UNIVERSAL WEIGHTED REGIONAL REPRESENTATION
AS A BASIS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
Joseph E. Schwartzberg
Professor Emeritus, University of Minnesota
schwa004@umn.edu
For presentation at the opening panel on “Reform of the Security Council”
at the International Law Weekend Conference of the American Branch
of the International Law Association in New York on October 22, 2009.
Professor Alvarez, distinguished panelists, members of the bar, fellow world citizens:
I am deeply grateful for having this opportunity to discuss with you the important topic of
Security Council reform. As you know, attempts to reform the Security Council over the
past two decades have all been frustrating exercises in futility. Nevertheless, those
attempts continue. The reason why is obvious. Almost all observers recognize that the
Council is an unfairly constituted body and that its decision-making procedures are
politically inadequate. The root of the unfairness is, of course, the anachronistic
dominance of the five permanent veto-wielding powers, any one of which can block the
will of the remaining members. Thus, many needed decisions fail to be taken, while
others are watered down to ineffectual lowest-common-denominator resolutions.
Additionally, the SC is an exclusive club that fails to represent the great majority of the
nations of the world. Reform is sorely needed; but the key or, rather, the keys to reform
have yet to be widely recognized.
What, then, are those elusive keys? I respectfully submit that there are two. The first
would be the establishment of a system of regional seats such that all nations will be
entitled to a voice in determining the votes of their respective elected regional
representatives. Second, the votes that those representatives cast should be weighted
according to objectively established formulae so as to reasonably reflect the power of
their respective regions, but with no nation or region enjoying the privilege of the veto.
The new paradigm that I am advocating will probably strike you as excessively
ambitious; but I hope to demonstrate its workability and to show that its advantages will
be such as to give it a chance of adoption.
Let us begin with the first of two formulae. To determine the weight of each UN
Member, I propose the following [overhead no. 1]:
W = (P + C + M) / 3
In this equation, W is a nation’s weight, the average of three factors: P, or population,
expressed as a percentage of the world total; C, or contributions to the regular UN
budget, expressed as a percentage of the whole; and M, or membership, expressed as a
percentage of the whole, which is a constant, namely 1/192 or 0.52%, reflecting the
sovereign equality of nations. The formula is a pragmatic integration of three valid
principles: the democratic principle, which counts people; the economic principle, which
counts contributions; and a legal principle, based on equal national sovereignty. The
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weights determined by the formula are presented on this map by proportionally scaled
circles:
[Overhead no. 2, World Map]:
The range runs from a low of 0.17%, for a number of microstates, to a high of 12.1% for
the United States. Three additional nations are especially noteworthy -- China, India and
Japan – each of which has a weight well in excess of 5%, which I suggest as a qualifying
threshold value for a nation’s being recognized as a region in its own right.
I turn now to a proposed system of twelve regions with differentially weighted votes
based on a second objective formula, which I will explain shortly.
[Overhead no. 3, World Map]
Four of the regions are composed of the single nations just noted – the US, China, India
and Japan – with individual weights above 5%. Those are not to be considered permanent
seats, however, but rather as seats to which those nations are entitled only as long as they
exceed the stipulated threshold. The other eight multi-national regions, in descending
order of weight, are: Europe (with a weight of 16.2%), Latin America, East Asia, Africa,
West Asia, the Arab League, Russia and certain neighboring CYS states, and what I have
called the Westminster League, namely Canada, Australia and New Zealand (with a
weight of 4.3%). The ratio between the highest and lowest weights is less than 4:1.
The formula by which the regional weights were determined is as follows [overhead no.
4]:
W = (P + C + 8.33%) / 3
In this equation a region’s weight, W, is the average of P, its total population as a
percentage of the world’s total; C, its total contribution to the regular UN budget as a
percentage of the total; and 8.33% or one-twelfth, which signifies the presumption that
the world view of each region is equally worthy of respect. Regional weights, as well as
country weights, would be periodically recalibrated.
Let us now return to our regional map [overhead no. 3]. Each of the eight multi-national
groups shown here would constitute a caucus and would be responsible, through methods
of its own devising, for nominating from two to five candidate nations (or individuals) to
represent it in the Security Council. From this slate of candidates the General Assembly
would elect the preferred candidate. The suggested system is maximally democratic and
lends itself to meritocracy.
Each SC seat holder would be guided in debating and voting by a predetermined set of
rules devised by the region he or she represents. To enable a system such as this to work
it would be necessary for the ministers of external affairs of the constituent nations to
meet periodically at regional summits to stake out regional positions on issues of
perennial importance and, on an ad hoc basis, to confer, via teleconference, on specific
issues coming before the Council. Decision-making within the region could, but need not,
be according to weighted votes based on the individual country weights shown in our first
map. Regional unanimity in such a system is not to be expected; but one could devise
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rules such as the following: a) The delegate may use his or her own discretion in respect
to procedural issues. b) The delegate would abstain in most substantive votes in which
the vote of the regional caucus fell short of two-thirds the total, or, let us say, threefourths the total in votes authorizing the use of force. c) The region could authorize an
alternate to speak for it in situations in which the delegate felt, in good conscience, that
he or she could not uphold the dominant regional position. There is no reason why all
regions would have to follow the same set of rules in their internal decision-making.
While the proposed regionalization of the world would originate in the General
Assembly, it need not be adhered to rigidly and could change over time. Turkey, for
example, might decide that it would caucus with Europe than with West Asia and could
apply to the members of the European region for membership. It would then be up to the
designated nations of Europe to accept or decline that application. Alternatively, some
nations might wish to be in two regions. Turkey might opt for membership in both
Europe and West Asia; the UK might wish to form part of both Europe and the
Westminster League; Egypt might opt for membership in both the Arab League and
Africa; and so forth. In such cases, assuming the approval of such requests, fairness
would suggest that the individual weights of the countries in question would be divided in
half in the deliberations of each of the two regions to which they belonged.
The operational logistics of what I propose may, at first, appear a bit daunting; but
modern advances in transportation and telecommunications technology are such that they
should not prove insurmountable.
In the short run, it seems likely that the United States and other nations that believe they
benefit from the status quo would initially oppose the radical changes suggested in this
paper. Over time, however, careful deliberation of the pros and cons of the proposed new
paradigm, together with pressure from civil society in conjunction with advocacy by
progressive countries might well lead to a change in perspective. Presently, the US has
one SC vote out of fifteen; that’s 6.7% of the total. Under the present proposal, it would
have a weighted vote of 14.3%, or one seventh of the total. That’s not too bad a trade-off
for giving up the veto, especially if the SC were also to specify requirements for varying
qualified majority votes depending on the gravity of the resolutions under consideration.
The United States, along with all other nations in the world, needs a Security Council that
is universally inclusive, fair and effective. With a much more realistic allocation of
decision-making power than the one we have at present, the reformed Council proposed
in this paper would enjoy the greatly enhanced legitimacy and respect that it requires.
For those of you who are interested, a much fuller exposition of the ideas just proposed
appears in printed copies of my paper, which are available for all of you. Some similar,
but less radical, proposals appear in my 2004 monograph, Revitalizing the United
Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting.
Thank you for your attention. I shall be happy to respond to questions and comments.
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