Andria Cimino
Psych 2235
11.29.05
The Implications of Game Theory
For the Conservation of Global Resources:
Promise and Peril
In “The Commons, Game Theory and Aspects of Human Nature that May Allow
Conservation of Global Resources,”1 Walter K. Dodds looks to game theory research for
insights concerning humanity’s consumption of global resources. The question he seeks
to answer is can we control humanity’s seemingly endless appetite for resources before
we irreparably harm the global ecosystem and cause extinction of even more species.
Asserting that the central problem underlying the world’s environmental crises is that
some proportion of people in a group will behave selfishly, taking more than their fair
share of resources, he turns to research based on public goods games to better understand
this behavior and to help develop possible solutions. The paper explores such topics as
the relationship between resource value and inducement to “cheating” (i.e., taking more
than a fair share of the resource); the effect of population growth on the number of
cheaters and the implications of their cumulative influence for conservation; the
shortcomings of altruism with regard to conservation; and the vital importance of the
human propensities to cooperate with unrelated humans, to develop social norms, and to
punish cheaters in actualizing conservation goals.
He explores these issues within the context of some of our most pressing environmental
concerns, such as global warming, depleted fisheries, and the loss of biodiversity. In
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particular, he considers global warming a potential “tragedy of the commons,” with
nothing less than the future of humanity at stake. He states, “Nothing in our prior cultural
or genetic evolutionary history has prepared us to deal with global environmental
problems.” Although he finds hope in the global response to depletion of the ozone layer
and subsequent reduction in CFCs, he notes that the process, from documenting the
problem to agreement on a solution, took decades—and without the added burden facing
the environmental and global climate scientific communities of having to convince
skeptical governments, an uncertain public, and those with entrenched interests in the
fossil fuel industries (for whom believing would incur the most costs).
In conclusion, he states, “Efforts to control resource exploitation are bound to fail if they
do not consider human nature” and calls for additional research and conservation
approaches that rely more heavily on environmental education, which will lead to the
development of social norms that discourage cheaters and encourage more altruistic
punishment by noncheaters, who because of environmental education will better
understand and support environmental regulations and will be less tolerant of cheaters in
their midst.
Although Dodds makes an excellent case, there are problems in relying too heavily on
game theory research as a predictor of human behavior concerning resource use at the
global level. For instance, although game theory offers insights that hold true across
many different cultures1, such laboratory experiments fail to simulate the complexity of
real-world resource use scenarios. Global environmental problems are multifaceted, and
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any researcher attempting to model them in the laboratory would have to add and control
for numerous variables, making careful study for useful patterns quite difficult (although
surely not impossible). As noted by Kurz, in most social dilemmas experiments,
“participants are not being required to engage in a decision-making process in which they
are weighing personal satisfaction/comfort, the welfare of the resource, and personal
financial interest.”2
The focus on individuals also limits the usefulness of game theory findings for realworld, international environmental issues, leaving questions unanswered concerning how
larger groups such as nations might respond to cheaters or what would happen if another
country attempted to punish a cheater nation. Dodds states that nations behave the same
as individuals, following the same principles in terms of cheating or cooperating, but this
seems an oversimplification and an area that deserves further research. For instance, a
major difference between individuals and nations is that nations have numerous duties
and obligations to the varied interests of its citizenry (whether or not they fulfill or even
acknowledge those duties is a separate issue). An individual may be xenophobic, even
racist, and this may not change the outcome of a public good game. In the real world,
however, this sort of national perspective will have a direct impact on how amenable a
country is to world opinion concerning its use of such “non-owned” global resources,
such as the world’s fisheries and its atmosphere. Altruistic punishment options likewise
become more complicated at a national level and include actions (such as trade
embargoes and waging a war) whose severity and repercussions would be extremely
difficult to replicate in an experimental setting.
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Perhaps as a result of the difficulties posed by applying rules derived from individuals in
small groups to larger, more complex systems, penalties and punishments for
environmental cheating are currently weakly applied at the international level as
compared to within countries, as Dodds himself acknowledges. Although there has been
progress in terms of establishing certain generally agreed-on legal principles to guide the
creation of international environmental law (“polluter pays,” the idea of sustainable
development, and the importance of environmental impact assessments)3, enforcement of
existing law remains problematic. Part of the problem, according to Kurz, is the lack of
clearly defined international social norms concerning resource use at the global level. The
establishment and global acceptance of an international body with the power to
effectively (and fairly) punish cheaters would then be possible.
An additional shortcoming with game theory’s applicability to conservation is that public
good games are not usually designed to elicit certain aspects of altruism that exist in the
real world and can prove a strong incentive to conserving resources, such as a parent’s
concern with leaving the world a better place for offspring or a philanthropist’s desire to
ensure a resource will still be there for future generations. Indeed, Dodd discounts the
mitigating effect of such “extreme psychological altruism” on global environmental
problems. But doesn’t all such cooperation begin with the example of one influential
individual who can conceive a long-term view and convince those around him or her of
its power and wisdom (in this case, of living sustainably)? It is tantalizing to envision
what the US could accomplish if we had a leader who exhibited such altruism. Politics
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aside, the point is, not all behavior is the result of strict cost/benefit analysis. Human
behavior is far more complex and certain drivers of conservation behavior (altruism, as
mentioned previously, and religious/moral beliefs that hold humans as stewards of the
earth’s welfare, for instance) are not taken into account in public good games (although
some researchers assert there is a connection between cooperation and having highly
developed norms).
Kurz points out another important problem with social-dilemmas approaches, namely the
inherent assumption that all users of a communal resource will eventually suffer the
detrimental effects from its depletion (and so might be inspired to conserve). However,
the consumption behavior of individuals in western societies is rarely actually influenced
by the threat of resource depletion, in part because their governments go to great lengths
to protect consumers from the real consequences of their behavior. As Kurz points out, in
real-life environmental dilemmas, the real damage done by over-consuming is often not
in the form of a resource running out, but rather the collateral environmental damage that
occurs as a result of maintaining supply at such a level that demand can always be met.2
In addition, Kurz notes that, unlike the individuals in a social-dilemmas experiment who
must face the consequences of their decisions, the leaders of nations making the decisions
affecting such issues as global warming and exhausted fisheries, are unlikely to have to
face the consequences of their decisions.
Dodds raises another issue that has bearing on the applicability of public good games on
conservation. As the world population has increased, so has the absolute number of
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cheaters in the system. But the world’s finite resources can only tolerate a set number of
cheaters; so as the population increases, the number of cheaters must be decreased just to
keep the total effect on resources steady. However, as the population grows and resources
become ever more precious, the incentive to cheat becomes greater, with the potential
gains outweighing the risks, even if they include death. This encourages others to move
away from cooperation and conservation to selfishness and unbridled consumption,
leading to a tragedy of the commons effect. The traditional public good games approach
of small groups of individuals does not take this exponential population growth factor
into account when simulating the conditions leading to tragedy of the commons.
A recent article on sturgeon fishing in the Caspian Sea highlights how cheating leads to
widespread, deeply entrenched corruption that would require drastic international action
to stop.4 Despite laws that forbid sturgeon fishing (including by CITES, the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna), despite the ban
of beluga caviar imports by the US, despite harvests of less than 10% of historic highs,
and a population of mostly (as high as 80%) males (far less lucrative to catch than eggladen females) in a species that takes 10 years to reach maturity, poaching continues
unchecked. Illegal fishing operations share their profits with local police, who then turn a
blind eye. National officials turn a blind eye, denying widespread violation of
environmental laws even as sturgeon is featured on most restaurant menus and sold,
along with black-market caviar, in local markets. Where is the outrage that would lead to
punishment of poachers by community members who are concerned about the future of
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this resource? Apparently there is none (no doubt the cost of speaking up is too high,
especially when poachers are making as much as $50,000 from a beluga with eggs).
Clearly there is a need for more realistic experimental models in social dilemma games to
help us better understand the interplay of individual and group drives on resource use,
including the effects of sociocultural norms, nationalism vs globalism, globalism vs
“localism,” and education vs sense of economic scarcity (I say “sense” because I suspect
the current rage of consumption going on in the US stems at least in part from an
underlying sense that resources are in fact extremely finite, an attitude inculcated parents
who suffered real deprivation as result of the Great Depression and two world wars and
imparted a sense of economic scarcity to their children, who internalized this fear and
have spent their adult lives trying to quell it with the acquisition of not only material
goods, but knowledge and experiences as well. The legacy of consumption is continued
in each generation with less idea of why we are consuming everything in sight. So, stated
this way, it covers not only cases in developing nations where economic scarcity is a fact
and the acknowledged reality, but also in wealthier nations, where it is but a ghost.) In
terms of educational approaches in the US, we need to find a way to make conservation
not feel like deprivation.
References
1
Dodds W K. The commons, game theory, and aspects of human nature that may allow
conservation of global resources. Environmental Values 14 (2005): 411-425.
2
Kurz T. The psychology of environmentally sustainable behavior: fitting together
pieces of the puzzle. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 2 (2002); 1: 257-278.
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3
The World Bank Group. International environmental law: concepts and issues.
Available at www4.worldbank.org/legal/legen/legen_iel.html. Accessed Nov. 30, 2005.
4
Chivers C J. Corruption endangers a treasure of the Caspian. The New York Times,
Monday, November 28, 2005, A1-A8.
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