G. Peeters / Causal and Dispositional Inferences
CAUSAL OR DISPOSITIONAL INFERENCES FROM
VERBS/RELATIONS:
Overview of Some Published and Unpublished Material
Relevant for the Issue of Implicit Causality in Verbs
Guido Peeters
Catholic University of Leuven
Center for Social and Cultural Psychology (CSCP)
Technical Report
April 2010
Abstract. Some published and unpublished research from the CSCP (former LESP) that is
relevant for the understanding of implicit causality in verbs, is reviewed and discussed. The
reviewed research deals with the formation of impressions of personality on the basis of
information about interpersonal relations between the target persons of whom impressions are
formed. The obtained impressions often do not fit current theory and research on causality in
verbs. However, the outcomes from both research strands may be reconciled if it is assumed
that (a) both impressions of personality as well as causal inferences from verbs are consistent
with the covariation principle of attribution, and (b) perceived covariation is reversed when
verbs or interpersonal relations from which inferences are drawn, are embedded in a
cognitively inconsistent or "imbalanced" configuration of information.
Author' s address: C.S.C.P. Tiensestraat, 102, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium.
Email: guido.peeters@psy.kuleuven.be
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G. Peeters / Causal and Dispositional Inferences
CAUSAL OR DISPOSITIONAL INFERENCES FROM
VERBS/RELATIONS:
Overview of Some Published and Unpublished Material Relevant for
the Issue of Implicit Causality in Verbs
The aim of this paper is to compile some ideas and outcomes from my and my students'
research that may be relevant for an issue that commonly has been referred to as the issue of
causal inference from verbs. However, before going into the issue, some conceptual
ambiguity should be resolved. Ambiguity resides in the observation that the term "causal
inference" refers to a cognitive category, while the term "verb" refers to a linguistic category.
Hence, the expression "causal inferences from verbs" should be understood as "causal
inferences from cognitive contents designated by verbs." It follows that the relevant research
literature may not be limited to literature focussing on verbs. Any theory or research dealing
with causal inferences from perceptual or cognitive contents may be relevant, at least as far as
the perceptual or cognitive contents in question can be conceived as possible referents of
verbs. In this way some of my research on inferences from interpersonal relations may be
relevant. Indeed, as it has been observed by Chomsky (quoted by Bever, 1970), the noun-verb
distinction may reflect a universal distinction between entities and relations between the
entities as basic units of cognitive organization. Hence, in the following, the terms verb and
relation are used quasi interchangeably. Also the terms "subject" (agens or agent) and
"object" (patiens or patient) refer to a linguistic context. Considering that relations (verbs) can
be formalized as vectors with an origin and a terminal, the linguistic "subject" and "object"
correspond to cognitive entities associated with respectively the origin and the terminal of a
relation. Hence the terms "origin entity" and "terminal entity" in my papers on relational
information processing can be considered equivalent to "subject" and "object" respectively.
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§1. Some Serendipidity from Research on Personality Inferences
from Relations:
§1.1. Are trait inferences from verbs or relations "causal" by default?
Being intrigued by the impressive literature on the formation of full-fledged impressions of a
target person's personality on the basis minimal information about some personality traits
attributed to the target, I wondered if impressions of personality could not be formed as well
on the basis of information about interpersonal relations between the target persons. Thus, I
asked participants to form impressions of A and B who were presented in one condition as
two people who like each other, and in another condition as two people who dislike each other
(Peeters, 1976).
As mentioned, the main aim of the study (not relevant for present purposes) was to investigate
the formation of impressions of A and B's personalities on the basis of information about
liking/disliking relations between A and B. However, for the sake of generalizability several
additional manipulations (between participants) were involved; among which there was an
explicit causality manipulation involving two conditions:
- No explicit causality condition: "A and B like/dislike each other"
- Explicit causality condition: "A and B like/dislike each other "because of their characters"
The results showed a huge effect of the manipulation of the liking/disliking relations, but no
apparent effect of the explicit causality manipulation. This absence of any effect of explicit
causality suggests that trait inferences from like-dislike relations are implicitly handled as
causal inferences. Apparently trait inferences from verbs/relations are causal inferences by
default
§1.2 Content and direction (to subject or object) of inferences.
The next study on personality inferences from relations involved an extended and modified
replication of the previous study (Peeters, 1983). Again trait inferences were drawn from
affective relations between A and B, but no manipulation of explicit causality was involved.
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A complex design was used of which only four conditions are relevant to the present
purposes. These relevant conditions formed a 2 by 2 factorial design involving the following
factors:
2 (AB Relation: 'A likes B', 'A dislikes B') X 2 (BA Relation: 'B likes A', 'B dislikes A')
Notice that, in addition to the symmetric relationships used in the previous study, the present
design involved also asymmetric relationships (e.g., A liking B while B disliking A). The use
of asymmetric relationships enabled to distinguish between inferences to the subject (agent)
and inferences to the object (patient).
The results showed again strong relation effects, though not all of them being relevant to the
present purposes. In order to explain the relevant findings, we should first elaborate briefly on
the nature of the traits that were inferred. In the literature on social perception and cognition
two trait dimensions have been advanced in different research contexts and carrying different
labels (e.g., see Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008). In my research I have labelled them
OP or "Other Profitability": +OP (likeability, warmth, communion, social evaluation, etc.)
versus -OP (dislikeability etc.) on the one hand, and
SP or "Self Profitability": +SP (power, competence, agency, intellectual evaluation, etc.)
versus -SP (powerlessness etc.) on the other hand.
Notice that there is some semantic correspondence between OP value of traits and
interpersonal like/dislike relations. For instance, the verb "Liking" is clearly related to the
adjective "likeable" that belongs to the OP dimension. Hence, inferring OP saturated traits
from liking/disliking relations would be a case of what attribution theorists have called
"correspondent inferences" (Jones & Davis, 1965). A most obvious expectation was that
participants would draw correspondent inferences. For instance, one could expect that A and
B who like each other would be perceived as friendly, warm and likeable (+OP), and that A
and B who dislike each other would be perceived as unfriendly, cold, and dislikeable (-OP).
When A likes B while B dislikes A, one could expect that the likeability associated with
liking and the dislikeability associated with disliking would either cancel each other or show a
negativity effect resulting in -OP impressions of A and B. Alternatively, considering that
"liking" is a "state verb" (Semin & Fiedler, 1991)--even an "experiencer-stimulus" state verb
(Brown & Fish, 1983)--the literature on causal inferences from verbs would allow to expect
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correspondent inferences to the object (patient). It would make that if A likes B while B
dislikes A, B should be perceived as +OP (likeable) and A as -OP (dislikeable). However the
results showed a quite different and non-obvious pattern.
In spite of the fact that liking is a state verb, stronger inferences to the subject than to the
object (patient) were obtained. Moreover, inference contents differed between subject and
object:
- Correspondent OP (likeability, warmth, communion, social evaluation) was attributed to the
subject --as if the liker of an "other" would be likeable, and the disliker of an "other" would be
dislikeable.
- Non-correspondent SP (power, competence, agency, intellectual evaluation) was attributed
to the object--as if the liked target is powerless and the disliked target is powerful
Conclusion: OP seems associated with the origin (source, subject), SP with the terminal
(target, object) of affective relations (liking/disliking, solidarity relations, communal
relations, etc.). These associations are non-obvious. One could wonder why. A reasonable
explanation may be that in real life the difference between origin (subject) and terminal
(object) inferences is masked because affective relations are expected to be symmetric
(reciprocal) --cf. Brown (1965). Only when participants were forced to draw inferences from
asymmetric affective relationships, the given pattern of differential associations of OP and SP
with subject and object was revealed.
§1.3. Parenthesis on a replication study highlighting roles of grammatical and
logical subject
A largely extended and modified replication of the study discussed in §1.2. (Peeters 1983)
was run by Peeters & Wyer (1985). The aim was to investigate whether a particular cognitive
bias (obtained by Peeters, 1983) could be overcome by priming. This aim was not relevant to
the present purposes. Let it just be mentioned that the expected priming effect was not
obtained because participants managed to interpret even the primes in the given biased way.
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A relevant outcome was that, as far as a comparison was possible, the new data were, in
general, compatible with the former data from Peeters (1983). There was, however, a most
interesting exception that may shed light on the relevance of the distinction between
grammatical and cognitive roles associated with the sentence subject. In the sentence "A helps
B", A functions as a grammatical subject and also as a cognitive "origin entity" associated
with the origin of the "helping" relation from A to B. In the sentence "B is helped by A", it is
no longer A, but B, that functions as the grammatical subject. However, on the cognitive
level, A still functions as the origin entity associated with the origin of the "helping" relation
from A to B. In Peeters & Wyer (1985) the latter cognitive function of A was termed "logical
subject." Thus in the active sentence "A helps B" both the grammatical and the logical subject
coincide in A, but in the passive sentence "B is helped by A", grammatical and logical subject
are separated, B being the grammatical and A the logical subject. Evidence was obtained that
participants tended to distribute inferences across the grammatical and the logical subject.
Thus the sentence "A helps B" triggered attributions to A, and the sentence "B is helped by A"
triggered attributions to both A (logical subject) and B (grammatical subject). Unfortunately
the study did not focus on the nature or content of the attributions. Participants were not asked
to produce personality descriptions of A and B. So we have only a suggestive outcome that
may deserve attention, but it is not further dealt with in the following paragraphs. Let it just be
mentioned that also in the literature on causality in verbs, the possible impact of active versus
passive form has been considered (e.g., the salience hypothesis of Kasof & Lee discussed by
Rudolph & Försterling, 1997), but, according to Rudolph & Försterling (1997) that impact
would be very limited.
§1.4 Conclusions from Serendipity
Trait inferences from verbs/relations may be causal inferences by default. Correspondent
"OP" trait inferences from liking versus disliking relations seem predominantly subject
inferences rather than object inferences. The object inferences seem less prominent and
belonging to a non-correspondent "SP" dimension.
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§2. Validation and Extension of the Serendipitous Findings
In the following a series of experiments are summarized from a thesis by Demol (1999). The
aim was to check the validity of the 1983 findings by having more verbs than just liking and
disliking as stimuli. Analogously to the OP and SP classes of traits, two classes of
verbs/relations were used:
(1) Affective relations (e.g., liking-disliking) that are correspondent to OP. They correspond
to the class of "solidarity relations" (Brown, 1965) that tend to be perceived as symmetric (or
reciprocal: if A likes B, perceivers assume that B likes A)
(2) Status relations (e.g., influencing, hierarchical relations, power relations, dominance,
etc.) that are correspondent to SP. Brown (1965) has reviewed evidence that status relations
tend to be perceived as asymmetric (if A influences B, perceivers assume that B doesn't
influence A).
As extensive descriptions of the experiments are available in Demol (1999), only schematic
outlines of hypotheses and outcomes are reported, but a substantial general discussion is
added..
In the presentation, I use concepts and terminology from the revised ASD (Action State
Differentiation) model, which is an extension of Brown & Fish's (1983) model by Rudolph &
Försterling (1997). The model involves the following distinction between verbs (based on
semantic roles).
- ES (Experiencer Stimulus) verbs that correspond to the State Verbs (SV) of the LCM
(Linguistic Category Model) of Semin & Fiedler (1991; see also Semin & Marsman, 1994);
e.g.: A (experiencer) likes B (stimulus).
- SE (Stimulus Experiencer) verbs that correspond to the State Action Verbs (SAV) of the
LCM. E.g.: A (stimulus) impresses object B (experiencer)
- AP (Agent Patient) verbs, e.g.: A (agent) kicks B (patient), A (agent) helps B (patient).
- AE (Agent Evocator) verbs, e.g.: A (agent) punishes B (evocator of the punishment).
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Notice that AP verbs and AE verbs are Action Verbs. Action Verbs (AV) are also dealt with in
the LCM model that distinguishes between Interpretative Action Verbs (IAV, e.g.: A helps B)
and Descriptive Action Verbs (DAV, e.g.: A kicks B).
§2.1. Experiment 1: Extended and modified replication of Peeters (1983)
Hypotheses (H):
1 - H(ypothesis) 1: Peeters (1983) will be replicated for affective relations
=> (H1a) correspondent OP attributed to origin (logical subject)
=> (H1b) correspondent SP attributed to terminal (logical object)
2 - H(ypothesis) 2: Reverse outcomes are expected for status relations
=> (H2a) correspondent SP attributed to origin (logical subject),
=> (H2b) correspondent OP attributed to terminal (logicalobject)
Rationale: A influencing B implies sufficient power (SP) in A to influence B
(=H2a), and/or leniency in B making B willing to comply with another's requests
(=H2b)
Results:
- Hypotheses confirmed
- Additional findings (= referred to as new future hypotheses H3 and H4)
=> (H3) Correspondent OP also attributed to object of affective/solidarity verb (If A
(dis)likes B, correspondent likeableness not only attributed to A but also to B)
=> (H4) Reverse SP also attributed to object of status verb (If A influences B, then low
power attributed to B--may be due to the fact that in the instructions to the
participants, the influence relation was formulated using passive form: "B does
what A wants")
§2.2. Experiments 2-5: Partial and modified replications of experiment 1
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Experiments 2-5 are in point of fact secondary analyses of partial data from another study
(Peeters, 2005) on effects of symmetry and asymmetry of relations--not at stake in the present
presentation.
§2.2.1 Experiment 2.
Verbs (relations) used:
- likes/dislikes (vindt sympathiek/heeft hekel aan)
Nature of the verbs (relations) according to the literature:
- Solidarity relation (Brown, 1965) -- tends towards symmetry (implies that correspondent
subject attributions and correspondent object attributions are similar)
- State verb of the ES (experiencer-stimulus) type with implicit causality in the object
(according to Rudolph & Försterling, 1997). This causality is in line with H1b and/or H3, but
not with H1a. And so neither with Peeters (1983) nor with part of the above Experiment 1.
Results
=> (H1a) CONFIRMED correspondent OP attributed to origin (subject)
=> (H1b) CONFIRMED BUT NOT SIGN.. correspondent SP attributed to terminal (object)
=> (H3) CONFIRMED Correspondent OP also attributed to object of affective/solidarity
verb (If A (dis)likes B, correspondent likeableness not only attributed to A but also to B)
The confirmation of H3 fits Rudolph & Försterling. However the confirmation of H1a and the
lack of significant evidence for H1b do not so; they suggest a subject inference bias..
§2.2.2 Experiment 3
Verbs (relations) used:
- encourage/discourage (bemoedigen/ontmoedigen)
Nature of the verb (relation) according to the literature:
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- Solidarity relation (Brown, 1965) -- tends towards symmetry (implies that correspondent
subject attributions and correspondent object attributions are similar)
- State verb of the SE (stimulus-experiencer) type with implicit causality in the subject
(according to Rudolph & Försterling, 1997). This is in line with H1a but not with H1b and
H3..
Results
=> (H1a) CONFIRMED correspondent OP associated with origin (subject)
=> (H1b) NOT CONFIRMED SP not significantly attributed to terminal (object)
=> (H3) NOT CONFIRMED No evidence of correspondent OP attributed to object of the
given affective/solidarity verb (If A (dis/en)courages B, no significant effect on
likeableness attributed to B)
The confirmation of H1a and disconfirmation of H1b and H3 fits Rudolph & Försterling.
§2.2.3 Experiment 4
Verbs (relations) used:
- logical object has/hasn't him- or herself influenced by the logical subject (Object laat zich/
laat zich niet beinvloeden door subject-- Note that the logical object is the grammatical
subject and presented as the experiencer, the logical subject or grammatical object being the
stimulus that causes the experience )
Nature of the verb (relation) according to the literature:
- Status relation (Brown, 1965) -- tends towards asymmetry (implies that correspondent
subject attributions and correspondent object attributions are mutually opposed, e.g. if the one
is powerful and dominant, the other may be weak and submissive. In order to remind that, we
use the term "correspondent reverse attributions")
- It is not immediately clear how Rudolph and Försterling (1997) would categorize this verb.
At a first glance one might consider that the verb is a state verb of the ES (experiencerstimulus) type with implicit causality in the (grammatical) object (Rudolph & Försterling,
1997). However, the grammatical object is the logical subject, and the grammatical subject is
the logical object, which would mean that the verb would be of the SE type. Assuming that
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Rudolph & Försterling's expectation deals with subject and object as semantic roles, and that
semantic roles reflect logical rather than grammatical functions, we assume that Rudolph &
Försterling would expect confirmation of H2a but not of H2b and H4.
Results
=> (H2a) CONFIRMED correspondent SP attributed to origin (logical subject though
grammatical object)
=> (H2b CONFIRMED correspondent OP attributed to terminal (logical object though
grammatical subject)
=> (H4) CONFIRMED correspondent reverse SP attributed to terminal (logical object
though grammatical subject)
The confirmation of H2a (grammatical object inference) fits Rudolph & Försterling, but the
confirmation of H2b and H4 does not so.
§2.2.4 Experiment 5
Verbs (relations):
- subject does/doesn't exert influence on object (heeft invloed op/heeft geen invloed op-assumed to be status verbs with implicit causality in the subject)
Nature of the verb (relation) according to the literature:
- Status relation (Brown, 1965) -- tends towards asymmetry (implies that correspondent
subject attributions and correspondent object attributions are mutually opposed. In order to
remind that, we use the term "correspondent reverse attributions")
- State verb of the SE (stimulus-experiencer) type with implicit causality in the (grammatical
and logical) subject (Rudolph & Försterling, 1997). This is in line with H2a but not with H2b
and H4.
Results
=> (H2a) CONFIRMED correspondent SP attributed to origin (subject)
=> (H2b CONFIRMED correspondent OP attributed to terminal (object)
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=> (H4) CONFIRMED correspondent reverse SP attributed to terminal (object)
The confirmation of H2a (grammatical object inference) fits Rudolph & Försterling, but the
confirmation of H2b and H4 does not so.
§3. General Discussion
Semin & Marsman (1994) proposed two independent types of causality implicit in
interpersonal verbs: event instigation and dispositional inference, dispositional inferences
being specified as inferences about personality. The research reviewed in this paper concerns
trait inferences from verbs, which means: dispositional inferences rather than event
instigation. In agreement with Semin & Marsman's studies, we found huge evidence of
subject inferences, and less compelling (more variable) evidence of object inferences, which
argues for a subject inference bias of dispositional inferences. Indeed, the reviewed evidence
is in line with a strong subject inference bias for trait attributions, though also object
inferences of traits were observed, but they were more variable and less consistent across
studies.
§3.1. The subject inference bias of dispositional inferences
Rudolph & Försterling (1997) ignored the subject inference bias of dispositional or
personality inferences. A bias is a constant, and Rudolph & Försterling considered causal and
dispositional inferences only as far as they vary as a function of variables such as verb types,
acitve/passive voice, sentence context, subject/object reference of adjectives derived from the
verbs, etc. They concluded that variation of implicit causality, including dispositional
inferences as far as they varied, could be accounted for by Kelley's (1967) covariation model.
Perceived or assumed covariation between verb and subject involves subject inferences, and
percieved or assumed covariation between verb and object involves object inferences.
However, they ignored the constant subject inference bias of dispositional (personality)
inferences superimposed to the condition-bound variations of subject- and object inferences.
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The reasons why Rudolph & Försterling (1997) ignored the subject inference bias of
dispositional inferences may be twofold. First, they were primarily interested in effects of
conditions and may have considered a systematic bias as irrelevant. Second, only one study
(Semin & Marsman, 1995, Study 2) out of 36 reviewed studies was specified as a study
involving "dispositional inference" as a dependent variable. Hence the bias might be disposed
of as a chance effect.
However, the subject inference bias of dispositional inferences cannot be disposed of as a
chance effect because it has shown up in studies on the formation of impressions of
personalities of targets as a function of information about interpersonal relations between the
targets. For instance, as reported above, Peeters (1983) obtained personality impressions
formed of targets A and B on the basis of interpersonal liking and disliking relations between
A and B. Liking and disliking are state verbs with the subject in the role of experiencer and
the object in the role of stimulus (ES verbs of Brown & Fish, 1983 and Rudolph &
Försterling, 1997). Hence, if asked why "A likes B" respondents may answer "B because B is
likeable." However when participants were asked to attribute traits to A and B, they tended to
attribute likeable traits to A rather than to B, and, to a lesser extent, power-related traits to B-as if participants considered that "power rather than leniency is attractive."
In order to explain the discrepancy of dispositional inference data with current theory and
research on causality in verbs, one might consider that dispositional trait inferences should not
be dealt with as causal inferences. However this explanation seems contradicted by the
observation that no difference was obtained between a condition where perceivers where
informed that given interpersonal liking and disliking relations were caused by the traits they
had to infer and a control condition without any suggestion about the causal role of the traits
(Peeters, 1976--see §1.1 above)). A weaker version of this explanation may build on Semin &
Marsman (1995) who dealt with dispositional or "personality" inferences as a separate class of
causal inferences, to be distinguished from other causal inferences called "event instigation."
A main difference between both classes of inferences seems to be that the dispositional
inferences involve a huge subject inference bias. However, this bias contradicts other causal
inference rules as well as common sense--provided that A says that B is likeable, it seems not
evident to infer that A rather than B is likeable. Hence it requires an explanation.
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Peeters (1983) explained the surprising character of the obtained subject inference bias in that
subject inferences were misinterpreted as object inferences because perceivers go beyond the
information given in a way as to confound subject and object roles. For instance,
liking/disliking relations tend to be perceived as reciprocal. If A likes B, perceivers assume
that B likes A in turn. Thus, if likeable traits are attributed to B, it may be because B is the
subject in assumed "B likes A", and not at all because B is the object of A's liking.
Consistently Peeters (1983) found that if "A likes B", likeable traits are attributed to B only if
B likes A in turn. The present explanation may account fairly well for the surprising character
of particular manifestations of the apparent subject inference bias of dispositional inferences.
However it does not yet account for the apparent subject inference bias itself.
§3.2 Towards an explanation: The role of cognitive imbalance and the
covariation principle
In an impressive review and reanalysis of the extant literature, Rudolph & Försterling (1997)
demonstrated quite convincingly that causality implicit in verbs varied consistent with the
basic attribution mechanism of perceived covariation, particularly covariation with low vs.
high consensus and covariation with high vs. low distinctiveness (Kelley, 1967; see Rudolph
& Försterling's article for a suited explanation). As mentioned yet, Rudolph & Försterling
ignored the subject inference bias of dispositional inferences. However, in the following, I
will demonstrate that the covariation principle may account for dispositional inferences
included the ones attributed to a subject inference bias. Therefore we proceed from more
recent work of Rudolph on implicit verb causality, particularly on the role of imbalance repair
(Rudolph & von Hecker, 2006).
Cognitive balance theory (Heider, 1958) was a pioneering elaboration of the cognitive
consistency concept that dominated social psychology during the sixties of the 20th century.
Hence in Rudolph & Hecker's article the term "balance" refers to the basic concept of
cognitive consistency rather than to the specific elaboration of cognitive consistency that has
become associated with the label "balance theory." Humans tend towards cognitive balance,
which implies that they tend also to "repair" imbalance. Proceeding from Brown & Van
Kleeck (1989), who advanced "imbalance repair" as an explanatory principle, Rudolph & von
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Hecker (2006) investigated the role of imbalance repair in causality implicit in verbs.
Specifically, they investigated whether imbalance repair of unbalanced cause-effect
relationships would affect perceived covariation and hence perceived causality. For instance,
"A likes B" implies perceived causality in B. Consistently it has been found that the ES verb
"likes" is characterized by high perceived consensus (many people are expected to like B) and
high distinctiveness (B is one of few people liked by A). The balance concept implies that the
cause is evaluatively correspondent with the verb. E.g.: A may be expected to like B because
B is nice. "A liking B because B is arrogant" would be an imbalanced statement because the
valence of the cause is inconsistent with that of the verb. In this case, balance repair is
achieved by a reversal of perceived covariation: few people like arrogant guys (low
consensus) and A seems someone who likes arrogant people in general (low distinctiveness).
Consistently causality is situated in A (A has unusual tastes and preferences that make him
feeling attracted to arrogant people).
The effect of imbalance repair Rudolph & von Hecker observed for cause-effect unbalance,
may extend to other forms of imbalance as well. The designs used in the reviewed
experiments that yielded the apparent subject inference bias of dispositional inferences all
involved both balanced and imbalinced conditions. However the imbalance did not concern
unbalanced cause-effect relationships but the violation of expectations about the going
together of particular interpersonal relationships. In the following we shall have a look at the
relations (verbs) used in the various experiment reviewed in this paper.
As it was explained above, the verbs used represented two classes of interpersonal relations
according to Brown (1965): solidarity relations (tending to be perceived as symmetric) and
status relations (tending to be perceived as asymmetric).
(1) Solidarity relations
Solidarity relations tend to be perceived as symmetric (if A likes B, perceivers expect that B
likes A); hence asymmetric solidarity relations (A likes B but B dislikes A) are cognitively
inconsistent of "unbalanced." The designs used in the reviewed experiments involved both
symmetric (balanced) and asymmetric (unbalanced) relationships And as it was mentioned
yet, unexpected outcomes such as the apparent subject inference bias were owed to the
unbalanced conditions. Hence we shall have a closer look at possible perceived covariations
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of unbalanced liking relations as a case in point of unbalanced solidarity relations in general
and consider the related causal attributions.
Given that A likes B while B dislikes A, one may expect low consensus and high
distinctiveness:
(a) Low consensus. Perceivers would not expect that people would like someone by whom
they are disliked. So there must be something special to A. For instance, A may be an
extremely nice "+OP" person, which fits H1a. In addition, People do not expect that people
would dislike someone who likes them. So there must be something special to B too. For
instance B may be an extremely nasty "-OP" person, which also fits hypothesis H1a.
(b) High distinctiveness. Perceivers would not expect that A is a masochist who likes
everyone by whom he is disliked. Thus B may be an exception that has properties that make
him attractive to A in spite of his rejection of A. We may exclude OP or likeability from those
properties, because the low consensus suggests that B is rather -OP or dislikeable, and A may
not like B because B is dislikeable. So B must have other attractive properties, and,
considering that power attracts (power is sexy), an obvious candidate is +SP, which fits
hypothesis H1b. By an analogous rationale we may attribute -SP to A: B is not expected to
dislike others by whom he's liked, but A is an exception because A is a weakling, and also
that rationale fits hypothesis H1b. Nevertheless, it may happen sometimes that perceivers
ignore the above "low consensus" implications, which leaves room for correspondent OP
attributions to the object (hypothesis H3) that sporadically were observed.
(2) Status Relations
Status relations tend to be perceived as asymmetric (if A influences B, perceivers expect that
B does not influence A); hence symmetric status relations are cognitively inconsistent or
"unbalanced." In the following we have a closer look at possible covariations (and related
causality) of unbalanced influencing relations as a case in point of status relations in general
Given that A influences B while also B influences A in turn, one may expect low consensus
and high distinctiveness:
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(a) Low consensus. Perceivers may expect that only few people are able to exert influence on
someone by whom they are influenced themselves. Hence A must be extremely influential,
and so must be B, because both are able to influence an influential other. Being influential
means having power, which means: +SP, and this fits hypothesis H2a.
(b) High distinctiveness. Perceivers may not expect that highly influential people give in to
the influence of another person. Hence A and B's willingness to accept another's influence
implies a special attribute. One possibility might be that A and B are weaklings, which
actually happened to the extent that hypothesis H4 was confirmed. However, that possibility
can be ruled out by the above implications of the low consensus rule. Hence an alternative
explanation may be that A and B are open-minded and benevolent "+OP" persons who are
prepared to meet other people's wishes, and this fits hypothesis H2b.
We may conclude that imbalance repair and covariation principles may provide an avenue
towards the explanation of some intriguing findings, particularly the apparent subject
inference bias of dispositional inferences. However, this conclusion raises a problem that may
not bother the present scientific community, but that bothers me. Namely, the conclusion
seems incompatible with some of my earlier work on cognitive programs. In the study that
serendipitously revealed the subject inference bias of dispositional inferences (Peeters, 1983),
I demonstrated that inferences can be drawn from relations consistent with two independent
cognitive programs called the Self-Other (SO) Program and the Third Person (3P) Program
(for a review about cognitive SO and 3P programs, see Peeters, 2004). Personality inferences
were found to be drawn exclusively consistent with the SO program. This means that in order
to draw inferences from relations between A and B, perceivers conceive of the relations as
relations between self and other. For instance, given the relation "A helps B out of a
problem", perceivers may infer that A is generous only if they take into account that A is
helping an "other" person. No generosity would be inferred if A would be helping out himself.
Inferences drawn consistent with the 3P program do not rely on the self-other distinction. For
instance, imagine that the problem of which A helps B out is a mathematical problem.
Perceivers may attribute mathematical competence to A irrespective of whether A is helping
out another person or himself.
The connection of personality inferences with the SO program has consequences for the
Correspondent Inference theory of causal attribution (Jones & Davis, 1965). Specifically,
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Jones and Davis seem to have conceived their theory consistent with the SO program,
whereby they may have sticked to the "other" part of the program, which means: to relations
with the "other." For instance, associating helping with generosity, classic correspondent
inference theory assumes implicitly that "helping" is conceived as "helping others" rather than
as "helping oneself out." In this way, correspondent inference theory may be improved by
fully taking into account the implications of the SO program.
Considering that correspondent inference theory is an attribution theory shaped consistent
with the SO program, it has been advanced that the covariation principle would be its 3P
shaped counterpart. Particularly Kelley's ANOVA model of causal attribution would be
shaped consistent with the 3P program (Peeters & Hendricks, 2002). However, this division is
challenged by the present role assigned to the covariation principle in the explanation of
dispositional "personality" inferences. Apparently covariation is relevant to inferences
consistent with the SO program as well. However, it is to be taken into account that within the
scope of the SO program variation is limited to only two alternative entities: self and other.
For instances, "helping out" varies only between "helping out the self" and "helping out the
other." OP dispositions (generosity etc.) are bound to "helping out the other" and SP
dispositions (self-confidence etc.) to helping out the self. Any other possible variation, such as
about the nature of the problem (mathematical, technical, social, etc.) of which the self or the
other is helped out, involves the 3P-program.
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