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FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL COLLABORATION FOR DISASTER
MANAGEMENT: THE KATRINA EXPERIENCE
BY
Ann Marie Domino
and
Khashruzzaman Choudhury
Nelson Mandela School of Public Policy
Southern University
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70813
Phone :( 225)252-4882
(225)753-9306
Email:kchoudhury@yahoo.com
mdomino@ldaf.state.la.us
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
September 2006
[Abstract of paper for presentation at the Annual Meeting of Southeastern
Conference for Public Administration (SECOPA), Athens, Georgia, September 2730, 2006.]
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines critical issues involving federal-state-local collaboration for disaster
management, drawing upon the Katrina experiences. After the listing the important
literature on these issues including government reports, the paper outlines the
requirements of an effective collaboration model. The paper then identifies deficiencies
observed and experienced during Katrina on federal-state-local collaboration. The most
important finding of the paper is that collaboration on theory and practice was completely
lacking in almost all phases of the disaster management cycle: risk assessment and
remedial actions, comprehensive pre-disaster planning, and post-disaster rescue, relief
and rehabilitation operations.
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FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL COLLABORATION FOR DISASTER
MANAGEMENT: THE KATRINA EXPERIENCE
Introduction
Hurricane Katrina, a category four Hurricane and in U.S. history, struck the golf coast on
August 29, 2006. Katrina unleashed unprecedented death and destruction: over one
thousand people lost their lives; properties worth about $200 billion were destroyed; the
total area devastated in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, 93010 square miles equaled
the size of Great Britain; the debris from Katrina, if stacked onto the space of a football
field, would have reached over ten and a half miles high!
Federal Government, Louisiana State Government, New Orleans City Government, other
Louisiana parish governments, alongwith many other governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations(e.g. Federal Emergency Management
Agency(FEMA),Red Cross, Walmart, the Coast Guard)were involved in the management
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the Katrina disaster, covering the entire disaster management cycle beginning with
pre-disaster planning and preparedness and ending with post-disaster rehabilitation,
which has not yet been completed. Despite massive preparations, previous knowledge
and experience, and detailed emergency management plans and programs, Katrina
brought to the surface and demonstrated alarming interagency co-ordinations/cooperation/collaboration problems which seriously impeded disaster management
functions, especially pre-disaster evacuation and post-disaster rescue and relief
operations. Although theoretically federal, state and local governments all had their
detailed emergency plans (even with earlier mock exercise experience), effective
collaboration was glaringly lacking!
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Purpose, Scope, Methodology and Literature
This research is a part of a major research initiative at the Nelson Mandela School of
Public Policy and Urban Affairs, Southern University, which investigates the broad issue
of collaboration/co-ordination/communication amongst participant governmental and
non-governmental agencies/organizations in disaster management, drawing upon the
experiences gained from Hurricane Katrina.
The purpose of this present paper is quite modest: We wish to examine the federal-statelocal collaboration issue for Katrina in the framework of an effective collaboration
model, which identifies mistakes or lapses, and suggests improvement measures or
actions. In the very brief presentation that follows, we provide mostly our findings about
what went wrong in Katrina, without much elaboration. In reaching these findings and
conclusions, we reviewed all important secondary data and information on the Katrina
experience, including published and unpublished research papers, conference papers and
presentations, reports on congressional hearings, press reports, and several government
reports (especially, the White House Report titled “ The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina : Lessons Learned.”).
Although the literature on disaster, disaster management and Hurricane Katrina is vast,
not many research efforts have addressed the issue of intergovernmental collaboration in
disaster management. A selected list of research on such collaboration is provided under
“References” at the end of this paper.
A Collaboration Model
Although not exactly synonymous, the terms co-operation, collaboration and coordination have generally been used to mean the same phenomenon. Winer and Ray
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(1994) define collaboration as “--- a mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship
entered into by two or more organizations to achieve results they are more likely to
achieve results they are more likely to achieve together then alone”(p.24).While
acceptable as a “working” definition this definition lacks some important points, involved
in our warranted by , “effective” collaboration amongst national and sub-national
governments. For our purpose collaboration amongst different levels of government in
disaster management means co-operation amongst these agencies/organizations, based
upon or mandatory provisions included in these organizations’ anti-disaster emergency
management plans or programs. The reference to the three different levels of government
does imply some degree of superior-subordinate relationship not necessarily incorporated
in a general collaboration plan.
An effective collaboration model involving three levels of government somewhat
different from collaboration amongst general agencies, imply the following
assumptions/requirements/features.

A sharing of the belief that collaboration will deliver results which are more or
better than those likely to be achieved through individual efforts.

Prescription of a common governmental mission, explicitly and unambiguously
states in emergency plans and documents ,which indicate and describe
collaboration avenues, methods, degrees and other characteristics.

Commitment of politicians and the bureaucracy to the common mission.

Undertaking of all necessary and helpful measures which initiate, encourage and
sustain the prescribed collaborative activities and tasks such as : creation of
necessary political, administrative and logistical structures; assignments of tasks,;
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delegation of authority; pre-disaster survey/study to determine risks and undertake
preventable measures including construction; comprehensive pre-disaster
planning, involving the three tiers of government; mock rehearsals of emergency
plans: establishment of well defined communication channels; comprehensive
planning for pre and post disaster activities involving all private or nongovernmental organizations, including first responders, non-profit organizations,
faith-based organizations, and volunteers; establishment of
task groups to
constantly plan, rehearse, monitor and evaluate expected collaborative results.

Collaboration must be a continuous, and not sporadic, activity, implying a lifelong
cycle of collaboration amongst the three tiers of government, institutional and
other private or/and non-governmental organizations. This “ lifecycle” of
collaboration implies the following sequential stages/operations :initial planning
and start-up ‘ establishment of agreements, protocols and channels; growth and
institutionalization ; matured and sustainable communication and co-operation;
comprehensive
evaluation
after
“
disaster”,
and
reformulation
of
goals/objectives/methods, based upon feedback.

Specific provision of an unambiguous command and control structure which takes
over in the time of emergency. This structure must indicate the span of control
and chain of command involving all concerned governmental and nongovernmental agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA
; several Federal Government Departments; the Armed Forces; the National
Guard; Governor; state, parish and city governments; Red Cross; first responders;
nonprofit organizations; many citizen groups; volunteer groups; etc.
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
a clear
“ understanding of the roles that various public, nonprofit, voluntary,
faith-based and private organizations as well as private citizens play in all stages
of emergency management including preventions, preparedness, response and
recovery”. (Norris-Tirell, 2006).

Periodic rehearsal of possible disaster scenarios to test response capacity and
effectiveness, as per per-determined and prescribed strategies/participants cited in
emergency plans/operational programs.

A clear recognition in emergency plans/programs of uncontrollable variables
operating in emergencies and best provisions for such eventualities, including the
role of the media, citizen groups, and public perceptions of disaster preparedness
and response efforts.

Provisions of clear channels and means of communications amongst all disaster
response providers, the media and general public; establishment of additional (if
necessary, traditional) means of communication, with clear focal points for
contacts, communications and information dispersals.
Collaboration Deficiencies Displayed During Katrina
The review of the relevant literature and actual study of Hurricane Katrina reveal the
following deficiencies displayed during the storm and its accompanying storm surges and
flooding. Some of these deficiencies have already been acknowledge on the literature
especially the White House Report on federal responses. The deficiencies are presented
in the framework in the framework of our model outlined above.

There was no clear recognition and acknowledgement a sharing philosophy with
its benefits in federal, state and local plans.
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
The common governmental mission was not highlighted or emphasized enough in
emergency plans or documents, displaying the glaring lack of
“ a national
preparedness system: ,acknowledges by even the White House Report : At the
most fundamental level, the current system fails to define federal responsibility
for national preparedness in catastrophic events . Nor does it establish clear,
comprehensive goals along with and integrated means to measure their progress
and achievement.
Instead, the United States currently has guidelines and
individual plans, across multiple agencies and levels of government that do not
yet constitute an ‘integrated’ national system that ensures unity of effort”.

Since the common mission was not explicitly stated and crystallized, the question
of commitment of politicians and the bureaucracy was never seriously
contemplated and acted upon. All plans and documents lacked “a common vision
for preparedness – what end states are we seeking to achieve and how do we plan
t get there?” (The White House Report, Chapter 6).

Although risk assessments were done, and the risks had been known for a long
time, preventable levee restructuring and repairs were not undertaken. This
partner should combine the various disparate citizen preparedness programs into a
single national campaign to promote and strengthen citizen and community
preparedness”. (Chapter 6).

The worst lapse in Katrina was the dangerous absence of an unambiguous
command and control structure involving all response groups, including the three
levels of government. This resulted in non-utilization of resources, lying idle, and
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non-interventions at critical times in a timely manner, leading to more deaths and
destructions hen were warranted by the catastrophe.

Periodic rehearsals were not undertaken; response capacity and effectiveness were
thus not tested.

The other deficiencies were a lack of recognition of uncontrollable variables and
non-provisions of eventualities; also a lack of understanding of citizen and other
response group perceptions, and provision of measures to address such
perceptions/concerns, if necessary.
Conclusions
This brief paper addressed the critical issues involving federal-state-local collaboration
for disaster management. The most important conclusion of the paper is that
collaboration in theory and practice was completely lacking in almost all phases of the
disaster management cycle in the case of Katrina. Although we do not provide
recommendations, improvements measures and actions are clearly suggested by our
review and findings.
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REFERENCES
Bardach, E. (1998). Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of
Managerial Craftsmanship. Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press
Behravesh, Nariman.2005. “The Worst Storm in U.S. History Will Have a Large Impact
on the National Economy”, Global Insight, September 14.
Boris, Elizabeth T. and Eugene Steuerle.(1999). Non-profit and Governmental :
Collaboration and Conflict. Washington, D.C : The Urban Institute Press.
Center for Economic and Social Justice, “ The Katrina Wake-up Call: A Strategy for
Turning Disaster into a Twenty-First Century Model for Regional Rebirth” website
file://F:\strategy%20for%20disaster%20number%204.thm
Choudhury,K.(1997). “Collaboration in a Disaster Management Cycle”, unpublished
paper.
Congressional Budget Office, 2005, “The Macroeconomic and Budgetary Effects of
Hurricane Katrina”, September 6, at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/docs6627/09-06ImpactKatrina.pdf
Foster- Fn’shman, P. et. al. (2001).” Facilitating Interorganizational Collaboration: The
Contributions of Interorganizational Alliances”, American Journal of Community
Psychology 29(6).875-906
Gray, B. (1989).Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Norris- Tirell, D. and J. Clay. (2006). “Collaborative Planning as a Tool for
Strengthening Local Emergency Management”, Journal of Public Management & Social
Policy, 12.26-36
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_________. (2006). “ Building Community Networks for Emergency Preparedness ;
First Responders, Non-profit Organizations,, Faith based Organizations and Volunteers”,
paper presented at the American Society of Public Administration(ASPA) Annual
Conference, Denver, Colorado, April.
Stehr, S. D. (2001). “Community Recovery and Reconstruction Following Disasters” in
Farzmand, Ali(ed.).
Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management. New York:
Marcel Dekker, Inc.
The White House Report on Katrina, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned. 2006(March). http://www.whitehouse-gov/reports/katrina-lessonslearned/html.
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2006. “Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita – Co-ordination between FEMA and he Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006
Hurricane Season”, GAO Report, GAO-06-712
Winer, M. & K. Ray. (1994). Collaboration Handbook.Saint Paul, MN : Amherst H.
Wilder Foundation
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