most recent draft of the Palestinian Constitution: “Palestinian citizenship shall be organized by law
without prejudicing the right of anyone who acquired it before 15 May 1948 in accordance with the law or the right
of the Palestinian who was resident in Palestine before that date. This right is transmitted from fathers and mothers
to their children. The right endures unless it is given up voluntarily."
3
Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but recaptured parts of the Strip in June 2006 following
the abduction of Corporal Gilad Shalit.
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national holidays all commemorate and manifest Jewish religious events and persons” (Kook
1995, 321). In addition, Kook argues implicitly that the Zionist manifesto, “A land without a
people for a people without a land,” is still perpetuated within Israeli written texts that “either
ignore the Arab population almost totally or deal with them in a separate, usually relatively short,
chapter at the end of the analysis (Kook 1995, 321).
Khalidi argues that the conflict between the Palestinians and Zionists, which developed in
the early stages of both movements, is a main reason why Palestinian identity is misunderstood
(Khalidi 1997, 6). He believes the Zionist and Palestinian identities are so intertwined that it has
become difficult to disentangle the latter narrative from the former and present it as its own
separate entity. Khalidi also describes the multiple layers of identity experienced by the
Palestinians as another confusing aspect of their heritage. Unlike the French or Americans who
can be easily identified as such, it is normal for a Palestinian to identify as an Arab in one
context, a Muslim or Christian in another, a Nabulsi or Jaffan in yet a third, and as Palestinian in
a fourth (Khalidi 1997, 146). In addition, Palestinian Israelis have yet another layer of identity to
contend with: that of an Israeli citizen.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the Palestinian and Zionist narratives,
however, is the notion that while the Palestinians were keenly aware of Zionism from its first
mass migrations in 1882 (Muslih 1988, 69), many Zionists were not aware of the extent that an
Arab population was thriving in Palestine. As noted previously, Theodore Herzl, the founder of
political Zionism, lacked knowledge that an Arab population of significance existed in Palestine
and felt those Arabs who did inhabit the land would co-exist peacefully with the Zionists
(Brenner 2004, 43). Indeed, Golda Meir’s famous quote: “There was no such thing as
Palestinians . . . They did not exist” (Khalidi 1997, 147) largely sums up the Zionist
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understanding of the Arab situation in Palestine. The Palestinians, on the other hand, were keenly
aware of their Zionist foe. As early as 1908, the Arabic press began publishing anti-Zionist
articles and editorials in an effort to mobilize the Palestinian people against dangers posed by
Zionist colonization to the indigenous peoples of Palestine and within surrounding regions
(Khalidi 1997, 121).
III. Conclusions
The Zionist and Palestinian narratives, though constructed independently of one another,
arose under similar circumstances and for similar reasons. Both movements were ignited largely
as a response to the phenomenon of exile. Historians purport that Judaism was formed during the
Babylonian exile in the sixth century BCE. In addition, the Jewish experience, prior to the advent
of Zionism, was largely defined by the 2,000-year Jewish Diaspora, which began with the
destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem. One of the most central goals of the Zionist
movement was to put an end to the Diaspora by creating a homeland for the Jewish people
(Scham 2006, 65). Similarly, the Palestinian nationalist movement, which emerged in response
to European colonization and Zionist mass migration to Palestine, was fueled in the crucible of
exile following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (“al-Nakba”). Whereas the Zionist movement formed
in response to anti-Semitism and failed Jewish emancipation in Europe after the French
Revolution, Palestinian identity was largely a response to the Zionist movement in Palestine
(Scham 2006, 65).
Despite fused histories, a shared connection to the biblical land of Palestine and a
common homeland, the Palestinian and Jewish people do not share the same historical narrative
(Scham 2006, 58-75). The movements ascribe different significance to Jerusalem. They have
separate accounts the history of Palestine and the wars fought over its land and monuments. They
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disagree on the Palestinian Right of Return and, despite the Oslo agreements, it is questionable
whether either movement fully recognizes the other’s legitimacy, at least on its own terms. If
there is to be peace, it must begin with the Palestinians’ and Zionists’ mutual recognition of each
other’s historical narratives. As Scham asserts, “there needs to be recognition on the part of
policy- and opinion-makers on both sides that peace is not attainable unless ideology, as well as
territory, is the subject of compromise (Scham 2006, 73).”
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Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. 2003. The Palestinian People: A History.
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Kook, Rebecca. 1995. "Dilemmas of Ethnic Minorities in Democracies: The Effect of Peace on
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Mahler, Gregory S. 2004. Politics and Government in Israel: The Maturation of a
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Migdal, Joel S. 2001. Through the Lens of Israel: Explorations in State and Society. (3): 51-79.
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