Filed 11/5/01
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
PETER VU,
)
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
)
)
v.
)
)
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY &
)
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Defendant and Respondent. )
____________________________________)
S078271
On certification from
The United States Court
of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
No. 98-55540
In a case involving an insurance claim for damages caused by the 1994
Northridge earthquake, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
certified the following question to this court: “Where an insured presents a timely
claim to his insurer for property damage under a policy, and the insurer’s agent
inspects the property but does not discover the full extent of covered damage, does
California Insurance Code § 2071 bar a claim brought by the insured more than
one year after the damage was sustained but within one year of his discovery of
the additional damage? Or, to put the matter differently, does Neff v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal.2d 165, 180 P.2d 900 (1947), remain good law?” (Vu v.
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 725, 727.)1
While this case was pending, California’s Legislature enacted Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.9, which extends the statute of limitations for some
insurance claims arising from the Northridge earthquake. We asked the parties to
1
(footnote continued on next page)
1
In answering this question, we explain below that Neff’s holding that an
unconditional denial of coverage commences the running of the one-year statute of
limitation of Insurance Code section 2071 remains good law. On the facts of this
case, however, Prudential may be estopped to raise the statute of limitations
defense if the insured can show that he refrained from bringing a timely action
because he reasonably relied on the insurer’s factual misrepresentation that his
damages were less than his policy’s deductible amount. We do not decide whether
the federal district court erred in sustaining defendant insurer’s motion for
summary judgment. That task remains for the United States Court of Appeals,
aided, we hope, by the views expressed in this opinion.
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S CERTIFICATION
The Northridge earthquake struck at 4:31 a.m. on January 17, 1994. It had
an estimated magnitude of 6.7 or 6.8 on the Richter Scale. Many residences and
commercial buildings were damaged. One report estimated that 450,000 insurance
claims were paid, totaling $12.5 billion. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) p. 2.) Another estimated that some
600,000 claims were paid, and put the damage figure at $15.3 billion. (Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analysis, 3d reading analyses of Sen. Bill No. 1899
(1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) p. 4.) Many other claims were rejected, often on the basis
(footnote continued from previous page)
brief the applicability of this statute to the case at hand to determine whether this
case was moot. Because the briefs showed there is a substantial dispute whether
the statute applies to this suit and whether it is constitutional, we conclude that this
case is not moot and that the certified question “may be determinative of a cause
pending in the certifying court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.5(a)(2).) Because
the effect, if any, of section 340.9 on this case is not within the scope of the
question certified to us by the Ninth Circuit, we do not address it in this opinion.
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of the statute of limitations. (Sen. Com. on Ins., Rep., Department of Insurance:
In Rubble After Northridge (Aug. 28, 2000) p. 9.) More than 2,000 complaints
were filed with the California Insurance Commissioner. (Assem. Com. on
Insurance, Rep. on Dept. of Ins., Northridge Earthquake (2000) p. 26.) The
Legislature later undertook an extensive investigation of the California
Department of Insurance, its handling of these complaints, and its settlements with
various insurers. (See generally Sen. Com. on Ins., Rep., Department of
Insurance: In Rubble After Northridge, supra.) The rejected claims have also
engendered considerable litigation and generated five published opinions in the
federal district court. (Campanelli v. Allstate Ins. Co. (C.D.Cal. 2000) 85
F.Supp.2d 980; Vashistha v. Allstate Ins. Co. (C.D.Cal. 1997) 989 F.Supp. 1029;
Ward v. Allstate Ins. Co. (C.D.Cal. 1997) 964 F.Supp. 307; Sullivan v. Allstate Ins.
Co. (C.D.Cal. 1997) 964 F.Supp. 1407; Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co. (C.D.Cal. 1997)
962 F.Supp. 1244.)
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit succinctly summarized the facts and
proceedings leading to its order of certification in this case:
“Peter Vu was one of countless insureds who suffered damage to his home
as a result of the infamous Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994. At the
time of the earthquake, Vu maintained a homeowner’s insurance policy with
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company. The policy included an
endorsement for earthquake damage, covering $300,000.00 for his dwelling and
$30,000.00 for appurtenant structures. A separate 10% deductible applied to each
coverage. As required by California Insurance Code § 2071, Vu’s policy
contained a one-year suit clause providing that ‘[n]o action can be brought unless
. . . the action is started within one year after the date of loss.’ Cf. Cal. Ins. Code,
§ 2071 (‘No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be
sustainable in any court of law or equity . . . unless commenced within 12 months
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next after inception of the loss.’). Within a few days of the earthquake, Vu
contacted Prudential to report that his home had sustained observable damage,
which included cracks in his walls and ceilings. An adjuster sent by Prudential
inspected Vu’s home on January 26 and informed him that he was entitled to
$2,500 for damage to appurtenant structures, but that the damage to his home was
only $3,962.50, an amount significantly below the policy deductible. On January
30, Prudential paid Vu for the appurtenant-structure damage.
“Relying on Prudential’s inspection and denial of his claim, Vu took no
further action until August 1995 when he discovered substantial additional damage
that had been caused by the earthquake. In September 1995, some twenty months
after Prudential had effectively denied Vu’s claim for damage to his home, an
appraiser hired by Vu estimated that the earthquake damage to Vu’s home far
exceeded the $30,000 deductible.[2] Vu promptly informed Prudential and
requested coverage for this newly discovered damage. Prudential declined on the
ground that the one-year statute of limitations on actions for recovery of claims
had expired.
“Two and a half years after Prudential had resolved Vu’s original claim, but
less than a year after Vu discovered the additional damage, Vu filed suit in federal
district court. Vu alleged that Prudential was estopped from invoking the one-year
statute of limitations because his failure to bring an action within one year was the
direct result of his reasonable reliance on Prudential’s January 1994 inspection,
and on Prudential’s representation that the damage to his home fell below the
$30,000 deductible. The district court granted Prudential’s motion for summary
“An architect hired by Vu in 1997 concluded that there was $302,728.40 of
damage to Vu’s home and $348,024.20 in total damage to his property.” (Vu v.
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 172 F.3d at p. 727, fn. 2.)
2
4
judgment, holding that the one-year statute of limitations acted as a bar to Vu’s
breach-of-contract claim and to his second claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Vu timely appealed.” (Vu v. Prudential
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 172 F.3d at pp. 727-728.)
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON INSURANCE CLAIMS
The ordinary statute of limitations for breach of a written contract is four
years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.) Insurance claims for property damage, however,
have a one-year limitation period. (Ins. Code, § 2071.) We explained: “The short
statutory limitation period is the result of long insistence by insurance companies
that they have additional protection against fraudulent proofs, which they could
not meet if claims could be sued upon within four years as in the case of actions
on other written instruments. (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.) Originally, the shortened
limitation periods were inserted into policies by insurers. Some courts declared
such provisions void as against public policy while other courts enforced them in
order to protect freedom of contract.” (Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co. (1944)
25 Cal.2d 399, 407.) In 1909, the California Legislature intervened in favor of a
shortened period of limitation by enacting the predecessor to Insurance Code
section 2071 to impose a 15-month limitation on claims under fire insurance
policies. (Stats. 1909, ch. 267, § 1, p. 409.) The statute was fashioned after a New
York statute governing lawsuits on fire insurance policies. “Thereafter, as
insurance coverage was expanded to cover more than fire (e.g., theft, lightning and
other property damage) the New York provision was broadened in 1943 by
replacement of the phrase ‘after the fire’ with . . . ‘after inception of the loss.’ ”
(Prudential-LMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 683,
quoting Proc v. Home Ins. Co. (1996) 17 N.Y.2d 239, 244.) In 1949, California’s
section 2071 was amended to conform more closely to the New York law,
5
shortening the limitation period to the one-year period of that law. (PrudentialLMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 682.)
For years, California cases debated whether the defense of the statute of
limitations was a favored or disfavored defense. In 1999, we resolved the matter:
“[T]he affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations should not be
characterized by courts as either ‘favored’ or ‘disfavored.’ The two public
policies identified above – the one for repose and the other for disposition on the
merits – are equally strong, the one being no less important or substantial than the
other.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 396.) Thus, we approach
the issue of the statute of limitations defense in this case with no policy
predisposition favoring either side.
III. ESTOPPEL
The Ninth Circuit has asked us whether our decision in Neff v. New York
Life Ins. Co., supra, 30 Cal.2d 165 (Neff), “remain[s] good law.” (Vu v.
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 172 F.3d at p. 727.) Neff involved the
doctrine of estoppel. In December 1926, Arthur Neff, the insured, became
disabled by tuberculosis. He submitted a claim under his disability policy in April
1927. The insurer denied the claim, asserting that it did not appear Arthur was
entitled to disability benefits. Arthur did not pursue the matter further. He died in
1937. In 1943, during his widow’s last illness, their son discovered the
correspondence between the insurer and his father. The son’s lawsuit alleged that
the insurer knew that Arthur was disabled within the meaning of the policy but
fraudulently represented that Arthur was not entitled to policy benefits.
By 1947, when we decided Neff, it was already well settled that “an
unconditional denial of liability by the insurer after the insured has incurred loss
and made claim under the policy gives rise to an immediate right of action.”
(Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 404.) It was also clear
6
that under some circumstances a misrepresentation or concealment by a defendant
might bar it from raising the defense of the statute of limitations. (Neff, supra, 30
Cal.2d 165, 169; see Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 226, 229232; Kimball v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 203, 210.) The issue in
Neff was how to treat the insurer’s allegedly false communication that the insured
was “ ‘not entitled to any benefits under [the] policy.’ ” (Neff, supra, at p. 168.)
Was this an unconditional denial of liability that would start the running of the
statute of limitations? Or was this a misrepresentation of fact on which the insured
reasonably relied, and thus a misrepresentation that could furnish a basis for
estopping the insurer from raising a statute of limitations defense?
This court viewed the insurer’s communication as a denial of liability, not a
misrepresentation of fact. Affirming the judgment for the insurer, the Neff
majority said: “Under the circumstances[,] the conclusion is inescapable that
plaintiff . . . belatedly attempts to assert a cause of action that allegedly accrued to
the insured as a result of an alleged representation which was made sixteen years
earlier by defendant and which was allowed to stand undisputed for that entire
period of time by the aggrieved parties – the insured and his widow – though the
same facts on which plaintiff here relies for relief were at all times known to
them.” (Neff, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 171.) We rejected the contention that an
estoppel could be grounded on the theory that the insurer concealed the “fact” of
the insured’s right to recovery. We said that such a rule “would mean that no
insurer could deny liability without indefinitely suspending the running of the
statute of limitations . . . .” (Id. at p. 172.) Referring to the case as one involving
a difference of opinion on the meaning of the policy, Neff concluded that “no mere
denial of liability, even though it be alleged to have been made through fraud or
mistake, should be held sufficient, without more, to deprive the insurer of its
7
privilege of having the disputed liability litigated within the period prescribed by
the statute of limitations.” (Id. at pp. 172-173.)
Plaintiff argues that developments in the law since Neff call for
reconsideration of that decision. He points out that although Neff itself recognized
that “an insurer has the duty of exercising good faith in its dealings with the
insured” (Neff, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 172), later cases have built upon this premise
and declared that an insurer and its insured have a “special relationship” (Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 685; see Kransco v. American
Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390, 401; Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, 575; Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co.
(1958) 50 Cal.2d 654, 659). Under this special relationship, an insurer’s
obligations are greater than those of a party to an ordinary commercial contract.
(Chase v. Blue Cross of California (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1152.) In
particular, an insurer is required to “give at least as much consideration to the
welfare of its insured as it gives to its own interests.” (Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 818.) Cases have referred to the relationship
between insurer and insured as a limited fiduciary relationship (see Gibson v.
Government Employees Ins. Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 441, 449-450) as “akin to
a fiduciary relationship” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court
(1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1226); or as one involving the “qualities of decency
and humanity inherent in the responsibility of a fiduciary” (Frommoethelydo v.
Fire Ins. Exchange (1986) 42 Cal.3d 208, 215).
The insurer-insured relationship, however, is not a true “fiduciary
relationship” in the same sense as the relationship between trustee and beneficiary,
or attorney and client. (See Croskey et al., 2 Cal. Practice Guide, Insurance
Litigation (The Rutter Group 2000) ¶ 12:1150.) It is, rather, a relationship often
characterized by both unequal bargaining power (see Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty
8
Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862, 879-884) in which the insured must depend on the good
faith and performance of the insurer (see Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot
Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28, 44; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., supra, 24
Cal.3d 809, 819). These characteristics have led the courts to impose “special and
heightened” duties, but “[w]hile these ‘special’ duties are akin to, and often
resemble, duties which are also owed by fiduciaries, the fiduciary-like duties arise
because of the unique nature of the insurance contract, not because the insurer is a
fiduciary.” (Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1148; see
Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co. (S.D.Cal. 1990) 740
F.Supp. 789; Croskey, supra, ¶ 12:1150.)
Consequently, even as the California cases expanded upon the significance
of the special relationship between insurer and insured, they have not viewed those
cases as undermining the Neff decision. For example, in Love v. Fire Ins.
Exchange, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, the plaintiffs’ house sustained subsidence
damage in 1981 caused by third party negligence. They filed a claim, which the
insurer denied on the ground that the policy did not cover such damage. In 1988,
the plaintiffs discovered the policy did cover subsidence damage when caused by
third party negligence. They brought suit, alleging that the insurer should be
estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because it had fraudulently
concealed that the policy provided coverage for their damage.
Citing Neff, the Court of Appeal in Love affirmed a judgment for the
insurer. It said: “It is undisputed that the Loves knew the operative facts (i.e.,
their home was damaged and the causes of damage included third party
negligence) . . . . [T]hey admit being told unequivocally in 1981 their claim was
denied for lack of coverage. [The insurer] neither ‘misrepresented’ nor
‘concealed’ any facts (as opposed to pertinent law or legal theories) . . . .” (Love v.
Fire Ins. Exchange, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1145.) In a footnote, Love
9
distinguished the estoppel cases cited by the plaintiffs, explaining that in those
cases “the defendants’ nondisclosures and/or misrepresentations effectively
concealed the facts upon which the cause of action rested, not the legal theories
supporting the complainants’ claims.” (Id. at pp. 1145-1146, fn. 5.)
On similar facts, the Ninth Circuit in Matsumoto v. Republic Ins. Co.
(1986) 792 F.2d 869, applying California law, also found for the insurer: “Here,
[the insurer’s] denial of the Matsumotos’ claims was, at most, an incorrect
interpretation of the terms of [the] contract. We are therefore bound by Neff v.
New York Life Insurance Co. [citation] wherein the California Supreme Court held
that an insurer’s disclaimer, even if ‘made through fraud or mistake’ could not toll
the statute of limitations.” (Id. at p. 872.) In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit
observed that the Matsumotos did not argue “factual concealment.” (Id. at p. 872,
fn. 3.) Many other cases have applied our decision in Neff without suggesting that
Neff’s reasoning may be outmoded. (See Prieto v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1188; Magnolia Square Homeowners Assn. v. Safeco Ins.
Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1049; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior
Court (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 604; Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 530; Lawrence v. Western Mutual Ins. Co. (1988) 204
Cal.App.3d 565; Cardosa v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 279,
283.)
We therefore reaffirm our holding in Neff, supra, 30 Cal.2d 165, that a
denial of coverage, even if phrased as a “representation” that the policy does not
cover the insured’s claim, or words to that effect, offers no grounds for estopping
the insurer from raising a statute of limitations defense. But as we have seen, Neff
and many of the cases applying Neff were careful to distinguish such a
representation from a misrepresentation of fact. The latter, they noted, could lead
to an estoppel.
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Here the undisputed representation is one of fact. William Leggitt,
Prudential’s inspector, examined Vu’s property after the earthquake, and provided
Vu with a worksheet showing the specific items of damage and the cost of repairs.
Leggitt then explained to Vu that the total cost of repairs, $3,962.50, was less than
the policy’s deductible amount of $30,000. Leggitt’s worksheet and explanation
did not merely convey a denial of coverage, or state Prudential’s interpretation of
the policy. Leggitt communicated specific facts describing the nature and amount
of damage, and he advised Vu not to file a claim because the total damage Vu had
incurred was less that the policy’s deductible.
On these facts, Prudential may be estopped from raising a statute of
limitations defense if Vu can show that he reasonably relied on Leggett’s
representation. As we explained in Benner v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1945) 26
Cal.2d 346: “An estoppel may arise although there was no designed fraud on the
part of the person sought to be estopped. [Citation.] To create an equitable
estoppel, ‘it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using such
means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved
his position and saved himself from loss.’ . . . ‘Where the delay in commencing
action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it cannot be availed of by him as
a defense.’ ” (Id. at pp. 349-350; see Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524525; Valvo v. University of Southern California (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 887, 896;
Elliano v. Assurance Co. of America (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 446; Industrial Indem.
Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 684.) Chase v. Blue Cross of
California, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1157, confirmed that “[a]n insurer is
estopped from asserting a right, even though it did not intend to mislead, as long
as the insured reasonably relied to its detriment upon the insurer’s action.”
On point is the decision of the federal district court in Ward v. Allstate Ins.
Co., supra, 964 F.Supp. 307, another Northridge earthquake case. Applying
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California law, the federal court said: “[A]fter the Plaintiffs had submitted a
timely claim to Allstate, they relied on the representations of Mr. Sanchez, a
purported expert and agent of Allstate, that their damage was limited to
approximately $20,000. For this reason, the Plaintiffs allowed the limitations
period to elapse without conducting a further investigation. This is precisely the
type of situation contemplated by the estoppel doctrine. Allstate cannot be
allowed to lull the Plaintiffs into sleeping on their rights, and then use the
limitations period as a sword to cut down their claims.” (964 F.Supp. at p. 310.)
Prudential disputes whether Vu’s reliance was reasonable, claiming that Vu
did not use due diligence to discover that his damage exceeded the deductible
amount under his policy. Whether Vu’s reliance was reasonable depends on a
myriad of factual questions. These may include: whether Vu himself was
qualified to evaluate the damage or had to rely on an expert (see Vu v. Prudential
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 172 F.3d 725, 730-731); what Vu told the
inspector about his damage; whether the inspector was qualified and, if not,
whether Vu knew of his lack of qualification; whether the inspector examined the
entire property and, if not, whether Vu knew the inspection was more limited;
what led Vu to suspect his damage was greater than the policy’s deductible
amount, and whether Vu then acted diligently after he so suspected, etc. Our role
here is limited to setting out general principles of California law for the assistance
of the Ninth Circuit. The application of these principles of law to the specific facts
of plaintiff’s case is a matter for the federal judiciary.
IV. CONCLUSION
We answer the Ninth Circuit’s certified question as follows: Our decision
in Neff, supra, 30 Cal.2d 165, remains good law to the extent it holds that an
insurer’s denial of a claim on the ground that the policy does not cover the loss in
question offers no basis for estopping the insurer from asserting the one-year
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period of limitation as a defense. Neff, however, does not necessarily control the
result in this case. Prudential, the insurer, inspected the property of Vu, its
insured, to determine the nature and extent of the damage caused by the
earthquake. After the inspection, Prudential represented incorrectly to Vu that his
loss was less than the policy’s deductible amount. Under these circumstances,
Prudential would be estopped from raising the one-year statute of limitations of
California Insurance Code section 2071 as a defense if Vu proves that he
reasonably relied on Prudential’s representation in not bringing a lawsuit within
the statutory period.
KENNARD, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
LEVY, J.*
*
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.
13
See page 16 for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XXX
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S078271
Date Filed: November 5, 2001
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Gruber & Kantor, Glenn R. Kantor, Daniel S. Gruber, Lisa S. Kantor and Sara Smith Ray for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Timothy G. Laddish, Assistant Attorney General, Randall P. Borcherding,
Deputy Attorney General for the State Insurance Commissioner as amicus curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and
Appellant.
James T. Linford as amicus curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, Janice A. Ramsay, James F. Henshall, Jr.,
William Wraith, Craig S. Simon; Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, Ronald D. Kent and Susan M. Walker
for Defendant and Respondent.
Robie & Matthai, Pamela E. Dunn and Daniel J. Koes for the Personal Insurance Federation of California
as amicus curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Lewis, D’Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard, Raul L. Martinez, Richard B. Wolf and Elise D. Klein for
California FAIR Plan Association as amicus curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, Peter H. Klee and Marc J. Feldman for the National Association of
Independent Insurers as amicus curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, Ronald D. Kent and Susan M. Walker for the Association of California
Insurance Companies as amicus curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
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Horvitz & Levy, Mitchell C. Tilner and Lisa Perrochet for 21st Century Insurance Company and Truck
Insurance Exchange as amici curiae.
James Osborne & Associates and W. James Osborne as amicus curiae.
Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor and Richard D. Martland for the California Chamber of
Commerce and California Manufacturers Association as amici curiae.
Barger & Wolen and Kent R. Keller for Century National Insurance Company, the National Association of
Independent Insurers and the Association of California Insurance Companies as amici curiae.
Robinson, Calcagnie & Robinson and Sharon J. Arkin for United Policyholders as amicus curiae.
Fred J. Hiestand for the Civil Justice Association of California as amicus curiae.
15
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Glenn R. Kantor
Gruber & Kantor
15821 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 600
Encino, CA 91436
(818) 981-9944
Susan M. Walker
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal
601 S Figueroa St
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Phone: (213)892-5039
16