Sunghoon Hong
Curriculum Vitae, January 2011
E-mail: sunghoon.hong@vanderbilt.edu
Cell: (615) 339–7325
Office: (615) 322–6243
Department of Economics
VU Station B #351819
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN 37235
http://people.vanderbilt.edu/~sunghoon.hong/
Graduate Education
Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
Undergraduate Education
Seoul National University, B.A. in Economics, 2003
Research and Teaching Fields
Primary: Game Theory
Secondary: Public Economics, Experimental Economics
Honors and Fellowships
Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics, Kirk Dornbush Summer Research Grants, 2010
Vanderbilt University, Summer Research Award, 2009
Vanderbilt University, University Graduate Fellowship, 2007-2011
Teaching Experience
Vanderbilt University, Teaching Assistant
Microeconomic Theory II: 2010 Spring, 2011 Spring
Public Finance: 2011 Spring
Social Choice Theory: 2010 Spring
Game Theory: 2009 Fall, 2010 Fall
Industrial Organization: 2009 Fall, 2010 Fall
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory: 2009 Spring
Mathematics for Economists: 2008 Fall
Research Papers
“Efficiency and Stability in a Model of Wireless Communication Networks” (with Youngsub Chun)
Social Choice and Welfare (2010) 34:441 – 454
We introduce a model of (wireless communication) networks: a group of agents want to
communicate with each other; an agent has his own position and chooses his communication
range; any two agents can directly communicate if each agent is located within another agent’s
communication range. Also, they can indirectly communicate if two agents are connected through
a sequence of direct communications between agents. An agent benefits from the communication
and pays for his communication range. Although efficiency and stability are not compatible in a
general context, we identify interesting subclasses of problems where an efficient and stable
network exists: the uniform interval model, the uniform circle model, and the communication
favorable domain. Also, we investigate the consequence of allowing agents to relocate their
positions. For a certain network, relocation-proofness is equivalent to stability.
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“Hacking-Proofness and Stability in a Model of Information Security Networks”
A group of players form directed links and set up security systems called firewalls. Each player
benefits from direct and indirect information obtained via his links. Firewalls may be beneficial
since setting up a firewall will ensure that a player cannot be attacked by a hacker. Maintaining
both links and firewalls is costly. The hacker enjoys destroying the information of players but
hacking is costly. The hacker knows the cost of hacking but the players have subjective beliefs
about this cost, described by a given probability distribution. Each player has the same beliefs.
The probability of a player being hacked is defined as the probability that the cost of hacking is
no more than the benefit the player may lose if hacked. In our model, for a given network,
stability requires that each player maximize his expected utility while hacking-proofness requires
that no player be attacked with positive probability. We first investigate the conditions under
which stability implies hacking-proofness. We then provide a probability upper bound of being
hacked over all stable networks.
“Enhancing Transportation Security Against Terrorist Attacks”
We study a model of strategic interaction between a terrorist organization and a security agency
in a transportation network. By carrying bads to a target through the transportation network, the
terrorist organization can damage the target and disrupt the operation of the network. While
gaining utility from the damage of the target and from the disruption of the network, the terrorist
organization incurs the cost of carrying bads. A security agency is informed of the terrorist attack.
By shutting down some transportation routes in the network, the security agency can protect the
target from the attack. Since the shutdown of routes disrupts the operation of the network, the
security agency incurs the cost of shutting down transportation routes. The security agency also
loses utility from the damage of the target. In this model we find an optimal security policy under
which the security agency can protect the target from devastating terrorism and effectively
operate the network. To understand how the terrorist organization commits terrorism under the
optimal security policy, we find a class of subgame perfect equilibria of this model. We also
introduce algorithms to find a maximum flow and a minimum cut in a transportation network.
“Strategic Network Interdiction”
We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A
security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded
quantity of bads, chooses a flow that specifies a plan for carrying bads through the network from
a base to a target. Simultaneously, the agency chooses a blockage, which specifies a plan for
blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. However, the blockage of arcs
disrupts the operation of the network. The adversary gains and the agency loses from the target
damage and the network disruption. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. We
characterize the Nash equilibria in terms of the primitives of our model. Our model contributes to
the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel type
mode of a (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on
network interdiction.
Professional Activities
Presentations of Research
Strategic Network Interdiction
Second Brazilian Workshop of the Game Theory Society, 2010
Summer Meeting of the Korean Econometric Society, 2010
Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions, 2010
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Enhancing Transportation Security Against Terrorist Attacks
WCU/BK Summer Economics Program at Yonsei University, 2009
20th Stony Brook Game Theory Festival of the Game Theory Society, 2009
Hacking-Proofness and Stability in a Model of Information Security Networks
9th International Meeting of the Society of Social Choice and Welfare, 2008
PET 08 Seoul, 2008
Efficiency and Stability in a Model of Wireless Communication Networks
Summer Meeting of the Korean Econometric Society, 2007
PET 07 Vanderbilt, 2007
3rd Pan-Pacific Game Theory Conference, 2006
The Society for Economic Design, 2006
8th International Meeting of the Society of Social Choice and Welfare, 2006
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