INQUIRY BY HOUSE OF COMMONS DEFENCE SELECT COMMITTEE INTO THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE
AND SECURITY REVIEW (SDSR)
EVIDENCE OF THE KEEP OUR FUTURE AFLOAT CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
1.
The Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign and its Objectives
1.1
The Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC) is a trade union and local community
campaign. Formed in 2004 in response to large scale redundancies at Barrow Shipyard, its
objectives are to:


Sustain and grow jobs in naval shipbuilding in NW England;
Secure full utilisation of the NW of England’s shipbuilding assets and the supply
chain it maintains throughout the UK.
2.
Executive Summary
2.1
We welcome the new foreign policy and capability led Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) process and advocate that the SDSR invests in maritime capability.
2.2
Initial Gate approval for the successor submarine project should be determined no later than
31 December 2010.
2.3
The successor submarine programme should be funded as a national priority rather than
wholly out of the MoD budget.
2.4
Up to 8 Astute class nuclear powered submarines should be built at a steady drumbeat to
ensure a smooth transition into the successor.
2.5
Nuclear powered submarines give the UK unprecedented utility and flexibility, but they
cannot be in two places at once. There should be no reduction in fleet size, to ensure
capability is retained and overhead costs are affordable.
2.6
The SDSR and Defence Industrial Strategy ‘2’ which flows from it need to recognise that the
programme to build Astutes has been optimised in terms of its size and programme. Any
small disruption to the overall programme assumptions has potential for a dramatic impact
on the business which rapidly becomes unsustainable from a SQEP skills perspective.
Regenerating submarine capability is hugely costly and difficult to do.
2.7
Diversification is difficult. The PA Management Study 2003 on behalf of the Barrow
Taskforce concluded that “the value of one additional boat employing 2-3,000 people for 1824 months is worth more to Barrow than any combination of diversification possibilities”.
3.
Our Views Echo Those of UNITE
3.1
“Up to 13,000 jobs could be at risk if Trident is delayed and any lengthy delay will mean that
Britain is in danger of losing the skills and ability to build such submarines”. (Source: UNITE Press
Release, 30 July 2010).
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4.
The First Sea Lord
4.1
Who recently said “maritime capabilities are not a luxury, they are a necessity for a global
trading island with many overseas interests.”(1)
5.
And the Foreign Secretary
5.1
KOFAC notes that the Foreign Secretary(2) in July 2010 identified several priorities for UK
foreign policy. Maritime capability is crucially important if the UK is to:



Extend Britain’s global reach and influence, inspiring other nations and people using
communications in a networked world and protecting Britons abroad;
Projecting forces overseas instead of homeland based defence;
Dealing with widely dispersed, often difficult to access security threats.
KOFAC also welcomes the policy to:

“Build up bilateral relations and reinvigorate diplomacy in Latin America”, and is in
agreement with “a modernised NATO Alliance and an unbreakable alliance with the
United States complemented by partnerships with France and Germany”. However,
the UK should clearly recognise that “we have underestimated the challenges of
operating in multinational operations in the past(3)
6.
Principles of a UK Strategic Defence and Security Policy beyond 2010
6.1
KOFAC’s views are as follows:







(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
A foreign policy led SDSR must be adequately funded to be effective.
We need to win the war we are in (Afghanistan) and address future threats by
preventing and deterring conflicts whilst being prepared to defeat adversaries.
In the future a need to sustain long-term maritime or air campaigns could emerge.
Britain is a maritime nation, dependant on sea lanes for trade. Strong maritime
capability enables the UK to better guarantee security of supply and address threats
at distance.
The SDSR should define the kind of navy we need in years to come and its key tasks
which we see as being to protect safe passage of our merchant fleet, move armed
forces by sea and into the littoral environment quickly and safely, use of vessels that
can give hard support on the ground and delivery of the strategic deterrent(4).
The defence industrial base should be regarded as a front line service which
provides high skilled jobs which offer, “high levels of employment in some
economically less well off parts of the UK” (source: Secretary of State for Defence identified 21 June
2010)
The MoD restructuring to reduce numbers improve efficiency should be based on
the three pillars of “strategy and policy, the armed forces and procurement and
estates (5) and a 10 year (2011-21) funding plan.
First Sea Lord, 7 July 2010, RUSI Future Maritime Operations Conference
Britain’s Foreign Policy in a Networked World, speech by the Foreign Secretary, London 1 July 2010
Adaptability and Partnership Green Paper, MoD February 2010
Alison Seabeck MP, 21 June 2010 Hansard Col.76
“The Need for Defence Reform”, speech by Secretary of State for Defence, 13 August 2010, RCIS, London
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7.
Specifically on Nuclear Powered Submarines,
7.1
KOFAC makes six key points as follows:
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
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The unique capabilities of submarines must be exploited to the full by the UK. They
provide “the most sophisticated and flexible weapons that we have to exercise sea
control.(6)”
“Astute submarines can deter almost any other navy from putting to sea against
us.”(7)
Only submarines can for example safely conduct missions deep inside an enemy’s
battle network. They are a strategic vital capability for Britain.
There is “an enduring need for Britain to retain the capability to design, build,
operate, maintain and dispose of nuclear powered submarines.”(8)
“As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a need to sustain safe, secure and
effective nuclear forces” .... to “play an essential role in deterring potential
adversaries and reassuring allies”.
Britain must commit to retain sovereignty over all aspects of the nuclear powered
submarine enterprise-design, construction and operation to support such a strategic
capability.
7.2
SDSR need to make it clear that the UK is prepared to fund the nuclear submarine
programme over the long term to keep the unique capability it offers the Royal Navy and to
keep the submarine industrial base on which the capability depends strong and vibrant.
7.3
The SDSR should commit the Government to invest in nuclear submarine capabilities by:






(6)
(7)
(8)
Funding a steady drumbeat of submarine orders, one every 22-26 months to replace
aging submarines with 21st century capability. Stretching out the drumbeat could put
skills and capability at risk.
Building up to 8 Astutes and 4 successor submarines as part of future maritime
capability, with a follow on class of attack submarines beyond 2030 to replace
Astutes which have a reactor design life of 25 years.
Ensuring a smooth transition of the Astute programme to development of the
successor strategic deterrent carrying programme.
Retaining a survivable strategic deterrent through a new submarine programme
designed to maintain undetectable continuously at sea patrols by submarines.
Funding of the strategic deterrent capability as a national priority as the ultimate
guarantor of our national security and not wholly seeking to have it funded out of
the MoD’s budget. It should not be regarded as a financial burden.
Perhaps seek value for money savings on the strategic deterrent by delaying Trident
warhead or supporting infrastructure costs and prolonging the life of existing
missiles.
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughhead, 17 June 2009, BSBA
Bernard Jenkin, MP for Harwich and North Essex, Hansard 21 June 2010 Col.74
MoD Submarine Enterprise Collaborative Agreement Impact Assessment http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/D929BC42-19684BD8-95E4-BE8CB71F576E/0/SecaImpactAssessmentFinalVersion.pdf. “The capability provided by nuclear submarines is
therefore unique and of vital importance to national defence”.
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8.
Industrial Base Issues
8.1
“Defence Matters.” Britain’s defence industrial base is a front line service as are the skills
within it. Both support the armed forces by providing them with the capabilities they require
to protect our national security and deter threats.
8.2
Defence “represents high levels of employment in some economically less well-off parts of
the United Kingdom” (Hansard 21 June 2010, Col.53). Cumbria is very defence dependent and the
SDSR should recognise the significance of defence spending as a means of helping improve
wealth in remote areas like Barrow.
8.3
Every job in defence creates 1.6 jobs elsewhere in the economy. Investing in defence can
help Britain’s economic recovery and can contribute significantly towards the Coalition
Government’s policy to create a more balanced economy.
8.4
The SDSR must:




Set a consistent, realistic long term strategy for shaping the structure and
capabilities of the defence industrial base.
Make a clear statement of the industrial capability that the Coalition Government
wishes to keep onshore and what is needed to deliver operational sovereignty.
Create conditions for a continuing supply of critical components and that ensure
that supply chains are not compromised by over reliance on overseas suppliers.
Ensure critical skills are not lost.
8.5
In September 2010, Britain’s Submarine Enterprise has been optimised in terms of its size
and programme such that any small disruption to overall programme assumptions has the
potential for a dramatic impact on the business, which rapidly becomes unsustainable from
a skills retention perspective.
8.6
The National Audit Office has clearly documented the effects of not building submarines for
many years and the atrophy of skills that result from a lack of submarine work. Work load
gaps continue to have an adverse impact on the Astute programme beyond fabrication and
build. Test, commissioning and entry into service dates of fleet submarines are all impacted
as well. The National Audit Office’s “The UK’s Future Nuclear Deterrent (HC 1115, 20072008) said “the time delay between the construction of the Vanguard class submarines and
the beginning of the Astute programme meant that key skills and submarine building
experience had been lost.”
8.7
The House of Commons Defence Select Committee echoed this view observing that “if you
don’t exercise your submarine design capability; if you don’t exercise those specialist
submarine build techniques; in short, if you don’t build submarines regularly, you
haemorrhage the capability to build submarines very quickly and it costs more.”(9)
8.8
Regenerating submarine capability is hugely costly and difficult to do. Therefore a regular
drumbeat of orders is necessary.
(9)
Lord Drayson, House of Commons Defence Select Committee, The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: The
Manufacturing and Skills Base, paras 57 and 59
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8.9
The SDSR was launched in the knowledge that the NAO Major Projects Report 2009 had
identified the following “slow of spend” policy increasing costs in the submarine industrial
base:

“On Astute Class submarines, the Department decided to slow the production of
boats 2-7, by delaying the delivery of boats 2-4 and deferring the start of build of
boats 5-7 which will lead to a net increase in forecast costs of £400 million,
arising as a result of reducing expenditure by £139 million up to 2013/14. After
this time costs are forecast to increase by £539 million”.

“As a result of the slippage on the Astute Class submarines, additional costs of
£38 million will be incurred to continue running the existing, less capable,
Trafalgar Class submarines, although these costs should be at least partially
offset by the savings from not having to support the new Astute Class. Further
life extensions to the Trafalgar Class fleet are not considered feasible”.

“The decision to constrain expenditure during the four years commencing 200910 will slip the entry into service of each subsequent boat by an average of nine
months. This is forecast to leave a period between 2015 and 2021 when there
will be a shortfall of submarine availability against the Department’s stated
requirement.”
The SDSR should carefully consider whether the slowing of programmes is in the best
interest in retaining long-term capacity and capability to afford and build future nuclear
powered attack submarines beyond the Astute class.
9.
Industrial Base Opportunities that the Successor Creates
9.1
It is important that the Initial Gate appraisal of the successor submarine is completed by
December 2010. This will give industry clear visibility of forward commitment.
9.2
It is crucially important that the time tabling of the design and build of the successor to the
Vanguard class is not “moved to the right”, so as to open up a risk of workload gaps which
will put capabilities and skills that are irreplaceable in the supply chain and shipyards at risk.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
Terry WAITING, Chairman,
Keep our Future Afloat Committee
c/o Secretariat KOFAC,
Furness Enterprise, Waterside House,
Barrow in Furness, Cumbria LA14 2HE
Tel: 01229 820611
Secretariat Email: sklosinski@furnessenterprise.co.uk
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G:\Stuart\KOFAC\ KOFAC Evidence to HoC Defence Select Committee 20 September 2010