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Kay Ware
Annotated Bibliography
Rhetoric Seminar
April 4, 2006
Kennedy, George A. Aristotle’s On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. NY: Oxford
U Press, 1991.
Aristotle speaks about one historical instance in which there arose the need for the
invention of speeches in approximately 467 B.C.:
When tyrannies were abolished in Sicily and private property, after a long
interval of time, was being recovered in the lawcourts, then for the first
time, since that people was shrewd and born for controversy, the Sicilians
Corax and Tisias compiled an Art and precepts [of rhetoric]; for before
that, no one was accustomed to speak by method and art…(293).
The heart or “core” of rhetoric, and subsequently its artistry, is derived from argument,
but one must begin the argument or discussion; therefore, what to say must be invented.
One must be able to “see” the various avenues to compose an argument, as Aristotle
claims, “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the
available means of persuasion. This is the function of no other art;” (36). Kennedy adds,
“Rhetoric, in the most general sense, is the energy inherent in emotion and thought,
transmitted through a system of signs, including language, to others to influence their
decisions or actions” (7). Because of the invention of something to say, several
communications emerge such as literary works, public speeches, and private
communications such as letters.
Stasis Theory
A strategy for invention Aristotle alluded to but didn’t directly address is known
as the stasis theory or stasis of definition. Aristotle begins, “Since people often admit
having done an action and yet do not admit to the specific terms of an indictment or the
crime with which it deals—,” and then, after this abrupt stop in his thought, he continues
by questioning the definitions of certain terms in a certain order to determine the issue at
hand, or “question at issue,” and then declares that definitions had to be employed to
qualify the agreed upon issue. He pursues the sought after “issue” by addressing virtues
(such as “just, unjust”) and refers to topics as he proceeds through the many
“subdivisions and variations” throughout his exposition (104, 265-266). Later,
Hermagoras of Temnos further developed stasis theory to be “a systematic way to
determine the central question at issue in a speech” (307). This strategy for invention is
considered a “fundamental rhetorical importance of determining the question at issue”
(266). Additionally, stasis theory is most effective for the judicial speech, one of the three
“species” or branches of speech formulated by Aristotle. The other two are deliberative
and epideictic (47). (For more explanation of these, see the section under Topics.)
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Topics
To forge an argument, or come up with ways to infer thought, statements can
derive from premises, or propositions, of which there are three classes: “ethical, physical,
and logical” (51). Aristotle claims that “It is evident from what has been said that it is
first of all necessary [for a speaker] to have propositions [protaseis] on these matters”
(50), matters meaning in regard to the specific topic being discussed. Moreover,
extremely useful are “kinds” of “opinions and propositions” for their “persuasive
expression” when discussing a topic: “‘ place,’ metaphorically that location or space in
which a speaker can look for ‘available means of persuasion’” (45, 120). Aristotle
determined that topics, or places to craft arguments, varied according to the “species [or
classes] based upon the hearers of the speeches” of rhetoric (47).
Judicial. The species or branch of speech composed of rhetoric that “advises
about the past,” or about what judgment to make about a past action. Judicial speeches
are comprised of discourse of accusation and discourse for the defence (48).
Deliberative. The species or branch of speech composed of rhetoric that “advises
about future events,” or about what future action(s) to take (48). Deliberative discourse is
concerned with ideas such as the advantageous, the harmful, exhortation, and dissuasion
(47-49).
Epideictic. The species or branch of speech composed of rhetorical topics that
“characteristically praise or blame some person or thing, often on a ceremonial occasion
such as a public funeral or holiday” (7).
Common Topics. Aristotle devised 28 common topics, or matters commonly
understood by all, and they are good for all three branches of speech (190). These include
topics of magnitude such as greater and smaller, possible and impossible matters, past
fact, future fact, degree of magnitude or importance (66), and “propositions about the
emotions useful to a speaker in all species of rhetoric” (122).
Special Topics. There are specific topics for each species of rhetoric. Some
examples of these matters (topics) of deliberation are “finances, war and peace, national
defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws” in deliberative rhetoric (53).
Special judicial topics include “justice and injustice” (102), “wrong doers” and those
“wronged” (97), and topics about pleasure (91). In epideictic speeches, topics consist of
“virtue and vice and honorable and shameful,” including “self-control, liberality,
prudence, wisdom” (79-80), and “kinds of amplification” (85). Kennedy clarifies that
“…rhetoricians have found it convenient to speak of ‘special, specific, particular,
material’ topics belonging to the separate disciplines, in contrast to ‘common’ or ‘formal’
topics, which [according to Aristotle] are rhetorical or dialectical strategies of argument”
(46).
Evidence
Statements from evidence provide a strategy of invention to argue something.
Aristotle states, with Kennedy’s insertions,
Of the pisteis , some are atechnic [“nonartistic”], some
entechnic [“embodied in art, artistic”]. I call atechnic those
that are not provided by “us” [i.e., the potential speaker]
but are preexisting: for example, witnesses, testimony of
slaves taken under torture, contracts, and such like; and
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artistic whatever can be prepared by method and by “us”;
thus, one must use the former and invent the latter (37).
One must “invent”—heurein—entechnic (inartistic) thoughts and “use” atechnic
(artistic) thoughts (37). The word invent is the Greek word “heurein, ‘to find out’;
heuresis becomes the regular word for rhetorical invention” (37, footnote #39).
Continuing, Aristotle adds “ethos, logos and pathos” in devising “the means to persuade,”
which is involved in the thought, or “dianoia, and the sources of arguments and how we
shall refute them”(25, 37, 215). Crafting the thoughts of what to say in a speech is
significant, as what is said clarifies the speaker’s character (ethos), impacts the
audience’s personal “attributes” (pathos), and persuades toward the truth or “seeming
truth” of the argument (logos) (38).
Facts, maxims, definitions, examples, paradigms (inductive reasoning),
syllogisms and enthymemes (deductive reasoning) are all types of evidence. On Rhetoric
is divided into three sections or “books,” and syllogisms and enthymemes are illustrated
throughout because Aristotle demonstrates how both are useful in developing an
argument. He goes into great detail as to how construct all these devices, as well as when
to use them, for what purposes, and in what setting(s) they are best applied. The
following explanations are examples.
Aristotle uses a maxim (brief opinion, assertion) developed by the wise, old man,
Chilon when he describes the character of “the young,” how they do “‘everything too
much.’” The original maxim from Chilon was “‘Nothing too much’” (166). Aristotle also
directs as to how a maxim develops into an enthymeme, (a syllogism that) does not state
the major premise toward a comparison as a syllogism does, and is derived from
probabilities and signs (33, 43). Aristotle states the maxim first, which he quotes from
Euripides:
“It is never right for a man who is shrewd
To have his children taught to be too wise.
But if the cause is added and the reason, the whole is an enthymeme; for example,
For apart from the other idleness they have,
They incur hostile jealousy from fellow-citizens” (182).
Further, the main difference between the enthymeme, “a rhetorical syllogism,” and a
syllogism is the enthymeme will contain the probable and probably true or valid premise
and the reason (“‘Socrates is virtuous; for he is wise’”) but not state the “universally”
accepted or “assumed” major premise (“‘All the wise are virtuous’”) (33).
Probability
Argument from probability is a strategy of invention (9). In Aristotle’s time,
statements of probability were trusted more than evidence (176). Aristotle asserted that
for a crime committed in the past, if the suspect is considered to have the “capacity and
motivation” to commit the alleged crime, one could construct an argument of probability
in judicial rhetoric for the best judgment (177). Likewise, if something more than likely
will occur in the future, one could construct an argument of probability for deliberative
rhetoric, to determine future action. Kennedy adds, “Behind what is said here lies the
assumption that human actions and events follow predictable natural patterns, except in
unusual circumstances” (176).
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Signs
Signs help to invent discourse in that they are “usually an existing fact or
condition that anyone might recognize”(44). Signs differ from statements of probability
in that “signs correspond to things that are necessarily true,” and state a “particular,”
apparent truth corresponding to a universally accepted thought, while a probability can
be a statement about a sign that is universally accepted as “true for the most part”(43).
Signs are one place from which enthymemes can be drawn. There are “existing” signs
“that point to a necessary conclusion” (since a person has a fever, he is ill), and signs that
may be only “partially” true and “refutable” (since a person has a cold, it is certain he has
a fever) (14, 212). As Aristotle continues to develop out his theories, more clarification
for signs develop in that valid signs cannot be refuted unless there is “some plausible
exception that the audience will grant” (212, footnote #260).
Parts of Speech
Finally, Aristotle discusses in length the usages of metaphor, homonyms,
synonyms, and other words we now call parts and figures of speech, for the development
of one’s “lexis” for expression in rhetorical invention (294). He also gives his opinion
about the uses of these forms of words, and if one is going to use them, how often this
should be done and to what extent.
Enos, Richard Leo and Lois Peters Agnew, eds. Landmark Essays on Aristotelian
Rhetoric. “The Meaning of Heuristic in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Its
Implications for Contemporary Rhetorical Theory.” NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1998.
Understanding the invention process in rhetoric is not limited to a transfer of
meaning between the speaker and the audience. The meaning of the Greek word heuristic
(inventio in the Latin), to find out or discover, goes beyond a transfer of knowledge;
indeed, it includes
“…the way meaning is cocreated between rhetor and audience and how,
through this process of interaction, participatory meaning is shared. In
short, this essay provides an explanation of the place of heuristic in
Aristotle’s Rhetoric by showing its endemic operation between rhetor and
audience in constructing probable knowledge” (203).
Aristotle’s idea for invention has been “restricted” to “a collection of methods for
categorizing and explicating preexisting ideas.” “Traditional treatment” of Aristotle’s
heurein does not include the “epistemic process,” providing an “incomplete interpretation
of Aristotelian rhetoric” (204). Rather, Aristotle’s proofs have been explained in the
context of conveying the speaker’s knowledge to the audience without involving the
“epistemic” process he spoke about when distinguishing “episteme” from “formal techne
or knowledge whose end is in the user” (204). An added “dimension” to Aristotle’s canon
of invention involves “enabling the rhetor and audience to cocreate meaning” (204). In
other words, this dimension of invention transcends the limitations of the traditional,
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compositional fit between the audience and the speaker, where the speaker composes
with the audience in mind, working to persuade them to an agreement or action. The
authors are proposing that not only does a judgment or decision of some sort take place,
but heuristic can be seen as conceptually “generating probable knowledge for oneself [the
rhetor] and others…”(205). This is done by “expanding Aristotle’s notion of heuristic as
an epistemic process” (205), or how invention furthers the audience’s knowledge as the
rhetor and audience “cocreate” meaning and thought, apprehending knowledge. Invention
is not limited to the speaker, but is experienced via the “meaningfulness of the discourse”
between the speaker and the audience (207).
“Two kinds of heuristics,” topics and entechnic proofs, can be discussed in the
forms of “methods and abilities.” Instead of “dormant places” with “static qualities”
already used by speakers, topics “can also energize ideas through the socially shared
understanding of such modes of relational thought.” The example of Jesus Christ
teaching unheard of proofs of faith demonstrates “entirely new proofs generated by the
rhetor,” or entechnic proofs, reflecting Aristotle’s “‘invented by us.’” The new meanings
and notions he introduced were “invented within a faith community,” devising a new
social knowledge to be learned and experienced by himself and those he taught (206). In
view of this extension of heuristic’s meaning, as originally conveyed by Aristotle that
entechnic proofs “are invented by us” (206), “a reciprocal action of mutual needs and
values between the rhetor and audience motivate the epistemic act,” typically overlooked,
and determines that “Aristotelian invention [is] a complex social act” (208). Assimilation
is a key to heuristic implementation where the rhetor is a learner, and a goal is to
“distinguish rhetorical invention from the enumeration of predetermined subjects” (209).1
The “advancing” of the meaning of heuristic furthers the vocation of the techne
from the “sharing of probable meaning” to a “meaning-making act” (208), allowing
probable knowledge to be built through the co-participation of the audience and speaker
while challenging conventional thoughts and ideas. The old “inventional arts” necessarily
function, “weaving new knowledge,” while “guiding rhetors and audiences to
problematize experience, cultural beliefs, and current theories to cocreate new meanings”
(209). In looking anew at Aristotle’s heuristic, invention is an “evolving” tool, supplying
conventional rhetoric with a “more compatible” meaning “for desirable courses of action
with consequences for society” (210).
Heath, Malcolm. “The Substructure of Stasis-Theory from Hermagoras to
Hermogenes.” Classical Quarterly 44 (1994) 114-29. <eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/>
3/30/06.
Hermagoras
Hermagoras of Temnos, a second-century rhetorician and theorist, furthered the
Aristotelian ideas of observing all the facts and defining all necessary terms in a criminal
case to identify the main issue to be disputed. Aristotle would use the appropriate topic to
See George A. Kennedy, Aristotle’s On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 1.2.2, for Aristotle’s
translated quote within its context.
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argue the alleged criminal’s guilt or innocence, whereas, according to writings from such
philosophers as Cicero—briefly put—Hermagoras located the central issue of dispute
from “the initial proposition of the defence,” which countered the initial charge from the
prosecution (3). Then the jury was able to deliberate the question at issue logically and
concurrently reached. These theories about the invention of discourse in a forensic case
were later developed into stasis theory. “Stasis-theory seeks to classify rhetorical
problems (declamation themes, or real forensic and deliberative situations) according to
the underlying structure of the dispute that each involves” (1). Hermagoras’ theory
contains a “triad,” “aition-sunekhon-krinomenon” (2). Although we don’t have the exact
meanings for these terms, later writers were able to understand them within his theory,
and either develop (or diverge from) this structure. We know this triad indicates the
following system: the prosecution’s charge; followed by the defendant’s response—a
conceding, but also a presentation of a proposition of justification; then, a question is
ascertained for the jury. This type of disputation leads into another round, or “phase,” of
“conflicting propositions” that defined for the jury another central issue, or stasis (5).
Philosophers such as Hermogenes, Cicero, and Quintilian wrote enough about
Hermogoras’ theories that they can be historically documented to illuminate his ideas and
the “changing conceptions of the fundamentals of stasis-theory from Hermagoras on” (2).
Most available sources agree to a simple model in reaching stasis when the question to be
answered is “conjectural (i.e., one of fact),” but “their accounts of more complex analyses
diverge” (2). The simple model of conjecture comprises three parts: “Prosecution (P),
You did it;” “Defense (D), I did not do it:” “Jury (J), did he do it?” (3). As other theorists
developed out this basic model, phases of new propositions, analyses and categorizations
became intensified and divergences utilized more and more. Three “theories of stasis,” or
“positions,” materialized. “Position A: stasis is the initial proposition of the defence.”
“Position B: stasis is the conflict of the initial propositions of the prosecution and defence
(P + D).” “Position C: stasis is the question which arises from the conflict of initial
propositions.” (Jury: did he do it?) (3-4).
Cicero
Cicero asserted that Position A was “Hermagoras’ view” (3-4). Other sources say
that Hermagoras did acknowledge Position B, “which clearly identifies stasis with the
initial conflict (P + D) and distinguishes it from the question which arises out of the
conflict (J)” (4). The other positions came about because Position A seemed “one-sided,”
to only consider or “emphasize” the “defence’s initial proposition” as the stasis of the
problem. Recognizing only the initial proposition from the defence was quickly judged as
illogical: “one must take account of the prosecution’s contribution as a co-determinant of
the dispute. Position B and C achieve that shift of emphasis” (4).
From Hermagoras’ writing, Cicero cultivated the original simple model into three
complex models which include more phases of analysis (questions and responses),
counterpleas, which involve stasis of quality (attributed to Hermogenes), and new
questions for jury adjudication (4). (Of course, this moves beyond conjecture to include
the qualifying and classifying of propositions of justification.) The schematic and
analysis of Model 1 (attributed to Hermagoras) shows the discourse progressing to phase
2 of disputations, challenging the jury to answer a new question developed by further
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charges from prosecution and the defence’s propositions to “ground” their justifications,
developing a new central issue, or stasis, on which to build the argument.
Model 2 consists of the same schematic except that in Model 1, the defence is
acknowledged as stating the key point because of propositions to affirm justification for
the act, and possibly a new stasis, where in Model 2, that possible key issue is
“transferred to the prosecution” in the second phase of arguments (5-6). The schematic
for Model 3 shows that the prosecution’s and the defence’s “relationship” is changed: “In
Models 1 and 2 the defence substantiated its plea of justification, and then the
prosecution tried to rebut it; now the prosecution’s second proposition precedes that of
the defence. The prosecutor substantiates his charge, and then the defendant substantiates
his defence” (7). Clearly, the foundation for stasis theory laid down by Hermagoras was
substantial, and “if Hermagoras proposed Model 3, he established—in pioneering work—
the dominant system for the rest of antiquity; subsequent criticism would have created
nothing but dead-ends” (8).
Quintilian
Quintilian attributed Cicero’s Model 1 to be that most closely associated with
Hermagoras’ original theory (this is disputed), even though he believed that Cicero
“misunderstood” Hermagoras (7-8). Additionally, Quintilian it impractical and illogical
to keep the judicial argument to only two phases of analyses (as described in Cicero’s
Models), because “this approach to the problem conflicts with the assumption that any
problem has a single stasis. In general, therefore, later rhetoricians were forced to
collapse the two phases of analysis into one” (10). Quintilian’s contribution to more
modifications of Hermagoras’ theories are shown by his “rejection” of Position A and
continues to “qualify and modify” Position C by questioning “whether stasis is what
arises from the first conflict, or is in what arises” (11). Hence, Quintilian develops a third
phase for the defence, a combination of the prosecution’s first proposition and the
defence’s second proposition, or counterplea: “stasis is not itself the product of the initial
conflict, but is in or arises out of the product” (11). The schematic of the “collapsing of
the two phases into one” from Quintilian’s theory handles the “impracticability of
restricting stasis to the first phase” of judicial argument (12).
Lollianus, Minucianus, and Zeno
Lollianus diverges even more by asserting that “stasis is an accidental property of
rhetorical discourse” (12). Through discourse using definition, one can infer the location
of stasis found in the “defence only,” while it provides counterpleas and propositions to
define its actions with reference to the law. “So if (as I suspect) Lollianus is working with
a Collapsed Model, it is a collapsed version of Model 3” (13).
Minucianus, “whose work on stasis for a long time was more influential than that
of Hermogenes,” defined stasis as the “zetema [one interpretation: the body of the
question] constituted by the two initial propositions,” which of course is Position C (1415). In studying the commentaries written to Hermogenes from Minucianus, it is
concluded that he favored stasis through definition, and also upheld a collapsed model in
his methods to “diagnose” cases with their lack of stasis if the direct charges and
counterpleas were “groundless” (15-16). Hence, Minucianus is accredited with his theory
of asustata: “a Model for the analysis of themes possessing stasis” (16).
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Zeno mostly “abandoned” the Positions and Models inspired by Hermagoras in
that these systems must show more than the “triviality” that there are “two parties to a
dispute” (16). He resembles Minucianus in theory as he looked for the “definitional
aspect of the case,” and sought how to turn facts or accusations into interdependent
questions. For example, “a man raids a cenotaph and is charged with a grave-robbery
(16). Stasis would be declared as a “stasis of the whole,” by answering the questions “is
he a grave-robber,” and “is a cenotaph a grave?” The answer to the first question is
dependent upon the answer to the second question; therefore, the answer in the negative
or affirmative devises the key issue to be argued (17).
Hermogenes
Hermogenes’ method to arrive at stasis resorted to very few questions. It does not
include Hermagoras’ triad, aition-sunekhon-krinomenon, or totally rely on phases of the
volleying of questions and propositions, that would classify the rhetorical problem
leading to an argumentative strategy. Hermogenes pursued a structure to locate the key
issue, or stasis. He maintained that the initial charge will classify the problem and,
including all the underlying facts of the case, stasis will be determined because, “stasis is
definition; facts are agreed, and the dispute is about how to categorize those facts” (1). In
his structure, “one must inspect the krinomenon” [for which we lack a definitive
meaning], or the scrutinizing of the assumed key point of contention: “if that is unclear,
the stasis is conjecture; if it is clear but incomplete, the stasis is definition: if it is
complete, the stasis is quality, which in turn has manifold subdivision” (2). An example
of a “form of the stasis of quality” is the counterplea; the “act” for which defence is
“charged is lawful in itself”—i.e., in the act of adultery, killing is lawful—and the
defence will propose this counterplea, not entirely surrendering to the charge of murder,
to determine the stasis of the problem (1). But his theory didn’t answer “how to identify
which of the circumstances given in a rhetorical problem are materially relevant” to be
classified; therefore, his “basic analysis of a rhetorical problem” also fell into disuse (17).
Conclusion
Obviously, Hermagoras inspired a “quest” for a “theoretical underpinning for
practical work” regarding the location of stasis (19). Many of these methods fell to the
way side throughout the ages, but the ensuing innovations of later rhetoricians reflected
the search for the discovery of stasis in not only judicial but also other forms of speech.
Developing out Aristotle’s original ideas aided the expedience and fairness in a trial by
jury that can still be noted today.
Murphy, James J. Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from
Saint Augustine to the Renaissance. Berkeley: U of CA Press, 1974.
The “regions of discourse” constricted in range and magnitude in the Middle
Ages compared to the times of ancient rhetoric. Philosophers and theorists adapted
mainly from Cicero’s and St. Augustine’s texts to “select—and reject—on the basis of
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what the new ecclesiastical orator requires” (86). Dialectic was in the position of
incidental, and Aristotle’s On Rhetoric was “virtually unknown” (363). Approximately
between 1150 and 1400, Aristotle’s Topica was considered “closer in spirit to the matters
of invention and delivery usually associated with rhetoric” in medieval times, mainly
because the “practical advice about argumentation is mixed with hints about the
psychology of opponents,” the (psychological) realm of which the philosophers and
theorists of the time devoted most of their energies regarding human communications
(106). Additionally, Quintilian’s texts, especially on inventio, were “mutilated;” the
applications of his rhetoric was “meager, up to the year 850,” and from there “is a
complete silence” in referencing Quintilian until the “early twelfth century” with the
entrance of Chartres (126).
The New Dictator
What principles of rhetoric were operated were philosophically dictated (see
the “new term,” dictator, page 213), and combined with and dominated by grammar
instruction, disciplines in letter writing and other forms of expression (as poetry), and
“thematic sermons,” exhibiting the basic three modes of writing dominant in the Middle
Ages (362-363). Medieval theorists communicated in two particular ways: first, they
made “pragmatic adaptations of ancient materials to shape special genres for their own
purposes; and second, all the treatises written were ‘preceptive,’ designed to give specific
advice (praecepta) to future writers and speakers; also, they “shared one dominant
concern for order” (362-363).
The Art of Letters
Canon Hugh of Bologna, in the beginning of the twelfth century, wrote
Rationes dictandi prosaic, to compete in the many disputations regarding the new art of
letter writing (213-215). Hugh is the first to use the term “‘dictamen’” or dictations, in
such an expansive manner, as he not only relies on Cicero, but also the letters of the
Apostle Paul to deal with “epistolary prose.” This turned heads because the Apostle
Paul’s epistles were absolutely disregarded by theorists of medieval times: “they are not
used as examples (or models), they are not analyzed for their form, and the dictatores do
not even pay lip service to Paul by an occasional reference to him” (215). But as Hugh
developed out his own seventeen models of letters, his theory was clear that instead of
inventing discourse and expression in letters, his models were designed as dictates of
instruction, reflecting epistolary prose. The letter writer “copies” from his models,
especially the salutations, instead of “inventing” words for “actual composition.” This
was unacceptable in Greek and Roman theories of rhetoric where a speaker or writer was
responsible to invent statements to initiate discourse. Aside from Hugh, only St.
Augustine had made “a radical break with ancient tradition,” when, “because of the
importance of the Gospel message,” a preacher could draw upon and use “another man’s
exact words” (218). Before Hugh, Alberic had actually begun developing theories on
letter-writing in 1080, which was developed further and a bit modified by Hugh (224).
Their philosophies were furthered by other theorists: “It would be tedious to discuss
every letter-writing manual written in the middle ages…there is no complete list…”(226).
It is interesting to note that by the end of the century, this concept or doctrine of letter
writing found its way into France, Germany and England.
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Art of Preaching
It was held throughout the Middle Ages that “…Scriptural interpretation
should be used for the invention of preaching material. Obviously, Scripture continues to
be the starting point” (303). Upholding such thought was Thomas of Salisbury who was a
“master” of the art of theology by 1208 (312). He juxtaposes the “six parts of a sermon
and the five parts of rhetoric,” and concludes: a preacher “can never assume that his
audience will have good will in advance of his speaking…” (322-323). Moreover, he
believed that the job of the preacher was that of an orator: to move men to good works
and “dissuade” them from the bad. Thus, he introduced a new style of preaching, a move
from the direct to the indirect “approach,” for he stated that it (the direct approach) “is
not suitable to the introductions of artistic sermons”(325). Regarding the classical
rhetorical practice of the “discovery of proofs,” Thomas propounds “‘the sacred page has
its own special topics (loci) beyond those of dialectic and rhetoric.’” “Scripture, with aid
from theology, is therefore the basic source for the preacher. It provides him with both
valid and probable proofs” (323). His theories and dictatorial sermons reveal “a rare
insight into the kind of thinking that led to the formation of the new genre,” which is
actually an introduction to indirect preaching, directly diverging from the direct
approach, linking the artistic, the grammatical and the didactic forms of medieval
communication.
Revised “Species of Invention”
Toward the end of the middle ages, the classic rhetorical structures surfaced
with the work of John of Garland (actually born in England), a renowned “master of
grammar,” who sought to position himself as a “teacher of both oral and written
composition.” His treatise, “The De Arte Prosayca, Metrica, Et Rithmica of John of
Garland,” of which we have only parts, was made up of seven sections. He stated in his
introduction, “As Horace says in Poetria, we ought to find material before selecting any
of it, and should select before we arrange in any order. Therefore invention or finding of
material is our first concern…invention is the devising of matter, true or probable, that
would make the case convincing” (177). Garland developed five species of invention: I.
Ube invenitur; II. Quid invenitur; III. Quale invenitur; IV. Qualiter invenitur; and V. Ad
quid invenitur: according to the final cause of the invention. Interestingly, he ends this
section with grammatical instruction regarding the “choice” of words (“nouns, verbs, and
adjectives”) and how to “transsume” them within the “method of circumlocution” (177).
Garland’s theories weren’t revolutionary and didn’t cause a classical revival, but he
revealed that there could be “diversity,” mobility and concord of the “preceptive
movement’s ways of discourse” within medieval rhetoric (180).
Dictates vs. Invention
Despite the attempts of philosophers like John of Garland to infuse life into
rhetorical invention, others remained hard-core “didactics.” An “unknown Cistercian”
from Paris, who wrote Compendium rhetorice in 1332, states (as best as can be
ascertained because of lost pages), “From these qualities it is plain what a dictator ought
to be: in inventing, subtle; in arranging, prudent; in remembering, skillful; in styling,
distinguished; in delivering, temperate.” He seems to uphold the five canons of classical
11
rhetoric, but his further support of them only emphasizes style, and he ostentatiously
propounds his knowledge about other theorists’ doctrines, as well as his use of “rhetorical
precepts” from “preaching manuals” (236-237). Lawrence of Aquilegia’s Practica sive
usus dictaminis, published around 1300 throughout Italy, France, Germany and England,
“postulates [that] there is no longer any need for invention of materials, for arrangement
of parts, or for devising language. Communication for him is simply a matter of
completing a predetermined check list” (261).
Conclusion
Clearly, thought for rhetorical invention was not a practiced canon as
compared to classical times. This particular work is included to help the student of
rhetoric have a glimpse of the canon of invention’s place in the Middle Ages. The basic
conclusion regarding the development of rhetorical practices, especially where invention
is considered, is that there is “no history during the middle ages”(87). With the
observance of the art of letters and the preaching arts, we see that “invention” was carried
out either through copy or imitation throughout the Middle Ages. These all demonstrate
medieval movement or dictates of “precision,” rather than the “loose formalism or artistic
invention of the dictaminal art” (268).
12
Merry Luong
Burton, Gideon. “Invention.” Silva Rhetoricae Online. 1996. 31 January 2006.
<http://rhetoric.byu.edu/Canon/Invention.htm>
This particular site was created by Dr. Gideon Burton of Brigham Young University and
he defines invention as finding something to say. Invention is derived from the Latin
invenire which meant “to find.” There are categories of thought that allow for
brainstorming ideas and these places were what the Greek called topoi which are now
called the topics of invention.
Invention is tied to the rhetorical appeal of logos which is being oriented to what a person
would say instead of how the person might say it. Invention describes the argumentative,
persuasive core of rhetoric according to Burton. He quotes Aristotle stating that Aristotle
defined rhetoric as primarily invention—“discovering the available means of persuasion.”
Burton provides several links to relative information or subjects to the canon of
invention. The topics link provides a table. He explains at the bottom of the table that
although classical rhetoric called for the usage of topics as a starting point but he outlines
that imitation was equally important up until the seventeenth century.
Burton discusses the stasis theory, describing it as the method by which one would ask
certain questions in order to arrive at the point at issue in the debate or argument. He lists
the four basic types of conflict categorized by the Greeks and Romans as conjectural,
definitional, qualitative, and translative. Conjectural dealt with questions of fact,
definitional dealt with questions of definition, qualitative dealt with questions of quality,
and translative dealt with questions of jurisdiction.
Cline, Andrew R. “Invention.” Rhetorica Network Online. 2006. 31 January 2006.
<http://www.rhetorica.net/textbook/invention.htm>
Dr. Cline has designed this portion of the site to dedicate it to the canon of rhetoric
known as invention. Invention according to Dr. Cline is the discovery of the available
means of persuasion with exigence and audience being the primary building blocks of a
rhetorical situation. The rhetorical situation is that which compels someone to feel the
need to communicate to the audience. There are a multitude of varying rhetorical
situations and they range in the degree of thought before communicating.
The
rhetorician must figure out what to say before he/she can communicate.
Rhetorical situation demands specifics that we must discover. These specifics are that the
rhetorician must know the audience’s needs, desires, or thoughts about the situation. The
person must also know what are the types of evidence that are applicable to be used with
this particular audience, how can the person best appeal to this audience, which topics to
use to examine and produce the ideas, and the best timing and proportion of information
to communicate.
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The link to topics gives the reader a little more clarification on what topics is. Classical
rhetoric considered topics to be a set of ways of reasoning that are useful in constructing
a persuasive discourse. The Greek topoi literally means “place” and Aristotle used it as a
metaphor to describe the places one would look for arguments. Topics was once
considered an integral part of rhetoric’s invention process because it fit so well with the
deductive reasoning of ancient Greece, in which one bases argument upon a set of
cultural norms and truths; one would invent an argument by taking the cultural truth and
then searching for topics for a proper way to apply that truth to a specific kairos. Topics
has transformed since the Renaissance into the “modes of discourse” and it is considered
to be the ways to arrange an argument.
There are four common topics which included definition, comparison, cause and effect,
and circumstance. Definition has subtopics that include existence, classification, form,
degree, substance and capacity. All of these subtopics are concerned with defining what a
thing is. Comparison’s subtopics include similarity, difference, and degree. These
subtopics of comparison are concerned with the relationship or lack thereof among
people, things, situation, and ideas. It is particularly important because comparison is the
basis of metaphor and humans understand form and substance by comparing it to other
things in the world. The subtopics of cause-and-effect include correlation, causality, and
contradiction. The subtopics of circumstance include the possible, the impossible, fact,
and future probability. These subtopics consider the context of a situation.
“The art of rhetoric requires each rhetor to acknowledge the fluid and contingent nature
of human affairs.” (Screen 2)
Often an exigence includes a disagreement and the stasis theory of invention allows a
strategy for the rhetorician to discover the roots of a disagreement. Dr. Cline outlines
certain questions or subjects a rhetorician must answer or consider prior to
communicating a thought. They consist of conjecture (i.e. what is the thing/act to be
considered?), definition (i.e. how do we define the thing/act?), quality (i.e. how serious
.significant is the thing/act?), and procedure (i.e. should the act/thing be subjected to a
formal procedure?). The process of critical thinking is a process of invention according
to Cline.
“To discover what we think is to discover what we (might) have to say.” (Screen 1)
Heath, Martin. “Invention.” Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period.
Ed.
Stanley E. Porter. Leiden: Brill, 1997. 89-119.
Martin uses the Trojan War and its circumstances as examples to detail the necessary
steps and process for invention. Invention means “discovery” and in rhetoric it designates
the discovery of resources for discursive persuasion latent in any given rhetorical
problem. His handbook discusses the methods that the rhetor would instruct his/her
students on understanding invention and its place as a canon of rhetoric.
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A rhetor’s students would not be judged by their ability to compose and deliver speeches
and declamations which satisfied the expectation of contemporary audiences. The
example used is the one concerning Hermogenes, who rejects the concepts of class and
mode which were conventional in the rhetorical teaching of his day; even so fundamental
a principle as stasis could be dismissed as insignificant (at the risk of criticism by others).
The basic components of any rhetorical situation are person and act. The student should
first start with the exercise of narration which taught the student to present a clear,
concise, and plausible account of events. Then the student would use the paired exercises
of refutation and confirmation which brought the student back to narrative, and taught
him to take a critical view of it. According to Aphthonius, a refutation should begin by
discrediting those who tell the story; then the story itself is briefly recounted, and shown
to suffer from one or more a variety of flaws; it might be unclear, implausible,
impossible, inconsistent, improper, or inexpedient. This offers practice in the critical
analysis of narrative and this is an important skill in the handling of particularly judicial
speeches, in which it is often necessary to cast doubt on the opponent’s account of events.
The exercise also accustoms the students to the handling of prescribed formal structure,
with a prologue, narrative, and argument. The internal organization of the argument is
determined by the order of events in the story. The exercise also introduces the student to
the use of topics; there are not arguments but are literally “places” where we can look for
arguments. Common topics are when the student was trained to elaborate on
generalizations applicable to any instance of a given category.
Topics of refutation are the criteria already stated—clarity, plausibility, possibility,
consistency, propriety, and expediency—and each stage of the story can be tested to see
whether it is faulty in respect of any of these qualities. In confirmation and refutation, the
student seeks to demonstrate a conclusion. However, demonstration is only one of the
key abilities that an aspiring orator must acquire. He also needs a mastery of
amplification; a term which designates the techniques used to increase the perceived
importance of some fact that is taken as given.
An exercise of amplification was encomium in which the student takes as given the good
qualities attributed to a particular person and seeks to exhibit them in a way which will
excite or increase the audience’s admiration. The subject of encomium was not always a
person; a place or an abstract quality such as courage might also be prescribed. Praise of
the person was the standard form and the topics of encomium were accordingly created to
provide a comprehensive basis for assessment of personal attributes. Whenever an
argument based on a person is needed the topics of encomium can be used as a guide to
invention. Standard doctrine includes: the subject’s origin (i.e. nationality, ancestry, etc.),
birth (i.e. striking of divine favor?), nurture and education, chosen lifestyles,
achievements, illustrating qualities of soul (i.e. courage, piety, etc.), qualities of body
(strength or beauty), and the possession of external goods. Topics in encomium follow a
set of order, framed by prologue and epilogue. Additional element in this structure placed
before the epilogue, is a comparison designed to enhance the amplification. Martin
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emphasizes the significance of comparison explaining that after the student practices
encomium and its counterpart invective, the student would be required in comparison to
amplify the excellence of one person.
Rhetorical persuasion seeks for more than an abstract assent; some action is expected of
the audience. If the speaker wants to incite an active response from his response, he may
seek to arouse their emotions. The audience, however, is more predisposed to respond to
a rational or emotional appeal if they regard the speaker with confidence and goodwill; so
the projection of an attractive and trustworthy character will be useful. This leaves the
student with three basic means of persuasion which are argument, emotion, and character.
How much each orator will pull from each of this is determined by the nature of the case
and a different balance between them will imply a different approach to invention.
Principle of classification is mode and it categorizes themes according to the
opportunities and difficulties they present to the speaker in managing the relationship
with his audience. Ideally, the orator would wish to speak a theme that is honorable,
weighty, plausible, and intelligible; however where the subject has a discreditable aspect,
is trivial, paradoxical or hard to follow, additional care must be taken to make the
audience sympathetic and attentive.
Most important step in the analysis is to identify the stasis or issue of the theme. The
theory of stasis seeks to classify themes according to the underlying nature of the dispute
and Hermagoras of Temnos is considered the most influential contributor to the stasis
theory during this Hellenistic period. He distinguished between logical and legal disputes.
Stasis applies only to logical disputes or those concerned primarily with aspects of facts.
These disputes may be concerned with the fact itself or with the categorization of
acknowledged facts or their evaluation. Hermagoras believed that stasis was one key
aspect of a more elaborate diagnostic apparatus but this elaborate apparatus was not free
of practical problems and it underwent an evolution. Division of stasis into its constituent
heads of argument provided the speaker with a ready made outline of his case and the
division defines an appropriately ordered series of steps which the speaker may follow in
concrete form by relating its abstractly formulated heads to the particular circumstances
of the case. The distinction between logical and legal disputes changed in this system and
a thirteen stasis system emerged. The thirteen stasis system consisted of: conjecture,
definition, counterplea, the four kinds of counterposition (counterstatement,
counteraccusation, transference, and mitigation), the practical stasis, the four legal staseis
(letter and intent, assimilation, conflict of law, and ambiguity), and objection.
The prologues primary purpose is to establish the desired relationship with one’s
audience and the speaker may exploit favorable aspects of the theme or seek to disarm
unfavorable ones. Generally there are four topics from which acceptable material may be
taken and they were the speaker, the opponent, the audience, and the subject matter. The
prologue is usually conceived in this period as composed of a number of specific units or
proems and each were based on a different topic or a different application of topic.
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After the prologue follows the narrative but some rhetoricians have agreed that in some
cases there is no need for a narrative. The only indispensable part of speech is argument.
The stasis theory proves its worth in the argument and the division of the stasis provides
an outline strategy for handling a dispute of that kind. The practical stasis is divided
according to the heads of purpose—these are a checklist of the criteria by which an action
can be assessed. A division is not rigid but rather it is a guide. The order as well as
selection of heads needs to be considered because theory seeks to formulate in division
the natural order—the way of conducting an argument that is best in principle; but it is
recognized that the constraints of a particular situation will sometimes make a departure
from the norm advantageous in practice.
A speaker must always be aware of points contrary to his case and be prepared to disarm
them.
The chief purposes of epilogue are to reiterate the main points of our argument and to
incite the emotional response which will finally carry the audience along with the orator.
The epilogue contains a call to action which pulls on the heads of purpose.
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D. McGee Roberts
Annotated Bibliography
Rhetoric Seminar
Due: 14 March 2006
Annotated Bibliography
Corbett, Edward P. J. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student-Second Edition. 2nd ed.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Corbett’s guide to rhetoric, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student-Second Edition,
discusses the canons of rhetoric. He first invites the subject of invention in the
introduction by briefly highlighting the five different parts of the rhetorical canon. His
second chapter is devoted to invention under the phrase “discovery of argument.”
Inventio, as explained by Corbett in Chapter I, is the Latin term…for “invention” or
“discovery”. A rhetorician can talk on any subject in theory because there is no specific
subject matter. This requires the orator to rely “on native genius, on method or art, or on
diligence to help him find appropriate arguments” (Corbett 33). Invention is thereby, the
attempt to create a system or method for finding arguments.
Aristotle organized arguments and persuasions into two types. One was the non-artistic
or non-technical that the orator simply had to make use of. The five types of these are
laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and oaths. The other form of argument and
persuasion was artistic proof which involves the art of rhetoric through rational appeal,
emotional appeal, or ethical appeal. Classical rhetoricians developed topics designed to
give an orator a place to search so as to devise something to say on any given subject.
Aristotle sub-categorized topics into two categories: special and common. The special
topics were related to arguments that would be used exclusively in certain situations, like
the courtroom. Common topics were divided into four types: 1) the topic of degree; 2)
the possible and impossible; 3) past fact and future fact; 4) the topic of size.
Chapter II concerns itself with how to discover something to say on any given subject
and explains the statement: “Inventio is a systemized way of turning up or generating
ideas on some subject.” He does this by first explaining how to formulate a thesis,
describing the three modes of persuasion, and defining major terms within these modes.
Formulating a Thesis
Invention is the res in the res-verba where res refers to what is said and verba refers to
how it is said (style and delivery). Often a subject is given but sometimes the reader has
to decide on a subject. The challenge occurs when the subject exists and must turn into a
theme. The Latin rhetoricians used three questions as a formula for determining the
particular issue in a court setting which others can use in determining their thesis:
whether a thing is, what it is, and what kind it is. This formula can assist in helping the
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orator decide on what angle of the subject he or she will address and subsequentially
formulate a thesis. The subject matter as it corresponds to the current situation clarifies
which question should be classified as most applicable. The end result of whatever
question is used should be that of a single declarative sentence that acts as a thesis. With
a formulated thesis prepared in the beginning, the speaker can have clear in mind the
direction he or she will go with the subject. If there is a word limit set, a thesis will help
determine whether or not the subject can be justly handled.
There is great difficulty in forming a one sentence thesis. As Hugh Blair once said,
“Embarrassed, obscure, and feeble sentences are generally, if not always, the result of
embarrassed, obscure, and feeble thought.” Hence, unless a speaker’s thoughts are wellaccounted for, there will be difficulty in developing a simple but complete thesis. In
order to have a clearly defined thesis, one must practice. One way to do this is by reading
the works of others and attempting to discover their theses. As Corbett addresses, “If he
cannot abstract a thesis from what he reads, it is not likely that he will have much success
in formulating his own thesis sentences” (Corbett 49). Mastering a solid thesis is vital,
for “vague beginnings invite chaotic endings” (Corbett 49). In order to arrive at a thesis,
a writer may need to first pen unfocused thoughts. Hence, the thesis might not be
achieved until after the much time has been put into writing the rough draft.
The Three Modes of Persuasion
“In argumentative discourse, the thesis indicates the truth or proposal that we want our
audience to accept or act upon.” Nonetheless, “how do we get others, in Kenneth Burke’s
terms, ‘to identify’ with us?” We use the three means of persuasion provided by Aristotle.
While we have instincts to adapt given the situation, by constantly working on our
experience and education we can refine those instincts to a point where we must accredit
it “to an art rather than to a mere knack” (Cobett 50). We then continue to tweak those
instinctive abilities which fall within the parameters of rhetoric. Before discussing topics,
the three modes of appeal will be discussed.
The Appeal to Reason
“Rationality is man’s essential characteristic” (Corbett 50). “Because rhetoricians had
that faith in their fellow men, they thought of rhetoric as an offshoot of logic, the science
of human reasoning.” The appeals to reason do not violate principles of logic but, rather,
adapt them. For example, while logic makes use of the syllogism and induction, rhetoric
uses the enthymeme and the example as forms of reasoning. In order to discuss the
rhetorical appeals to reason, a review of the principles of logic is essential. The first to
consider is definition.
“Exposition and argumentation often turn on definition.”(51) Exposition is a kind of
definition because for something to be explained it must be described and defined as to
what it is. A dictionary, therefore, is an example of expository writing. Aristotle
developed a method of definition. If the predicate and subject of a sentence are switched
without destroying the sentence, an essential definition can evolve. In other words, the
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subject and predicate are equivalent terms. Definitions will vary because they depend on
the definer’s point of view. A rhetorician is interested in the variety of definitions that
can be given for one term.
Other Methods of Definition
There are other ways of formulating a definition. Synonyms are used to clarify a word’s
idea or feeling. Etymology can reveal the meaning of a word that an essential definition
would not be able to give; etymology digs below the surface definition. Description
illustrates what could be a complex thought or even a mechanism by employing
analogies, metaphors, and similes. An example assists in defining abstractions. No
matter what method is used, the defining words should be clearer and more familiar than
the term defined. The definition should not repeat the term or use derivative terms.
Defining a term positively rather than negatively also makes it more effective.
The Syllogism
Aristotle invented a method, called syllogism, to analyze and test deductive reasoning.
The syllogism reasons from statements or premises by making use of if…then statements.
There are four different kinds of premises represented by logicians in the square of
opposition: universal affirmatives, universal negatives, particular affirmatives, and
particular negatives. It is necessary to assess the quality and quantity of a proposition. If
we are looking into quantity, we will distinguish whether a proposition is universal or
particular. If we are honing in on quality, we will determine whether the proposition is
affirmative or negative. There are words that signal to us what angle of the premises we
are looking at. For universal, they are every, all, and no. For particular propositions,
they are some, most, many, a few, and the majority of. If a proposition is negative, words
like no, none, not all, and not any of the are applied. In order to fully understand a
statement, it is helpful to put it in this order: quantity word, substantive, copulative verb,
then substantive. The resulting sentence might be awkward, but it will be helpful in
distinguishing which terms are which. A syllogism is made up of three propositions: a
major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. The conclusion is hard to define, but
could simply be just the result of the two premises. It is important to note that unless we
know the conclusion, we cannot reconstruct the syllogism from deductive reasoning. In
constructing a syllogism it is necessary to keep in mind the difference between truth and
validity. Truth has to do with the substance of the syllogism and the validity has to do
with the form of presenting that syllogism. Practice helps in understanding the
construction of a syllogism and there are exercises provided in the text to assist.
The Enthymeme
The enthymeme is the rhetorical equivalent of the syllogism. The enthymeme is a
shortened version of the syllogism in that one premise is implied and the other premise
and conclusion are provided. Aristotle showed that the difference between the syllogism
and enthymeme lies in the conclusion because “the syllogism leads to a necessary
conclusion from universally true premises but the enthymeme leads to a tentative
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conclusion from probable premises” (Corbett 73). This is because we cannot always
determine truth, especially when it comes to human affairs. Instead, we make decisions
based on possibility and probability. Rhetoric functions like many of our decisions in
that it works to persuade where it cannot convince any given audience. Aristotle assessed
that we can either persuade an audience by using what usually happens or by what people
accept or believe to be true. The two materials of enthymemes are probabilities and
signs. Signs are indications that something else has happened, is happening, or will
happen. There are two kinds of signs involved with enthymemes: infallible and fallible.
If a sign accompanies something else it is infallible, whereas if it does not it is fallible.
An example of fallible signs is seen when circumstantial evidence is presented in a
courtroom. There are two main points when the enthymemes are utilized: 1) it is
important to decipher the implied premise; and 2) the probable propositions and fallible
signs do not lead always to true conclusions, but they can persuade effectively.
The Example
“Just as deductive reasoning has its rhetorical equivalent in the enthymeme, so inductive
reasoning has its rhetorical equivalent in the example” (Corbett 81). A statement
becomes truer when a study or inference is used to support it. Hence an orator must give
supporting evidence to convince his audience of his argument. The time constraint a
speaker is under will limit the amount of examples he or she can provide. While an
example may not persuade on its own and can be challenged, it has persuasive power
when an accounting is made for the role probability plays in the argument.
The Ethical Appeal
Rhetoricians are realistic enough to recognize that men are creatures of passion and of
will as well as of intellect. In order to persuade, the rhetorician must not only appeal to
what he wants men to be but also to what men really are. Hence, the persuasive appeal to
one’s character is described by Aristotle as ethical appeal. Ethical appeal is especially
needed in circumstances where absolutes are uncertain and opinions are vast. This form
of appeal is demonstrated when the audience perceives the speaker as a man of sound
sense, high moral, and benevolence. For his speech to perform such tasks requires a
tremendous undertaking. A step in the right direction would be first and foremost for the
speaker to actually posses such qualities. While the precise way of demonstrating the
ethical appeal is a bit blurry, it helps for the speaker to have a deep knowledge of his
subject as well as of human psychology. In this way, it is important for him to
compliment what Aristotle terms as logos with ethos. Not only must the speaker
manifest this in part, but his entire speech must demonstrate the complete image he is
intending for the audience to see. Ethical appeal can be sudden and blunt specifically in
the introduction and conclusion. It is, therefore, important that the audience is not
overwhelmed by this appeal.
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The Emotional Appeal
As humans often we respond and make decisions based on emotions, regrettably or not.
In fact, our emotions become catalysts for acting or for decisions. A rhetorician must be
aware of the role of emotions and also understand that we cannot will ourselves into a
particular emotion. This means that the rhetorician should decidedly not divulge to the
audience that he or she will appeal to their emotions but must appeal to the emotions in
an indirect fashion. An emotion is appealed to when something is described that
provokes the emotion, not when there is thought given to that particular emotion. This is
accomplished by imploring all five senses. A major key in appealing to the emotions is
forgetting in the conscious that appeal is being made to the emotions. In doing so, the
subconscious appeals to the emotions while this appeal is not apparent.
The Topics
Topics initiate a line of thought which sparks in the speaker an idea of what to say. There
are three main categories considered topics: common topics, special topics, and external
aids to invention. Common topics provide a speaker with general lines of argument that
can be used to incite any subject. Special topics deal with particular subjects under the
category of deliberative, judicial, or ceremonial. External aids are references that a
rhetorician could pull from to obtain facts and figures to further his argument or tear
down his opponent’s.
The Common Topics
There are five main categories under the discussion of common topics: definition,
comparison, relationship, circumstance, and testimony. Definition has already been
discussed as to how it can be employed. Comparison is broken down into similarity,
difference, and degree. Comparison helps us to learn, explain, and argue over a particular
subject. Finding similarities, we illustrate what a subject is. In doing so, analogies are
often used because they allow an unknown to be compared to a known and cause the
unknown to be better understood. Differences expose the subject for what it is not. To
make use of differences, it is helpful for a rhetorician to develop judgment and wit.
Degree helps to clarify the parameters of a subject. It compares things to find the
difference, not in kind, but in degree. Often times a speaker is attempting to convince the
audience to make a decision based on the idea that it is better than another decision.
Hence, degree allows the audience to see that a decision might not be right or wrong, but
it will be better or worse. The third kind of topic is relationship. The sub-categories are
cause and effect, antecedent and consequence, contraries, and contradictions. By
establishing a relationship between ideas, the rhetorician acts similarly as when
comparing. The fourth kind of common topic is circumstance. Proving whether
something is possible or impossible and whether it is a past fact or future act, a speaker
can convince the audience of the relevance of his or her subject. The final common topic
falls under the category of testimony. Testimony breaks down into six categories:
authority, testimonial, statistics, charismatic statements, laws, and examples. Testimony,
is being resorted to more and more because of the accessibility that technology offers.
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The Special Topics
When deliberative, judicial, and ceremonial activity is involved, more reliance is given to
a particular topic than to a common topic. When a speaker decides on his kind of
discourse, he or she can easily determine his objective and the kind of argument to
pursue. Deliberative discourse has to do with what we should choose or what we should
avoid. The major special topic for deliberative discourse, thereby, is happiness, for if a
decision results in happiness or unhappiness a person will act in kind. Judicial discourse
is patterned by determining the status of a case. The main special topics of judicial
discourse are justice and injustice or right and wrong. The three questions asked by
judicial discourse make use of different special topics. If we ask whether something
happened, evidence would be the main topic. If we want to know what something is then
definition will be the major topic. However, if we are asking about the quality of what
happened then the main topic is motives or the causes of action. Ceremonial discourse is
not to persuade necessarily but rather to praise or censure. In doing so the topics that can
be discussed further are courage or cowardice, temperance or incontinence, justice or
injustice, liberality or illiberality, magnanimity or meanness of spirit, prudence or
rashness, and gentleness or brutality. If we are trying to convince someone of a man’s
worthiness, we might seek a discussion of his physical attributes, external circumstances,
actions and achievements, or testimony of others. No matter what kind of rhetorical
activity we are involving ourselves in, it is important to develop instincts for what is most
appropriate and most effective. Rhetoric does not equip the speaker or rhetorician with
those instincts but only points him in the right direction.
Kinney, Thomas J. “Corax: The Crow’s Nest”. Website.
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~tkinney/index.html
Kinney’s website discusses rhetoric by providing an informative outline. Upon clicking
on the link to the left called “rhetoric,” the reader is presented with information on the
elements of rhetoric, rhetorical theory, history of rhetoric, rhetorical criticism, related
subjects, and resources. In Elements of Rhetoric, many definitions are provided from the
Oxford English Dictionary that could help one learn more about terms used in invention.
Rhetorical Theory provides information on the canons of rhetoric. There are articles on
invention (what it is and its origins), definition as applied in rhetorical invention and
common topics. Ethos and pathos are explained extensively on how they relate to
invention. The syllogism, enthymeme, and the example are all explained by their direct
meaning as well as their structure. A glossary is also included for invention so that
specific terms can quickly be defined. Under the History of Rhetoric heading, an outline
is provided as to how rhetoric transformed over time. The case of Corax and Tisias is
included which shows where the art of rhetoric came from and, in turn, where rhetorical
invention comes from.
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Lauer, Janice M. Invention in Rhetoric and Composition. West Lafayette: Parlor Press,
2004.
Janice M. Lauer, in her book Invention in Rhetoric and Composition, discusses rhetorical
invention from its beginning to modern day. Along with the historical timeline, Lauer
provides a detailed overview of the difficulties invention has faced. Her seven chapters
cover definitions of terms related to invention, theoretical and pedagogical issues over
time, twentieth century issues over the nature, purpose, and epistemology, issues over
invention pedagogies, as well as two chapters for a glossary and annotated bibliographies
that can be used as further resources.
Chapter one begins as an introduction and an overview for the book. Lauer explains to
her readers that the purpose of the volume is to offer “readers an account of some major
discussions of [invention], including an overview of the history of invention that stretches
back to the Sophists and a narrative of developments in inventional theory since the midtwentieth century” (Lauer 1). The definition of invention has implied from history a way
of providing a speaker with some sort of direction as to subject matter and arguments.
There are many different theories of invention that are discussed in further chapters that
illustrate the many different ways of viewing the purpose of invention and its
epistemology. Lauer organizes for the reader an outline of how these will be discussed in
the next few chapters. Her purpose is to narrate how rhetorical invention plays into
power and its circulation, both in conflict or in agreement. From the outset, the nature,
purpose, and invention’s epistemology show that theorists and rhetoricians disagree on
many facets of each. Rhetorical invention leaves many of these individuals arguing over
whether it is an art that comes from natural ability or a trained talent.
Chapter 2 defines terms related to rhetorical invention that are also listed in the glossary.
Lauer does so by dividing the terms into classical and modern terms, as well as those
from poststructuralism, postmodernism, and cultural studies. Terms like rhetoric,
invention, rhetor, kairos (the right moment), dissoi logoi (probability), and topics
(common and special) are defined. Modern terms become a little more complex. Since
the 1960s, words like epistemic emerged, which involved the construction of knowledge
through discourse. There are two terms that came from the idea of constructing
knowledge: situatedness of knowledge (limited to a particular context) and probable
knowledge (between certainty and opinion). The study of the process of delivery also
received a term which was heuristics. Two procedures related to this study are the
Tagmemic Guide and the Pentad. The Tagmemic Guide was developed as a way of
approaching problems for inquiry. Kenneth Burke developed the Pentad as a way to
interpret texts and viewed language as a symbolic action. Poststructuralism,
postmodernism, and cultural studies brought in new terms such as intertextuality which is
the “interdependence of texts as sources of their meaning” (Lauer 10). Further, two terms
are derived from intertextuality: iterability (inclusion of parts of one text in another) and
presupposition (assumptions a text holds). The phrase “signifying practices” also came
to the fore in expounding on typical ways people and communities develop inventional
strategies.
24
Chapter 3 divides into two parts where theoretical and pedagogical issues could be
discussed. Each part addresses the manner in which issues were handled by the Greeks,
Romans, Second Sophistic, Medieval, and Renaissance Rhetorics, as well as in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century. Part I addresses theoretical issues, starting with the
ones among the Greeks. Major disagreements occur when inventional acts are found in
texts. Some examples are seen with kairos and status as catalysts of discourse. Another
example is seen with deciding on probability, truth, and certainty as rhetorical
epistemologies. There is also great argument over the purpose of invention in reaching
probable judgment, creating knowledge, and discussing truths. The Romans were very
different in the issues they found with invention. For them, invention primarily focused
on finding support for judgments. Situatedness of the inventional acts and the initiation
of discourse with issues created conversation among some. Theories guided by the
Romans set the stage for how invention would be viewed for hundreds of years. Some of
the theories that created the Roman concepts were complex logical frameworks and
valuing natural abilities over learning the art of rhetoric. The Second Sophistic period
honed in on ceremonial discourse to build up the Christian faith. During the Medieval
period, invention fed into other fields of thought rather than a well-defined form of
rhetoric. During the Renaissance, invention was regulated to logic and left style and
delivery to rhetoric. Francis Bacon tore down known invention by saying that it was no
more than pulling information out of the known whereas science created new ideas and
information. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries maintained among Scottish and
British rhetoricians that invention could only truly be tied to logic. George Campbell
connected rhetoric to moral reasoning. As the century went on, invention was pulled into
criticism and linguistics. The term rhetoric was even changed to that of composition.
Invention was eventually taken under the wings of modes of discourse, encompassing
description, narration, exposition, and argument. As the nineteenth century moved
forward, women rhetorical theorists brought in new ideas with conceptualizing
metaphors, designing creative thinking, presenting new subject matters, and addressing
orphaned needs of society.
Part II delves into the pedagogical issues among the differing cultures. Rhetoricians have
debated since the Greeks on the same four subjects: natural ability, imitation, practice,
and art. Each culture maintained various concerns as well as a variety of discussions on
all of these topics. The Greeks were primarily taken with the idea of art as a kind of
knowledge used to guide everyday life and that art could be taught. Art (termed techne
by the Greeks) has set the stage for much discussion through the decades. One definition
of techne is to be considered from the Greeks forward: Techne is a uniquely temporal and
situated kind of knowledge. During the Sophist period, Protagoras was able to clearly
illustrate the relationship between art, endowment, practices, and the development of the
rhetor. Rhetoric is challenged as beginning with the Sophists. However, many agree that
there was an art of logos that called for arguing, although not called rhetoric, which was
employed by Sophists like Empedocles, Corax, and Protagoras. Plato in Phaedrus
defined the various characteristics of an art as well as conceptualized rhetoric by
comparing it to medicine. Aristotle added to Plato’s work by tying art and rhetoric to
each other all the more so. For Aristotle, rhetoric as an art is where there is a
disagreement over values and is completely dependent on time and situation.
25
The Romans made use of Rhetorica ad Herennium that served as a textbook for rhetorical
strategies. The guides were presented as rules to follow and limited the flexibility of
discourse. Cicero helped to make these strategies less rigid and not so much a
requirement for the perfect speaker. Quintillian molded the terms we now know as
common and special topics, status, enthymeme, and the example. With these terms,
though, came a tighter reign on the applicability of these strategies.
During the Second Sophistic and Medieval periods, rhetoric, and especially invention,
took the back burner. Rhetoricians were having difficulty tying in rhetoric with faith and
truth. Texts discouraged furthering invention into new rhetorical concepts and caused a
decrease in preaching and poetry. The Renaissance period did encourage the growth of
new rhetorical devices. There was a clear line set dividing rhetoric from such concepts as
intuition, imagination, logic, and scientific inquiry. As the Renaissance was left behind
in history, teachers put natural ability well over taught art in teaching students to write.
Chapter 4 discusses the issues over the nature, purpose, and epistemology of rhetorical
invention in the twentieth century. Theorists differ in their ideas as to what should be
considered invention. In deciding what the purpose of invention is has also led rhetorical
theorists to go back and forth in disagreement. The strategies, or ways to employ
invention, are constantly leading to controversy. For instance, do you use the tagmemic
guide or free writing? Journaling or creating anagrams? Debates continue on into our
modern day and constantly grow in complexity with the rise of technology.
Chapter 5 first focuses on the teaching of invention as five broad issues. The first issue
discusses how to develop inventional powers. The second issue contrasts the
effectiveness of different heuristic procedures. The third issue contemplates whether
invention is an individual or social event. The fourth issue battles whether invention is a
hermeneutical or heuristic act. The fifth issue discusses the epistemic purpose of
inventional strategies. Various pedagogies were addressed chronologically, such as
tagmemic rhetoric, freewriting, problem solving heuristics, and visual rhetoric. They
were examined as they related to the five issues initially discussed. The chapter
concludes with a variety of essay exemplifying the criteria for inventional pedagogies.
Chapter 6 provides an extensive glossary defining many terms related to invention.
There are many Greek and Latin words that might not be recognized immediately but
understood through the glossary. Lauer also includes an annotated bibliography in the
very end that provides many resources for anyone wanting to further research on the
subject of rhetorical invention.
26
Jennifer Altenor
English 4320
Invention
Dr. Pullman
Janice M. Lauer, Invention in Rhetoric and Composition, Chapter 3 Historical Review:
Issues in Rhetorical Invention
In this chapter, Lauer presents opposing and similar epistemology of invention in rhetoric
“The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention: for to invent is to
discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know:
and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof out mind is
already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the
purpose which we take into our consideration” (12).
Lauer refers as far back to the Sophists and offers several different perspectives on the
rhetorical process as described by philosophers, writers, and rhetoricians throughout
history. “Knowledge and science must furnish the materials that form the body and
substance of any valuable composition. Rhetoric serves to add polish” (12).
While Plato emphasized the heuristic qualities of dialogue, the Sophists concentrated on
the earliest moment in discourse; Aristotle, on the other hand, developed the most
detailed theory of invention. Lauer compares and contrasts the differences in Greek
conceptions of invention. For instance, according to Lauer, most historians of rhetoric
agree that Sophists believed that conflict was the prompted discourse. “Another aspect of
invention that has received considerable scholarly attention has been sophistic
epistemology. Kathleen Freeman explained that in Protegra’s theory of knowledge “each
individual’s perceptions are immediately true for him at any given moment, and that there
is no means of decided which of several opinions about the same thing is the true one;
there is no such thing as a ‘truer’ though there is such a thing as ‘better’” (15).
In the section Inventional Issues in Aristotle’s Rhetoric Lauer analyzes the topics that
Aristotle explored within rhetoric and in respect to invention. “Scholars have disagreed
over whether Aristotle’s Rhetoric included a discussion of the initiation of discourse.
Kinneavy, for example, originally maintained that Aristotle had no concept of kairos, but
later he and Catherine Eskin discussed the crucial role of kairos in the Rhetoric, basing
their interpretation on the fact that the text was built around the concept of “in each
case…Yameng Liu argued that despite Aristotle’s familiarity with stasis, he had serious
reservations about its applicability to rhetoric because he saw it as only occasionally
useful for local functions (19).
During this Greek period, the position of writer/speaker was largely limited to men,
excluding slaves and women, although we now know of some women like Sappho,
Praxilla, Aspasia, and Diotima, who occupied that position.
27
Lauer also refers to Cicero’s conceptions of invention in rhetoric “In Cicero’s mature
discussion of rhetoric, De Oratore, Crassus and Antonius (the two major discussants in
the text) treated invention more subtly. Although both of them downplayed their own
reliance on inventional strategies in favor of their natural abilities, in a number of places
the conversation revealed their knowledge of status and the topics. Both showed
familiarity with the three types of issues: conjecture (fact), definition, and quality” (25).
According to Lauer, Quintillian’s rhetoric focused on rhetoric as an art and status. His
theories of invention included the history of status. “Quintilian’s notion of rhetorical
epistemology can be found in his discussion of certainties in conjunction with his
treatment of the enthymeme and epicheireme. He claimed that something in every case
must need no proof, which either was or was believed to be true. The person who was to
“handle arguments correctly must know the nature and meaning of everything and their
usual effects” in order to arrive at probable arguments.
In the section Inventional Issues in Medieval Rhetoric, Lauer exposes the knowledge
collected about rhetoric during this era as information based on that which was left out, as
well as that which was either misunderstood or fabricated. Three new medieval rhetorical
arts developed during this time--letter writing, preaching, and poetry. The study of
rhetoric then included remembering, amplifying, and describing those new forms, rather
than creating new forms or interpreting those forms. “According to McKeon, rhetorical
invention also influenced theology by offering methods for interpreting Scriptures. For
example, formal methods were defined for three approaches to reading sacred texts:
allegorical, moral, and analogical. The Augustan distinction between things and signs
was used to solve theoretical problems (“Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 178). Thus,
discovery became what should be understood” (33).
Review: Roman Rhetorical Invention
Conceptions of invention in these major Roman rhetorical texts differed from those of the
Greeks and among themselves and their interpreters. Two rhetoricians placed status and
the topics (now a mixture of common and special) under parts of the discourse. The
epicheireme was added to the enthymeme and example as means of rhetorical reasoning.
Invention was largely viewed as finding support for judgments and material for sections
of the text. Some scholars commented on the situatedness of the inventional practices and the initiation of discourse with issues (28).
Review: Pedagogy from the Renaissance through the Nineteenth Century
During these periods, aside from the resurgence and adaptation of classical invention in
vernacular Renaissance rhetoric, many treatises gave only lip service to the art of
rhetorical invention, placing the onus of creation and discovery on processes outside of
rhetoric: intuition, imagination, logic, and scientific inquiry. Genung’s textbook did outline modal inventional questions for description, narration, argument, and exposition
while Gertrude Buck applied psychology to the study of invention. After the Renaissance,
28
authors placed natural gifts, imitation, practice and art in descending order of importance
for teaching students to write (64).
Janice M. Lauer, Invention in Rhetoric and Composition, Chapter 4 Issues over the
Nature, Purpose, and Epistemology or Rhetorical Invention in the Twentieth Century
According to Lauer, the state of invention during the twentieth century had largely
abandoned rhetoric as a discipline, keeping only its application--the teaching of
composition. However, within composition, invention was largely ignored in English
Departments and often trivialized.
It wasn’t until the 40s and 50s that rhetorical invention began to reemerge. In the first
part of the twentieth century, the dormant state of invention and rhetoric as a whole was
manifest in English Studies where literature had eclipsed rhetoric and in the academy at
large where philosophy monopolized invention (65).
The first part of the chapter outlines some interdisciplinary intellectual developments in
the first half of the twentieth century that created a context for the renewal of interest in
invention. In 1949, Craig La Driére in “Rhetoric and ‘Merely Verbal’ Art” argued that
rhetoric had its own kind of thinking, a rhetorical dianoia whose end was in the addressee
(139). In 1953, Manuel Bilsky, McCrea Hazlett, Robert Streeter, and Richard Weaver in
“Looking for an Argument,” advocated a topical approach to college composition. Their
course at the University of Chicago aimed at discovering relevant and effective
arguments by using the topics of genus or definition, consequence, likeness and
difference, and testimony and authority” (74).
In the 1930s, I.A. Richards in The Philosophy of Rhetoric introduced a conception of
rhetoric as the study of verbal understanding and misunderstanding and its remedies,
building on a contextual basis of meaning (67).
“Two important theorists of this era whom Daniel Fogarty cites in his influential book
Roots for a New Rhetoric were Kenneth Burke and I.A. Richards. In the 1940s and
1950s, Kenneth Burke advanced a number of seminal concepts and theories that impacted
work on invention, including dramatism (language as symbolic action), the view that
language is primarily a mode of action rather than a mode of knowledge.” (66) Lauer
writes that the 1960s marked a turning point for invention--especially in English
departments around the country.
“At the 1961 Conference on College Composition and Communication,
speakers on a panel entitled “Rhetoric—The Neglected Art” argued for the
importance of rhetorical invention (Virginia Burke), while others spoke of rhetoric
as an intellectual art whose core was invention… Two years later, Dudley Bailey in
“A Plea for a Modern Set of Topoi” challenged composition instructors to develop
a new rhetorical invention, claiming that: “The heart of rhetoric has always been
‘invention’ and disposition (115-116)” (74).
29
In 1958, Michael Polanyi, in Personal Knowledge and later in The Tacit Dimension,
discussed tacit and focal knowledge in the act of inquiry and developed an epistemology
of personal knowledge. (67)
In 1969, Stephen Toulmin, in the Uses of Argument, challenged the dominance of formal
logic, questioning the validity of formal or analytic reasoning and theorizing informal or
substantive reasoning (68).
The new theories in the 60s and 70s reflected diverse conceptions of the nature, purpose,
and epistemology of invention according to Lauer. “Some theories of invention dealt only
with the exploration of subjects; others addressed the search for rational arguments to
support these. Very few treated the initiation of discourse. These theories also varied in
their conceptions of the social nature of invention and the purposes for rhetorical
invention, which included raising questions for inquiry, identifying points at issue,
stimulating text production, generating subject matter for texts, constructing new
knowledge, reaching insight, finding arguments for theses already held, interpreting texts,
and investigating from different perspectives” (76).
The new invention theories in rhetoric and composition also took shape and a number of
scholars in the emerging field of Rhetoric and Composition within English Studies
developed new theories of invention, generating research and pedagogies.
Scholars also began new research and experimentation in rhetoric and invention. Janice
Lauer documented the state of invention in English Studies in the mid 1960s. “Because
new studies of heuristic thinking defined it as more flexible and open-ended than logic
and as a guide to creative acts and complex arts, she maintained that heuristics had
potential for characterizing new theories of invention. She described a number of these
theories, critiquing them with criteria gleaned from a broad range of literature on
heuristics: theories based on Aristotle’s rhetoric (e.g., Corbett, Hughes, Brockriede,
Black, Dearin, and Weaver); Overstreet’s behaviorism; Kenneth Burke’s dramatism...”
(81).
During this period there was also critique on the new emerging interest in invention and
rhetoric. The long debate over whether invention’s purpose was heuristic or hermeneutic
was key.
Kenneth Burke, Permanence And Change An Anatomy of Purpose, chapter four:
Argument by Analogy.
In this chapter, Burke distinguishes heuristic characteristics in linguistics, writing, and
thought. Burke juxtaposes Analogy and Proof, Interrelation of Analogy, Metaphor,
Abstraction, Classification, Interest, Expectance, and Intention, he also writes about the
Incongruous Assortment of Incongruities.
30
Burke writes that men have long confused heuristic qualities in thought with reiteration
or rearrangement of old information:
The question of new meanings or heuristic is confused in its individual trends;
and though many men would seem to have merely been breaking down old
schemes of orientation, it is probable that with greater or lesser clarity they were
doing so in accordance with a new schematization of their own which they were
offering as replacement (111).
Analogy can be a roadblock to understanding. Burke suggests that it has long been one of
man’s faults to associate one thing with another based on similarity and that that might
hinder heuristic endeavors. “The great danger of analogy is that a similarity is taken as
evidence of an identity. Because two things are found to posses a certain trait in common
which our point of view considers notable, we take the common notable trait to indicate
identity of character” (97). Burke’s assumption here then is whether or not we can
distinguish our thoughts as being “logical and analogical.” The degree to which we can
make that distinction will determine how “clearly” one might be able to formulate a
thought and then express it---which is where heurism comes in.
Burke also explains how success tests throughout the years have never been without
fallacy. The reason for this is because once there is a thought that “something” is
generally good, or produces results, the “something” will continually be attributed to
production. However, that outside factors could have aided in the productivity of a
particular task, never comes into question because it has already been so widely held that
the “something” was to thank. “If people believe a belief and live, the fact of their
survival tends to prove the adequacy of the belief. This is so because wrong beliefs are
not necessarily fatal--and because even dangerous beliefs may be of such a sort that they
cannot easily be proved dangerous” (101). Burke is saying that since the beginning, man
has no imoporves on his testing of “analogical extensions by reference.
In the section Interrelation of Analogy, Metaphor, Abstraction, Classification, Interest,
Expectancy, and Intention Burke links our senses with our interpretation and thus our
interests. “…sensory equipment is a set of recording instruments that turn certain events
into a certain kind of sign, and we find our way through life on the basis of these signs”
(106). We classify ourselves by our interests and similarly our intentions. “Classifications
are heuristic by reason of the fact that, through the process of abstraction and analogy,
they dictate new groupings, hence new discoveries” (106). Abstraction: when similar
strains are drawn from dissimilar events, we classify them together on a basis of common
abstraction, dependent upon the nature of our interest at the time. “The factor of
expectancy suggests also the relationship between interest and intention” (104).
Analogical extensions (linguistic inventions) used when one attempts to extend one’s
classifications into regions of inference, no sanctioned by the precious usages of his
group, which is determined by the particular kind of interested uppermost at the time
(104).
Interpretation is not only a factor of our senses.
31
“The business of interpretation is accomplished by the two processes of oversimplification and analogical extension. We oversimplify a given when we
characterize it from the standpoint of a given interest--and we attempt to invent a
similar characterization for other events by analogy. The great difficulty with the
method in the judging of historical events is that it requires the rectification of
false analogies through trial and error…” (107).
For invention burke says we can arbitrarily begin discussion with interests, why not do it
deliberately by using interests known to begin a discussion and using “the concept of
metaphorical and analogical abstraction until in covers the whole field or orientation?
Burke claims that discovery or invention (heuristic) can be done through
“classifications.” Original classifications are achieved through the “characterizing” of
events, or the meaning given by us to name, or classify our experience. And we tend to
classify things together based upon their meaning. An example of this is the term
“dictatorship.” “When listening disparate governments, such as “Fascism, Communism
and monarchy,” they successfully classify together under the term dictatorship.” When
the “processes of abstractions (to draw from) and analogy (examples of the unlike for
emphasis) are put in motion, “they dictate new groupings, hence new discoveries.” Burke
is referring to a “new approach to reality.” If one is to write or speak, his/her discourse
could be an exposition about the comparison of what once was considered incongruous in
meaning, like Fascism and Communism, are now unified because of a classification’s-dictatorship--meaning (103).
Edward Bernays, Propaganda
All that we prefer, suggest, are drawn to, and ultimately are interested is directly liked to
propaganda. In Propaganda, Bernays suggests that the “invisible government” is what
shapes society’s perception as to what is in, what is out, and what is a necessity.
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions
of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who
manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government
which is the ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds molded,
our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.
They govern us by their qualities of natural leadership, their ability to supply
needed ideas and by their key positions in society” (37).
Bernays’ explanation of the “machine” is one that uses rhetoric in its classical form--for
persuasion of masses of people. In the beginning chapters, Bernays defines propaganda
and offers us an alternate view of the word, paralleling it to rhetoric. He also established
why it is necessary for propaganda to exist.
According to Bernays, our lives are so inundated with objectives to accomplish,
appointments to keep, and other daily mundane activities that were we given the option to
32
be in control of each and every factor of our lives, that we would be unable to function.
“But the American voters soon found out that without organization and direction their
individual votes, cast, perhaps, for dozens of hundreds of candidates would produce
nothing but chaos.”
“In theory, every citizen makes up his mind on public questions and matters of private
conduct. In practice, if all men had to study for themselves the abstruse economic,
political, and ethical data involved in every question, they would find it impossible to
come to a conclusion without anything.” This is where propaganda comes in. Bernays
suggests that propaganda exists to maintain order.
Bernays also explores the extent to which out minds have been shaped by these invisible
authorities. The Public Relations sector was created to be the agent who works with the
media to bring certain ideas to the consciousness of the people. These ideas enter society
simply as a suggestion. But that suggestion is the seed from which preference grows.
These suggestions can be as subtle as product placement or use of certain colors in a
political advertisement, or as obvious as celebrity advertising.
Bernays writes that ‘New Propaganda,’ which employs tactics from classical rhetoric in
persuasion, “is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the
relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.” Advances in communication
during the twentieth century have made it easier to persuade large groups; it also lends to
the “herd” mentality of society in general. “This practice of creating circumstances and of
creating pictures in the minds of millions of persons is very common. Virtually, no
important undertaking is now carried on without it…so vast are the numbers of minds
which can be regimented, that a group at times offers an irresistible pressure before
which legislators, editors and teachers are helpless” (52-53).
Psychology also plays an important role in Bernay’s ideas about public relations and the
use of rhetoric. “If we understand the mechanism and motives of the group mind, is it not
possible to control and regiment the masses according to our will without them knowing
it? (71). The study of mass psychology is not exact, but human’s instinct to survive, and
thus adhere to the ‘herd mentality’ assures that if studied closely, the majority of people
will be as susceptible to influence from these invisible entities. Furthermore, Bernays
writes that “when the example of the leader is not at hand and the herd must think for
itself, it does so by means of clichés, pat words or images which stand for a whole group
of ideas or experiences” (75).
Business and economic growth is another facet in society in which rhetoric has been
employed. Because of society’s new advances in information and communication, society
has become aware of business and economics like never before. Thus, “business today is
taking the public into partnership” (83). The partnership on the part of the business must
employ rhetoric in order to reach the individual on a personal level--advertising, and has
been directly influenced by mass production. “Mass production is profitable only if its
rhythm can be maintains--that is, if it can continue to see its product in steady or
increasing quantity.”
33
Bernays explores how propaganda has been used in politics and women’s issues.
“Whether in the problem of getting elected to office or in the problem of
interpreting and popularizing new issues, or in the problem of making day-to-day
administration of public affairs, a vital part of the community life, the use of
propaganda, carefully adjusted to the mentality of the masses, is an essential
adjunct of political life” (110).
“Women in contemporary America have achieved a legal equality with
men…This does not mean that their activities are identical to those of
them…women’s most obvious influence is exerted when they are organized and
armed with the weapon of propaganda…the suffrage campaign showed the
possibilities of propaganda to achieve certain ends.” 130
Propaganda and all its components, which use rhetoric as a device for persuading large
groups of people is what keeps the democratic society in order as well as propel the
economic structures of capitalism.
Further Readings
Cicero De Inventio passim
Halford, Donna. “Angel Day.” 2/21/06. <www.dhalford.42.com/>
Hildebrant, Herbert W. ed. Richard Sherry’s Treatise of Schemes and Tropes. (1550,
1555). Scholars Facsimiles & Reprint (1961). ISBN 0820112585
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: U of Chicago P,
1980.
Matthes, D. “Hermagoras con Temnos.” Lustrum 3 (1958), pp. 58-214
Mazzeo, Joseph Anthony. Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Studies. NY: Columbia
U Press, 1964.
Russell, D.A. Greek Declamation. Cambridge U Press, 1983.
Solmsen, F. “The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric.” AJP. 62 (1941), pp 35-50, 169,
190.
Stump, Eleonore. Boethius’s De Topicis Differentiis. Ithaca: Cornell U Press, 1978.