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Rádl and hermeneutics
[An historian] might give us the detailed ancestry of an Alexander the Great, a
Caesar … and hold that he had fulfilled his function as an historian by making such
an ancestral portrait gallery more complete. But this is not the method of the
historian. He describes his heroes as the originators, the protagonists or antagonists
of ideas which have dominated the mankind. The world of living organisms seems
likewise to be dominated by ideas.1
We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the
claim that truth is out there. […] Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist
independently of the human minds – because sentences cannot so exist, or be out
there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions
of the world can be true or false. The world on its own – unaided by the describing
activities of human beings – cannot. […] But if one clings to the notion of selfsubsistent facts, it is easy to start capitalizing the word “truth” and treating it as
something identical either with God or with the world as God’s project. Then one will
say, for example, that Truth is great, and will prevail.2
Emanuel Rádl – a biologist, historian and philosopher in one person – provides an excellent resource
for a researcher who seeks for the roots of the 20th-century biology. His History of biological theories3
is perhaps a founding treatise marking the appearance of a new genre of writing about the history of
science. It provides a testimony about the turmoil in biology of the time and outlines potential
pathways which were, in the future, rejected, neglected, or simply suffered in the shadow of the
winning neo-Darwinian synthesis. Even after a century, it remains an invaluable source of
information, and its standard matches such contemporary science history writers, like S.J. Gould or
J. Sapp.4
My goal, in this paper, is to reconstruct, Rádl’s his biological worldview from above-mentioned and
also later works. In doing so, I tried to take into account the multi-faceted personality of Rádl,:

At the turn of century, Rádl was already a successful and well-established experimental
biologist (physiology). As a matter of course, he respected the contemporary canon of
science, with its implicit prerequisite of immutable and knowable natural laws which are
independent on the investigator as well as object investigated.

As a biologist, he ought to recognize, however, the limits of objective science, which took for
granted that the properties of the word could be derived from the study of lifeless objects of
1
Rádl, E. (1930) History of biological theories. London: Oxford UP, vii
Rorty, R. (1989): Contingency, irony, solidarity. Cambridge UP, 4-5.
3
The two-volume German version Geschichte der biologischen Theorien (1907, 1909) is the original text,
translations into Czech (1909) and English (1930) appeared quite drastically abridged into a single volume
starting, respectively, only with Lamarck and Darwin. The topic of the present paper treats, however, topics
treated in all three versions. Especially the author’s preface to the English edition is very highly illustrative as
concerns later development of his views. Where the English translation corresponds to the German original, I
quote from this translation; otherwise I provide bilinguas where the English translation is mine. In-text
references will be abbreviated as Geschichte, Dějiny, or History.
4
Gould, S.J. (2002) Structure of scientific theories. Belknap Press. See also essays in natural history by the same
author; Sapp, J. (1990): Where The Truth Lies. Franz Moewus and the Origins of Molecular Biology. New York:
Cambridge UP; (1994) Evolution by Association. A History of Symbiosis. New York: Oxford UP.
2
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physics. Leading personality in this respect was the vitalist H. Driesch,5 who coined the idea
of a set of laws specific to the realm of the living. In contrast to the previous point of view, he
opposed reductionism going up to the level of physical laws, and acknowledged the
autonomy of the life processes. Drieschian vitalism, however, never doubted the existence of
timeless and immutable natural laws. It recognized laws specific for the living, but living
beings were – as in case of “objectivist” science – pushed and pulled by forces, and according
to rules, external to them. “Lawful behavior” was the catchword of this branch of German
biology. This is why they couldn’t accept Darwinian evolution with is basic axiom of random
modifications in any possible direction. The only imaginable evolutionary process was that
proceeding according to pre-existing rules. Therefore orthogenesis (Eimer6) or what would
today be called organicism, or biological structuralism (Driesch). The world ought to be
lawful, to avoid total chaos.

Rádl was, however, also a historian who stood in a strong opposition to romantic and
positivist views regarding history also a mere effect of “push and pull” rules, and who instead
sought his inspiration in F. Nietzsche and T.G. Masaryk. He always stressed that a historian
should be able of a deep empathy, to bring fore not only rough facts extirpated from
chronicles and artifacts, but the real “spirit” of the time studied. This is well apparent in the
History of biological theories, and even more in his historical works and quarrels he went
through in decades that followed.7 Did Rádl, then, project his experience as an historian, also
into his understanding of the living?

Last but not least, Rádl was also a distinguished philosopher. During his whole life he was
obsessed by seeking truth, absolute, eternal, single Truth that keeps us, as well as the world,
in Her possession. Truth, which is not relative historically, culturally, etc. (see, e.g. his
polemics with the pragmatism8). Truth accessible from whatever starting position we begin
our life-path. It is not so that we actually have the same truth: each person’s way of grasping
is a result of her life-long personal effort. We participate on that Truth – we do not owe it! It
follows that Rádl believed in the purpose in the world. Nature can be apprehended by a
scholar only from a viewpoint that there is a higher-order law which reigns,9 and through a
deep empathy she gained by a concentrated cognitive effort – both scientific and personal.
Science, then, is a tool how to reveal that order in Nature, through a personal effort,
5
Driesch, H. (1914) The History and Theory of Vitalism. (London: Macmillan & Co.); (1929) The Science and
Philosophy of the Organism. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the
6
Eimer, G.H.T. (1897) Orthogenesis der Schmetterlinge. Leipzig: Engelmann. In context of this paper se
especially the foreword
7
For this part of Rádl’s activities, see Hermann, T.(2002) Emanuel Rádl a české dějepisectví [ER and the Czech
historiography] Praha: Charles University; see also Hermann‘s paper in this volume.
8
For his polemics with pragmatism, see his 1926 book Moderní věda [Modern science]; Praha: Čin, 30-31.
9
See, e.g. Patočka, J. (1990, written in 1948) Český humanismus...[The Czech humanism...] Proměny 27/2,
1990, 3-8;.
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engagement of a scientist. Some elements of this teaching as if were marking the advent of
T.S. Kuhn…
My goal is to conciliate the dialectics of this four facets of Rádl’s personality, to bring forth a picture
of his views concerning living beings. I shall claim my playground as a triangle, and try to localize
Rádl’s position within its area:10
Objectivism
Structuralism
▼
Creative
evolution
My rough fore-understanding of the topic is as follows: Development of biology during last 200 years
can be traced as a constant oscillation between the two top vortices, objectivist or “function first
”view, and structuralist, or “morphology first” one. Both approaches differ in proposed causes driving
evolution of the living: the first will recognize the primary formative forces of the living in the cues
originating in the environment. The second approach will stress the role of causes internal (nisus
formativus, entelechy, organization, structure). What is, however, common for both these stances, is
the essentially passive role of living beings – their shapes and behavior are molded exclusively by
forces that are external as to their being as living, i.e. it does not really matter whether their action
comes from the environment, or from within. Eternal, timeless laws reign absolutely in the realm of the
living, and life has no choice but to obey. Of course, after the advent of evolutionary theories, it could
not be further denied that evolution has also its historical dimension, but this history was regarded
either as law-ruled process (orthogenesis), or simply pell-mell accumulation of randomly acquired
traits. Evolution in a sense of creation of something new, of negotiation of rules new in the universe
(the third vortex), was seemingly unthinkable in experimental science of the time.
Of course, the third view that would see life as something that governs itself, invents novelties,
changes the universe by its very being, of course also existed in Rádl’s time. Scholars like H. Bergson
or C.S. Peirce, just to mention two contemporaries of Rádl, always stressed the creative aspects of the
living, but with almost no response from the sciences.
My own position in the field is near the geometrical center of the triangle, biased somewhat towards
the lower vertex. I recognize the hermeneutical nature of the living, with endless negotiation of what-
The names given the vortices may seem improper; I’d better to epitomize them with names of Rádl’s
contemporaries holding such views. For “O” I could substitute names like H. Helmholtz, H. Poincaré and even
Darwin, for “S” H. Driesch, Geoffroy St. Hillaire or Th. Eimer, and for “C” H. Bergson or C.S. Peirce. I do not
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should-be-done, with creativity laying down new pathways into worlds unknown and even not having
existed even as a potency before the very act of the laydown. At the same time, structural and
functional laws and rules symbolized by two other corners play their role as well; in the long run,
however, also these laws are not simply octroied by the external world, but negotiated by livingbeings-within-the-world. (After all, this is the original meaning of the concept “law”.11) Natural
language might be the best analogy of how I perceive the doings of the living embedded in the
world.12 I am sympathetic with the recent development in “biosemiotics”13 and “general biology”.14 I
was wondering whether or how Rádl would fit into this schema.
What, then, is Rádl’s position, with his experience in biology, history, and philosophy? Apparently, he
does not like both materialists and idealists; neither has he understanding towards structuralist
pedantery or to mechanicism; and he does not stick to pragmatism, either. Materialists and idealists
alike seem to consider that Nature is identical with our picture of Nature; the former declare that it is
Nature which is real, the latter that it is our picture which is real.15 Does he, then, allow life to possess
autonomy, or even the leading role in enacting, in ruling over world’s affairs? I thing the answer is No.
My reading reveals to me Rádl as a personality obsessed by seeking Truth, absolute, eternal (see
above), by all means available to the intellect. Nature can be apprehended only from a viewpoint that
there is a higher-order law which reigns.16 Science, then, is one of tools how to reveal that order. In
Modern science we can even read a paean praising the supremacy of scientific knowledge:
Všechen náš život má býti uvědomělý a tedy All our lives should be conscious, i.e. rooted in
založen na poznané pravdě; pravdu vyhledává a the truth experienced. Science is seeking for and
podává věda, věda tedy má býti vládcem v životě
administering the truth – therefore science should
soukromém i veřejném. Lidé, bohužel, jen become the sovereign in our lives, private or
pomalu a neradi uznávají tuto svrchovanost vědy. public.
People,
[…] Jednou [lidé] jistě také uznají, že i politika supremacy
of
regrettably,
science
only
recognize
the
slowly
and
má býti založena na vědě, a že dnešní její stav grudgingly. […] Sure by one day they will admit
use “vitalism”, because I consider the teachings of H. Driesch and H. Bergson – both labeled by tradition as
“vitalism” – incompatible.
11
See the famous letter of Lady Welby to C.S. Peirce, where she says: Among the many defeating absurdities of
current imagery perhaps that of “laws of nature” is one of the worst. One would really think some-times that
nature had primordially summoned councils and decreed laws, or even brought in a bill in some National
Assembly, discusses it, passed it, clause by clause, carefully defining its regulations and penalties! And one
would think that nature’s lawyers and judges expounded or laid down her laws and enforced her decrees,
imposing the statutory penalties for their infringement. For, of course, we are supposed to “break” nature’s
laws – though the idea is [...] grotesque. Welby V.L. 1985 [1911] Significs and language. Amsterdam: John
Benjamins)
12
For more details, see Markoš, A. (2002) Readers of the book of life. New York: Oxford UP.
13
Hoffmeyer.J (1997: Signs so meaning in the Universe. Indiana UP.
14
Kauffman, S.A. (1993). The Origins of Order. Self-organization and Selection in Evolution. New York:
Oxford UP; (2000). Investigations New York: Oxford UP.
15
History…395; the passage is present also in Geschichte…575
16
Patočka, op. cit.
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[…] jest stejně zastaralý jako mastičkářství that even politics should be based on science, and
v medicině.17
that its contemporary state […] is as oldfashioned as is charlatanry in medicine.
If we go through Rádl's writings, we find that he is quite consistent in his views, for decades. He was
always ready to stress that the eternal truth or idea sticks in the background of all kinds of beings, and
history is no exception:
Das Christentum, das Klosterwesen, […], die Christianity,
monastic
life,
[…],
science,
Wissenschaft, der Darwinismus bedeutet doch Darwinism represent something real, they are
etwas Reales; sie sind mehr als ein Aggregat, es
more than a sum of their parts, there is an idea
steckt eine Idee darin. Die Weltgeschichte […] within. The world history […] may not reveal
braucht keine Idee darzustellen, in ihr gab und any idea, but it did and does contain ideas. The
gibt es aber Ideen. Der Geschichtsschreiber hat task of an historian is the same as the task of any
dieselbe Aufgabe, wie jeder andere Forscher: other scholar: to discover […] such ideas and to
[…] die Ideen […] zu entdecken, nach ihren describe them according to their properties.
Eigenschaften zu beschreiben.18
From the context, of course, it comes out that such quotations are not speaking in favor of some
scientistic views seeking to comprime all knowledge to the single point “O” in our triangle. His
“science” can encompass, I believe, all forms of critical scholarship.
Even then, Rádl’s position on our hypothetical triangle is safely on a connecting line between the
“functionalist” and “structuralist” vertices, with no understanding to contingency, randomness, free
will, historicity of and within the world. Following quotation is from Rádl’s characterization of the
rational morphology from the beginning of 19th century; I feel, however, that it can stay as a gist of his
own beliefs, too:
Ideálem vědy by bylo, zachytit život jedním The ideal of science would be to characterize life
pojmem tak, aby obsahoval všechno: aby jím bylo by a single concept encompassing everything: the
povědíno vše o těle, o úkonech, o duši, o vývoji, o flesh and its doings, the soul, development,
všem, co jest na životě zvláštního; jako z výměru everything that makes life distinctive. As the
kruhu odvodíme všechny jeho vlastnosti, tak definition of a circle allows to derive all its
abychom definicí života obsáhli celou jeho properties – so the fullness of the living should
plnost.19
be contained in its definition.
Moderní věda 33
Geschichte… 537
19
Dějiny… 29
17
18
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So far, Rádl comes out from our analysis as a typical biologist of his time, sharing a common
worldview with a great fraction of Continental scientists, be it “mechanicists” or “vitalists”.20 It is only
insufficiency and inconsistency of our vocabulary which makes our theories contradictory and bans us
to reveal truth “as it is”.21 The task of biology should be to go after the essence of things, as physics
does, not to suppose free play of contingencies and evolutionary tinkering.22 No understanding for
Darwin in those circles: evolution will reveal lawful processes – nobody would suppose that the world
itself would change in the process!
Darwin sought to make his presentation historical. It is based on the thought that the history of the
world is full of events; that every transformation of one organism into another presents the world with
a new fact; and that there have been an infinite number of such facts. Goethe [et al.] – all those
thinkers paid attention to the events by which evolution proceeds, merely to deduce therefrom a law of
development, an idea.23
No such Goethian laws or ideas in Darwin – his world can be only described, but not understood:
Laissez faire, laissez passer; la nature va d’elle même was the famous watchword of those times. […]
Laissez faire, laissez passer was the negation of the old law of the divine right of kings. Darwin, in his
theory, accepted the second half of this sentence and wrote his book on the theme La nature va d’elle
même. There is no God-given law in Nature.24
And another quote:
Darwin objected to definitions because his whole thoughts were centered on the variety of Nature.
When he should give a definition he overwhelms his readers with examples of that richness of Nature
which seems to mock every definition. A species cannot be defined since so many transitional and
irregular forms exist. We cannot define “struggle for existence”, since so many different phenomena
are included under this heading.25
We see Rádl’s views as those of a typical scientist, whatever generation in the last 150 years he might
belong to. Not much understanding for an internal creativity of life itself. Bergson and his Creative
evolution is surprisingly lumped together with Darwinian evolution (apparently due to the surface
property of bboth authors describing evolutionary processes);26 Rádl apparently does not know the
work of the semiotician C.S. Peirce. Only in 1930, in the Foreword to the English edition History, he
would acknowledge historicity and inner endeavor as factors playing role in the lifeworld:
For more details, see Markoš, op. cit.
e.g. Dějiny… 72
22
S.J. Gould in his Structure… provides an analysis of proceedings from a conference dedicated to Darwin’s
centennial and to 50th anniversary of his Origins (A.C. Seward, ed.) It is typical, Gould says, that albeit most
speakers gave a lip service to Darwin and Darwinism, they often distorted the issue to the extent that it meant the
right opposite.
23
History… 3 (highlighted AM)
24
History… 19
25
History… 27
26
History…, p. 375
20
21
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Since about 1890 practically no advance has been made in our knowledge of the origin of living
organisms. Can this, by any chance, be due to the fact that our methods have been too exclusively the
methods of science? It would be quite possible to treat the past history of the world of living organisms
as an historical problem, and to attempt to solve the problem by historical methods. […] The more I,
personally, think on the subject, the more I believe in this method of attack.27, 28
In 1920s, he even admits the interpretation method, but gives it only a marginal role:
V
novodobé
přírodovědě jest
interpretační In modern science, the interpretation method is
metoda neznáma, ale neprávem. Interpretace jest unknown, but not by right. Interpretation,
možná ovšem jedině tam, kde daný objekt má
however, is possible, only in cases when a given
smysl (cíl); nemá tedy ve vědách fysikálně object has a purpose; it has no place in physics
chemických. V biologii lze interpretovati všechna and chemistry. […] In biology, we can interpret
organická jednání […] dále zjevy ontogenetické a all organic processes, […] furthermore all
regenerační a vůbec všechny ty projevy života, ontogenetic and regeneration phenomena and all
které mají smysl. Prakticky se této metody tokens of life that have any sense. The method is
neužívá, leda mimochodem; lékařská diagnostika not being used in the practice, or only
nemocí
jest
v
podstatě
interpretací
[…] incindentally; the medical diagnostics is in
symptomu.29
principle an interpretation of symptoms.
Furthermore, we see that it is only interpretative method used by science, not by the living itself.
Do living beings have purpose or meaning, for Rádl? The answer is, on my opinion, “Not too much, if
any”. Life is harnessed in internal laws of forms, which control a priori the structure of organism and
grant the unity of plan:
[Tierwelts]
Wesen
in
der
Identität
der
The essence of animal identity is to be sought in
strukturellen (und der funktionellen) Gesetze structural (and functional) laws, which put
gesucht werden muß, nach welchen aus dem together the organic material of a living body.
organischen
Material
die
lebenden
Körper
30
zusammengefügt werden.
History…vi-vii (highlighted AM)
Well, there can be found a similar quotation in the German edition from 1909, but note how the topic is mixed
up with social Darwinism and human affairs (I am quoting from the English edition, 222): A further peculiarity
of the theory is that it looks upon progress as a purely passive thing. By life Man has always meant an activity, a
development of power, an effect upon the surroundings. Progress in the world was believed to depend upon
endeavor, upon the struggle for ideals, upon the force of the individual, and we are as a matter of fact convinced
that this is so. Indirectly, Darwin opposed this idea. Life itself can do nothing; according to him it is only a
plaything in the hands of the most diverse external factors. There is no stepping forward, one is only pushed
forward. If a man has some advantage over others he cannot develop it and make it of value by his own efforts;
and at his death all that he has struggled for dies too. The only individual who can hope for victory is the one who
produces a numerous progeny.
29
Moderní věda 136
30
Neue Lehre… 484
27
28
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We see here strong echo of Driesch, who says things like:
The degree of manifoldness of a natural system can never increase of itself, i.e. without a cause as its
quasi-sufficient reason. To allow this would be to abandon the rational theory of becoming. […]
Whenever there is an increase of the degree of manifoldness in the one spatial becoming that is to be
rationalized, there must be a quasi-reason, i.e. a cause, for this increase that is outside the system
itself.31 Rádl apparently would like, as Driesch did, to seek a pure natural science whose propositions
would be generally valid.32
Diese dogmatische Auffassung der Einheit des
Our dogmatic view concerning the unity of the
Organismenreiches haben wir aus zwei Gründen realm of organisms has grown from two
verworfen; (1) suchen wir die Verwandschaft der
fundamental premises: 1. we look for the kinship
Organismen
nicht
of organism not in the identity of their material
materiellen
Bestandteile,
in
der
Identität
sondern
in
ihrer
der parts, but in the similarity of laws which define
Ähnlichkeit der nun dem forschenden Geist sich the fabric of an animal; such laws will reveal
ergebenen Gesetze, nach welchen die Tiere themselves only to a seeking mind (spirit); 2. We
aufgebaut sind, und (2) haben wir uns über alle disclaimed all privileges of particular animal
durch die Systematiker aufgestellten Privilegien casts like vertebrates, insects etc., and look for
einzellnen
denselben
Tierkasten
hinweggesetzt
Strukturgesetzen
den
und uniting structural laws common to all of them.
organischen
Körper des Wirbeltier-, Insekten., Mollusken-,
Wurmtypus zu unterwerfen gesucht.33
The work of Driesch has, however, an extension from embryology towards the realm of psyche. Rádl
follows this line of thought and says, in Geschichte:
Der handelnde Organismus soll den einzigen
An acting organism should present the only
gegenstand der Psychologie darstellen. Den subject of psychology. The basic property of
Handlungen (des Menschen, der Tiere) liegt actions (of humans or animals) is the same as that
dasselbe Charakteristische zugrunde, wie den of evolutionary novelties: they are aimed towards
Entwicklungserscheinungen: sie sind auf ein Ziel
a goal, they cannot be described by a mere
gerichtet, lassen sich bloß mechanisch nicht mechanism, but they are lead by an idea.
begreifen, sondern werden von einer Idee
geleitet.34
In foreword to his History we can find a following hint: Above all, we should have almost completely
abandoned that positivist attitude which characterised the work of the second half of the 19 th century.
31
(Driesch, 1914:197-198).
Geschichte… 532-3
33
Neue Lehre… 484
32
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This would involve a thorough investigation of Driesch’s work on the autonomy of the life processes.
Such a study would lead us to realise how analogous are the physical activities of living organisms to
mental activities.35 Does it mean that Rádl was able to make the final step and project his
hermeneutical experience as a historian into the realm of his biological experience? If he did so, it is
not easy to demonstrate it. We can find, for example, quotations like this: [Darwin] taught us to
regard organisms as structures with a history, but as the product, not of an idea, but of a series of
events in the real world. This was a great thought. We may study an animal as thoroughly as we
please; we may compare it in the most detailed manner with other forms; but this will not enable us
fully to understand its nature, for it bears within it the traces of the past, traces which can only be
revealed by historical study.36
The context, however, suggests simply a rhetorical figure used to criticize Darwin for not going this
way. Rádl himself, however, has not taking this path either. Perhaps he was too anthropocentric and
did not like the idea of acknowledging living beings the same hermeneutical powers as those he
uncovers in human culture and history.
Where, then is Rádl’s horse in our triangular corral? It is very close to the right vortex, quite close to
the horizontal fence. Rádl keeps his historical and biological insights apart, and a synthesis leading
towards the emancipation of the living from eternal and immutable external laws never took place in
his thinking.
Geschichte… 230
History… vii (highlight AM)
36
History… 174; Geschichte… 326
34
35
9