Index of Subjects
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AC: see ‘consequentialism, act- (AC)’
across-the-board approach:
act-consequentialism: see ‘consequentialism, act- (AC)’
actions:
o act-sets
o act-tokens
o act-types
o best: see ‘best, actions’
o compound
o individual
o intentional
o maximal set of (MSA)
o minimal
o negative
o positive
o simple
actualism:
agent-centered constraints:
o agent-centered restrictions
o consequentialization of
o infringements of
o inter-agent cases of: see ‘inter-agent cases’
o intra-agent cases of: see ‘intra-agent cases’
o special obligations
o violations of
agent-centered options:
o agent-favoring options
o agent-sacrificing options
o consequentialization of
agent-focused explanation: see ‘inter-agent cases, agent-focused explanation of’
agent-identicalness: see ‘alternatives, agent-identical’
agglomeration over conjunction:
o see also ‘bottom-up approach’
alternative(s):
o agent-identical
o available
o best available: see ‘alternative(s), optimific’
o optimal
o optimific
o time-identical
altruism:
anti-Footian procedure:
Last Updated: 8/13/10
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asymmetric relation:
background attitudes: see ‘judgment sensitive attitudes, background’
basic belief:
o and Gert’s view
o and imperfect reasons
o and incomparability
o and multiple-option cases
o and the satisficing conception of rationality
o and securitism
best:
o action
o expectably best action
o expectably morally best action
o morally best action
o outcome
better:
o better for
o better of kind
o better that
blameworthiness:
o and control
o and the free performance of an action
o and the knowledgeable performance of an action
o and the objective ought
o and the subjective ought
bottom-up approach:
o see also ‘agglomeration over conjunction’
buck-passing account of value:
o and agent-neutral reasons
o and the partiality challenge
o and pragmatic reasons
o and the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem
burning building case:
coherentist procedure:
commonsense consequentialism: see ‘consequentialism, commonsense (CSC)’
commonsense utilitarianism: see ‘utilitarianism, commonsense (CSU)’
comprehensively-adjusted utility: see ‘utility, comprehensively-adjusted’
consequentialism:
o act- (AC)
 defined
o the argument for act-consequentialism
o the argument for securitist consequentialism
o commonsense (CSC)
 initial formulation of
 final formulation of
o defined
o direct: see ‘consequentialism, act- (AC)‘
o dual-ranking act- (DRAC)
 defined
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 Kagan’s objection to
 Norcross’s objection to
 Splawn’s objection to
o indirect
o ruleo satisficing
o securitist (SC)
 defined
o traditional act- (TAC)
 defined
consequentialist prudence:
consequentializing:
o agent-centered constraints: see ‘agent-centered constraints, consequentialization
of’
o agent-centered options: see ‘agent-centered options, consequentialization of’
o consequentializing project
o how to consequentialize
o moral dilemmas: see ‘moral dilemmas, consequentialization of’
o self-other asymmetry: see ‘self-other asymmetry, consequentialization of’
o supererogatory acts: see ‘supererogation, consequentialization of’
constraining right:
constraint-adjusted utility: see ‘utility, constraint-adjusted’
control:
o over beliefs
o over judgment-sensitive attitudes
o volitional control
o voluntary control
counterfactual determinism:
criterion of rightness:
o for dual-ranking act-consequentialism
o for maximizing act-utilitarianism
o meta-: see ‘meta-criterion of rightness (META)’
o for Schefflarian utilitarianism
o for traditional act-consequentialism
CSC: see ‘consequentialism, commonsense (CSC)’
CSU: see ‘utilitarianism, commonsense (CSU)’
deontically equivalent:
deontic equivalence thesis (DET):
deontic status:
o impermissible
o merely permissible
o obligatory
o optional
o permissible
o right: see ‘permissible’
o supererogatory
o superperfecterogatory
o wrong: see ‘impermissible’
deontic value:
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o deontic moral value
o expected deontic value
o expected deontic moral value
o inter-theoretic comparisons of
deontological prudence:
deontology:
desirable:
o see also ‘good’
desire:
o narrow versus broad construal of
o non-requiring reasons for
o requiring reasons for
DET: see ‘deontic equivalence thesis’
determinism:
o see also ‘counterfactual determinism’
distribution over conjunction:
o with respect to permissibility
o with respect to supererogatoriness
o see also ‘top-down approach’
DRAC: see ‘consequentialism, dual-ranking act- (DRAC)’
dualism of practical reason:
dual-ranking act-consequentialism: see ‘consequentialism, dual-ranking act- (DRAC)’
duty:
o imperfect
o of beneficence
o minimal fulfillment of
o negative
o partial fulfillment of
o perfect
o positive
o self-regarding
EGO (the egoistic normative principle):
egoism: see ‘ethical egoism’
ethical egoism:
evaluative ranking:
expectably best: see ‘best, expectably best action’
expectably morally best: see ‘best, expectably morally best action’
fittingness reasons: see ‘reasons, fittingness’
fitting pro-attitude account of value:
o see also ‘buck-passing account of value’
Footian procedure:
Foot’s thesis (FT):
freedom:
o of belief (doxastic freedom)
o of intention
o of judgment-sensitive attitudes
free performance of an action: see ‘blameworthiness, and the free performance of an
action’
FT: see ‘Foot’s thesis (FT)’
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generous donation case:
good:
o agent-neutral
o agent-relative
o and its relationship to ‘better’
o good for: see ‘better, better for’
o good of a kind: see ‘better, better of a kind’
o good that: see ‘better, better that’
o good-relative-to
o impersonal good
o morally
impartial spectator:
imperfect duties: see ‘duty, imperfect’
impermissibility: see ‘deontic status, impermissible’
impersonal-value teleology:
o see also ‘consequentialism, act- (AC)‘
independence axiom:
indexing permissions and obligations to times:
inclusion:
incommensurability: see ‘incomparability’
incomparability:
o roughly incomparable
o wholly incomparable
indirect consequentialism: see ‘consequentialism, indirect’
infringement: see ‘agent-centered constraints, infringements of’
intentions:
o ineffective
o the lack of volitional control over
o and plans
o and policies
o and resolutions
o and the toxin puzzle: see ‘toxin puzzle’
intra-agent cases:
inter-agent cases:
o agent-focused explanation of
o victim-focused explanation of
judgment-sensitive attitudes:
o background
o control over
o responsibility for
Kantianism:
Kantsequentialism:
Kavka’s toxin puzzle: see ‘toxin puzzle’
knowledgeable performance of an action: see ‘blameworthiness,
knowledgeable performance of an action’
law:
loan case:
Mahatma case:
MAU: see ‘utilitarianism, maximizing act- (MAU)’
and
the
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maximal set of actions (MSA): see ‘actions, maximal set of (MSA)’
maximizes:
maximizing act-utilitarianism (MAU): see ‘utilitarianism, maximizing act- (MAU)’
maximizing securitist utilitarianism (MSU): ‘utilitarianism, maximizing securitist
(MSU)’
META: see ‘meta-criterion of rightness (META)’
meta-criterion of rightness (META):
o see also ‘criterion of rightness’
mind-reading psycho case:
mine shafts case:
minimal act: see ‘act, minimal’
minimal donation case:
MO: see ‘overridingness, moral (MO)’
Mod-SU: see ‘utilitarianism, modified-Schefflerian (Mod-SU)’
moral badness (degrees of):
moral dilemmas:
o consequentialization of
o obligation dilemmas
o prohibition dilemmas
o and rational dilemmas
moral justifying strength:
o of non-moral reasons: see also ‘NMR+MJS (non-moral reasons have some [+] moral
justifying strength)’
morally best alternative: see ‘best, morally best action’
morally relevant reasons: see ‘reasons for action, morally relevant’
moral option:
o to act altruistically
o to act self-interestedly
o versus agent-centered option
moral overridingness: see ‘overridingness, moral’
moral overridingness of moral reasons:
o and agent-centered options
o and supererogation
o and the view that some moral reasons have no moral requiring strength
o and the view that some non-moral reasons have some moral justifying strength
moral rationalism (MR):
o as distinguished from the thesis that moral reasons are morally overriding
o as distinguished from the thesis that moral requirements are themselves reasonproviding
o and how it compels us to accept act-consequentialism
o initial formulation of
o final formulation of
o and legal rationalism
o the presumptive case for
o and the rejection of utilitarianism
o the revised version of and how it compels us to accept securitist
consequentialism
o and the too-demanding objection
moral reasons: see ‘reasons for action, moral’
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moral requiring strength:
o lacking in moral reasons: see also ‘MR~MRS (some moral reasons have absolutely
no [~] moral requiring strength)’
o and requiring reasons
moral responsibility:
o attributionist view of
o for judgment-sensitive attitudes: ‘judgment-sensitive attitudes, responsibility for’
o and reasons-responsiveness
o and volitional control
o volitionalist view of
moral securitism: see ‘securitism, moral (MS)’
motivating reasons for action: see ‘reasons for actions, motivating’
MPU: see ‘utilitarianism, maximizing possibilist (MPU)’
MR: see ‘moral rationalism (MR)’
MR~MRS (some moral reasons have absolutely no [~] moral requiring strength):
MS: see ‘securitism, moral (MS)’
MSA: see ‘actions, maximal set of (MSA)’
MSU: see ‘utilitarianism, maximizing securitist (MSU)’
multiple-option cases: see ‘basic belief, and multiple-option cases’
murder:
NMR+MJS (non-moral reasons have some [+] moral justifying strength):
nonconsequentialism:
non-moral reasons: see ‘reasons for action, non-moral’
non-normative facts:
non-normative uncertainty:
non-requiring reasons: see ‘reasons for action, non-requiring’
normative uncertainty:
normative facts:
normative reasons for action: see ‘reasons for action, normative’
objective ought: see ‘ought, objective’
objective rationality:
objective reason: see ‘reasons for actions, objective’
obligation dilemma: see ‘moral dilemmas, obligation dilemmas’
obligatory action: see ‘deontic status, obligatory’; see also ‘duty’
optimal alternative: see ‘alternative, optimal’
optimal reason: see ‘reasons for actions, optimal’
optimific alternative: see ‘alternative, optimific’
optimific reason: see ‘reasons for actions, optimific’
ought:
o advisory sense of
o all things considered
o implies ‘can’
o implies ‘scrupulously securable’
o just plain ought
o moral
o objective ought
 and advice
 and blame
 and first-person practical deliberations
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o rational ought
o subjective ought
outcome:
overridingness
o moral (MO): see also ‘moral overridingness of moral reasons’
o rational
o thesis
paradox of supererogation: see ‘supererogation, paradox of’
partiality challenge: see ‘buck-passing account of value, and the partiality challenge’
PDC (permissibility distributes over conjunction): see ‘distribution over conjunction,
permissibility’
perfect duty: see ‘duty, perfect’
performance of a set of actions:
personal possibility:
personal-value teleology: see ‘teleology, personal-value’
plans: see ‘intentions, and plans’
policies: see ‘intentions, and policies’
positive act: see ‘actions, positive’
positive duty: see ‘duty, positive’
possibilism:
practical comparatives:
procrastination:
professor procrastinate cases:
o case 1
o case 2
o case 3
prohibition dilemma: see ‘moral dilemmas, prohibition dilemmas’
Quinn’s self-torturer puzzle: see ‘self-torturer puzzle’
rational-desire teleology: see ‘teleology, rational-desire’
rational egoism:
rationality:
o objective
o satisficing conception of
o subjective
rational justifying strength:
rational overridingness: see ‘overridingness, rational’
rational requiring strength:
rational securitism: see ‘securitism, rational’
reasons:
o agent-neutral
o agent-relative
o attitude-related
o for belief
o content-related
o for desire
o epistemic reasons: see ‘reasons, for belief’
o evaluative reasons: see ‘reasons, for desire’
o fittingness
o having
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o to intend
o non-pragmatic
o object-given
o practical: see ‘reasons for action’
o pragmatic
o state-given
o time-relative
reasons for action:
o all things considered
o altruistic
o bracketing off
o decisive
o defeated
o distinction between moral and morally relevant reasons
o distinction between moral and non-moral reasons
o enticing
o explanatory
o imperfect
o impartial
o morally relevant
o moral
o motivating
o non-moral
o normative
o objective
o optimal
o optimific
o partial
o requiring
o self-interested
o silencing
o subjective
o successfully countered
o sufficient
o sufficient requiring
o teleological conception of: see ‘teleological conception of (practical) reasons
(TCR)’
o undefeated
o undermining
reasons-responsiveness:
requirements: see also ‘duty’
o legal
o moral
o rational
o of reasons
resolutions: see ‘intentions, and resolutions’
responsibility: see ‘moral responsibility’
restrictions: see ‘agent-centered constraints, restrictions’
revised version of moral rationalism (MR*):
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revised version of the teleological conception of practical reasons (TCR*):
rights:
RMAU: see ‘utilitarianism, revised maximizing act- (RMAU)’
rule prudence:
rule-utilitarianism: see ‘utilitarianism, rule-‘
satisficing conception of rationality: see ‘rationality, satisficing conception of’
satisficing consequentialism: see ‘consequentialism, satisficing’
Schefflerian utilitarianism: see ‘utilitarianism, Schefflerian (SU)’
scrupulous securability:
securability:
securitism:
o and the basic belief
o and consequentialism: see ‘consequentialism, securitist (SC)’
o moral
o rational
o teleological maximizing (TMS)
self-other asymmetry:
self-torturer puzzle:
sets of actions: see ‘actions, act-set’
simple act: see ‘actions, minimal act’
special obligations: see ‘agent-centered constraints, special obligations’
subjective ought: see ‘ought, subjective’
subjective rationality: see ‘rationality, subjective’
successfully counter:
sufficient reason: see ‘reasons for action, sufficient’
sufficient requiring reason: : see ‘reasons for action, sufficient requiring’
SUPDC (supererogation distributes of conjunction): see ‘distribution over conjunction,
supererogation’
SUPER:
supererogation
o Dreier’s view of
o and going above and beyond the call of duty
o and imperfect duties
o and the insufficient-moral-requiring-strength explanation
o and maximal sets of actions
o and maximizing act-utilitarianism
o and non-maximal sets of actions
o and the non-moral-reason explanation
o paradox of
o range of supererogatory acts
o and self-regarding duties
o sub-optimal supererogatory acts
o Zimmerman’s view of
SUPERF
Super-Max
Superperfecterogation
TAC: see ‘consequentialism, traditional act- (TAC)’
TCR: see ‘teleological conception of (practical) reasons (TCR)’
TCR*: see ‘revised version of the teleological conception of practical reasons (TCR*)’
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teleological conception of (practical) reasons (TCR)
o arguments for
o and the bearers of value
o and the buck-passing account of value
o initial formulation of
o final formulation of
o and friendship
o misconceptions about
o and Scanlon’s putative counterexamples
teleological maximizing securitism: see ‘securitism, teleological maximizing (TMS)’
teleology:
o impersonal-value: see ‘consequentialism, act- (AC)‘
o personal-value
o rational-desire
thresholds:
time-identicalness: see ‘alternatives, time-identical’
time relativity:
TMS: see ‘securitism, teleological maximizing (TMS)’
top-down approach:
o see also ‘distribution over conjunction’
too demanding objection:
Toxin puzzle:
traditional act-consequentialism: see ‘consequentialism, traditional act- (TAC)’
transitivity:
two daughters case:
ultimate end:
utile:
utilitarianism:
o commonsense (CSU)
o compelling idea of
o maximizing act- (MAU)
o maximizing possibilist (MPU)
o maximizing securitist (MSU)
o modified Schefflerian (Mod-SU)
o and moral rationalism
o Schefflerian (SU)
o revised maximizing act- (RMAU)
o ruleutility:
o aggregate utility
o comprehensively-adjusted
o constraint-adjusted
value (see also good):
o abstractism
o bearers of
o buck-passing account of: see ‘buck-passing account of value’
o concretism
o deontic
o fitting pro-attitude account of: see ‘buck-passing account of value’
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value-as-they-see-things:
victim-focused explanation: see ‘inter-agent cases, victim-focused explanation of’
violation: see ‘agent-centered constraints, violations of’
welfare:
welfarism:
wrong-kind-of-reasons problem: see ‘buck-passing account of value, wrong-kind-ofreasons problem’
wrongful conception case: