Civil War and Contributions
The civil war and the decisions which occurred during January
1919
"den
bestimmt."1
Gang
der
Dinge
bis
zum
Untergang
der
Republik
Similar claims have been made about Ebert's pact with
Groener and about the unions' agreement with the employers. A
closer look suggests that the union-employer agreement remained
significant
only
1923/24).
The
for
the
first
Ebert-Groener
part
pact
of
was
the
one
republic
among
(until
many
which
influenced events and may have contributed to the survival of the
republic and avoidance of civil war (in November 1918, June 1919,
March 1920 and November 1923).
Finally, the decisions of January
1919 which accentuated differences between the SPD and USPD were
partly reversed during 1922.
The historians' exaggerated claims
about decisions made during the revolutionary era may point to the
need to consider the continuity from 1918 to 1933, and in general
may be an acceptable way to explain Weimar's end, though not its
operation.2
Situations are constantly open and restricted; open
in the sense of individuals taking new stances, and restricted in
the sense of the values held and the commitments made to that
point.
During January 1919 Ebert did indeed make decisions which
affected the "Gang der Dinge", but those decisions included some,
especially
on
the
constitution,
which
helped
maintain
republic, as well as some which helped to undermine it.
the
In the
end two novel elements, the depression and the Nazi movement, not
the SPD's compromises destroyed the republic; Ebert and the SPD
leaders of 1918/19 laid some questionable foundations, but many
others participated in creating and destroying the building.
Noske and Ebert joined forces with the old military to put
down all attempts to challenge SPD-bourgeois supremacy beginning
in
January
1919.
From
January
to
May
homogeneity
would
be
enforced
throughout
the
country.
The
workers'
and
soldiers'
councils and their allies, the Independent governments from Bremen
to Braunschweig to Bavaria, would be pushed aside or destroyed.
Only
a
socially-consultative
councils.
the
role
would
be
allowed
to
the
The Spartacists and the Independents identified with
councils
government.
and
advocated
their
rule
in
opposition
to
the
The putsches of some Spartacists and revolutionary
Obleute provided the government the excuse it needed to confront
and to repress.
Having "thrown his heart over the barricades" in
December 1918 and personally fearful of the national consequences
(armistice,
peace
and
parliamentary
democracy)
struggle, Ebert rejected compromise.
of
an
extended
His part in the January
civil war demonstrates that, and it reinforces that both state
authority and parliamentary democracy were his priorities.
At
the
end
of
December
and
beginning
of
January
Spartacists went into conference and emerged as the KPD.3
the
Against
the advice of leaders like Luxemburg and Liebknecht the majority
rejected
parliamentary
democracy
elections to the assembly.
and
participation
in
the
They proposed a new revolution and
began preparations for class war.
The many street demonstrations
and weaknesses of the government encouraged their activism.
With
the
Independents
out
of
the
government,
mass
demonstrations and street shows of strength became the order of
the day to illustrate support for or repugnance against the bloody
events
of
Christmas.
Thousands,
for
instance,
passed
the
chancellery on 29 December during the burial of the dead from the
24th.4
The cabinet members were edgy and talked about moving the
government out of Berlin.
The Christmas events signified not only a changed attitude
among Ebert and his colleagues.
About the same time workers and
soldiers
began
a
new
activism
demanding
socialization.
The
Independents, especially Daumig and Ledebour encouraged it and in
early January advocated council government.
Strikes and violence
became commonplace as a spontaneous protest movement swept through
the Ruhr and central Germany.
The councils may have shifted more
into Independent hands, or dropped party allegiance altogether.
The exact relationship between the renewed agitation of the KPD
and
the
Independents
to
push
the
revolution
protest wave is difficult to determine.
fronts ran through the parties.5
forward
and
the
One author suggests the
In Berlin the SPD leaders saw
chaos everywhere and confused protest with Bolshevism.6
In his
memoir-like account on the provisional cabinet Landsberg denied
that personal fear influenced Ebert's decision making though he
acknowledges they all felt personally threatened.7
He showed,
however, that they thought serious strengths lay behind the calls
for overthrowing the Ebert-Scheidemann government and that the
calls came from well armed groups only a week after the SPD
leaders had been arrested by a small group of marines.
The Social Democratic leaders may have been nervous in the
face of what they perceived as new threats but they were also
confident.
On 4 January Noske let the members of a political
salon (to which Ebert had also been invited) know he intended a
showdown with Spartacists, Poles and strikers.8
form
volunteer
corps
out
of
taking over military affairs.
officers
almost
He had begun to
immediately
upon
The Zentralrat had approved the new
war minister Reinhardt on 31 December.
He, together with Ebert
and Noske, had convinced the Zentralrat that the details of the
Kommandogewalt issue left undefined since the council congress
should be worked out later.9
Ebert and Noske went to see some of
the volunteer corps outside Berlin already on 4 January.
Noske
assured Ebert that with such men everything would soon be fine.10
Events from 3 to 5 January illustrated how precarious the
situation
was,
that
no
one
controlled
directed the drift into disaster.
it
and
no
conspiracy
First, the Independents in the
Prussian cabinet resigned to show solidarity with the colleagues
who had left the Reich ministry.
From among the Independents that
left only the police president of Berlin, Eichhorn, who refused to
give up his office.
He was especially distrusted by the SPD
leaders because he supposedly supplied arms to the Spartacists and
because he had broken the attack of Lequis' troops on Christmas
morning.
On 4 January the Prussian interior minister announced
his dismissal.11
Again pro and con demonstrations filled the
streets.
Some Communists and Obleute escalated tensions, for on 5
January some members forcibly occupied Vorwärts and other presses.
hen they declared the Ebert-Scheidemann government deposed.
Few
governments would accept such a deposition from the streets and
Ebert's
responded.
endangered,
the
Under
cabinet,
the
in
claim
the
that
press
presence
of
freedom
some
was
Zentralrat
members, appointed Noske with special powers to employ troops "zum
Zweck
Wiederherrstellung
geordneter
Verhältnisse
in
Berlin."12
Noske supposedly claimed "Einer muß der Bluthund werden."
and Scheidemann signed the empowerment.
Ebert
Noske's rear flank would
be covered by Ebert, who began a new role as the legitimizer of
other's actions.
Ebert's
discussions
skills
would
be
at
coordination,
tested
as
he
negotiations
tried
to
balance
Zentralrat and other groups during the civil war.
Spartakus began with a cannonade of words.
and
leading
cabinet,
The war against
The Zentrale für
Heimatdienst issued millions of "Propagandamaterial" between 5 and
12
January.13
The
akusherrschaft
"Was
wird
Vorwärts
titles
wankt!"
sein,
ist
"80000
wenn
Mark
"Arbeit!
Noske"
"Liebknechts Parole".
at
Spartakus
genommen"
Oberbefehlshaber
hint
"Die
the
contents:
russisches
zur
Spart-
Bestechungsgeld"
Regierung
Soldaten!
"Die
kommt?"
Bürger!
Verschwörung
"Der
Aufruf
im
des
Marstall"
These handbills appeared in numbers ranging
from 10,000 to 1.5 million, most over 500,000.
The intense
struggle to sway people can be seen in that twenty-one government
speakers
attended
1360
meetings,
including
Spartacists, and employed slides and films.
those
of
the
Party electoral and
state propaganda overlapped and intertwined.
The real war started on 6 January as demonstrators comprised
mostly of revolutionary factory workers and some Communists tried
to repeat the SPD trick of 9 November by simply marching on the
city center.
However the SPD called for a general strike and for
its supporters to come to the government sector.
about.
Shooting and fistfights were common.14
Crowds milled
Volunteer troop
units were formed though Noske and Ebert later claimed that while
many volunteered, few served.15
Fearing for his life Ebert again
slept at Sklarz' and the cabinet even met in a private house to
avoid being captured.16
The
occupation
of
more
government
buildings
by
the
Spartacists and some council allies placed the cabinet before the
problem of how to regain them.
If they did not retake the
printing presses the means of fighting their propaganda war as
well as of retaining sympathy among their own supporters and nonworkers
would
disappear.
Though
two
Social
Democratic
organizations of worker-troops soon existed, Noske proceeded to
build volunteer corps of which most members came from the old
officers or bourgeois elements.
The intentions of the government
were announced with a declaration on 8 January: "Spartakus kämpft
um die ganze Macht.
werden."
Die Regierung... soll mit Gewalt gestürtzt
This accurate claim prefaced a list of Spartacus' sins.
As a result the government announced its motto, "Gewalt kann nur
mit Gewalt bekämpft werden... Die Stünde der Abrechnung naht!"17
Other means to settle the dispute aside from force existed.
Some Independent leaders suddenly realized what being outside the
government
meant
bloodshed.
and
tried
to
act
as
go-betweens
to
avoid
Ebert reported to the cabinet and Zentralrat on 7
January that representatives from the cabinet (including Ebert and
Scheidemann), from the Independents and from the Revolutionary
Arbeiter had debated until late into night.
latter group had proposed an armistice.
Ledebour from the
Ebert had responded with
the cabinet position that press freedom was a precondition.
general
agreement
was
reached,
though
the
revolutionaries
promised no more violent actions would be taken.
night,
according
to
Ebert,
they
overran
a
No
had
But during the
provision
depot,
hindered the distribution of pamphlets at gunpoint and tossed
24000 copies of Vorwärts into the river.
Ebert reiterated: no
negotiations without a guarantee of press freedom.
decisive
question:
precondition.
In
would
the
the
Zentralrat
discussion
some
support
affirmed
others wanted to know the military situation.
He put the
this
cabinet
support
while
Ebert admitted
uncertainty, but acknowledged "Wir sind aber dabei die Kräfte zu
schaffen,
die
zur
Herstellung
der
Ordnung
ausreichen."18
Landsberg wanted no half-hearted efforts and no Zentralrat members
opposed the cabinet precondition.19
By the second session with
the cabinet on 7 January the Zentralrat members had woken up to
the significance of their stance, but decided to affirm the hard
line course they had earlier approved because more buildings had
been taken and some SPD organizations wanted to begin action
against
the
revolutionaries
on
their
own.
The
latter
is
insufficiently acknowledged.20
Some workers formed cross-party committees to work for a
compromise, but the government had attained its legitimization and
the
revolutionaries
castigated
the
too
refused
Independents'
to
efforts
negotiate.
at
They
even
negotiation.21
On
9
January the cabinet and Zentralrat reviewed further negotiations
which
Kautsky
Ebert's
had
cabinet
led,
members
but
the
Independents
of
double-dealing
were
since
accused
USPD
by
members
allegedly had taken over the government printing office.
The
government also claimed military defence works were being erected
in
the
occupied
Vorwärts.22
Without
fully
exploring
all
compromise possibilities on 10 January Ebert expressed the hope
that the troop action could start soon.23
The situation had
become confused; where the Independents stood and who supported
the government difficult to determine.
The handout of 9 January
calling for a general strike under the combined leadership of the
revolutionary Obleute, the USPD of Berlin and the KPD Zentrale
reinforced the cabinet members' desire for protection as well as
action against the armed uprising.
Landsberg reprinted it in his
historical account on the provisional government: "...Bewaffnet
Euch!
Gebraucht
die
Waffen
gegen
Eure
Todfeinde,
die
Ebert-
Scheidemann. Zerschmetterung der Revolution, Niedermetzelung des
Proletariats oder Zerschmetterung der Ebert-Scheidemann und aller
Todfeinde des Proletariats -- so steht die Alternative!"24
image
thinking
was
not
limited
to
cabinet
members
and
Enemytheir
outlook on Bolsheviks.
On 10 January Ebert and Scheidemann explained their unbending
position
to
Eisner,
who
had
registered
a
protest:
"Die
Reichsregierung
Berlin.
teilt
das
Entsetzen
über
den
Bruderkrieg
in
Ihre dauernde Verhandlungsbereitschaft hat sie erst heute
wieder
gegenüber
den
Arbeitern
kopfschenwerke bewiesen.
der
AEG
und
der
Schwartz-
Die Antwort darauf bittet sie in dem von
den revolutionären Obleuten, dem Berliner Zentralvorstand der USP
und der kommunistischen Partei erlassenen Aufruf zum Generalstreik
und
zu
mörderischem
nachzulesen."25
behind
them
dictatorship,
elections.
Aufruhr
und
blutigem
Strassenkampf
The SPD leaders asserted that the populace was
in
fighting
repressed
"dunkeln
press
Elementen"
freedom
and
who
pushed
tried
to
for
prevent
However, this reply was not accurate in that just
those workers' to which Ebert referred still sought a negotiated
outcome.
Despite the explanation offered to Eisner those negotiations
continued because when Leinert reported on 10 January to the
Zentralrat on his conversation with Ebert about the types of
troops being recruited by Noske, he alluded to them.
Ebert had
replied about the nature of the troops that he would ask Noske,
but was evidently not worried since all volunteers had to take an
oath to the socialist republic.
Ebert then had added that the
cabinet had negotiated all day with the various workers' and party
groups.
The cabinet had not budged from its precondition: "erst
muß der Vorwärts geräumt werden, ehe überhaupt zu Verhandlungen
geschritten werden kann."26
Next morning Noske's troops employed artillery against the
Vorwärts building.
issue
of
arrived
The Zentralrat simultaneously discussed the
socialization.
and
negotiations.
pleaded
with
A
delegation
the
from
Zentralrat
the
to
Both groups favored an armistice.
Independents
initiate
new
They wanted the
press buildings to be vacated and the troops to withdraw.27
Why
were they not able to carry that out?
The relations of Zentralrat
to the cabinet demonstrated that again party loyalty triumphed
over loyalty to any other approach.
The
Zentralrat
and
cabinet
basically
agreed
that
their
conditions had not been met on the morning of 11 January and so
thought the troop action justified.
The Independents had tried to
influence the cabinet through the Zentralrat by its intervention.
When
the
cabinet
and
Zentralrat
met
later
in
the
day
Ebert
reinforced his view by claiming that offices and factories had not
been vacated and "Verhandlungen [sich] erübrigen."28
hinted
that
resignations
the
Independents
and
that
a
Democrats,
Independents,
proposed.
The
wanted
new
Ebert's
government
Communists
Zentralrat
took
no
and
Scheidemann
Scheidemann's
comprised
and
of
bourgeois
official
Social
had
stance,
but
been
the
cabinet's hard line was encouraged as its negotiation efforts from
earlier in the day dissolved.
Already that morning Ebert and Scheidemann signed a note to
the newly-appointed Kommandant of Berlin informing him that at 1
pm
about
3,000
Artillerie
in
government
Berlin
troops
"mit
einziehen.
Maschinengewehren
Der
Einzug
dient
und
der
Demonstration; er soll zeigen, dass die Regierung die Macht hat,
die Ordnung in Berlin wiederherzustellen."29
The Kommandant was
to let them pass.
When the troops arrived Ebert held a short
welcoming
His
speech.
remarks
against
"Wahnwitzige
Elemente"
sounded like the defences he made of executive policies during the
party split as he talked about the patience shown toward this
minority.30
Noske's
troops
had
begun
building at 8 am 11 January.
artillery
fire
on
the
Vorwärts
The outcome is well known in that
both sides shot captives without trial.
The two days of fighting
cost some 350 lives.
A report on deaths during the so-called
"communist putsches" demonstrates the escalation of violence: 6
December, 21; 24 December, 168; January, 351.
In March 1919 it
would reach about 2,000.31
Some important aspects of the mini-civil war need to be
remembered when evaluating Ebert's and Noske's resort to force.
The
government
had
the
right
to
try
to
newspapers and to answer force with force.
the
Free
Corps
revolutionaries
was
unnecessary
overestimated.
and
retake
the
occupied
The total reliance on
the
Second,
threat
the
from
the
Zentralrat
had
legitimized a hard line and had not reigned in the government.
Most
of
its
members
too
wanted
order
restored.
Third,
the
Independents were trying to correct the mistake they made in not
participating
in
the
Zentralrat
and
in
leaving
the
cabinet.
However, there were loud hints that their attempts at compromise
and unity were aimed at a change of cabinet.
The proposal for a
new government of two members from each of SPD, USPD, KPD and
bourgeois
included
"Rücktritt
Eberts
und
Scheidemanns
und
Eichhorns".32
By 13 January Ebert thought the Spartacist "terroristische
Bewegung in Berlin als erledigt und die Gefahr eines Generalstreiks geeinigter Sozialisten nicht für sehr groß erklärt."33
Further this insider knew the SPD-USPD unity attempts had failed
because as Ebert said, the cabinet members "dachten nicht daran".
If the situation was under control then having Noske's additional
free corps enter and completely occupy the city on 14 January was
unnecessary.
Two days later the deaths of Karl Liebknecht and
Rosa Luxemburg went through the streets.
"fast zu Boden geworfen".34
surprised.
Ebert may have been
But he could not have been very
His "near collapse" probably related to the fear of
further unrest and the political consequences for the imminent
elections.35
The murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg could have
been prevented if Ebert and Noske had withdrawn troops once they
had re-established press freedom and made their demonstrative show
of strength.
In actuality they were out to assert authority.
The inability of the Zentralrat between 13 and 15 January to
limit, or even oversee, the actions of the cabinet demonstrated
its weaknesses and adherence to party loyalty.
It negotiated with
the Independents, factory representatives and the SPD organization
of Berlin on 13 January but the Independents refused to commit
themselves unreservedly to press freedom and demanded that the
"Regierung durch den Zentralrat abberufen werde."36
Next day the
Zentralrat (with Ebert's secretary Krüger present) took up the
issue of replacing cabinet members, but only in context of a
'program'.
"Gewalt
The discussion first focused upon how acceptable was
gegenüber
hiring.
Gewalt"
and
the
types
of
troops
Noske
Müller defended his SPD cabinet colleagues against the
Obleute who sympathized with the USPD.
Krüger tried to prove that
Obleute had led in the occupation of some press houses.
Those
remarks were aimed against labor-party unity of SPD-USPD.
Wäger
was
advocated
that
unity
and
applauded
the
When
"vernüftigen
Standpunkt der Genossen der USPD" a discussion began about the
nature
and
course
of
the
revolution
agreement between the two parties.
including
the
original
Müller insisted that the
Obleute had yet to promise adherence to press freedom, that the
issue
of
the
police
president
further separated the parties.
and
disarming
of
the
In the end, nothing was decided,
especially not about the "belastete" cabinet members.
the
Zentralrat
returned
to
populace
the
issue
in
the
Next day
presence
of
representatives of the Berlin SPD and USPD as well as Obleute.
At
this and another meeting with the cabinet on 15 January the
Zentralrat and the Independents helped the cabinet maintain its
hard-line course because the Independents admitted they did not
want to enter the government.37
Liebknecht and Luxemburg.
This was before the murders of
It showed that the USPD wanted to
influence the composition of the cabinet, to work toward unity of
the
labor
movement
on
responsibilities of power.
their
terms
but
not
to
share
the
Haase referred to "workers" setting up
a program as though the parties could be excluded.
The SPD
Zentralrat members concluded no agreement would be possible on
such a basis.
Haase put another question: how was the Zentralrat
going to prevent a repetition of the violence?
around
this
building.
question
government
troops
stormed
As they talked
the
Vorwärts
The Zentralrat told Haase to come back with "ein
sachliches Programm als Grundlage der Zusammenwirkung der beiden
Parteien."38
Neither the Zentralrat nor the Independents had a
workable program for labor unity or a changed cabinet membership.
The Zentralrat's weaknesses appeared in negotiations with the
cabinet.
Landsberg and Ebert defended the arrest of Ledebour and
that "Mißgriffe können nicht ganz vermeiden" in such a troop
action.39
Ebert explained that the cabinet had intervened against
some arrests.
As the discussion turned more to whether the
cabinet had fulfilled the revolutionary program Ebert argued that
socialization of the mines was not possible without consulting the
states.
With little resolved, on the next day the Zentralrat
returned
to
the
details
of
military
command.
In
a
special
afternoon session it agreed to a common declaration with the
cabinet condemning the death of Liebknecht and Luxemburg, but the
question of the cabinet's composition had disappeared.
The return to normality within the abnormality of civil war
surfaced as Ebert guided the cabinet sessions to catch up on all
the problems left untouched since "bloody" Christmas.
January,
for
instance,
the
agenda
contained
39
On 13
items.
The
pressing questions were among the reasons Ebert wanted the putsch
attempt quickly ended.
soldiers'
councils
The armistice renewal and complaints from
against
the
military
demanded
attention.
Already earlier Preuß complained about lack of contact with the
state secretaries who worked without guidance.40
Decisions were
required on where the national assembly would meet, as well as on
the draft constitution, and relations with the states too required
consideration.
On
such
significant
constitutional
draft
issues
Ebert
as
made
the
very
national
important
assembly
and
contributions.
Whereas Preuß favored Berlin, Ebert said "würde ich mich aus rein
politischen Gründen gegen eine Berufung der Nationalversammlung
[nach
Berlin]
aussprechen."41
He
pointed
to
the
distrust
of
Berlin by the south and the west and he wanted unity symbolized by
having the assembly in "dem Herzen Deutschlands".
for Weimar.
Hence he argued
He added: "Es wird in der ganzen Welt angenehm
empfunden werden, wenn man den Geist von Weimar mit dem Aufbau des
neuen
Reiches
Reinhardt
verbindet."
opposed
favored Weimar.
Berlin
Though
and
Landsberg
Weimar,
favored
Scheidemann
and
Berlin,
Rantzau
On 20 January the cabinet officially announced
for Weimar.42
On the draft constitution Ebert made even more significant
contributions.
During the cabinet session on 14 January his
pressure led to greater federalism than he personally wished or
the draft proposed.
This issue relates directly to how historians
have seen Ebert's role in the revolution.
man
with
"Durchsetzungsvermögen",
The image is that of a
directing,
controlling
and
caught
in
the
Democracy.43
traditional
mental
world
of
pre-war
Social
The above account has emphasized the pressures under
which he operated and his flexibility and improvisation (pact with
both military and USPD) just because he could not get his way.
With
the
exception
of
opposition
to
dictatorship
and
January uprising he showed a preparedness to compromise.
to
the
He could
not get the bloodless march to the elections that comprised the
crux of his approach to revolution and peacemaking.
unitary
state
but
again
he
adjusted
to
the
He wanted a
situation.
By
contrast, Landsberg advocated a more centralized state which he
thought the revolution had made possible.
Ebert agreed in theory
but argued the socialists had to learn from the course of the
revolution: "daß die Reichseinheit nur möglich ist auf föderativer
Grundlage."44
national
Ebert acceded to a federal structure to retain
unity
threatened.
which,
according
to
Landsberg
was
gravely
Later Landsberg acknowledged that in the short term
Ebert had been right, for when the states gathered to discuss the
draft
constitution
on
25
January
in
Berlin
"zeigte
sich
die
Unmöglichkeit einer unitarischen Lösung der deutschen Frage...
Ebert
war
sich
darüber
klar,
daß
Deutschland
in
der
Zukunft
solange in seinem Bestande gefährdet war, als seine einzelnen
Bestandteile nicht unlösbar miteinander verbunden waren.
Aber
sein Blick war in höherem Maße auf die Wirklichkeit gegenwärtiger,
also auf die Möglichkeit zukünftiger Gefahren gerichtet.
daß
die
particularistischen
saugten."45
Führer
aus
allen
Er sah,
Blüten
Honig
The pressure from the states began as soon as hints
existed that a new constitution was underway.
Hirsch and Ströbel,
the SPD-USPD heads respectively of the Prussian government, wrote
that they wanted to be part of any discussion: "In der wegen einer
organischen
Verbindung
zwischen
der
Reichsregierung
und
der
Preußischen
Regierung
am
2.
d.
M.
stattgehabten
Besprechung
zwischen dem Herrn Reichskanlzer Ebert und dem Minister Hirsch
wurde ausdrücklich anerkannt, daß sich die Zentralbehörden des
Reiches
und
Preußens
Angelegenheiten,
miteinander
die
insbesondere
in
Verbindung
beiden
bei
setzen
Interessen
berührenden
gesetzgeberischen
sollen."46
By
Arbeiten,
the
end
of
December the southern states in particular were complaining to the
Reich
cabinet
that
the
Bundesrat
had
no
functions
substitute existed to let the Länder know about laws.
and
28
December
they
met
and
continue as a federal system.47
proclaimed
that
and
no
On the 27
Germany
should
Preuß answered their demands by
acknowledging on 7 January that the states legally had rights to
be
informed
and
the
constitution-forming
states
process.
would
The
be
represented
federalism-unity
in
the
problem
involved more than the questions of legality and constitutionmaking.
Rantzau wrote the cabinet on 23 January that if the
national assembly attempted to work without the states, France
would exploit the disunity and end the Reich: "Es ist zur Zeit
völlig
unmöglich
Bayern
durch
Beschluß
der
gesamtdeutschen
Nationalversammlung die Verwaltung der Posten und Eisenbahnen zu
nehmen oder die Sozialisierung wichtige Erwerbszweige durch das
Reich
aufzuerlegen."
separatism
would
be
If
"Mitbestimmung"
encouraged.
He
were
thought
not
the
respected
question
of
Prussia too could only be answered once peace and French plans of
destruction had ended.
In keeping with this advice Ebert wrote
the Bavarians on 27 January: "Es liegt der Reichsregierung fern,
die
Bundesstaaten
beiseite
zuschieben.
Sie
erkennt
an,
daß
grundsätzlich ihre Befügnisse nicht weiter gehen als diejenigen
der deutschen gesetzgebenden Körperschaften vor der Revolution.
Nur in Fällen, die keinen Aufschub vertrugen, hat sie sich vor den
Erlaß
von
Verordnungen
nicht
mit
den
Regierungen
von
den
Bundesstaaten ins Benehmen gesetzt... Was das Gesetz über die
Bildung
einer
freiwilligen
Volkswehr
anlangt,
so
beweisen
die
Vorkommnisse in Posen und Oberschlesien, sowei die Bewegung der
Sowjetarmee in der Richtung auf Ostpreußen, daß die schleunigste
Schaffung militärischen Schutzes dringend geboten und Gefahr im
Verzuge war."48
The opposing pressures under which Ebert and his
colleagues operated appeared in that Zentralrat on 4 February
complained about not achieving central control, while on the same
day Gradnauer from Saxony agreed only to measures which did not
harm
Saxony.
constitutional
Ebert
and
saw
a
financial
solution
rights
to
only
the
via
question
of
the
national
pressure
achieved
assembly.49
An
greater
observer
acknowledged
federalism
in
the
that
Ebert's
constitutional
construct.50
As
a
balance, and in keeping with his belief in an interventionist
state, he hoped to increase the economic power of the central
state via its transportation, educational, taxation and postal
systems.
In the cabinet Ebert also defended having an upper house
to represent the states.
Most important, he pointed out the
liberal expert's omission from the draft of democratic rights:
"Vor allem vermisse ich in der Vorlage die scharfe, ins Auge
fallende
Betonung
gewisser
demokratischer
Gesichtspunkte:
persönliche Freiheit, Freiheit der Wissenschaft in ihrer Lehre,
Gewerbe-freiheit,
Pressefreiheit,
Koalitions-freiheit usw."51.
Versammlungs-freiheit,
As stated before, on such issues
Ebert's abilities shone.
Another postponed matter involved peace preparations. On 6
January Ebert motivated his resolve "daß es so nicht weitergehen
könne.
Zu einem Frieden könne Deutschland nur kommen, wenn es
gefestigte Regierungsverhältnisse hätte."52
The cabinet took up
the issue on 15 January and discovered Solf had done little.
Ebert's role in this question is so important that it will be
presented
in
a
separate
section
but
significant
here
is
his
coordination of cabinet tasks and the difficulties under which the
cabinet worked.53
The armistice renewal problems were another
reason why Ebert and his colleagues wanted order.
On the same day
as the civil war began cabinet members discussed about how tough
armistice negotiations would be.
The British had instructed the
Germans to stop provoking the Poles on territorial issues.
At the
same time, on 8 January, the Germans learned that the armistice
renewal
would
armistice
not
committee
be
automatic.
exclaimed:
One
"Soweit
member
haben
of
wir
the
es
German
glücklich
gebracht mit unserer unbeschreiblichen Schweinerei zu Hause.
Die
Leute [Entente] machen mit uns absolut was sie wollen... Sie haben
gar kein Interesse daran, den Frieden bald zu Stande zu bringen.
Denn erstens wissen sie gar nicht, wie sich die Verhältnisse bei
uns
noch
entwickeln
verhandlungsfähiges
observer
asked
werden
Deutschland
Erzberger
to
und
ob
vor
sich
inform
the
sie
überhaupt
haben..."54
cabinet
that
ein
That
he
was
convinced "Wir bekommen keinen Frieden...wenn nicht schleunigst
Ordnung bei uns einzieht."
On 15 January the new armistice-
extension
and
negotiations
began
the
cabinet
rediscovered
the
Entente's harshness: foodstuffs would be available only against
gold payments.
A further reduction of bread rations meant more
starvation.55
What the cabinet minutes do not reveal is the dispute which
emerged between the German shippers and Erzberger which Ebert had
to iron out.
Once the terms of the armistice agreement appeared
the shippers protested to Ebert because the agreement amounted to
turning over most ships to foreign control.
They claimed their
experts had been brought into the negotiations too late.
The
Hamburg shippers protested the government's acceptance as well as
not being allowed to ship foodstuffs on their own.
The Bremen
shippers added protests about "die leichtferige Art und Weise" in
which Erzberger operated.56
Ebert defended Erzberger because the
government had found itself in a "zwangslage" due to the need for
foodstuffs.57
The quantity of work that had piled up due to the continual
crisis situation since mid-December had almost incapacitated the
government.
Foodstuffs,
shipping,
peace
preparations,
constitutional drafts, were among the items which Preuß complained
the secretaries were forced to work on without direction.
Another
crucial issue was socialization of coal and again the cabinet did
not act.
The inaction on economic issues combined with the
January uprising unleashed more strikes and occupations and the
creation of council governments, for instance in Bremen.
None of
this augured well for Ebert's conception of the revolution though
some outcomes resulted from earlier delays and compromises.
The
elections
to
the
national
assembly
brought
further
disappointment but confirmation that working with the bourgeoisie
would be the only way to rule. The SPD received 37.9%, the USPD
7.6% while the Center gathered 19.7%, the DDP 18.5%, the DVP 4.4%
and DNVP 10.3%.
Though the cabinet became a real "provisorium"
when it announced that the National Assembly would gather in
Weimar on 6 February, it still made a series of significant
decisions.
Constitutional preparations and military structures
were two areas.
On the day of the elections the decree regulating
command power was issued.
military.
Another related to creating a new
This was more the work of the Zentralrat and Reinhardt
than
the
cabinet
which
approved
the
measures.
The
decrees
demonstrated that no one had very good answers to the military
questions.58
The context in which a new military was discussed needs to be
recalled.
well
as
Noske's troops had been employed against workers as
revolutionaries
authority.
to
regain
buildings
and
to
assure
On 21 January August Müller had asked for a cabinet
meeting so he could outline why a new military was necessary: for
economic reasons.
At that session Noske agreed a power factor had
to be created.59
Part of the concern focused on borders with
Poland and all were agreed that force was necessary.
Whereas the
generals wanted increased troops at the border, Noske also wanted
some for the unrest in the Ruhr.
Two remarks from this cabinet
session illustrate where Ebert's and Noske's new approach led.
Groener thought "wir in kurzer Zeit in die Lage sein werden,
Elsaß-Lothringen wieder zu erobern."60
Erzberger followed with
estimates about how "Wir könnten noch eine große Weltpolitik mit
Amerika treiben..."
In one breath the cabinet members talked
about the need for a power instrument to control insurgents, and
in the next, war and Weltpolitik.
optimism but not his aims.61
Only Rantzau opposed Groener's
On 23 January Landsberg responded to
increased separatist tendencies with: "Es gibt nur ein Heilmittel:
den Militarismus."62
The values and beliefs of German Social Democrats after a
world war and an armistice surfaced in what they let the generals
express
without
militarism
civilians.
as
contradiction,
well
National
as
what
power
and
what
Noske's
concerned
Landsberg
troops
this
did
cabinet
said
to
about
unarmed
more
than
democratization of institutions or socialization of the economy.
An indices is the discussion with the Zentralrat on the draft
constitution.
einmal
liegen,
möglich."63
"Die
Again Ebert argued "Wie die Dinge in Deutschland
ist
nur
ein
föderativer
Aufbau
des
Reiches
However, his view of the election results included
Nationalversammlung
ist
so
zusammengesetzt,
daß
wir
die
demokratischen Errungenschaften der Revolution sichern können."
Ebert's conception of democracy, namely the transition made on 912 November to universal suffrage, removal of feudal vestiges, a
new social policy by an interventionist state and the continued
cooperation between SPD and bourgeois experts, those were the
"Errungenschaften" to be defended.
about
workers'
constitution
and
and
soldiers'
when
the
He expressly doubted anything
councils
national
could
assembly
appear
met
politische Tätigkeit der Arbeiterräte aufhören."
say that to the Zentralrat underscored his honesty.
"muß
in
the
aber...
That he could
Ebert had not
wanted the bloodshed or civil war and he had tried to contain it
by compromises and then force.
By the end of January he had
revealed that formal parliamentary political democracy in common
with the bourgeois parties sufficed for him, especially since he
took more actions to hinder than to introduce socialization.
He
had begun to help roll back the institutions which had emerged
spontaneously, the workers' and soldiers' councils.
The three issues left at the end of the revolutionary period,
if one looks from Ebert's perspective, were: 1) how to limit or to
eradicate the councils and create a new military basis for a
great-power state 2) what role he and his party would have in the
coalition government, which relates to division of offices and
cabinet formation, including the Reich presidency and 3) how to
assure peace.
Only the first will be considered here with the
revolutionary period.
selection
as
Reich
The third will be handled after Ebert's
President,
because,
although
peace-making
affected
Ebert's
beyond it.
approach
to
the
revolution,
it
extended
far
For Ebert, the revolution in the sense of change of
power, had been over on 10 November, in the sense of compromise
between groups and institutions (USPD-councils-officials-military)
on 24 December, and in the sense of proving authority on 11-15
January.
His cabinet had reluctantly provoked the split with the
USPD in December and thus encouraged a more radical but not last
phase of unrest during 1918-19.
Ebert and his colleagues did not
control this phase, but they did influence the escalation of
violence.
Ebert had shown his preparedness to fight for a strong state
authority, to assure a national assembly to define the nature of
parliamentary democracy, plus seeking the basis for a great power
state.
The latter determined Ebert's relations to the councils
and the military.
Notes
1.Miller, Bürde, 235.
2.The recent discussion on the strengths and nature of bourgeois
society questions the history which offers "ein breit
angelegtes Tableau der Voraussetzungen für den Niedergang der
Republik und den Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus... Im Kern
geht es jedoch bei allen diesen Erklärungsversuchen um die
Zuschreibung historischer Verantwortung... Sie erklären
jedoch unweigerlich die Entwicklung der Weimarer Republik von
ihrem Ende her." B. Weisbrod, "Das Neue und das Alte -- Eine
Einführung" in Lutz Niethammer u.a. Bürgerliche Gesellschaft
in Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1990), 325.
Instead he wants
questions asked about the "Charakter und der Beständigkeit
des neuen 'Gesellschaftsvertrages' and the possibilities in
the "neuen gesellschaftlichen Konsens".
3.See Hermann Weber, Der Grundungsparteitag der KPD. Frankfurt,
1969, introduction and Winkler, Von Revolution, 114ff.
4.See Bern 2300 Berlin 20 report of 15 January 1919.
5.W. Mommsen, "Die deutsche Revolution 1918-20" Geschichte und
Gesellschaft IV (1978), 378ff.
6.In various essays R. Lowenthal has developed the idea that fear
of chaos, an "Anti-Chaos Reflex" inhibited actions because of
the fear of destroying a functioning state in an industrial
society,
"Vom
Ausbleiben
der
Revolution
in
der
Industriegesellschaft" HZ 232 (1981), 1ff
Hence not only
Ebert was not prepared to break with the OHL but the party
followers also could not get beyond wishing for change. R.
Müller, Republik, 130 in pointing to the differences between
Russia and Germany too suggested that the level of German
industrialization and the state of the labor movement were
decisive in affecting the revolution's course.
7.Landsberg, "Rat der Volksbeauftragten" in Ebert und seine Zeit,
183ff, here 196.
8.Hapag, Holtzendorff to Vorstand 5 January 1919; this confirms
Wette, Noske, 297 that preparations for a showdown were made
before the uprising.
9.Rvb II, 153ff.
10.Maercker, Vom Kaiserheer zur Reichswehr. Leipzig, 1921, 64.
11.Miller, Bürde, 225ff.
12.Noske's own account of the cabinet meeting on 6 January given
in Von Kiel bis Kapp, 67-68.
13.DZA Reichskanzlei 2479, 99-100 gives a detailed breakdown.
14.The Swiss representative provided a detailed personal account
and because he lived near the Reichschancellory and described
the taking of hotels and counterattacks his presentation
provides insight on the threats experienced by the cabinet.
Bern 2300 Berlin 20, report of 15 January 1919.
15.Dowe, PA II, 760-4, during Januar 1920 while Noske defended his
military policies he claimed Ebert and Scheidemann were lucky
to be alive he remarked that some 3000 men sworn to republic
but few served. Ebert interjected "Ganz 80 Mann sind
gekommen."
16.See BA R43 I/1239, 63 (re sleeping at Sklarz' because not able
to get rest); Stadtarchiv Köln NL Marx 66, 5-6 (re not
getting rest); Müller, Revolution, 256.
17.Printed in Ritter/Miller, 184-5, and in Ebert, Schriften II,
147-48; materials published in that collection were either by
Ebert or he had a large part in its creation. The text
included: "Das Volk soll nicht sprechen dürfen".
18.Rvb II, 197-8.
19.The Zentralrat members seemed unaware of the significance of
the issue as they talked about their budget and travel
rights, Rvb II, 198.
20.Winkler, Revolution, 124 notes the Social Democrats' demand.
21.See "Auf zum Generalstreik" in Dokumente und Materialien II/3,
33-35.
22.Kolb, Zentralrat, 265ff, Rvb II, 202-04.
23.Rvb I, 204.
24.Landsberg, "Rat der Volksbeauftragten," 205-207.
25.DZA Reichskanzlei 2480, 139.
26.Kolb, Zentralrat, 308.
27.Kolb, Zentralrat, 314ff, esp 332.
28.Rvb II, 211.
29.DZA Reichskanzlei 2480, 138-139; the note was handwritten by
Ebert and then typed.
30.Text in Berthold/Neef, Militarismus, 361f.
31.BA R43 I/2, 296, these figures vary from others and tend to be
higher.
32.Kolb, Zentralrat, 337-8.
33.Baden 233/34826; Gesandter Bericht 13. January 1919.
34.Landsberg, "Rat der Volksbeauftragten" in Friedrich Ebert, 207.
Ebert called Landsberg back from Kattowitz "Ich fand ihn in
einer Aufregung, wie er sie auch in den schlimmsten Tagen
nach der Staatsumwälzung nicht gezeigt hatte."
35.See report by Hermann Müller, Revolution, 271 whom Ebert had
asked to come to the chancellory to discuss the situation.
36.Freiheit NNr 25, 14 January 1919.
37.Kolb, Zentralrat, 400.
38.Kolb, Zentralrat, 411.
39.Kolb, Zentralrat, 415.
40.For above Rvb II, 205-210.
41.Rvb II, 224-25.
42.Rvb II, 283-84 with notes in which the memoir literature is
cited: Noske claiming for himself, Brecht for Baake, Apelt
for Ebert (who opposed spirit of Potsdam).
43.The term is employed by Miller, Bürde, 252; similar Kolb,
Arbeiterräte, 184ff; Schönhoven, Reformismus, 53 ("Sie
dachten in den traditionellen Kategorien der deutschen
Arbeiterbwegung") summarizes the views found in much of the
literature but does not then address a resulting puzzle: how
the thinking on the military and the nation-state were so
changed between 1914 and 1918 by such traditionalists and how
flexible they showed themselves on coalitions even with a
clerical party.
44.Rvb II, 237ff, esp 239.
45.Landsberg, "Rat der Volksbeauftragten," 201.
46.BA R43 I/2746, 16 December 1918. Preuß promised that Prussia
would be invited and he would see Hirsch.
47.See
matrials
in
BA
R43
I/2746;
Blos
to
Rat
der
Volksbeauftragten on 24 December 1918 and Blos to the
Württemberg representative in Berlin, Hildenbrand, informing
him on results of southern state meeting.
48.BA R43 I/2746.
49.BA R43 I/1863, 37-45; Besprechung in der Reichskanlzei of 31
January 1919 on the Notverfassung and Finanzgebahrung. See
also the Aufzeichnungen sent by Preuß to Scheidemann on 25
March 1919 (ibid, 191) which showed how many negotiations the
cabinet had during January with the states.
50.StA Karlsruhe, Baden 233/34825, report of 15 January 1919:
"zwar auf Veranlassung Eberts in mehr federalistischem
Sinne..."
51.Rvb II, 240. He continued: "Aus politischen und taktischen
Gründen muß das in prägnanter Form hervorgehoben werden, wenn
es auch sachlich schon in der Vorlage steht."
Ebert also
proposed following the proceedure of consulting with the
states.
52.Müller, Revolution, 256.
53.Rvb II, 267ff.
54.BA NL Groener N46/130, Winterfeldt an Erzberger 8 January 1919,
copy to Groener. He added that the separatists were creating
fait d'accompli which the Entente approved.
55.Rvb II, 279-80.
56.Hapag,
"Cuno"
telegrams
of
19
and
20
January
to
Volksbeauftragter Ebert.
The Bremers added that the work
places of many were endangered.
A later undated telegraph
asked for attempts to reverse the agreement. The Swiss
representative obtained a direct report on Erzberger's
flipant attitude, see Bern 2300 Berlin 20, report of 21
January 1919.
Cuno had been called late and refused to
consider such momentous question as turning over most of
fleet but Erzberger went and signed.
57.Hapag
"Cuno Friedensverhandelung" Ebert to Cuno 19 January
1919.
58.Two studies have presented the significant roles of Reinhardt
and Noske: Kluge, Soldatenräte, 259ff and Wette, Noske,
333ff. Reinhardt tried to integrate the soldiers' councils in
opposition to the OHL which wanted them to disappear.
Appeals were made to Ebert by Reinhardt and Groener; his
stance limiting the counicls to very secondary roles became
clear by February.
59.Rvb II, 287.
60.Rvb II, 294, 295 for next quotation.
61.Protest letter in Rvb III, 297.
62.Rvb II, 308.
63.Rvb II, 340, 28 January 1919.