Discussant’s Comments on “Transparency – From Enlightenment to
Neoliberalism Or When a Norm of Liberation becomes a Tool of Governing” by
Afshin Mehrpouya (Accounting and Management Control Department, HEC,
France) and Marie-Laure Djelic (Management Department, ESSEC Business
School, France).
Discussant: Prem Sikka (University of Essex, UK)
Overview of the Paper:
The concept of transparency is intertwined with notions of democracy, accountability,
efficiency, liberation, fairness and justice, and is now routinely mobilized in public
debates about competing discourses on governance, accounting, auditing and
emancipator change. It has become the grand narrative of our times and is used to
(re)position social subjects. What does it mean? How has its meaning shifted and
may be transparency has become something that it was not expected to be? Such
questions form the backdrop this rich and fascinating paper.
The paper’s main aim (p. 3) is to “probe the various meanings historically associated
with the powerful notion of transparency. We explore the competing and conflicting
mobilizations of transparency for different purposes, be it to liberate, to deliberate, to
legitimize, to control, to structure or to govern. We deconstruct the unstable historical
assemblage of faults, fissures and heterogeneous layers that have steered the
evolution and transformation of this fluid but dominant signifier and norm (Foucault,
1977b, p. 82). This, we argue, constitutes an important gap in contemporary studies
of accounting and accountability, and our objective here is to begin addressing it”.
The paper argues that there has been a fundamental shift in the meaning of
transparency. Its meaning has shifted from being a norm of emancipatory
accountability which intended to expose the few to the many, to one of governing
where now many are exposed to the few. In other words, the politics of contemporary
societies, or neoliberalism to be more specific, may have blighted the dreams of the
enlightenment philosophes and the concept is transparency is more likely to be used
as an instrument of social engineering to achieve a particular kind of control.
The paper’s methodological approach is to “undertake a conceptual genealogy of
transparency. Starting from the notional roots of transparency in Enlightenment
thinking, we identify the various intellectual trajectories – each with its own
assemblage of actors, institutions, language and power relations – and show the
points of interface between them” (p. 4). The paper explains that “Conceptual
genealogy is a “history of morals, ideals and metaphysical concepts.” It is a history of
successive “interpretations” pointing to different “systems of rules” and regimes of
power (Foucault, 1984, p. 86). It is a “form of history, which can account for the
constitution of knowledge, discourses…” (Foucault, 1978, p. 118). Conceptual
genealogy, however, is a “particular form of history that does not presuppose linear
evolution, teleology, destiny, identity or even path dependency. Instead, it gives pride
of place to contingency, errors and chance ...” (p. 10). The methodological approach
is valuable because it can provide a deeper understanding of the notion of
transparency by fragmenting and disturbing the assumed foundations, and in the
process encourage reflections and engagement with layers of contemporary social,
economic and political reality. The papers adopts a classical forward looking
approach to genealogy as it moves from older, contextualized meanings towards
dominant contemporary ones and attempts to uncover the key patterns, events and
mechanisms that account for conceptual transformation.
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The paper’s genealogical detail unfolds by consideration of four historical trajectories
of transparency (p. 13) which have arguably shaped the subsequent debates and
meanings assigned to notions of transparency. These are characterized by the
enduring legacy of the enlightenment and the association of transparency with
publicity, democracy and accountability, all meant to expose the few to the gaze of
many. The enlightenment also incubated a variety of liberalism espoused by John
Locke and Adam Smith who in an emergent capitalism were concerned with
transparency to facilitate workings of an efficient market. At the same time, the
Benthamite surveillance of the masses was considered to be a necessary condition
for the improvement of social welfare. The complexities of managing society, also
encouraged faith in statistics or numerical representations of society, especially as
nation-states and corporations vied for leading positions,
The paper then shifts attention to the twentieth century and considers what it calls
“the transnational turn” (p. 22). It notes how particular notions of transparency,
articulated by the US, the League of Nations and the United Nations, facilitated
diffusion of liberal democracy and concerns about calling the state to account
through freedom of information laws. These developments are accompanied by the
“market turn- towards transnational calculative transparency” (p. 30). The post-war
construction of Europe through the Marshall plan associated transparency with
numerical construction of reality to enable policymakers to steer the economy and
remake society. Complex social interactions could be studied and controlled through
selected economic statistics. Arguably, one of the biggest shifts in the meaning of
transparency occurred with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s. With the support of
the (neoliberal) state quest for economic efficiency became associated with
transparency. Statistics relating to rising unemployment, rate of inflation, balance of
payments deficits and public debt were all portrayed as providing insights into the
workings of the state, and the state was portrayed as wasteful and inefficient and had
to be rolled back. The neoliberal project portrayed markets as efficient and
transparency increasingly became associated with the welfare of investors.
Accounting was also enrolled and the needs of capital markets and investors welfare
became central to financial reporting. Transparency began to be mobilised in the
name of market stability, governance and interests of shareholders. The nature of
financial reporting also shifted from concerns about stewardship to the informational
needs of shareholders and markets. The concern about the rights of individuals and
citizens, once championed by enlightenment philosophes, became marginalised.
Some Observations
The paper is ambitious in scope and rich in detail. I have a number of observations.
1. The paper is Western-centric and universalizes western logics. There are also
Eastern (for example, see Shah, 2007; Liyanarachchi, 2008), and other, ways of
understanding notions of transparency and accountability, but this is not aired in
the paper.
2. One advantage claimed for Foucaldian methodologies is that they can help to
draw attention to continuities, discontinuities and contradictions. This may require
prior theorization of society and the social world, especially if the concept of
transparency and related notions of democracy and accountability are presented
as universal constructs. The paper’s starting point seems to be that the
enlightenment philosophes somehow advanced universal virtuous ideals though
there is no indication how the thoughts of enlightenment philosophes acquired a
universal currency.
2
The enlightenment philosophes advanced notions of transparency and
accountability to enhance personal liberty and freedom of man, but which man
had the right(s) or deserved to be emancipated (Paine, 1985).
John Stuart Mill championed notions of liberal democracy in England, but at the
height of empire building by European countries these ideals were somehow not
applicable to Indians. Apparently, the best thing for Indians was to remain
subjugated and be governed by the opaque governance structures of the East
India Company (Mill, 1977).
French intellectual Alexis de Tocqueville attacked the American mistreatment of
black slaves and native Americans, but the same norms and critique did not apply
to the treatment of Muslims by France whose subjugation by violent means was
considered to be necessary and justified (de Tocqueville, 2001).
David Hume, Eighteenth century Scottish historian, considered to be the father of
empiricism wrote: “I am apt to suspect that negroes, and in general all other
species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior of
whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion that whites.
Nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious
manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most
rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present
TARTARS have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of
government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference
could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an
original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies,
there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever
discovered any symptom of ingenuity; tho’ low people, without education, will start
up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA,
indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but ’tis likely he is
admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words
plainly” (Garrett, 2000: 171-172)
It would be helpful to have some rationale for starting with the enlightenment
philosophes and some clarity about whether their discourses were racist and thus
hindered the development of freedom, equality, justice, fairness and democracy,
which are all associated with the notion of transparency, for some. Thus,
enlightenment’s notions of transparency, accountability and freedom were not
intended for all. Maybe writers such as Frantz Fanon, C.L.R. James and Aimé
Césaire rehabilitated transparency to give it a universal flavour.
3. The enlightenment’s fable of progress is present in the paper. Openness,
embodied by the freedom of information laws (FOI), is considered to be another
episode in the onward march of transparency. This can produce a certain kind of
comfort and the feeling is that somehow everything is more open and democratic
though that might not be the case. To my mind, most western states have ‘right to
know’ laws rather than FOI laws. We do not know what exactly is held by the
state and therefore do not always know what to ask. For example, recent
revelations by US whistleblower Edward Snowden show that the state holds
considerably more data about individuals (few watching the many) than any of us
ever imagined. Democratic institutions (e.g. parliament) had little knowledge of
the data or the mechanism used to collect such data. Individuals can only make
requests for information whose existence is unknown. Even if the information is
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held by the state, it can easily be denied to citizens1. For example, the public
authorities in the UK can withhold information by invoking any of the twenty-three
public interest exemptions available under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
It would appear that FOI seeks to silence whistleblowers and conscientious
objectors by regulating the flow of information and may not be such a big victory
for transparency or openness. Such practices may enhance the rhetoric of
transparency but actually stymie or limit the citizen’s right to know. So how should
we understand transparency, its limits, rhetoric and mobilization to deny
information?
4. Why do the rhythms of transparency differ in the economic and political spheres?
For example, there is no equivalent of FOI for large corporations whose turnover
may be even bigger that the GDP of nation states. Even in the economic sphere,
it is hard to know things like corporate taxes paid by transnational corporations in
each country even though such disclosures may assist investors in making
assessment of possible costly lawsuits and actions by tax authorities. Seemingly,
capitalist enterprises value secrecy as it gives them competitive advantage, but
this is hard to reconcile with the welfare of investors and markets. So how are
these tensions resolved? Why do arguments against transparency hold sway?
5. In tracing the genealogy of transparency, the paper is in danger of overlooking the
politics of transparency and how resources are marshaled to advance or frustrate
particular notions of transparency. It associates the UNDHR with freedom of
information and transparency (p. 28), which could arguably enable people to live
fulfilling lives, but these freedoms are constantly suppressed. For example,
employment contracts contain gagging clauses which prevent employees from
information the public about questionable corporate practices. Such gagging
clauses are permitted by the state which under UNDHR has the prime
responsibility for advancing human rights.
6. Rather than being an emancipatory force could transparency be a regressive
tool? For example, requests to companies for greater transparency may result in
crumbs of additional information, but that does not change the structure of
corporations, power of corporations or the power of its directors. Transparency by
itself, does not give any additional rights to stakeholders to call directors or
companies to account. Over a century ago, shareholders had the right to examine
company books, but with the emergence of professional accountants those rights
have disappeared and shareholders have to rely on the opinion of accountants.
Seemingly, transparency in company accounts and audit reports has been
accompanied by loss of rights.
7. The paper assumes that transparency somehow leads to social change. This is
difficult to argue against, but some counter examples pose questions. For
example, companies publish some information about executive remuneration, but
the disclosures have not resulted in equitable distribution of income. If change is
to be achieved then disclosures would need to be accompanied by power and
politics. However, the paper says little about such matters. What does
transparency fuel? How? When?
1
See Professor Prem Sikka v Information Commissioner, EA/2010/0054, 11 July
2011;
http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/i544/20110909%20Decision
%20and%20Conf%20Sch%202.pdf
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8. Transparency seems to promise so much but delivers so little. Thus, despite
reams of corporate governance codes and accounting standards (few setting the
norms for many), banks have been unable to produce meaningful financial
statements. Their annual accounts provide little information about risks, assets,
liabilities, leverage and capital and consequently may have destabilized the
markets. Arguably, markets are not a sea of transparency (p. 16). So, why does
the huge social investment in transparency deliver so little? Do accounting
practices add to openness and transparency or is transparency now a rhetorical
and ideological resource, which functions to obfuscate matters.
9. The papers states that “Statistics and calculative devices played little role in the
transnational space up until the 1960s”. This claim seems to be highly
problematical as at the beginning of the twentieth century London exchange had
a large number of overseas companies listed on it. Investment in European
colonies ad extraction of surpluses must have required some knowledge of
money flows. In 1933, the League of Nations sponsored an international treaty on
taxation of corporate profits (Picciotto, 1992) and this could not have been done
without some awareness of statistics.
10. Transparency is a social practice and a discourse. It must be produced,
consumed, regulated and represented in ways that reconstructs identities and
enrolls social subjects. How might we research this? The paper ends with a call
for research. It would be helpful to have some indication of the kind of projects
that scholars can undertake.
References:
de Tocqueville, A. (2001). Writings on Empire and Slavery (edited and translated by
Jennifer Pitts), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Garrett, A. (2000). Hume’s Revised Racism Revisited, Hume Studies Volume XXVI,
Number 1, April, pp. 171-178
Liyanarachchi, G.A. (2008). Ethics in accounting: Exploring the relevance of a
Buddhist perspective, Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, 7(2): 118-148.
Mill, J.S. (1977) John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume
XVIII, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Paine, T. (1985). The Rights of Man, New York: Penguin Books (originally published
in 1791).
Picciotto, S. (1992), International Business Taxation: A Study in the
Internationalization of Business Regulation, Cambridge: Cambridge University press
Shah, A. (2007). Jain Business Ethics, Accountancy Business and the Public
Interest, 6(2): 115-130.
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