Demography, Politics and Old Age
by Dr John A. Vincent,
for British Society for Gerontology Annual Conference, Newcastle upon Tyne, 4-6 September
2003.
Abstract
The paper explores the extent to which increased proportions of older people in the electorates
of modern western democracies has increased their impact on the political process. Are the
voices of older people articulated more clearly and listened to more readily in the corridors of
power as a result of their greater numbers? The paper draws on original research conducted at
Exeter University into older people politics in Britain, and compares this information with
published sources on older people's politics in USA, France and elsewhere. The paper
concludes that the contrasts observed are less to do with demography and more to do with the
institutional structures and political cultures of different countries.
Introduction Statement of the Problem.
Does an ageing population create a different kind of society? Fears have been expressed
widely across time and nations that that an ageing society will lack innovativeness, economic
dynamism and cultural creativity. In 1949 the Royal Commission on Population suggested:
“321. Though individuals differ more than age groups, there do seem to be
certain qualities and defects characteristic, on the whole, of the young and other
more commonly associated with the old. Older people excel in experience,
patience, in wisdom and breadth of view; the young are noted for energy,
enterprise, enthusiasm, the capacity to learn new things, to adapt themselves, to
innovate. It thus seems possible that a society in which the proportion of young
people is diminishing will become dangerously unprogressive, falling behind
other communities not in technical efficiency and economic welfare but in
intellectual and artistic achievement as well. “ p.120-1 Royal Commission on
Population Report 1949.
In 2003, a similar view is currently driving US foreign policy. Rumsfeld references to “Old
Europe” in the build up to the Iraq war in January 2003 were construed as ‘old’ meaning
‘passed it’, but looking at briefing documents, he was also likely to have been referring
ageing populations and reluctance to fight outside Europe. To quote the CIA (2001) global
strategic review:
Historically, the richest developed nations have been growing, capital
exporting, philanthropic giants that have projected their power and mores around
the world. A quarter-century from now these countries may instead be
demographically challenged, fiscally starving neutrals who maneuver to avoid
expensive international entanglements:
Elder-dominated electorates may be more risk averse, shunning decisive
confrontations abroad in favor of ad hoc settlements. (CIA 2001:85)
It is not just Europe that is identified as problematic. The CIA, in same document, uses Japan
as an example and argue that capital will decline as savings are used up by ageing retirees.
They also use the cultural argument saying that previous Japanese economic success based on
exploiting new technologies and suggest that Japanese corporations will be “starved of young,
new employees who bring with them the latest ideas.”
The CIA report not only draws attention to on the economic aspects population ageing but
also the changing character of electorates and politics and raises the question as to whether
intergenerational conflict will arise? They identify electoral politics as creating a key problem
A critical uncertainty is what, with ever more electoral power flowing into the
hands of the elderly, will motivate political leaders to act on behalf of the longterm future of the young. We are already seeing a rise in polarization among age
groups in some countries. A rise in intergenerational conflict may not be far
behind: (CIA 2001:35)
They argue that ‘Senior power’ is on the rise in Europe and that it is less based in independent
older peoples organisations as in the United States than in Trade Unions and Union backed
political parties (CIA 2001:35). The purpose of this paper is to explore the reality of the threat
of older people dominating electoral politics, stifling economic and cultural creativity and
sparking inter-generational conflict. Are these fears genuine or do they hide another agenda?
Will an ageing population really create a new kind of society?
Description of Methods.
I will explore these issues by examining the similarities and differences in the politics of
major western democracies. The paper starts with the analysis of data from a project funded
by the Leverhulme trust into ‘old age’ in British politics. This project ‘Older People and
Politics’ (OPPOL) drew on a wide variety of techniques and sources to assemble data. The
team researched documentary sources relating to older people’s politics in general and the
1997 General Election in particular. Over a twelve-month period from May 1999 to May
2000 interviews were conducted with politicians from the three major political parties. Key
figures from the major charities working on behalf of older people and activists within the
pensioners’ movement were also interviewed. The opinions of the general public were
obtained from focus groups and individual interviews held with a wide range of people. The
focus groups looked at how the power and influence of older people is perceived by older
people themselves and by the general public. From the results obtained from the qualitative
data, areas of specific interest were identified and operationalised into survey questions. The
generality of perceptions derived from these interviews and focus groups was examined in a
nationwide face-to-face survey of 2,087 adults aged over sixteen throughout Great Britain
conducted by the polling organisation MORI.i Members of the research team also observed
and participated in a wide range of events and activities through which older people’s
interests were expressed.
Published results of the work so far have concentrated on understanding the British
pensioners movement (Vincent, Patterson and Wale 2000a,b, 2001). This paper aims to
compare the British situation with published international sources on the politics of old age.
In particular the documents of the parties and politicians themselves in Scotland, France, the
Netherlands and the US in an attempt to critically evaluate the fearful proposition
prognosticated for ageing populations in Europe. The book ‘Politics and Old Age’ (Vincent et
al 2001) identified three key problems for the political effectiveness of the pensioners’
movement iiin the UK: the diversity of interests with a stake in the pensions issue, the
problems of organising older people on a national basis, and cultural issues about old age and
its identification as an appropriate basis for political solidarity. Important areas of social
difference including class, age, gender, ethnicity, benefit status, savings and health can inhibit
older people in achieving political cohesion. Organisation fragmentation and co-ordination
was an issue and cultural aspects impacting on the effectiveness of the pensioners’ movement
were found to include the cultural evaluation of old age itself and the political culture of the
UK.
Findings of the British Study summarised
Organisations and leadership
Older people’s organisations share problems with other radical and campaigning
organisations, but they also have their own specific problems. Organisations of older people
appear to be divided into a multiplicity of groups that do not cooperate easily. Older people
are a diverse population, and these various differences are mirrored in a diversity of
organisations. Age also brings with it a personal history of both commitment and enmity. The
older you are, the more past loyalties and past disagreements can complicate decision making
over priorities and campaigning strategies in the present. This problem of fragmentation is
also reflected in the local and regional bases of many of the organisations. Our British study
found distinct problems of mobilisation and coordination on a national level. Although
numbers of pensioners’ organisations have venerable histories, organisations of older people
have particular problems with continuity. The career structure of the leadership and
organisation specific skills of the cadres of activists is naturally shorter for older people than
it is for other groups. Youth wings of political parties, as well as student organisations, have a
similar problem as one cohort of leaders after another surpasses the age range of the
organisation. While many older people are fit and healthy and not all are poor, as a social
group they are less well-off, have greater difficulties with mobility and are less well-educated
than younger age groups are. This is reflected in their preference for the parochial, face-toface, community organisation rather than the more politically effective, media-oriented
national organisation. Both practical difficulties and the orientation and culture of older
people may play a part in this pattern.
Cultural Problems
The dominant culture in Western so devalues old age and valorises youthfulness (and
newness) such that no one wants to be old. It is difficult to create a positive identity for old
age as a symbol that people wish to internalise and to around which they can mobilise and
commit their time and resources (Biggs, 1997). The devaluation of old age makes it more
difficult for older people’s organisations to form effective coalitions and alliances. Access to
the media to convey their message is restricted and distorted by negative images of old age.
Some images are more media-friendly than others: pictures of furry animals, dolphins or
children are more likely than pictures of older people to generate coverage and sympathy.
People are more likely to organise around issues than age based or generational identities.
Pensions and rights in the welfare state, are the issues around which most older people’s
organisations campaign. However, these issues are frequently seen by the general public and
older people themselves as universal rights, not ones specific to older people as an interest
group. In terms of a single-interest pressure group, the only viable option as an issue around
which older people can unite in the UK is the current value of the state pension. The
universality of the state pension gives all older people a common interest and makes it a
logical central issue for the pensioners’ movement. However, interests over the current value
of the pension are fragmented and divide pensioners from pension contributors, and state
pensioners from occupational or private pensioners. The diversity of the levels and sources of
older people’s incomes means that the impact of the state pension on their household budgets
is in many cases not a strong motivation in terms of self-interest.
I am not sure that people at home doing their household calculations are quite
as persuaded by the economics of it. They are quite persuaded by the way it
reflects a sense of moral injustice and a sense of being left behind ... and not
having got what was deserved. (OPPOL interview with an informed Londonbased advocate on behalf of older people)
If there is a crisis of old-age politics, it is the reflection of a wider crisis in the relationship,
the rights and duties owed, between the state and its citizens.
It should be manifestly clear that it is an injustice in a society like ours to expect
older people who’ve paid taxes and all the rest to live on the pittance that is
handed out. (Bruce Kent, 70 years old, OPPOL interview)
The question can be asked: What is the moral basis for the claim to an income in old age?
This claim is widely upheld as a statement in principle; the general public believe that older
people should be supported financially in old age. The moral basis of this claim has to be
expressed symbolically in order for a campaign to be effective. The effects will be very
different depending on whether the claim is made as the self-proclaimed right of a citizen or
on behalf of a deserving object of charity. We concluded that the prime impact on politics was
not older people’s political activity but rather ‘compassionate ageism’ amongst the majority
of the population. Our study and many other have found a strong widespread belief amongst
the electorate that is appropriate for the state to provide a secure income and a decent life for
the nations older people.
Cultural factors combine in various ways to limit the effectiveness of older peoples’
organisations. In terms of leadership, there are few nationally recognised leaders who want to
transfer from their current political parties or organisations into older people’s organisations.
Further, the British political tradition and the devaluing of old age combine to limit the value
of this career move for an aspiring leader looking for power and influence. The leadership of
the Pensioners Convention has passed from the former leader of the TGWU to the former
leader of UNISON. The financial resources and technical expertise of the major charities
enable them to master and argue the specifics of benefits, pensions and allowances. Such
expertise does not promote the solidarity engendered by the pensioners’ organisations, and
charitable status limits their political activities, but it does give them the information and
skills to enter consultative relationships and become the voice of older people to government.
We also concluded that the political culture and constitution of the UK structure political life
in ways that affect older peoples’ representation. The British ‘first past the post’ electoral
system encourages the dominance of two-party politics. Further, in the British political
tradition this has been thought of as left and right, that is, as an ideological or class divide.
There is thus no tradition of sectional interests such as age groups or occupations seeking
their own representation; neither is there a multiplicity of potentially electable parties amongst
whom voters can pick and choose. In the second half of the twentieth century there has been a
growth in single-issue pressure groups, which see their role as influencing existing parties and
governments rather than participating in government. An older persons’ party is unlikely to
meet with success on the electoral battleground but I will qualify this statement by reference
to elections to the devolved Scottish Parliament.
Scotland
The election of the first person standing on a senior citizens platform in the UK was John
Swinburne of the Scottish Senior Citizens’ Unity Party in May 2003. He was elected in the
Central Scotland ‘regional list’ and thus acts as a test case for some of our findings, for
example that relating to the impact of the ‘first past the post’ electoral system. Swinburne’s
success depended on Scotland’s system of proportional representation which also enabled a
number of other fringe parties and candidates to gain seats. He made a direct appeal to the
electorate for ‘second preference’ votes.
John said: The 'over 60s' in Scotland represent 24% of the electorate and while
they are our main target group we are also calling upon their families to go out
and vote according to their conscience with their first vote on polling day but to
give their SECOND vote to their 'old folks.' www.seniorsnetwork.co.uk
downloaded 4 June 2003
In our terms, this can also been seen as a direct appeal to ‘compassionate ageism’. His local
paper in Hamilton had his victory as the top election night story and explained the importance
of proportional representation.
It emerged when the count of the second votes for the ‘top-up’ list candidates
for Central Scotland region was announced... his two-month-old party came into
its own. Backed by a gang of steely-eyed pensioners — among them his trusty
lieutenant and statistician-in-chief, Russell Rodger — he roamed the hall as the
results came in. In all, they gained 17,146 votes across Central Scotland, beating
along the way the Scottish Socialist Party and the Scottish Lib. Dems. in
Hamilton South and that pair plus the Conservatives in Motherwell and Wishaw.
(Hamilton Advertiser Thursday, 8 May 2003 )
The final Central Region result was as follows:
PARTY SEATS VOTES %
LAB
0
106318
40.4
SNP
3
59274
22.5
CON
1
24121
9.2
SSP
1
19016
7.2
SSCUP
1
17146
6.5
Lib Dem 1
15494
5.9
GRN
0
12248
4.7
SLP
0
3855
1.5
SUP
0
2147
0.8
IND
0
1265
0.5
SPA
0
1192
0.5
UKIP
0
1009
0.4
John Lynch www.seniorsnetwork.co.uk downloaded 4 June 2003
As with the rest of the pensioners movement, the Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party
campaign addressed the pension as their central issue. Anger over the pension is what
Swinburne presents as his personal motivation and he drew up an admirably simple party
manifesto which he called ABC:
A - Abolish poverty for all Scottish Senior Citizens by increasing the basic pension to £150
per week
B - Banish means testing for all Scottish Senior Citizens
C - Council Tax to be replaced by a fairer local income tax
Although the pension and taxation are not powers devolved to the Edinburgh Parliament, his
appeal obviously met with some level of voter approval. Devolved politics has made a
difference in terms of social welfare issue, in that a distinctive Scottish policy has emerged
over payment for residential care. Swinburne also made the free home care in Scotland as
issue in his campaign.
Unsurprisingly, and reflecting the leadership issues discussed above, Swinburne’s campaign
depended on leadership qualities and resources derived from other areas of life (in this case
football). The Hamilton Advertiser has him as “a dapper, silver-haired 72-year-old, hitherto
known only to many as the man steeped more than anyone else in the lore of his beloved
Motherwell Football Club”. Through his position in Scottish football he was able to attract
media attention for the launch of his party and its campaign.
“the former Celtic captain and manager [decided] to enter politics as a
champion of the pensioners’ cause. At 63, McNeill remains as animated about
social injustice as he does about the sport that brought him more medals than
Colin Powell. ...John Swinburne, president of the Scottish Senior Citizens Unity
Party, asked him to become a candidate in the forthcoming Scottish elections,”
Scotsman Sat 19 Apr 2003
The formation of SSCUP and their campaign also strengthens our observations about the
organisation problems and fragmentation of older peoples parties in the UK. Swinburne’s
team, what ever their individual talents were organisationally naive, unaware and
uncoordinated with other pensioners parties. Swinburne stated at the party’s launch that “We
are making history because never before has a 'Grey Party' stood for election in the United
Kingdom. In fact there have been a number of unsuccessful attempts to stand as pensioners
parties by different groups and individuals across the UK. Indeed as his own party was
launched another Pensioners Party was also being launched in Fife. In the end the two leaders
Swinburne and Rodger cooperated, an example of what is gained by unity. Swinburne
describes himself as politically naive, lacking expertise, and having to seek advice from the
Electoral Commission on how to start a political party.
Swinburne was not treated seriously in the campaign by important sections of the Scottish
media. They were portrayed as “grumpy old men in cardigans” by the Scotsman.
“Unfortunately, we’d wandered off the subject fairly early, but were soon
redirected to an interesting and informative sheet of paper, which contained the
principal policies of the SSCUP (sounds like a ship with a urinary problem): raise
the pension to 150 notes a week; banish means-testing; and replace council tax
with a local income tax. “ Scotsman Wed 9 Apr 2003
Again unsurprisingly for someone trying to promote identity politics behalf of older people he
came into criticism from other identity politics factions. Swinburne was various criticised for
having no women on his platform and encountered adverse publicity when elected for being
allegedly ‘anti-gay’. The electoral success of Swinburne therefore rather than undermining
our analysis in ‘Politics and Old Age’ in reinforces it. Swinburne’s victory does not seem to
be a precursor to intergenerational conflict.
Can we examine other accounts across Europe of political successes for the pensioners’
movement which might contradict the rather low key situation I have presented for the UK?
Two cases might suffice. The first is the powerful political mobilisation in France against
various attempts at pension “reform”. The second is the electoral success of older people’s
parties in the Netherlands.
France
This section draws heavily on a major new work “Le Pourvoir Gris” by Jean-Phillippe Viriot
Durandal. (2003)iii. He argues that there has been a change in France with the growth of a
social movement in which older people seek to represent themselves independently of
churches, political parties, or trade unions. This represents a challenge to the well entrenched
corporatist structure of French politics in which older people were spoken for by ecclesiastical
or class based organisations of which they were a special part. He sees the demonstrations of
6 June 1996 in defence of pension rights as a key point in which the Trade Union organisers
joined with older people’s organisation for an agreed set of objectives. He also sees their
participation in collective action as part of the process of the formation of a new collective
identity for older people. He notes as we do in our British study of the ambivalence between
working class trade union organisations and their retired members sections and associations of
mainly former professions who combine leisure pursuits and commercial opportunities with a
degree of activism. The French Unions and government have come to accept that they should
deal directly with new pensioners organisations and the study documents how older people’s
own organisations have been drawn increasingly into consultative roles with government. The
Pensions Advisory Council which was established in May 2000 is a permanent body set up
with a variety of representation and expertise from different sections of the community for
consultation purposes. There are Members of Parliament, representatives of employers and
unions from both the public and private sectors, representatives of associations representing
the interests of families, experts and civil servants and pensioners and the elderly. Its main
mission is to monitor the state pension system, conduct research and analysis and make
recommendations for reform. It describes itself as a think-tank and a debating forum.
In the Pourvoir Gris, Viriot Durandal examines the issue as to whether old people represent a
threat to democracy by considering the way larger numbers of older people effect political
systems and how they participate politically. He examines the way retirement has changed,
emphasizing the success of the third age and the ways in which these newly retired people
have found ways of organising themselves identifying the demonstrations of June 1996 as
being a particularly seminal moment. He goes on to demonstrate how the character of the
French welfare state creates particular kinds of interests and how older people have inserted
themselves into the corporatist institutions of the French state. He sees grey power as a force
in formation, with considerable difficulties in achieving effective power and realising its
objectives. It is struggling with the fragmentation and problem of making strategic alliances,
problems which we have similarly described for the British system. Viriot Durandal points to
the problems of making effective appeals to voters and indicates the cultural and symbolic
obstacles as well as the organisational problems of radicalising older people. He debates the
issue of ‘empowerment’ (which is apparently difficult to translate into French). His analysis
concentrates on actions and how older people are creating new ‘espaces d’action’, new
agendas, new ways of interaction and collective action which will themselves play a role in
coming to define ‘grey power’.
The fragmentation of French older politics is in evidence not least by the number of national
let alone regional or local organisations involved (Argoud and Guillemard 1999). The 25
organisations listed in the decree instituting ‘Un Comite National Et Des Comites
Departementaux Des Retraites Et Des Personnes Ageesiv’ demonstrate the range of
organisations involved. However despite this fragmentation massive demonstrations and
strike action have been mobilised. French activism focuses on opposition to pension ‘reform’,
a key part of the government proposals being to State workers to pay in for 40 years to receive
full pension -matching private sector - by 2008; payment period to be increased to 42 years by
2020; higher contributions from 2008 together with workers to be allowed to stay on after
official retirement age and tax incentives introduced to boost company-based savings
schemes. The opposition to these proposals are led primarily by Trade Unions. vThey
successfully called a one day strike and massive national demonstrations in May 2003.
However, most political pundits believe that the new French government will pass the
proposed legislation and the Union led opposition will not have the success it did in 1995 in
forcing a government retreat.
Netherlands
The Algemeen Ouderen Verbond (AOV) is the Dutch “General Seniors Party”. The
AOV was founded in December 1993 by Martin Batenburg at Eindhoven. He is described in
the party literature as a pensioner who was in his seventies who was irritated by government
cutbacks especially in the field of healthcare. The party was responding directly to
government proposals for cutting the old-age pensions, that is to say the party selfconsciously was responding to demographic fears over the affordability of pensions. They
defined the issue as one of entitlement. They saw the pension as an:
“achievement of only 40 years, that most pensioners have been paying for all
their working lives, was about to perish at a moment when they were finally
entitled to collect it themselves. That is why many older people welcomed the
idea of a party that would take special care of their increasingly worrying
situation.” (http://www.het-klankbord.vuurwerk.nl/aov-eng.htm accessed 11th
Aug 2003)
The AOV participated in the municipal elections and won 5 seats in the Eindhoven City
council. In 1994 they took part in the general election for Parliament, and to widespread
surprise won 6 seats. Another new party for the elderly, the Unie 55+, also won a seat at that
election. However, the party did not survive its success and split and lost its seats. It fell apart
in suspicion, wrangles, sackings and intrigue (van Stipdonk and van Holsteyn 1995). It has
since joined in an electoral alliance with the Unie 55+ but not so far been able to repeat its
success of 1994. This party was able to succeed, as in the Scottish case, because of a system
of proportional representation which enabled disillusion with the mainstream parties to
manifest itself with the election of fringe parties. Their six seats in 1994 came from a 3.6% of
the vote. The Netherlands saw an even greater collapse of traditional voting patterns through
disillusion, which resulted in electoral meltdown and the short-lived electoral success of Pim
Fortuyn’s party in May 2002. Schuyt, et al (1999) argue, despite the evidence they present of
greater propensity of older Dutch people to participate in politics by party membership and
voting, that there is a problem of social and political participation for older people. In fact the
crisis of decreasing legitimacy of government which they identify is the more general political
problem behind Dutch politics and indeed politics in most modern democracies.
How does this story of fragmentation, marginality and focus of pensions seen for older
people’s politics in ‘old Europe’ differ from that in the United States.
USA
The most powerful and well organised lobby for older people in present day America is the
AARP (American Association of Retired Persons). It has a professional organisation,
sustained by membership payments and commercial activities. Membership of the
organisation brings with it access to life assurance benefits and travel and drug discounts as
well as pressure group activities and policy making. It is a highly influential organisation of
35 million members. It has had financial difficulties in the last few years along with most
American voluntary organisations caught in an economic downturn and collapse of stock
market incomesvi. In remains a powerful organisation which in recent years has both deepened
and broadened it scope. At home in the US it has made spread its organisation across the
whole country at state level, paid particular attention to the Spanish speaking population.
Abroad it has used its pre-eminent size and wealth amongst older peoples organisations to
take a lead in international forums. Mass membership and a secure independent financial base
are the key to AARP power. AARP lists the following under its services and discounts for
members: Airlines, Entertainment, Insurance Automobiles, Financial and Legal, Vacations &
Tours, Career and Work, Gifts and Music, Computers and Technology, Health, Cruises,
Hotels and Lodging. Thus while its financial base is secure through the benefits of collective
consumerism, it is also able to mobilise its professional expertise for political lobbying. The
AARP website for its election and campaigns activities as of August 2003 highlights
campaigns on the following issues: legislation on prescription drug benefit in Medicare,
proposals to deny retiree health benefits to retirees who are eligible for Medicare, changes to
pension rules which have a potentially devastating impacts on lump sum pension payments,
and they draw members attention to policy formation on transportation, health care and
employment and in particular the high cost of prescription drugs.
Elected politicians tend to be keen to respond to the AARP because of its size and potential
for mobilising votes. The association has a direct electoral role in advising voters. It has an
arm of the organisation, called AARP/VOTE, that is charged with informing the public about
where the candidates for public office stand on old-age issues. Through mechanisms such as
sponsorship of candidate debates and dissemination of written voters’ guides, AARP/VOTE
can influence the electorate.
Under the startling title Young v. Old: Intergenerational combat in the 21st century
MacManus and Turner (1996) give a comprehensive account of US older politics using
Florida as a case study. In practice the content of the book in far less alarmist that the title.
Among her contributions is point out the importance of older people as grass roots political
activists and at to fore of those prepared to take Civic responsibilities. Dona Street provides
an important cautionary note to the general view that older people form an effective pressure
group in the USA. She argues that it is necessary to question the views that age against youth
is an explicit conflict, that elderly voters act self-interestedly and vote as a block (Street and
Quadragno 1993). The US attribution of senior power is usually made in the context of the
politics of Social Security and Medicare. Dona Street (1997) contrasts the conventional
construction of elderly political actors as a special interest group successfully in extracting the
spoils of ‘pork barrel’ politics with a more critical perspective that views Social Security and
Medicare as citizens’ rights. She uses a political and moral economy framework to analyse
the welfare state’s role in creating age as a potential political cleavage. In her view,
investigation of the politics of Social Security and Medicare reveals no undifferentiated
politics of ageing in the United States. Rather, age interacts with a variety of other statuses,
such as race and ethnicity, gender and class, to condition citizens political mobilisation.
Welfare state policies - social insurance programmes like Social Security and Medicare,
means-tested programs like Medicaid, are targeted tax expenditures, and reflect the power of
revenue contributing groups. Similarly access to private pension and health insurance
differentially empower particular sub-groups of elderly citizens and routinely disadvantage
the most vulnerable elderly including minority elders, women and the oldest-old. Thus, the
essence of Donna Streets argument is that the fragmentation of elderly people means that
older people do not have the unity of interests, or the self-perception of themselves as a group
with a common interests, to sustain an effective solidarity. Within a different framework
using public opinion data, Hamil-Luke (2001) suggests there is no difference between
American age groups in their opinions towards federal government expenditure for older
people. Silverstein et al (2000) present the case that there are growing intergenerational
tensions in the United States that are related to underlying public values of individualism and
self-reliance. They argue that there little evidence of direct tension between the generations
rather that growing distrust of government and reluctance to help the poor has indirectly
fuelled opposition to public spending on the older population. They identify an “ambivalence”
felt by many Americans toward government which they expect to “make good on its promise
to care for all older citizens, but to use fewer resources in doing so”.
The contrast in size and sophistication of older people’s organisations between the
two sides of the Atlantic is striking. Although the British Association of Retired
People and those over 50 models itself directly on the AARP, it does not have the
same size and influence as its American counterpart. Having the independent financial
resources for a modern campaigning political organisation is related to the legal
structures of civil society. Asked about the lessons which could be learnt from
America the chief executive of a leading older peoples organisation in the UK said
I think that with charitable giving in America. The whole atmosphere is very
much more integrated with the tax system it’s very much more structured. I think
there is something to learn there in terms of how we might seek to get the
government to create an atmosphere of individual and corporate donorship at a
very much higher level than it is at the moment in this country,
The issues and activities to which are given priority can also be contrasted between
the US and Europe. Health Care, medicines and private insurance are vital services in
the US which are the responsibility of the State in Britain, France and the
Netherlands.
Conclusion.
Are older people using their increased numbers to dominate politics and to fossilise culture?
Clearly not on the basis of evidence discussed here. Older people tend not act collectively or
vote together, even although many share common experiences of dashed expectations of
income and support in old age. Achenbaum (1997) argues that in the USA old people don’t
vote differently than rest of population, although they tend to vote more. Our work suggests
this is also true for Britain. Voters in both the USA and the UK do not tend to vote as an
interest group. The reluctance of older voters to shift their votes deprives them of the political
clout they might otherwise expect. Achenbaum questions whether the ‘baby boomers’
generation may behave differently and to show less historical party allegiance. Both,
Achenbaum and Street emphasises that, in America, social security issues fragment older age
groups. If their characterisation of ‘grey power’ as a myth, is true of America with its tradition
of interest group politics and highly organised lobby system, how much more is it true for the
UK.
The burden of this paper is to argue that older people do not seem to carry the political weight
ascribed to them by others. It may be that statistical analyses by Pampel and Williams (1989)
and others (Pampel and Stryker 1990, O’Connor and Brym 1986, O’Connor 1990) suggest
that where there are more older people the greater the welfare sate expenditure on older
people. However, even if these correlations are valid, and there must be severe doubts about
the concepts and data that are used in such studies, it may be that it is the belief of decision
makers that older people do have electoral power that inclines them not to cut specific
expenditures. However, this assessment of older people’s electoral impact is wrong. I believe
it is possible to demonstrate that the elderly are not successful in setting a political agenda.
They do not influence the party manifestos, the electoral debate, or set them terms for broader
political competition. Further, older people do not act electorally in their own interests. They
do not engage in tactical vote switching in order to gain either direct personal gain from
welfare benefits or organise their votes in a way which benefits older people as a group. Thus
not only do older people not think and act as an interest group, they do not organise
effectively to focus objectives and achieve them. Compared to groups who are much smaller,
for example the farmers, gun owners, or policemen they are relatively ineffective. And even
taking in account their difficulties of physical mobility and resources, older people do not
mobilise militant support in the manner of road protesters, animal rights, or disabled activists.
While pensioners organisations are able to hold mass meetings, marches and lobby’s they do
not attract the attention or the political clout that the numbers of older people in the
community suggest they might.
So why is the CIA assessment incorrect. A key error is that they confuse electoral power of
older people with the popularity of the welfare state. Public expenditure on health care and
pensions are not sectional interests of older people to be pursued through the ballot box. They
are rather the collective interests of the great majority of working people who will tend to use
their political influence to protect their entitlements to welfare and pensions. James and
Brooks (2001) conducted an economic metric analysis of the factors likely to lead to
pension “reform”. They conclude that:
“the design of the reform package to build a majority coalition of winners from
reform, credibly promising pensioners that they will not suffer, postponing some
painful adjustments, exempting certain influential groups, compensating groups
that fear losses of power or money, and trading off policy concessions or political
carrots in other areas. Governments have persuaded pensioners and younger
workers, labor unions, social security bureaucrats and financial institutions to
support the reform through these means.” (James and Brooks 2001:23)
The British and European data suggests that although there is a steady erosion of confidence,
using demographic arguments to convince people that state pension systems are
unsustainable, those pushing for state withdrawal from health and pension have not yet
persuaded European electorates to give up on their heritage of social citizenship. It is not the
blocking votes of older people but the more general perspicacity of European voters that their
pensions are no more secure with Merrill Lynch than they are with their own state systems.
The CIA analysis is also sociologically naive. It is a clear case of re-ification; that is
characterising society as if it were an individual. Personalities and character traits belong to
individuals not society, and societies are not individual write large but complex sets of
relationships. This mistake means the report fails to locate in social and institutional terms
sources of cultural creativity and economic innovativeness which might be lost. Indeed
counter intuitive social processes might be at work, generational blocks to aspiring youth
might be culturally creative. It is true that across most of Europe, older people are more
politically conservative than younger people. However there is a key difference between
conservative as avoiding change and conservative as supporting right wing policies and
programmes. Many progressive movements have appealed to preservation of old beliefs
values as they have gone on to create new alliances and new institutions. Many commentators
have suggested that the sixties generation as they read old age will be a force for social
change and will not be content with the passivity with which older people are sometimes
currently characterised. The CIA analysis is based on a re-ification of an ageist stereotype.
It is difficult to find at the close of the twentieth century any evidence of a growth in
intergenerational conflict except in the ideologically inspired literature of neo-liberal
economics. Evidence for an apparent lack of influence of older people, on the other hand, is
twofold, first, in the character and activities of older people’s organisations and, second, in the
low priority given by party political elites to older voters. It is not possible to identify changes
in the age profiles of party leaders that suggest that older people have become more desirable
or effective as leaders of the nation. Further, there is little evidence of increased
responsiveness by governments or political parties to organised groups of older people. It is
difficult to find examples of political parties having been particularly enthusiastic or efficient
in the identification of issues that are important to older voters, or having been sensitive to
presenting issues in a manner that appeals to older people.
Perhaps one reason for this in Britain is the existence of the NHS, which means that medical
costs are less pressing on older people and the benefits of collective insurance and organised
medical consumers are less relevant in the British context. Further, on this side of the Atlantic
there is not the same tradition of interest group politics. The British party system is organised
historically around more ideologically based parties. Although the UK has a range and
diversity of organisations of older people, they do not have the size and resources, even in
proportional terms to the American situation. Britain has a strong voluntary service sector,
and organisations for older people and charities are numerous and in some cases control
considerable resources. Campaigning and lobbying organisations of older people do not seem
to have the membership of influence of their US counterparts.
When we compare the UK, France, the Netherlands, and the US, the paradox then appears to
be that the fears (or at least the ideologically based expression of concern) come most
strongly from the United States the country which has the weakest welfare state but the most
politically effective organisations of older people. The different forms of welfare state within
Europe create a variety of citizenship interests in preservation of the welfare state. The
particular form of the welfare state creates distinctive mixes of interests and conflicts over
health care and pension provision in the different states. Thus powerful citizens lobbies
manifest in political parties, trade unions, churches and public opinion (not exclusively or
particularly older peoples organisations) provide an obstacle to the dismantling of the welfare
state. The interests of older people are fractionalised by the existence of welfare states, and
for this reason amongst others older peoples groups do not form cohesive alliances and
frequently fall out amongst themselves. The electoral success of pensioner parties depends on
constitutional regimes and the structure of politics. It takes forms of proportional
representation for older people’s parties to get elected and their success is based in other
resources than simply the appeal to older peoples’ material interests. The need in the United
States for older people to act collectively to try and secure for themselves health insurance,
cheap drugs, and a minimal safety net is precisely because of the paucity of the state
provision. Hence it is possible, in the US context, to portraying older people’s solidarity as
generational conflict. The different mixes of health, welfare, and pension provision in the UK,
Netherlands and France militate against collective action by older people and thus any illusion
of intergenerational conflict.
The pensioners’ movement does not see itself as girding up for intergenerational conflict. On
the contrary, a society in which age is less salient, particularly in determining access to work,
wealth and welfare, is seen as both desirable and feasible. The fewer younger people in our
society do not seem to become more valued because of their relative scarcity, and they have
ceased to participate in the conventional political process in large numbers. The old and
young do not get enough opportunities to work and the middle-aged work too much. If this
ageism in the organisation of work and the distribution of its benefits can be redressed, then
simplistic formulations of growing dependency ratios as a demographic time bomb will prove
to be groundless.
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Life’, Ageing and Society 17: 553-70.
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Hamilton Advertiser Thursday, 8 May 2003
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pampel, F. and Stryker, R.(1990) “Age Structure, the State and Social Welfare Spending”,
British Journal of Sociology, 41(1):16-24.
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Martin’s Press.
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London: HMSO.
Schuyt, Theo, Lucia Lameiro Garcia and Kees Knipscheer (1999) “The politics of old age in
the Netherlands” in Walker, A and G. Naegele (eds) The Politics of Old Age in Europe. Open
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Our questions were placed on MORI’s Omnibus, a nationally representative quota sample of 2,087
adults interviewed throughout Great Britain by MORI/Field & Tab across 151 constituency-based
sampling points. Interviews were carried out face to face using Computer Assisted Personal
Interviewing in respondents’ homes between 31 March and 3 April 2000. The data have been weighted
to reflect the national population profile.
i
There are three possible referents for the term ‘pensioners’ movement’. There is a restricted meaning
that limits the ‘pensioners’ movement’ to those organisations that are run by and for pensioners. There
is also a wider range of organisations including many charities and voluntary organisations that take an
interest in the well-being of older people that might also be included in the ‘pensioners’ movement’.
Finally, the term can also be used to refer to a social movement that reflects a set of values and
concerns – namely improved social conditions for older people – and is manifest amongst a wide range
of individuals as well as organisations.
ii
iii
There is also a very informative Website partially in English which provides an introduction to the
French pension system.
http://www.observatoire-retraites.org/versionanglaise/frenchsystem/Introduction.htm
iv
The decree itemising organisations entitled to representation on national and departmental
committee for the retired and old people provides evidence of fragmentation by the length and
specificity of the list:
La confédération nationale des retraités civils et militaires ;
La fédération générale des retraités civils et militaires ;
La fédération nationale des associations de retraités ;
La fédération nationale des clubs ruraux des aînés ;
L'union nationale des offices de personnes âgées ;
L'union nationale des retraités et personnes âgées ;
L'union française des retraités ;
L'union confédérale des retraités C.G.T. ;
L'union confédérale des retraités C.F.D.T. ;
La fédération F.O. des retraités et préretraités ;
L'union nationale des associations de retraités et pensionnés C.F.T.C. ;
L'union nationale pour la prévoyance sociale de l'encadrement C.G.C. ;
L'union nationale des indépendants retraités du commerce ;
La section nationale des anciens exploitants de la fédération nationale des syndicats
d'exploitants agricoles ;
La fédération nationale des associations de retraités de l'artisanat ;
La confédération nationale des retraités des professions libérales ;
La Confédération nationale des retraités civils et militaires ;
La Fédération générale des retraités civils et militaires ;
La Fédération nationale des clubs ruraux des aînés ;
La Fédération FO des retraités et préretraités,
sont remplacés respectivement par les noms :
La Confédération nationale des retraités ;
La Fédération générale des retraités de la fonction publique ;
La Fédération nationale des clubs d'aînés ruraux ;
L'Union confédérale des retraités FO.
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/SSHBFC.htm accessed 12 August 2003.
A further example at the Department level is provided by the list of organisations
invited to participate in planning the activities for the National Week of retired and
older people in the Department du Nord.
Association Jeunes Retraités
Centre d'Information et de Coordination de l'Action Sociale - CICAS Nord
Comité Départemental des Retraités et Personnes Agées - CODERPA
Conseil Général du Nord
Direction Départementale des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales - DDASS
Fédération des Clubs d'Aînés du Nord - FEDECRAN
Grandparenfant
Les Petits Frères des Pauvres
Mouvement Chrétien des Retraités
Union Nationale des Centres Communaux d'Action Sociale - UNCCAS
Union Régionale du Nord des Associations de Retraités - URNAR
Union Régionale Interfédérale des Organismes Privés Sanitaires et Sociaux – URIOPSS
http://uriopss-npdc.asso.fr/uriopss-nord/htm/semainebleue/composition_comite.htm accessed
15 August 2003.
v
Déclaration des organisations syndicales CFDT, CFTC, CGC, CGT, FO, FSU, UNSA.
Lundi 6 janvier 2003, l’ensemble des organisations syndicales, membres du
Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites, réunies en intersyndicale, ont défini les
principales lignes de force d’une démarche commune, afin d’aborder les
négociations à venir, relatives à nos systèmes de retraites.
C’est dans cet état d’esprit qu’elles ont décidé de présenter leurs propositions
communes pour consolider les systèmes de retraites des salariés des secteurs
publics et privés, face aux évolutions démographiques et à la baisse actuellement
programmée du niveau relatif des retraites pour les salariés du secteur privé, afin
de redonner confiance aux jeunes générations, dans la pérennité de la retraite par
répartition.
Il s’agit d’une première expression forte et unitaire.
Les syndicats CFDT, CFTC, CGC, CGT, FO, FSU, UNSA décident d’organiser
une journée nationale de manifestations décentralisées, régionales ou
départementales, le samedi 1er février 2003.
The AARP’s 2002 accounts state:
“Operating results generated a contribution to net assets of $14.9 million for calendar year
2002, partially recouping the board-approved deficit of $23.1 million in 2001.
Revenue Our total revenue in 2002 was $636 million, up 8% from 2001. Membership dues of
$186 million and royalties of $218 million continued to be the two largest sources of revenue
Expenses Our expenses totaled $621 million in 2002, an increase of 1% over 2001.”
Summary of 2002 Consolidated Financial Statements
vi