Political Structure, Mass Public, and the Generation of Consent:
Propositions and Hypotheses
Jaechun Kim
Abstract
The findings of the DP are very robust, but scholars have yet to produce alternate
theories that better explain the strong empirical regularities of the DP findings. In an
attempt to thoroughly address the DP phenomenon, this paper examine the mechanism by
which the foreign policy decisions of elites, domestic political structure, and public
consent interact with one another in a democracy. This paper also attempts to assess how
such factors as the popular value system, the distinct national mood of the time, and the
public’s normative concern affect the “consent-generating” process in a democratic state.
In so doing, I attempt to demonstrate that the mechanism whereby elites are constrained
by democratic political institutions and the way the consent of the public is created are
two elements essential for a more comprehensive understanding of how war and peace
decisions are made in democracies. DP(Democratic Peace) scholarship, which sprang
from the simple empirical finding that democracies rarely fight one another, has evolved
as a “progressive research program” as enunciated by Imre Lakatos. A host of theories
intended to explain the DP phenomenon has exceeded its original claim to explain a
variety of other phenomena of interest to students of International Relations. This paper is
an endeavor to extend a series of “consilience studies” that have been conducted since the
inception of DP findings. As with other such studies, this paper attempts to compare and
refine the existing explanations of DP (i.e., normative and institutional interpretations),
rather than testing or challenging the validity of the DP phenomenon.
Key Words: Foreign Policy Making, US Foreign Policy, Democratic Peace, International
Security
Democratic Peace: The Current State of the Debate
Democratic Peace is a “strong probabilistic observation, rather than absolute law”
(Russett & Starr, 2000, p. 93) that assesses that democracies rarely fight one another,
although they may aggress against non-democratic states. The strong empirical findings
of DP scholarship have withstood a host of tests employing different rating schemes for
1
democracy and advanced quantitative techniques.1 In addition to the joint effect of
democracy, proponents of DP now claim that, generally speaking, democracies are
inherently more peaceful – the monadic proposition that was once rejected even by the
most ardent proponents of DP.2
According to Lakatos (1970), scientific theories are embedded in research
programs that contain inviolable, “hard-core” assumptions and initial conditions that
define their scope. These programs include two other very important elements:
“auxiliary” hypotheses and a “positive heuristic” that tell scientists what sorts of
additional hypotheses to entertain and how to go about conducting research. A research
program is a set of methodological rules telling us what paths of research to avoid and
what paths to follow. In the course of research, however, anomalies are bound to appear;
predictions of the theory therefore can be falsified. Reactions from scientists are to protect
hardcore assumptions by constructing auxiliary ones that can explain anomalies. Yet, any
research program can invent such auxiliary assumptions on an ad hoc basis. The key test
for the research program is to establish whether or not these auxiliary assumptions are
“progressive” – that is, whether their invention leads to the discovery of new facts.3 From
this Lakatosian perspective, the so-called DP theories have been helpful in “puzzle
solving” in the field of International Relations. The scholarly works employing the
theories of DP have enabled us to assess important issues more accurately, or provided
1
According to Russett and Starr (2000), the DP result is robust even using the rating scale of Vanhanen
(1984, 1990). Vanhanen’s scale of democracy is one of a handful of longitudinal efforts outside Western
academic circles to rate democracy cross-nationally.
2
“Though there are elements of plausibility in the argument that democracies are inherently peaceful, it
contains too many holes, and is accompanied by too many exceptions, to be usable as a major theoretical
building block” (Russett, 1993, pp 30-31).
3
Lakatos developed this conception to assess development in natural science theories, particularly physics.
Thus, we should supplement this test with a “softer,” interpretative version.
2
answers to formerly unsolved puzzles. In this sense, it is certain that the DP meets the
standard of a scientific research program as enunciated by Imre Lakatos.
As Russett and Starr (pp. 99-102) point out, the basic DP proposition has served
as a platform for the development of a variety of theories other than the dyadic, joint
effect of democracy. Furthermore, Russett and his colleagues seek to move beyond the
DP toward Kantian peace, suggesting that economic interdependence and international
organizations – the other two legs of the Kantian tripod – are also crucial, independent
factors leading to peace.4 Nonetheless, scholars remain divided on the mechanism
whereby democracies attain and retain peace among themselves. In this sense, DP is an
empirical observation (or statement) still in search of satisfactory theories and
explanations; the dyadic phenomenon of DP remains under-theorized.
Structural and Cultural Explanations
The central claim of DP scholarship is that it is the very nature of domestic
democratic political structure that accounts for “zones of peace” among democracies.
Arguably, there are two strands of causal logic to DP (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Layne,
1994). One attributes the absence of war among democracies to democratic institutional
constraints: the restraining effects of public opinion, or those of the checks and balances
embedded in a democratic state’s domestic political institutions (institutional/structural
explanation). Other theories posit that democratic norms and culture – peaceful conflict
resolution norms and culture shared by elites (Dixon, 1993, 1994, 1998) or mass public
4
See for example Oneal and Russett (forthcoming in 2001).
3
(Owen, 1995, 1997) in democracies – account for the absence of war between democratic
states (normative/cultural explanations).
Admittedly, it is not always appropriate to separate institutional and cultural
explanations. To some scholars, the definition of institution consists of norms of
appropriate behavior and rules defining role expectations. As Ray (1995, p. 37) argues,
“the distinction between the cultural and the structural explanation of democratic peace
does not seem either stark or crucial, nor does the evidence seem to indicate that one is
clearly superior to the other.” The two factors may be complementary; “culture conditions
institutions, and institutions shape culture (Russett & Starr, p. 99).”5 Nonetheless, as
Maoz and Russett (1993) point out earlier, these two explanations emphasize the two
different facets of democracies that may be responsible for the DP phenomenon. The
tension between the structural and cultural explanations has its roots in two
fundamentally different approaches seen in political science. As Reiter and Stam (1998c,
p. 1) argue, “the structural model is based on fundamentally economic, rationalist
assumptions about the nature of politics, and the normative model is based on
fundamentally sociological and social psychological assumptions.” Thus, the structural
explanation focuses on the interaction between self-interested rational actors and the
democratic political institutions. The motivation to stay in power affects the elites’
foreign policy decisions, whereas the public merely wants to avoid the costs incurred by
war. From this perspective institutions are important in strategic context, imposing
5
To a certain extent, this dichotomous approach to explain DP has hampered the development of sound
theories. First, as Russett and Starr (2000) point out, a contending approach tends to obscure interactive and
overlapping dynamics of culture and institution that lead to peace among democracies. In fact, several
studies have attempted to synthesize these two approaches. Second, as Most and Starr (1989) and Russett
and Starr (2000) suggest, each explanation can be relevant in different contexts.
4
constraints on self-interested behavior, whereas institutions in normative theories not only
constrain but also constitute the behavior and preferences of political actors.6
At an earlier stage in the development of DP theories, it appeared as if the
institutional/structural explanations had been rejected in favor of normative/cultural
explanations on the grounds that democracies historically have been just as war-prone as
non-democracies (Layne, 1994). The previous consensus was that an institutional
constraint argument in its most straightforward form can only explain the monadic level
phenomenon – democracies are inherently more peaceful than non-democracies.7
Although theoretically rich and deductively well constructed, this monadic-level
explanation had not been empirically supported by many scholarly works.8 As a result,
the explanations based on democratic norms and culture came to bear much of the burden
of proof for the DP.
Several scholars (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Owen, 1995; Ray, 1995;
Rousseau et al., 1996) attempted to synthesize (wittingly or unwittingly) these two groups
of arguments in explaining DP. But the logic of their arguments tends to be tilted in favor
of democratic norms and culture.9 A near-consensus emerged that the dyadic
phenomenon of DP can only be confirmed by “shared” norms or culture in paired
6
The normative explanations of DP have two different theoretical origins. One is ideological (Owen, 1997;
Dixon, 1994) and the other is social/constructivist (Starr, 1997; Risse-Kappen, 1995). See also Reiter and
Stam (1998c).
7
Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues, in a recent article to American Political Science Review, claim that
institutional-constraint argument in its most basic form can explain dyadic phenomena of democratic peace
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999a).
8
However, several scholars have maintained that democracies in general are more peaceful than nondemocracies. See Rummel (1997) and Benoit (1996).
9
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) seem to play down cultural explanations in favor of structural
ones, but in fact their logic of explanation implicitly hinges on “shared knowledge” of democratic elites that
each will be constrained to disdain the overt use of military force. More recent works of Bueno de Mesquita
and his colleagues emphasize the aspect that leaders in democracies are motivated to avoid the possibility of
electoral punishments (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1995; 1997; 1999a; 1999b)
5
democracies. For example, upon reviewing the research on the DP proposition, Chan
concluded that “normative explanations of the democratic peace have been shown to be
more persuasive than structural explanations” and that “normative explanations have
faired better in research” (Chan, 1997, pp. 77-78). Maoz and Russett (1993) also
concluded that the normative argument is superior in its explanatory and predictive
capacity to the institutional one. Although theoretical bases for the existing theories of DP
premised on normative explanations may be relatively well developed, they are not
entirely self-evident; dyadic phenomenon of DP still lacks coherent explanations. To
demonstrate that existing DP theories leave a lot to be desired, I will evaluate two of the
most sophisticated theoretical works in DP scholarship: Owen’s normative - institutional
synthesis (1995) and Risse-Kappen’s constructivist explanation (1995).
Owen’s Normative - Institutional Synthesis
In “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” Owen (1995) distinguishes
himself from his predecessors in that: (a) he makes an explicit attempt to synthesize the
institutional and normative arguments and (b) he takes into account the importance of
perceptions. Owen defines a liberal democracy as a state “where liberalism is the
dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions.” However, what
matters for Owen is not how scholars define democracy, but rather how the populace
understands the character of other regimes. That is, the all-important criterion is whether
one “liberal” country recognizes its rival as a kindred spirit. If so, she will be disposed to
behave decently. If not, however, all bets are off. Such subjectivity helps to explain some
of the “close calls,” including the Spanish-American War of 1898. Although Spain had
6
universal male suffrage, Americans did not regard it as a liberal country like their own.
Likewise, Germany under Wilhelmine II had some claim to rank among world
democracies, but few West Europeans viewed her that way.10
Although Owen’s institutional-normative synthesis refined the causal logic of the
DP, it is not without its shortcomings. First, he seems to place too much confidence in the
mass public of liberal democracy. He argues that the mass public in a liberal democracy
always shares an ideological affinity toward other liberal democracies, whereas elites in a
liberal democracy can be illiberal, thereby becoming belligerent with other liberal
democracies. But he fails to explain this theoretical asymmetry; if elites do not have an
ideological predilection toward other democracies, why should we expect to see the mass
public embrace it? He argues that: “Liberal constituents will not change their assessment
of foreign states unless those states change their institutions . . . and that statesmen will
be constrained (by democratic institutions) to follow liberal policy” (pp. 103-104,
emphasis added). However, there have been several instances in which a liberal public’s
perception of another country was determined not so much by the other country’s
institutional change as by statesmen’s manipulations of the image. As Oren (1995)
argues, before World War I, some U.S. social scientists perceived Germany as a member
of a select group of the most progressive polities. It was following 1917 – after U.S.
statesmen, notably Woodrow Wilson, and other elite groups changed their view of
Germany – that the U.S. public started to perceive her as a non-democratic regime.
10
The problem is that such differences of perception do persist in the contemporary era. The Palestinian
National Authority reckons itself as democratic, but Israelis may think otherwise. Israel reckons itself as
democratic, but Palestinians under occupation scoff. Some Americans still do not view Asian democracies
such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore as fully “liberal” democracies.
7
German institutions per se had not changed as much as the subjective coding rules of U.S.
observers.
This suggests that the mass public’s perceptions of enemy or friend can be
manipulated by elites in democracy according to the need – whether that need is derived
from international systemic pressures or from rational self-interests rooted in domestic
politics.11 As Owen (p. 103) himself points out, “if (the above) hypothesis is not borne
out, the democratic peace is illusory, because power politics or some other force would
actually be determining what label liberals attached to foreign states.”
Risse-Kappen’s Constructivist Argument
Owen’s explanation, like those of his predecessors, fails to specify the mechanism
whereby one democracy develops positive perceptions of other democracies, but not of
non-democracies.12 How and why do democracies come to know that other democracies
are equally peaceful and can, therefore, be trusted? Constructivism is well suited to
explain the processes that lead to the development of such positive identifications.13 After
all, “shared” norms and culture presuppose a prior experience of interaction and learning,
areas that constructivists take seriously. Risse-Kappen argues:
Enmity as well as friendship in the international system neither result from some
inherent features of the international distribution of power, as realists would
assume, nor from the domestic structures of states as such, as liberals argue.
Rather, it is socially constructed . . . The democratic peace . . . results from a rule
11
There is a body of public opinion literature describing the public as merely the malleable target of public
relations efforts by the decision-making elites. According to this literature, the actual direction of causality
always runs from policy makers to the public rather than vice versa. See Ginsburg (1988) and Margolis and
Mauser (1989). However, there is an apparent limit to the degree to which elites in democracies can
manipulate the mass public’s perceptions. I will come back to this point in the latter part of this chapter.
12
Like other DP scholars, Owen simply assumes that a liberal populace will trust states they consider liberal
and mistrust those they consider illiberal (p. 103).
13
For more of constructivist approach to DP, see Peceny (1997).
8
learned through the processes of interaction, namely to infer aggressiveness or
peacefulness from the degree of violence inherent in the domestic political
structure of one’s opponent (p. 503).
There is little doubt that peacefulness as well as enmity can be learned through
international interactions. But Risse-Kappen’s constructivist explanation is not entirely
convincing as to “why democracies create their enemies and their friends – them and us –
by inferring either aggressive or defensive motives (only) from the domestic structures of
their counterparts” (p. 506). That is, why is it that domestic political orders and norms
shape the identities of actors in the international realm? Why not economic orders such as
capitalism? Why not geographic concepts such as West vs. East, North vs. South? Why
not gender and race? His answer is that “values and norms pertaining to questions of
governance are likely to shape identities in the realm of the political – be it domestic or
international” (pp. 506-507). But this indeed is a big assumption because it places
domestic political structure in an ontologically superior position in explaining states’
identity formation process via international interaction.
What factors dominate states’ identities in a given area of interaction needs to be
examined through empirical investigation. Interaction at the systemic level does change
state identities and interests, but why does this identity formation process have to be
constrained mainly by the perceived image of states’ domestic political structures? It is
certain that the interaction of states and identity formation does not occur in a vacuum;
states are not socialized into new preferences instantaneously. For this reason, we need to
have a more rigorous theory of static preference before a theory of dynamic interaction
(Moravcsik, 1996). There is little doubt that the domestic political structure of opposing
states – i.e., whether an opposing state is a democracy or autocracy – matters greatly to a
9
democracy.14 But it is not entirely convincing that preferences (that democracies bring to
a given area of interaction) and identities (produced and reproduced via international
interaction) are determined predominantly by how the state-society relationship is
structured in other countries. Second-level variables other than “domestic political
structure,” such as ethnicity, language, and religion, appear to be equally important in
determining the enmity and friendship in some inter-state interactions. It is also not clear
why the process of socialization invariably ensues from the bottom up. Risse-Kappen
believes that states externalize the internal behavioral norms in their interactions with
other democracies.15 But there is no a priori theoretical rationale to preclude the
possibility that the causal direction may actually be the reverse, that is, the possibility that
the states internalize the external norm – be it peaceful or hostile. In fact, Wendt’s
constructivist position is that peaceful inter-state interactions and practices can lead states
to significant redefinitions of interests and preferences. Wendt (1999) argues that egoistic,
self-regarding preferences of states are the product of historically contingent ideas and
interactions, which can be transcended by engaging in new practices. Thus, if states
peacefully interact with one another and instantiate new ideational structures, chances are
that more states will be “socialized” into adopting more peaceful and “other-regarding”
norms.16 If the states only externalize internal norms, as opposed to internalizing external
14
Thus, it will be difficult for a democracy to create an enemy image of other democracies.
The learning and evolutionary processes are not limited to the interactions among democracies. In
explaining why the evolutionary processes and learning occur only among democracies, Risse-Kappen
defaults to institutional constraint issues, such as the publicity of decision making and the interdependence
arguments. Nonetheless, there remains the possibility that free trade may bring about democracy as well as
wealth, which in turn may produce peace (Free Trade  Wealth and Democracy  Peace). The possibility
of this is called the problem of “omitted variable” and “spurious relation” (Gates et al., 1996). For more on
the effects of trade on peace, see Oneal et al. (1996). Yet, Oneal and Russett (1997) proved that democracy
has pacifying effects even after controlling for the trade effect.
16
Nonetheless, although the conflict may inhibit democracy, it is harder to imagine that peace in any one
15
10
norms, and if socialization comes mainly from the bottom up, rather than from the top
down, it is indeed unfortunate, because democracies and perceived non-democracies (or
illiberal democracies for that matter) would seldom be capable of building up trust and a
shared norm of non-aggression through practice and interaction.
Implications of Covert War Findings to the Current State of the Debate
The review of both Owen and Risse-Kappen’s works suggests that the existing
theories based on normative interpretations fail to provide compelling explanations of the
DP phenomenon. Both explanations pay insufficient attention to the mechanism by which
decision makers are constrained by democratic political institutions and a dynamic
“consent-generation” process in a democratic state. Forsythe (1992) claims that the U.S.
has resorted to the covert use of force against elected, arguably democratic governments
in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1958), Brazil (1960s), Chile (1973), and
Nicaragua (1980s). It seems this finding further undermines the elites’ norm or culturebased explanations of the DP. A series of covert operations, such as massive interference
in democratic political processes, the use of political propaganda, economic
destabilization programs, and instigation of terrorism, are not the kinds of acts that
normative theory would expect the elites in democracies to engage in against other
democratically elected governments.
I now follow with an assessment of the theoretical implications of this covert war
finding for the DP. Two separate questions generate from the covert war findings that are
of relevance to DP scholarship. First, why did one democracy (the U.S.) resort to the
dyad can promote democratic norms and institutions. I owe this point to Russett.
11
covert use of force, as with overt use of force, in destabilizing or overthrowing other
democratically elected governments? How does one explain a sub-war level of violence
rather than a peaceful resolution of conflict in this paring – i.e., why something rather
than nothing? But it seems that sophisticated DP theories have answers to such questions.
Democracy is a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable; states are democratic to
lesser or greater degrees. In this sense, it is not appropriate to classify states into two
distinct categories: democracies and non-democracies. Sophisticated DP theories claim
that only well established democracies do not fight against one another. That is, such
theories predict that well established democracies will virtually never fight each other,
whereas well established democracies and extremely autocratic states are most likely to
make war against each other (a difference effect). Similarly, a highly democratic state and
a state near the middle of the democratic/autocratic spectrum might be considerably more
likely to enter into war.17 Thus, it can come as no surprise that a well established
democracy (such as the U.S.) would use mid-level covert force, as with overt force,
against states that fall in the middle of the democracy/autocracy spectrum. According to
the ratings of a Polity98 dataset, among the six states in Forsythe’s cases, only Chile
(1972) and Brazil (1960) fared well in terms of the democracy/autocracy scale; the other
four states could hardly qualify as established democracies at the time of U.S. covert
intervention.18 Compared to Polity98, Vanhanen’s rating gives relatively favorable scores
to Nicaragua from 1984 to 1989. But one can still notice differences between the
The “difference effect” of this dyad may be less than that of dyads of fully democratic and autocratic
states, but still the difference remains substantial. All of these statements are supported empirically (see
Oneal & Russett, 1998).
18
The Dominican Republic under the rule of Bosch (1963) also came very close to meeting the objective
standards required for liberal democracy.
17
12
democracy scores for the target countries of the U.S. covert actions and those for the
well-established Western democracies such as the U.S., France, and Canada.19
Nonetheless, several target states fared better than Spain right before the outbreak of the
Spanish-American War (see Table 1).
Table 1
Democracy Scores for Selected States
According to Polity98 and Vanhanen’s Poliarchy Dataset
Country
Year
Polity98
DEMOC
Iran
Guatemala
Indonesia
Brazil
Dominican Republic
Chile
Nicaragua
U.S.A.
France
Canada
Spain
1952
1953
1957
1960
1963
1972
1984
1995
1995
1995
1896-1898
3
4
2
6
8
6
1
10
10
10
6
AUTOC
4
2
3
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
Vanhanen’s Index of
Democracy
0.53
5.45
8.76
9.99
13.08
19.78
11.45
23.41
33.77
27.22
1.18
In short, these findings do not contradict dyadic phenomena of democratic peace
postulates. Sophisticated DP theories have no difficulty in dismissing these covert war
findings on definitional grounds – the target countries were not genuine, liberal
democracies and the incidents failed to produce sufficient battle deaths to qualify as inter-
19
The Polity98 project extends Polity III through 1998 and contains corrections to the Polity III data. Ted
Gurr and Keith Jaggers are the principle investigators. See Jaggers and Gurr (1995) for the authoritative
description of Polity III. The data were downloaded from www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/. Most of the
empirical DP works have adopted the democracy ratings of Polity III. Vanhanen’s index of democracy was
retrieved from the Poliarchy dataset, compiled by Tatu Vanhanen, that covers 187 countries over the period
1810 to 1998. The current version of the dataset is 1.2 and available for downloading at
www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/data/vanhanen/.
13
state wars.20 The second question that arises from the covert war findings is: Why covert
use of force instead of open war? Forsythe (1992) is relatively quiet about the
implications of his findings to DP theory and dismisses the matter on the grounds that the
target nations did not qualify as mature liberal democracies. Given that the targets were
not “real” democracies and the covert engagements did not qualify as inter-state wars,
both in terms of lives and financial resources expended, the question still stands: Why
have the democracies fought secret wars? I believe more robust DP theories can help us
solve this puzzle.21 One plausible answer to this question revolves around the possibility
that using covert actions may allow elites in democracies to evade the constraints inherent
in democratic political institutions.
Propositions: Political Structure, Mass Public, and the Generation of Consent
The following propositions constitute key assumptions for the theoretical
frameworks through which we can analyze the decisions related to using force abroad.
Using this framework, we can establish several hypotheses that will have testable
implications.
PROPOSITION 1. An institutional mechanism whereby the public can constrain the
elite’s behavior exists in democracies.
PROPOSITION 2. The initial (default) preference of the public is “no war” (rational selfinterest).
20
However, it should be noted that target states such as Chile had a fairly long tradition of liberal
democracy. With regard to the response that covert action does not qualify as inter-state war, Sorenson
(1992, p. 405) pointed out, “As the events in Central American in the 1980s show, covert involvement with
economic and military and ‘expert’ support for opposition forces can develop to a point where the
distinction between such activities and open war becomes fairly academic.” Most DP researchers have
adopted the definition of “interstate war” devised by the Correlates of War project, which stipulates that
only military conflict between independent states producing at least 1,000 battle deaths (i.e., the deaths of
soldiers) will count as an interstate war.
21
As discussed earlier, strong theories of DP have helped us understand phenomena other than DP.
14
PROPOSITION 3. Perceptions of the public, however, can be manipulated via
news/propaganda.
First, I propose that elites in democracies are institutionally constrained by the
public. In democracies, political institutions provide the mechanism whereby the public
sets the parameters within which the decision-making elites should act. Elites may
influence the public over the short run, but in the long run, elites must operate within the
parameters set by the public or risk being replaced by new elites. This is the most
important trait that distinguishes democracies from non-democracies. Therefore, foreign
policy decisions of democracies reflect in general the will of the public. The extent to
which the public affects particular foreign policy decisions hinges on a number of
intervening variables.22 Nonetheless, such salient foreign policy issues as the war and
peace decisions cannot be made without the contemporaneous consent of the public in
democracies. Some (e.g., Morgan & Schweback, 1992) argue that the public’s ability to
constrain elites is not confined to democracies; even elites in autocracies cannot forego
the will of the public in waging war.23 Christopher Layne (1994) argues that institutional
constraint is associated with, but not exclusive to, democracies. In contrast to these
claims, I posit that the most important characteristics that distinguish democratic from
other forms of regimes are the domestic political institutions that aggregate the
preferences of the society, namely the mass public.
22
These intervening variables will include: (1) the salience of the issue, (2) the stage of policy development,
(3) the beliefs of elites and the public regarding the role of the public in foreign policy making process, (4)
the quality of decision makers’ leadership and the public’s political skills, and (5) the availability of
information.
23
Morgan and Schweback (1992) differentiate “constrained” and “unconstrained” democracies and argue
that “democracies, whether constrained or not, have not fought one another but constrained democracies
and constrained non-democracies have in fact fought 3 wars. This is consistent with the political culture
argument.” However, their distinction between constrained and unconstrained democracies is inappropriate
15
Second, I assume that the mass public by default is not overly enthusiastic about
war-making efforts by the elites. After all, it is their money and blood that are at stake
when their country becomes embroiled in any war. Studies (Mueller, 1973, 1994) have
shown that individuals in a democracy are extremely sensitive to casualties. Simply put,
people prefer life to death, and democratic institutions provide mechanisms that work to
constrain leaders in order to ensure this basic desire. For reasons specified in Propositions
1 and 2, democracies usually fight less costly and shorter wars (Siverson, 1995; Bennet &
Stam, 1998b) and are in general more likely to win the wars they initiate (Lake, 1992;
Reiter & Stam, 1998a) than non-democracies. Although the general public by default
prefers peace to war, there are many cases in which this initial consideration or the
preference of the mass public is overshadowed by other concerns, such as deep-rooted
enmity, nationalism, ethnicity, religion, or morality. In some cases, the mass public may
more enthusiastically demand war than the elites. For example, the American public at
the turn of the 20th century called for open warfare against Spain above and beyond the
governing elites before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. In such cases, the
democratic system of governance may discourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
In other cases, however, the public may be reluctant to enter into war whereas
elites may think that making war is inevitable and even desirable for the national interest.
The institutional constraint argument of early liberals in its straightforward form predicts
that the opinions of the mass public will prevail in such cases. But this has not always
happened. Elites in democracies may try to rally the mass public to induce contemporary
consent for their war-making efforts. In order to do so, the creation of an enemy image
because elites in a democracy by definition are constrained.
16
may be necessary. As Oren (1995) argues, American elites manipulated the image of
Germany in order to mobilize the mass public’s support for war against Germany. Before
the Wilson administration launched a large-scale propaganda campaign, the American
public in general was isolationist and saw no reason to become involved in a hitherto
European war. To initiate Operation Desert Storm, the Bush administration took great
pains to surmount the constraints initially imposed by Congress and the mass public by
creating an enemy image of Saddam Hussein. 24 Thus, my third proposition is that the
perceptions, if not the preferences, of the mass public in democracies can be manipulated
by elites via news and propaganda. Naturally, there is an obvious limit to the degree to
which elites in democracies can manipulate the perceptions of the public. For example, it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for contemporary American elites to
conjure up enemy images of such states as Canada and Britain. The U.S., Britain, and
Canada have long enjoyed close ties and share the same domestic political structure (i.e.,
liberal democracy), language, ethnic affinity, and religion – critical referents in
determining between national enmity and friendship.
Value, Mood, and the Creation of Consent
In contrast to the elite’s norm-based explanations of DP, Owen ascribes more
24
A key aspect of the whole Gulf War was how the Bush administration prepared the American public to
accept its decision. One method was to convince the American people that the Kuwaitis were the victims of
horrendous atrocities and Sadam Hussein was “another Hitler.” The Washington-based Hill and Knowlton
(H&K) public relations firm played a major role in this effort. H&K was paid $5.6 million to improve
Kuwait’s image in the U.S. after the Iraqi invasion in August l990. President Bush himself declared many
times in public that Hussein was “another Hitler.” In October 1990, President Bush said to a group of
reporters: “Good God, this is the 1990s and you see this man (Hussein) starving out small embassies . . .
There’s a parallel between what Hitler did to Poland and what Saddam Hussein has done to Kuwait.” See
Vancouver Sun, October 23, 1990. Initially, U.S. public opinion was not enthusiastic about entering into
war against Iraq (Bennett & Paletz, 1994).
17
explanatory power to the mass public than to the elites in his interpretation of DP (Owen,
1995, 1997). Nonetheless, Owen’s ideological distinction of liberal/illiberal mass public
does not seem to provide an adequate yardstick to gauge war-proneness of the mass
public, and hence to explain DP. Most of all, Owen’s argument fails to appreciate one
very important point: Liberalism as a mass belief system is not monolithic. For example,
liberalism and nationalism are not flatly contradictory concepts and accommodation
between the two is possible; in fact, liberalism and nationalism have often been intimately
linked to one another (Braumoeller, 1997, pp. 381-382). As far as beliefs about
legitimacy of the use of force are concerned, the type of liberalism that has arisen in the
Soviet successor states is more likely to create opportunities for more conflicts rather than
inducing peace among these states (Braumoeller, 1997). Like the 19th century nationalist
liberals, the raison d’être of the liberals in the former Soviet states is national selfdetermination. Thus, the liberals in these states are among those most ready to die – and
kill, if necessary – for their nation’s independence (Braumoeller, pp. 382-83). Snyder and
Ballentine (1996) also point out the sudden spread of democratic and liberal ideas in the
Soviet successor states might facilitate elites’ attempt at intense nationalist
mythmaking.25
Theoretical inadequacy of the Liberal/Nonliberal distinction forces Owen to place
greater emphasis on “perception.” This in turn has limited the explanatory scope of the
original DP theory’s claim, because it is not the democracy per se but the perception that
ipso facto contributes to peace among states. This line of argument may also slide into
25
Mansfield and Snyder (1995) argue that immature democracies may grow more likely to go to war,
although DP may exist between mature, stable democracies. One of the reasons is that, in nascent
democracies, elite groups often use appeals to nationalism as they compete for domestic power.
18
tautology: “Relations between democratic states are peaceful because they are informed
by a common perception that democracies are peaceful” (Gates et al., 1996, p. 3).
Predominant values held by public provides an important clue to the shaping of popular
preferences, because responses to policy-relevant information depend on a relatively
stable core of values and beliefs that constrain the manner in which information is
interpreted.26 But instead of Liberalism as the core mass value system, PostMaterialist/Materialist (or Nationalist) value categories might provide us with more
convincing clues to understanding the popular preference concerning war and peace
decisions. According to Inglehart (1977, 1990), conditions of security – particularly levels
of economic and physical security – during pre-adult socialization are the primary
determinant of the values that shape the central aspect of an individual’s outlook on life.
Thus, most individuals who grew up amidst economic and physical insecurity develop
Materialist values that reflect their early life concerns with satisfying lower-order needs
(material well-being and physical security), whereas those who grew up in the affluent,
physically secure era are able to progress to higher-order needs (quality of life) that are
the basis for Post-Materialist (PM) values. As a result of intergenerational population
replacement, Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1994, 2000) argues that the predominant values of
Western publics have been shifting from Materialist to Post-Materialist.27 World Values
Converse’s classic work on public belief systems (1964) found that the value systems of mass publics
show surprisingly little coherent structure. But, by definition, values differ from attitudes in being more
general, central, and pervasive; less situation-bound; and more resistant to modification (Robinson &
Shaver, 1969, p. 410). Thus, knowledge of the public’s predominant values makes it possible to predict a
much broader array of specific public attitudes.
27
The new generation in these countries is distinguished from the old one by two critical, distinctive cohort
experiences: “formative affluence” and “formative physical security” (e.g., absence of total war
experiences) (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 87-88). Inglehart and Abramson (1994) demonstrate, by a time series
analysis, that there has been a statistically significant intergenerational shift toward Post-Materialist values
in eight West European countries over last 2 decades.
26
19
Surveys indicate that this value shift occurs in any society that has experienced sufficient
economic growth in recent decades resulting in significantly more secure pre-adult
experiences for younger birth cohorts compared to those of older cohorts.28
To wage a war, the governing elites in democracies need to procure contemporary
consent from the mass public (Reiter & Stam, 2001). The nation-states have often based
their claims to legitimacy primarily on their functions in protecting their subjects from
foreign states. Throughout history, evoking real or imagined threats to national security
and appealing to nationalism have been perennially relied on by governing elites to rally
public support for war. History also shows that nationalism as a core mass value system
has interfered with the peaceful resolution of inter-state conflicts. But considerations
accorded to national defense and nationalist sentiment weigh less heavily among the
priorities of Post-Materialist values than of Materialist values (Inglehart, 1977, p. 334).
“A further shift toward Post-Materialist values would” entail “a further weakening of
support” for nationalism.29 Thus, the prevalence of PM values may make it difficult for
the elites in democracies to provoke nationalistic sentiment in attempts to garner the mass
public’s consent to go along with a war decision. Elites can “no longer rely on appeals to
nationalism and patriotism as much as in the past” (Inglehart, 1977, p. 16).
28
This confirms that societies that have experienced rapid economic growth have much larger
intergenerational differences than societies with little or no economic growth (Inglehart & Abramson,
1994). The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political change. It has
carried out representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of publics in more than 65
societies on all six inhabited continents (Inglehart, 2000). Inglehart operationalizes the concepts of
Materialist and Post-Materialist values by asking respondents to choose between various policy goals
designed to measure their positions on “need hierarchy.”
29
With an intergenerational shift toward Post-Materialist values, “one of the key symbols of nationalism
may have lost much of its potency” (Inglehart, 1977, p. 70).
20
Distinct public mood of the time is another important factor affecting popular
preference regarding the war and peace decision.30 For instance, Klingberg (1979, p. 38)
divided U.S. foreign policy history into four “extrovert” and four “introvert” phases.31
Introvert phases are characterized by a public reluctance to expand American political and
military concerns beyond its own borders, whereas during extrovert phases the public is
much more supportive of expansion and extraterritorial political/military involvement.
According to Holmes (1985, p. 25), the conclusion of Vietnam marked the beginning of a
new introvert phase in the U.S. During such introvert phases, elites in democracies are
expected to have difficulty mobilizing public support for military adventures abroad.
American presidents who have not adjusted to the change in mood have found themselves
in a losing position, like that faced by Woodrow Wilson over the League of Nations and
LBJ over Vietnam. Conversely, FDR, during the introvert 1930s, conformed to the public
mood on foreign policy to domestic acclaim.
Nonetheless, political systems will not automatically adopt foreign policies that
reflect the public’s values/moods. Whether or not the public’s preferences will prevail
depends on at least two other factors: (a) the political skills of the elites and public, and
(b) the state’s institutional structure. The expansion of education, technological
innovations, and the development of mass communications seemed to have enhanced the
mass public’s “political skills” to influence the making of foreign as well as domestic
Holmes (1985, p.2) argues: “Public mood is a dominant force in American foreign policy and limits
governmental actions.” Holmes (1985) and Klingberg (1979, 1983) use the term “mood” to explain the
generation-long societal swings. This use of “mood” differs from that of Almond (1950), whose use of the
term refers to sudden shifts of interest and preferences on the part of the public.
31
Introvert (1776-1798, 1824-1844, 1871-1891, 1919-1940) and Extrovert (1798-1824, 1844-1871, 18911919, 1940-). Every major war in which the U.S. has become involved has started during an extrovert
phase.
30
21
policy.32 Improved political skills enable the mass public to engage in elite-challenging
(as opposed to elite-directed) participation in the government’s decision-making process;
they strengthen the public’s constraints on elites. We should also note that elites in
democracies are not just passive registers of the mass public’s preferences. Quality of
leadership plays a big part in inducing the mass public to follow a government’s policy
initiatives.
Hypotheses
The theoretical discussion up to this point leads to the development of the
following four preliminary hypotheses that we can test in later studies concerning
decisions about war and peace.
H1. The public’s identification of an opposing state as a democracy significantly impedes
the generation of public consent in support of military action.
Previous research has shown that the mass public in one democracy may oppose
entering into war against another democracy because of the normative constraints that
joint democracy generates. For example, Owen’s case studies (1997) suggest that the
mass public identifying the opposing state as a democracy undermines the elites’ effort to
generate a consensus for war. From the perspective of “rational choice” theory, the
peaceful resolution of conflict with other democracies via international courts or
negotiations is less costly to the mass public in democracies. Both the mass public’s
normative concerns and rational self-interests influence the consent-generating process;
the mass public in a democracy expects and prefers peaceful conflict resolution with other
32
Rising levels of education and the expansion of mass communications will result in an increase in the
proportion of populations possessing the skills to cope with politics on a national scale.
22
democracies because of both normative concerns and rational self-interests. The so-called
“Joint Democracy” effect is one of the crucial factors affecting the consent generation
process on the part of the mass public in a democracy.
H2. The predominant value of the mass public or the distinct mood of the time shapes the
configuration of the public’s initial preference regarding the overt use of military force
abroad.
In democratic states where an increasingly large proportion of the public has come
to possess PM values, it would be difficult for the elites to appeal to such values as
nationalism and patriotism and to mobilize the mass public to enter into war. However, in
democratic states where the public’s primary value resembles that of 19th century (liberal)
nationalism, it might be relatively easy for the elites to appeal to nationalism and to
garner public consent for making war.33 Braumoeller (1997) shows that the DP is
particularly vulnerable to national issues in the Soviet successor states. Identification of
the opposing state as a democracy undermines the elites’ efforts to create consent for war
(H1). But in states where the mass public’s values are predominantly nationalistic, elites
may find it relatively easy to elicit the mass public’s consent for war against other
democracies, particularly when the issue at stake is susceptible to nationalistic sentiment.
From the perspective of the “institutional-consent model,” the predominant value system
of the mass public or the distinct mood of the time – as a crucial force affecting the
public’s consent-generation process – seems to provide basic clues to understanding
under what conditions and when the public yields the contemporary consent for the use of
force.
Likewise, the mobilization of the public’s consent for the use of force may be easier during extrovert
phases than during introvert phases.
33
23
H3. A free press and the development of mass communications restrict the range of
information that elites (elected or otherwise) may use to manipulate the public.34
The expansion of communication networks has been made possible by
technological innovation. The result has been to make information networks international,
and to communicate information rapidly from anywhere in the world. Thus, the free press
and the development of communication technologies will restrict the range of information
that elites may want to use in an attempt to manipulate the perception of the mass public.
Because of such factors as the change in the mass public’s value system, the much
improved political savvy of the mass public, and the development of technology and mass
communications, I suspect that the nature of DP in the latter half of the 20th century is
different from that of DP before WWII to a certain extent.35 With the free flow of
information, democracies may have a better chance of identifying fellow democracies.36
H4. If the consent for the open use of military force cannot be generated, elites may use
covert action to circumvent the constraints imposed by domestic political institutions.
If the elites in democracy somehow succeed in mobilizing the public’s support for
the overt use of military force, democratic states can proceed to wage war with opposing
states. Thus, the necessary conditions for the initiation of war in democracies are as
follows: (a) elites desire to raise a war and (b) the mass public is willing to go along with
the elites’ initiative.37 If it is difficult for the elites to garner public consent for the overt
34
For the relationship between the role of a free press and DP, see Van Belle (1997).
However, it is hard to make much of an empirical distinction between the strength of DP in the first half
of the 20th century and that in the second half.
36
If war were to break out among democracies in 21 st century, “misperception” would no longer be a
legitimate excuse for DP theories.
37
In some cases, the mass public may demand war whereas the elites may prefer a peaceful conflict
resolution. If the initial preference of the mass public is “war,” this itself may constitute the necessary
condition for the initiation of war in democracies.
35
24
use of brute force, elites in democracies may opt to use covert actions to skirt domestic
opposition.38
Of course, not every state – or democracy for that matter – is able to engage in covert action. The number
of states with covert action capacity is expected to be limited.
38
25
Bibliography
Almond, Gabriel. 1950. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York, NY:
Hartcourt, Brace.
Bennet, Scott, and Allan C. Stam. 1996. “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985.”
American Political Science Review 90: 239-57.
Bennett, Lance W., and David L. Paletz. 1994. Taken by Storm: The Media, Public
Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Benoit, Kenneth. 1996. “Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General).” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 40: 636-657.
Bosch, Juan. 1968. Pentagonism: A Substitute for Imperialism. Translated by Helen R.
Lane. New York, NY: Grove Press.
Braumoeller, Bear F. 1997. “Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic
Peace in the Soviet Successor States.” International Studies Quarterly 41: 375-402.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1992. War and Reason. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph Siverson. 1995. “War and the Survival of
Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.”
The American Political Science Review 89: 841-55
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith.
1999b. “Policy Failure and Political Survival: The Contribution of Political Institutions.”
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43: 147-61.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James Morrow, Ethan Zorick. 1997. “Capabilities,
Perception, and Escalation.” The American Political Science Review 91: 15-27.
Chan, Steve. 1997. “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise.” Mershon
International Studies Review 41: 59-91.
Dixon, William, 1994. “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International
Conflict.” American Political Science Review 88: 14-32.
Forsythe, David P. 1992. “Democracy, War, and Covert Action.” Journal of Peace
Research 29: 385-395.
26
Gates, Scott, T. L. Knutset, and J. W. Moses. 1996. “Democracy and Peace: A More
Skeptical View.” Journal of Peace Research 33: 1-11.
Ginsburg, G. 1988. The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power. New
York, NY: Basic Books.
Holmes, J. E. 1985. The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign Policy. Lexington,
KY: University Press of Kentucky.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Paul R. Abramson. 1994. “Economic Security and Value Change.”
The American Political Science Review 88: 335-54.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles
Among Western Public. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and
Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald. 2000. “Globalization and Postmodern Values.” Washington Quarterly
23: 215-28.
Jaggers, Keith, and Ted R. Gurr. 1995. “Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with the
Polity III Data.” Journal of Peace Research 32: 469-482.
Klingberg, Frank L. 1983. Cyclical Trends in American Foreign Policy Moods: The
Unfolding of America’s World Role. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Klingberg, Frank L. 1979. “Cyclical Trends in American Foreign Policy Moods and Their
Policy Implications.” In Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the
1980s, eds. C. W. Kegley, Jr. and P. J. McGowan. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Lakatos, Imre. 1970. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. Imre Lakatos and
Alan Musgrave (116-180). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Lake, David. 1992. “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War.” American Political
Science Review 86: 24-37.
Layne, Christopher. 1994. “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.”
International Security 19: 5-49.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. “Democratization and the Danger of
War.” International Security 20: 5-38.
Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace, 1946-1986.” The American Political Science Review 87: 624-38.
27
Margolis, M., and G. A. Mauser, eds. 1989. Manipulating Public Opinion. Pacific Grove,
CA: Brooks/Cole.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics.” International Organization 51: 513-53.
Morgan, T. Clifton, and Valerie Schweback. 1992. “Take Two Democracies and Call Me
in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?” International Interaction 17: 305-20.
Most, Benjamin, and Harvey Starr. 1989. Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics.
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Mueller, John. 1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York, NY: Wiley.
Mueller, John. 1994. Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. Forthcoming in 2001. Triangulating Peace:
Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York, NY: Norton.
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1997. “The Classical Liberals Were Right:
Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.” International Studies Quarterly
41: 267-93.
Oneal, John R., Frances Oneal, and Zeev Maoz. 1996. “The Liberal Peace:
Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85.” Journal of Peace
Research 33: 11-28.
Oren, Ido. 1995. “The Subjectivity of the Democratic Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions
of Imperial Germany.” International Security 20: 147-84.
Owen, John M. 1994. “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace.” International
Security 19: 87-129.
Owen, John M. 1997. American Politics and International Security. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Peceny, Mark. 1997. “A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The
Ambiguous Case of the Spanish-American War.” Journal of Peace Research 34: 415-30.
Ray, James L. 1995. Democracy and International Conflict. Columbia, SC: University of
South Carolina Press.
28
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 1998a. “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory.” The
American Political Science Review 92: 377-89.
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 1998c. “A Structural-Consent Model of Domestic
Politics and International Conflict.” Unpublished paper.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. “Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social
Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument.” European Journal of
International Relations 1: 491-517.
Robinson, John P., and Phillip R. Shaver. 1969. Measures of Social Psychological
Attitudes. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research.
Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, and Paul Huth. 1996. “Assessing the Dyadic
Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88.” The American Political Science Review 90:
512-33.
Rummel, R. J. 1997. Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Non-Violence. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Russett, Bruce, and Harvey Starr. 2000, “From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace:
Democracy and Conflict in the International System.” In Handbook of War Studies, eds.
Manus Midlarsky. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Russett, Bruce. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for Post-Cold War.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Siverson, Randolph. 1995. “Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the
Institutional Constraint Argument.” European Journal of International Relations 1: 48189.
Snyder, Jack, and Karen Ballentine. 1996. “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas.”
International Security 21: 5-40.
Sorenson, George. 1992. “Kant and Processes of Democratization: Consequences of
Neorealist Thought.” Journal of Peace Research 29: 405-33.
Starr, Harvey. 1997. Anarchy, Order, and Integration: How to Manage Interdependence.
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Van Belle, Douglas. 1997. “Press Freedom and the Democratic Peace.” Journal of Peace
Research 34: 405-14.
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1984. The Emergence of Democracy: A Comparative Study of 119
States, 1850 – 1979. Helsinki, Finland: Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters.
29
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1990. The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147
States, 1980-88. New York, NY: Crane Russak.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
30