Cyber-Terrorism and the Information Sword
Special Session
Organized by
Dr. Mahmoud Eid
University of Ottawa
Information–MFCSIT'06
The International Conference on Information
The Irish Conference on the Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science and
Information Technology
August 1st to 5th, 2006
National University of Ireland, Cork, Ireland
International Information Institute (III), Tokyo, Japan
Conference website: http://www.ucc.ie/info-mfcsit/index.html
Information–MFCSIT'06
National University of Ireland, Cork, Ireland, August 1 - 5, 2006
Theme:
Although there are many different concepts of “terrorism” and no one agreedupon definition of the term to date, most would acknowledge the existence of “cyberterrorism,” i.e., the use of information and communications technologies to facilitate any
or all forms of terrorism. Individuals or groups can now use cyberspace, computers, and
information technology, especially the Internet, to threaten, terrorize and cause harm to
both governments and civilians. Terrorists are pioneers in using the latest technologies. In
our growing era of cyber-terrorism, a cyber-terrorist can not only conduct the types of
attacks that we have grown accustomed to, such as remote bombing, but are increasingly
able to deliver horrific destruction at a remove. For example, it is possible, through the
use of the Internet, to hack into the processing control systems of a cereal manufacturer,
change the levels of iron supplement, and consequently kill the children of a nation
enjoying their breakfast. Info-terrorists no longer need to enter an office or a home to
steal or distort the information. Without leaving a single trace behind, info-terrorists can
steal and tamper with information, create new and corrupt existing electronic files, block
access to information by authorized users, and so on.
Information technology is a double-edged sword in time of terrorism. It can be
used to create strategies for peaceful resolutions or it can be attacked in ways that
exacerbate insecurity. Information can be accurate or distorted, true or false, complete or
partial, clear or vague, simple or complicated, stored or distributed, etc. In addition, any
information can be re-produced and re-created and consequently constitutes new set(s) of
information—hence the relationship to Norbert Wiener’s 1947 cybernetics. There are
several impediments to the comprehensive and effective flow of information during a
terrorist attack, such as lack of time, lack of adequate infrastructure and information
processing technologies, reduced communication between the opposing parties, and the
bureaucratic politics of information processing within the governmental apparatus.
Information that comes out of terrorist attacks has a different nature from that of normal
situations; it has similar characteristics to those of the terrorist situation itself. Therefore,
it must be searched out, produced, and dealt with differently by decision-makers (i.e.,
political, media, etc.); it should be accurate, clear, rational, fast, de-escalating,
constructive, and responsible. This session aims at sharing both ideas and the latest
experiences regarding the search, creation, processing, reproduction and attack of
information in the era of cyber-terrorism.
Presentations and Speakers:
Chair: Dr. Mahmoud Eid

Cyber-Terrorism in the Information Age: Actors, Communications, Tactics,
Targets, and Influences.
Mahmoud Eid, University of Ottawa, Canada.

Islamists and The Internet.
Maura Conway, Dublin City University, Ireland.
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
Anti- and Counter-Terrorism: Snagging the Practice of a Human Right to
Communicate.
Aliaa Dakroury, Carleton University, Canada.

E-initiatives and the Information Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts.
Georgios Terzis, Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium.
and
Bert Smeets, Belgian Army, Belgium.

Critical Interpretation of Broadband Services: Increasing Cyberterrorism in the
Information Age.
Dal Yong Jin, Simon Fraser University, Canada.

Cyber-Terrorism, Information Warfare, and the Olympics: An Application of
Information Filter Theory (Chomsky & Herman) to Security against Terrorism in
the Modern Olympics.
Michael Real and Diana Beeson, Royal Roads University, Canada.

Kavkaz Center vs. Kremlin: Cyber War and Propaganda during the Second
Russia-Chechnya Conflict.
Elina Yalov, University of Leeds, United Kingdom.
Speakers Biographies:

Diana Beeson graduated from the distinguished journalism school at the
University of Missouri, worked in newspaper and television news for six years,
public relations for five years, and broadcast management for eighteen years. She
completed her M.S. and Ph.D. in journalism and mass communication at the
University of Iowa. She currently teaches communication at Royal Roads
University in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.

Maura Conway is a Lecturer in the School of Law & Government at Dublin City
University where she teaches on the MA programmes in International Relations
and International Security & Conflict Studies. Previously, she was a Teaching
Fellow in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews,
Scotland and was awarded her PhD from the Department of Political Science at
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland. Her research interests are in the area of terrorism
and the Internet. She is particularly interested in cyberterrorism and its portrayal
in the media, and the functioning and effectiveness of terrorist Web sites. Along
with a number of book chapters, Maura has also published in First Monday,
Current History, the Journal of Information Warfare, and elsewhere.

Aliaa Dakroury is a Lecturer at the Communication Program, School of
Journalism and Communication, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. Her work
involves the examination of communication and human rights. She is a member of
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many human rights organizations, such as the right to communicate group, IFEX,
WACC, among others. Her areas of interest include human rights, communication
history, diaspora, and Islam. She is the recipient of the Van Horne Award from
the Canadian Communication Association, in its annual conference in June 2005,
London-Ontario. She received a B.A. (1993) in Public Relations and Advertising
from Cairo University’s Faculty of Mass Communication in Egypt and a M.A.
(2003) in Communication from Carleton University’s School of Journalism and
Communication in Canada, where she is currently completing her Ph.D. degree.
Her recent publications appear in different refereed journals such as: Journal of
Intergroup Relations, Culture, Language, and Representation Journal,
Reconstruction: Studies in Contemporary Culture Journal, American Journal of
Muslim Social Scientist, Global Media Journal, Journal of International
Communication, and elsewhere.

Mahmoud Eid is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Communication,
University of Ottawa, Canada. He previously taught in the University of Regina’s
School of Journalism in Saskatchewan, and in Carleton University’s School of
Journalism and Communication in Ontario. His professional expertise lies in
quantitative and qualitative research regarding the effects of mass media and
social development. His teaching experience, research interests, and publications
concentrate on international communication, media studies, communication
research methods, terrorism, crisis management and conflict resolution,
modernity, and the political economy of communication. He received his Ph.D.
(2004) from Carleton University’s School of Journalism and Communication in
Canada. Dr. Eid is the editor of the e-Book Cybercultures and serves as an
editorial board member for several academic journals and as an organizing
committee member for various international conferences. He has presented
numerous papers in global conferences and has published several book chapters as
well as journal articles in Communications: The European Journal of
Communication Research, International Journal of the Humanities, First
Monday, INFORMATION, and elsewhere.

Dal Yong Jin is Assistant Professor at Simon Fraser University, Canada. He
received his MA degree from the LBJ school of Public Affairs at the University of
Texas (Austin) in 2000, and he finished his Ph.D. degree from the Institute of
Communications Research at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign in
2004. Before coming to the U.S. in 1998, he had worked as a newspaper reporter
for 10 years in Seoul, Korea. His major research and teaching interests are media
studies, including political economy of culture and critical cultural studies, new
media and communication technology, international media and globalization, and
telecommunications policy. He is currently interested in doing research on the
macro-level effects of the diffusion of information and communication
technologies and their policy implications. His recent work has appeared in
several scholarly journals, including Media, Culture and Society,
Telecommunications Policy, Television and New Media, Information,
Communication & Society, and Gazette. His book entitled Hands On/Hands Off:
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The Korean State and the Market Liberalization of the Communication Industry is
currently under contract with Hampton Press.

Michael Real is Professor of Applied Communication at Royal Roads University
in Victoria, B.C., Canada. The focus of his work is media, culture, and social
responsibility. His Ph.D. is from the University of Illinois. He has written scores
of scholarly and general publications, directed local and international research
projects, and hosted television and radio programs. His books include Exploring
Media Culture, Super Media, and Mass-Mediated Culture. His numerous articles
have appeared in Critical Studies in Mass Communication, American Quarterly,
Journal of Communication, Media Development, Journalism and Mass
Communication Quarterly, Journal of Popular Culture, and elsewhere.

Bert Smeets studied at the faculty of social sciences of Katholieke Universiteit
Louvain, Belgium and he got his Master’s degree in 2001 in European Studies. In
his thesis “Media for Peace: Does the media contribute to peace?”, he analyses the
influence of mainstream and peace media on the dynamics of conflicts. In 2002 he
did an internship at the International NGO European Centre for Common Ground,
where he did research on web-based media and their relation to ethnopolitical
conflict. Currently he is working for the Belgian Army. He served for four months
in Kosovo (KFOR) and prepares his second term in Mitrovica as an intelligence
and operations officer.

Georgios Terzis is an Associate Professor at Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel in Belgium www.vesalius.edu and the Chair of the Journalism Studies
Section of the European Communication Research and Education Association
www.journalismstudies.edu. He received his Ph.D. in Communication Studies
from the Katholieke Universiteit Brussel and he also studied Journalism and Mass
Communication in Greece, U.K., USA and The Netherlands. He worked as a
foreign correspondent for Greek Media and as a course leader for the European
Journalism Centre, training journalists from all over the world on EU affairs.
Finally, he organized for the international NGO Search for Common Ground
media and conflict resolution web-based programs and trainings for journalists
from Angola, BiH, Cyprus, Greece, The Middle East, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.

Elina Yalov is a PhD student at the Institute of Communications Studies in the
University of Leeds. She has been an Associate Lecturer in Sheffield Hallam
University since February, 2006. Prior to that, she had been working as a
journalist in the magazine and as a research assistant in Bar-Ilan University,
Israel. Her research interests are Military-Media Relations, Russian-Chechnya
Conflicts, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, Psychological Operations,
Mass Communications and War on Terrorism. Her M.A. and PhD dissertations
are dealing with propaganda during the two Russia-Chechnya Conflicts. The title
of her PhD thesis is: “Russia vs. Chechnya: Fearing the Domino Effect.
Propaganda and Counter Propaganda during the Two Russian-Chechnya Conflicts
(1994-1996, 1999-present) and their Influence on the Outcomes of the Conflicts”.
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Cyber-Terrorism in the Information Age:
Actors, Communications, Tactics, Targets, and Influences
Mahmoud Eid
University of Ottawa
(558 King Edward Avenue, Room 202, Ottawa, Ontario
K1N 6N5 Canada, Tel.: 1-613-562-5800 ext. 3841,
Fax: 1-613-562-5240, E-mail: meid@uottawa.ca)
Abstract: Threats to global citizens emanating from various terrorist
groups around the world are increasingly widespread. No country is
excluded from terrorists’ potential plans, and both transnational and
internal terrorist attacks are possible in every country as long as the roots
of terrorism are not able to be effectively expunged. In understanding
terrorism as political violence, this paper sheds light on the major terrorist
organizations, their use of traditional and new media technologies, their
tactics, their target audiences, and their influences. With special attention
to information technologies, the paper demonstrates how modern terrorists
rely heavily on cyberspace to communicate messages, implement
operations, and achieve goals.
There are serious threats to global citizens emanating from various terrorist
groups around the world. Most noticeable in the late 20th and early 21st centuries are those
threats which come from Al-Qaeda, exemplified by bombings and multiple deaths in
Bali, Dar es Salaam, Istanbul, Nairobi, New York, Madrid, London, and Sharm AlSheikh. America’s recent “war on terrorism” has made the West in general and North
America in particular a major target of terrorist attacks. Even countries with good foreign
relationships and international reputation of peacekeeping, which might possibly reduce
potential external or transnational terrorist attacks, still cannot guarantee that they will
have any bearing in the face of potential national or internal terrorism.
The argument that recent internal terrorism has occurred in United Kingdom as a
result of the country’s policies towards some Muslim countries in the Middle East may be
partially correct, but it does not tell the whole story. As Majid Tehranian (2002) explains,
9/11, 2001, showed that the global villagers entertain profound misperceptions about, and
abhorrence for, each other. “Living in a largely mediated world, they are hostage to the
images of "the other" received through the mass media. A growing global apartheid is
tearing them apart into opposing camps. . . . Global terrorism appears to be a direct
outcome of this apartheid” (59).
The convergence of both traditional and transnational terrorism becomes a very
dangerous threat. As Joseph Nye (2005) calls it, transnational terrorism is a “type of
non-state actor that is becoming more important” (229). If external threats of
terrorism are dangerous and require a rational response from policy decision-makers, it is
also true that internal extremist groups can become more dangerous if policy decision-
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makers do not seriously address the issues these groups are concerned with, or indeed the
groups themselves. Some argue, for instance, that “most terrorist attacks start from a
racially, ethnically, or religiously motivated conviction that certain categories of
human beings are not worthy of moral standing or consideration” (Ignatieff, 2004: 94).
To help focusing the discussion of terrorism in this paper, it is worth referring to
one of the most recent definitions of terrorism relevant to discussion at stake. As Brigitte
Nacos (2006) defines it, “terrorism is political violence or the threat of violence by
groups or individuals who deliberately target civilians or noncombatants in order to
influence the behavior and actions of targeted publics and governments” (32).
With special focus on the political dimension, it is also important to note that the
major objective of terrorism “is not the winning of a military victory, nor the fulfilling of
private motives such as revenge or enrichment. It is a political manifestation and
normally aims at winning a political victory and thereby possibly also an ethical and legal
victory” (Thomassen, 1992: 219). One less severe way of defining terrorism considers it
as something in itself unethical, as a crime, or as a form of justifiable warfare. In this
way, terrorists are to be treated as prisoners of war and not as criminals.
The question then is whether or not terrorism can be defended under any
circumstances. Terrorism can only be justified, according to Niels Thomassen (1992:
219-222), if: 1) it is used against a form of power that uses illegitimate violence; 2) the
situation excludes all other possibilities for action; 3) it is only directed against those who
are responsible for the practice of illegitimate violence; 4) its sole aim is to neutralize
those people as practitioners of violence and not to harm them further; and 5) one has
taken precautions against unwanted side-effects or has seen to it that these are at any rate
kept within restricted limits. In short, terrorism can be justified as the absolute last
weapon of the oppressed.
As Nicholson (1996) explains, it is conventional for the opponents of a group that
uses terrorism as a political tool to regard terrorists as either mad or wicked. However,
from the terrorists’ perspective “they are freedom fighters, or fighters in a holy war or
whatever. Thus, to execute a captured terrorist might have the very opposite effect from that
which the authorities desired in that it creates a martyr and brings new people into the
movement” (169). So, conception of the belief structures of the terrorists will help
opponents understand the appropriate ways of either defeating or negotiating with
terrorists.
But who are the terrorists of the Internet? What are the contents of their websites?
Whom do the Internet terrorists target, and what are their goals? According to Yariv
Tsfati and Gabriel Weimann (2002: 320-326), numerous organizations have entered
cyberspace and created Internet sites. These include Hamas (the Islamic Resistance
Movement), the Lebanese Hizbollah (Party of God), the Egyptian Al-Gama’a al
Islamiyya (Islamic Group), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Basque ETA movement, the Irish Republican Army, the
Colombian National Liberation Army, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Armed
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, the Popular Democratic Liberation Front Party in
Turkey, the Kurdish Workers’ Party, and the Japanese Red Army. Geographically, most
of the organizations that have turned to the Internet are based in Third World countries
(in South America, East Asia, and the Middle East), and only a few are located in Europe.
Terrorist websites usually include information about the history of the organization and
biographies of its leaders, founders, heroes, commanders or revered personalities,
information on the political and ideological aims of the organization, and up-to-date
news. While avoiding the violent aspects of their activities, the Internet terrorists usually
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stress two issues: freedom of expression and political prisoners. The contents of their
websites generally attempt to approach 1) potential supporters, 2) their enemies, and 3)
international public opinion. The terrorists’ three main goals are attracting attention,
getting their demands recognized, and winning respect or gaining legitimacy. In
achieving these goals, terrorists appear to have seven main methods or tactics; ranked
from the most frequently to least frequently used, these are bombings, assassinations,
suicide missions, hijackings, kidnapping, missile attacks, and mass disruption/mass
destruction (Nacos, 2006: 126).
Modem terrorism is very dependent on the attention of the media. Thus, “modern
terrorism can be understood as an attempt to communicate messages through the use of
orchestrated violence” (Tsfati & Weimann, 2002: 317). As Former British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher once said “publicity is the oxygen of terrorism” and that terrorists
“understood this and acted accordingly” (Nacos, 2006: 208). Terrorists of our era are
much more aware of their relationship to the media and understand how they can benefit
the most from using them. Moreover, they are even more aware of avoiding “the use by
the media”—the other side of the relationship. In the first side, there are many incidents
in history when the media were used by terrorists and their sympathizers. “At the time of
the Tehran embassy incident … the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation filmed a mob
demonstration. As soon as the cameras were on, the demonstrators began shouting ‘Death
to Carter’, raised their fists, looked angry and burned American flags. After two minutes,
the cameramen signaled the end of the ‘take’. Then the same scene was done once more
for the French-speaking Canadians, with the crowd shouting ‘Mort à Carter’” (Schmid,
1989: 559). On the other side, “terrorists themselves also feel ‘used’ by the media which
pick up their action, but offer no guarantee of transmitting their message” (Ibid).
However, terrorists of our era overcome this obstacle and benefit from their relationship
to the media the most. Osama bin Laden used to provide Al-Jazeera with videotapes to
broadcast without any distortion of his messages. He can still even publish that on-line in
case the media would not give him exactly what he asked for.
In today’s world, “technology is putting into the hands of deviant individuals and
groups destructive powers that were once reserved primarily to governments. . . . [It]
has made the complex systems of modern societies more vulnerable to large-scale
attack” (Nye, 2005: 229). Although the “Internet, relying on widely separated but
interconnected computer systems, was originally designed as a military solution to the
threat of communication disruption due to nuclear attack” (Briggs, 2004: 453),
individuals or groups can now use cyberspace, computers, and information technology,
especially the Internet, to threaten, terrorize and cause harm to both governments and
civilians.
Terrorists have been always pioneers in embracing the newest communication
technologies and adding them to the available media. Much easier than the traditional
mass media, the new media technologies allow terrorist organizations to transmit their
messages. “The network of computer-mediated communication … is ideal for terroristsas-communicators: it is decentralized, it cannot be subjected to control or restriction, it is
not censored, and it allows access to anyone who wants it” (Tsfati & Weimann, 2002:
319). According to Gabriel Weimann (2005: 137) cyber-terrorism is a very attractive
option for modern terrorists for several reasons: 1) It is cheaper than traditional terrorist
methods and all what the terrorist needs is a personal computer and an online connection;
2) it is more anonymous than traditional terrorist methods as terrorists use online
nicknames or log on to a website as an unidentified “guest user,” making it very hard for
security agencies and police forces to track down the terrorists’ real identity; 3) the
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variety and number of targets are enormous as the cyber-terrorist can target the computers
and computer networks of governments, individuals, public utilities, private airlines, and
so on; 4) it can be conducted remotely, a feature that is especially appealing to terrorists
because it requires less physical training, psychological investment, risk of mortality, and
travel than conventional forms of terrorism; and 5) it has the potential to directly affect a
larger number of people than traditional terrorist methods, thereby generating greater
media coverage, which is ultimately a major goal for terrorists.
Members of Al-Qaeda, for example, rely heavily on the Internet to spread their
propaganda and have used it to plan and coordinate their operations; most notably the
9/11 attacks. “Former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh told the Citizens Crime Commission of
New York, when Ramzi Yousef (the mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing)
was being tracked in the Philippines, he left behind a laptop computer that itemized plans
to blow up (11) U.S. airliners in the Western Pacific on a particular day. All of the details
and planning were set forth in that laptop computer. While part of the information was
encrypted and difficult to decode, it revealed for the first time how sophisticated terrorists
utilized computers for planning their operations” (Nacos, 2006: 237). However, unlike
many other terrorist organizations, “Al Qaeda never established its own web site but has
depended on sympathetic individuals and groups to carry their propaganda” (Ibid: 230).
Terrorists have been also using the net in recruiting and fund raising. The Internet has
become the most effective recruiting tool for terrorists “simply by making their
propaganda material available online, by glorifying those who have committed political
violence against civilians, and by urging visitors to their web sites to join the cause, these
groups attract new followers” and a major tool for fund raising for “even the well-funded
Al Qaeda network [that] utilized web sites to solicit contributions” (Ibid: 240).
Despite the many attempts by governments and individuals to limit the terrorists’
use of the media and information technologies, terrorists’ messages continue to be
conveyed to their audiences with increasing influences over the years. “The growing use
and manipulation of modern communications by terrorist organizations led governments
and several media organizations to consider certain steps in response. These included
limiting terrorists’ access to the media, reducing and censoring news coverage of terrorist
acts and their perpetrators, and minimizing the terrorists’ capacity for manipulating the
media” (Tsfati & Weimann, 2002: 319). Also, there are many attempts by individual
hackers and governments to block terrorist organizations from using the Internet,
especially after 9/11. However, “these attacks affected the sites’ presence on the Internet
only temporarily” (Ibid: 329). The websites of terrorist organizations change addresses
frequently. Some sites disappeared from the network for a while. “The fact that most of
these sites reopened after a while demonstrates the futility of attempts to block terrorists
or their supporters from using the Internet to communicate their messages” (Ibid). This is
most likely to continue to be the case as long terrorists are pioneers in using the most
advanced technologies.
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Islamists and the Internet
Maura Conway
Dublin City University
(Glasnevin, Dublin 9, Tel.: 01 700 6472,
E-mail: maura.conway@dcu.ie)
Abstract: The purpose of the paper is to describe and analyze Islamic
terrorists’ use of the Internet, with a particular focus on their use of the
Web for intelligence gathering purposes and their establishment of their
own Web sites to engage in offensive information operations. The impact
of the Internet on the adoption of networked forms of organization by
Islamist groups will also be addressed, as will the effects of such structures
on both the conduct of international relations and our understanding of
same.
When US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was asked about soft power in
2003, he replied “I don’t know what it means” (as quoted in Nye 2006). In February
2006, in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, however, Rumsfeld
was forced to concede:
Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age,
but for the most part we, our country, our government, has not adapted.
Consider that the violent extremists have established media relations
committees—these are terrorists and they have media relations committees
that meet and talk about strategy, not with bullets but with words. They’ve
proven to be highly successful at manipulating the opinion elites of the
world. They plan and design their headline-grabbing attacks using every
means of communication to intimidate and break the collective will of free
people…They know that communications transcend borders and that a
single news story handled skillfully can be as damaging to our cause and
helpful to theirs as any other method of military attack. And they’re doing
it. They’re able to act quickly. They have relatively few people. They have
modest resources compared to the vast and expensive bureaucracies of
Western governments. Our federal government is really only beginning to
adapt our operations to the 21st century. For the most part, the U.S.
government still functions as a five and dime store in an eBay world
(Council on Foreign Relations 2006).
“In the global ‘war’ against terrorism, the ability to take command and control of
the global info-sphere is every bit as important as any other weapon on the military,
intelligence, financial or any other fronts” (Taylor 2004, 108).
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Certainly, one of the most significant aspects of al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 reshaping
has been the significant increase in its reliance on the Internet as a soft power tool (Eedle
2004). Bin Laden’s cadres had employed the Internet for communication and propaganda
purposes prior to the US attacks (see Conway 2002), but their use of the Internet
increased exponentially thereafter. Michael Scheuer has put this down to the loss of alQaeda’s Afghan base and the consequent dispersal of fighters, along with rapid
development of the medium itself and the computers and other gadgets with which it can
increasingly be accessed, and the proliferation of Internet cafes globally (2004, 78).
Indeed al-Qaeda’s increased virtuality post-9/11 inspired one analyst to coin the
descriptor “al Qaeda 2.0” (Bergen 2002) and another to liken al-Qaeda’s deployment of
cyber-based tools to their own “stealth ‘revolution in military affairs’” (Ranstorp 2004,
61).
In a videotaped statement that was released in December 2001 in which he
comments upon the 9/11 attackers, Osama bin Laden stated:
“[T]hose youths who conducted the operations did not accept any fiqh in the
popular terms, but they accepted the fiqh1 that the Prophet Muhammad
brought. Those young men…said in deeds, in New York and Washington,
speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere in the
world. The speeches are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs—even by
the Chinese” (as quoted in Devji 2005, 13).
Bin Laden thus describes the events of 9/11 not as primarily hostile or vengeful
actions, which they undoubtedly were, but underlines instead their essentially
communicative aspect(s) (Devji 2005, 14). The centrality of communication(s) and
communication technologies, especially the Internet, to al-Qaeda and its affiliates was not
immediately clear to researchers, analysts, or policy makers, however. Michael Scheuer
admits in the introduction to Imperial Hubris (2004) that a major problem with his
previous book, Through Our Enemies Eyes (2003), was that in it he seriously
underestimated the role of the Internet in al-Qaeda’s activities (2004, xx). Of course, one
reason for this may be the rapidly evolving nature of al-Qaeda’s Internet use and thus also
its impact.
Clearly interesting things can happen when a “complex world discourse” such as
Islam comes into contact with a force that can claim an equally wide geographic spread:
the socially and politically transformative effects of the Internet. Islam and political Islam
in particular has exhibited a wide range of responses to this relatively new information
and communication technology with certain features being eagerly appropriated and
others vociferously rejected (Mandaville 2001, 153). Bin Laden himself has observed that
“In the past there was imperfection, but it was partial. Today, however, the imperfection
touches the entire public because of the communications revolution and because the
media enter every home” (as quoted in Scheuer 2004, 152). However, citing the Western
media’s “vicious campaign” against Islam, Bin Laden called in a 2002 Internet posting on
Muslim publishers and broadcasters to take “[their] rightful position and play [their]
required role in confronting…[the West’s] visual, audio, and written organs” (as quoted
in Scheuer 2004, 132).
1
Fiqh is a generic term used to describe a School of Islamic law.
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Al-Qaeda’s Internet presence increased from January 2002 when the group began
to employ two sites, in particular, to spread their message. Al-Qaeda never claimed
ownership of the sites, Al-Neda and Al-Ansar, but senior al-Qaeda commander Abu-alLayth al-Libi provided the following recommendation as regards the al-Neda site—also
known as the ‘Center for Islamic Studies and Research’—to visitors to Islamic Jihad
Online:
It is a website run by reliable brothers …and financed by brothers that you
know. It is a good website and we hope that God will accept its
actions…[W]e will not spare any effort or withhold anything we can offer to
this website” (as quoted in Scheuer 2004, 79).
Al-Neda and Al-Ansar published, amongst other things:
-
-
Audio and video clips of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida spokesman Sualaiman Abu
Ghaith, and others.
Bi-weekly electronic journals containing analyses of the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Islamic scholars’ and clerics’ evaluations and explanations of al-Qaeda’s past
attacks, future plans, and admonishments to others to act. These included a series
of articles claiming that suicide bombings aimed at Americans are justifiable
under Islamic law
Essays describing al-Qaeda’s war aims and assessments of how achieving these
goals would benefit the Muslim umma (Iqbal 2002; Kelley 2002; Scheuer 2004,
79)
There was also media speculation that the Al-Neda site was being used to direct
al-Qaeda operational cells. According to one report the site has carried low-level
operational information: for example, in February 2002 it was said to have published the
names and home phone numbers of al-Qaeda fighters captured by Pakistan following
their escape from fighting in Afghanistan with the aim that sympathisers would contact
their families and let them know they were alive (Eedle 2002). Click on Alneda.com
today and the following appears: Hacked, Tracked, and NOW Owned by the USA. The
site is described as “a mostly unmoderated discussion board relating to current world
affairs surrounding Islamic Jihad [sic] and the US led war on terrorism (plus other
conflicts around the globe).”
Michael Scheuer has argued that post-9/11 bin Laden has maintained a
deliberately low profile for two reasons: firstly, to avoid the US and her allies fixing his
position and, secondly, because he knows his continued silence induces fear amongst
Western publics. The latter notwithstanding, however, Internet sites maintained by alQaeda and its supporters provide not just bin Laden’s followers, but also those he is
seeking to incite to holy war, with a regular, easily accessible flow of information and
comment carrying al Qaeda’s imprimatur” (Scheuer 2004, 79). Discussing the impact of
these websites, Paul Eedle goes further asserting: “As a result of the al Qaeda viewpoint,
it now takes great courage to speak out against the jihadi view….[and] public debate in
the Muslim world is now very radical” (as quoted in Scheuer 2004, 79).
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There is no requirement that soft power be employed only by the ‘good guys;’
indeed whether soft power produces ‘positive’ behaviour depends largely on the context
and the skills with which available informational resources are converted into outcomes.
It has been observed further that “it is a mistake to rely on hard or soft power alone.” The
ability to combine them effectively, Nye (2006) says, might be termed ‘smart power,’ the
employment of which has been adopted with alacrity by al-Qaeda and affiliated
organisations. Burkhart and Older’s observation that “When the social compact between
the government and the governed is bankrupt, information and communications
technologies become powerful weapons for both sides, but are of limited use to voices of
moderation” certainly appears to be borne out by recent events (2003, 31). It is doubtless
the case that “AQ’s online presence has become more potent and pertinent than its actual
physical presence because of the Internet” (Gruen 2005, 354).
Despite their recognition of the radicalising influence of the Internet, Burkhart &
Older persisted in dismissing the latter, insisting that radio and television remained the
most important media outlets because they reached out to those at all levels of society and
into every corner of a given country. The Internet was said to get most attention from
students of globalisation, “but it is the unwritten word that remains of most concern to
MENA governments” (Burkhart & Older 2003, 42). Such an insistence underlines the
way in which, as late as 2003, researchers were underestimating the soft power potential
of the Net and were also out of touch with the evolution of Internet tools and their effects,
especially streaming audio.2 Violent Islamists were labouring under neither of these
misapprehensions, however.
In fact, almost from the outset Bin Laden and his associates “thought big” by
integrating local causes and conflicts into a global campaign shaped “to resonate with
Muslims of all stripes and cultures.” Bin Laden has made globalisation work for him; he
has a capacity for what business executives term ‘strategic control,’ that is tailoring
himself, his ‘workforce,’ and his ‘product(s)’ to the changing ‘marketplace,’ whilst at the
same time making the most of the best available technologies (Larry Seaquist quoted in
Scheuer 2004, 117). The seriousness of the implications of such a strategy were remarked
upon by a number of commentators prior to being taken up by Rumsfeld. In an article that
appeared in Foreign Policy in 2004, Jason Burke made the following admonition:
Bin Laden is a propagandist, directing his efforts at attracting those Muslims
who have hitherto shunned his extremist message. He knows that only
through mass participation in his project will he have any chance of success.
His worldview is receiving immeasurably more support around the globe
than it was two years ago, let alone 15 years ago when he began serious
campaigning. The objective of Western countries is to eliminate the threat
of terror, or at least to manage it in a way that does not seriously impinge on
the daily lives of its citizens. Bin Laden’s aim is to radicalize and mobilize.
He is closer to achieving his goals than the West is to deterring him (p.26).
2
Although they do comment that “[Osama bin Laden] has made rather clever use of the other new medium
prevalent in the MENA countries—satellite television—and the Internet provides an inexpensive adjunct,
especially to the extent that it can be used to generate dialog with potential new supporters and recruits”
(Burkhart & Older 2003, 60).
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Anti- and Counter-Terrorism:
Snagging the Practice of a Human Right to Communicate
Aliaa Dakroury
Carleton University
(1125 Colonel By drive, Ottawa, K1S 5B6 Canada,
Tel.: 613-526-2371, Fax: 613-520-6690,
E-mail: adakrour@connect.carleton.ca)
Abstract: Following the September 11 attacks, and under the state of
anti/counter terrorism that preoccupies most of the national and
international discourses and spheres nowadays, global communicative
patterns have shifted towards highlighting “anti/counter-terrorism”
actions. In this paper, I argue that there is an ongoing elimination of the
emphasis of the human right to communicate as a core civil liberty as
stated in article (19) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and other
international treaties.
As McNeill and McNeill argue in their book The Human Web, our world has been
transformed through different communicative patterns associated with diseases,
friendship, rivalry, military, wars, technology, and so on. “In all such relationships,
people communicate information and use information to guide their future behavior”
(2003, p. 3). In other words, we can say that in each era/period, there are certain events,
crises or ideas that societies build their communication around.
Following the September 11 attacks, I would argue that our world began to center
its global communicative patterns based on anti- or counter-terrorism actions. In this
paper, I will suggest that these actions are infringing on the human right to communicate
as a core civil liberty as stated in article (19) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) as well as in other international treaties. I will start by first explaining what
exactly the right to communicate is. Following that, I will show what the relationship is
between this basic human right and the idea of anti- or counter-terrorism. Finally, through
the use of some current examples, I will show how a state’s policies of anti-/counterterrorism can eradicate the practice of the human right to communicate.
As I have argued elsewhere1, the concept of the right to communicate is first
associated with the language of international legal documents that go back to the late
eighteenth century. Drawing from the language of eighteenth-century philosophy, the
Virginia Declaration of June 12, 1776, the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776,
and the American Bill of Rights of 1789, appeared to placed great emphasis on the idea
1
Dakroury, Aliaa. (2003). Is communication a basic human right? An intellectual history. Unpublished
Masters’ thesis. Ottawa: Carleton University.
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of freedom through the use of phrases such as ‘by nature free,’ ‘inherent rights,’
‘enjoyment of life and liberty,’ ‘no men be deprived of this liberty,’ ‘unalienable right,’
and ‘pursuit of happiness2. The same idea has been firmly emphasized in Article 1 from
the American Bill of Rights, in which it specified the freedom of expression as part of the
basic rights:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.
Following that, Article (19) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
asserts that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.
However, the actual term “the right to communicate” is attributed to Jean d’Arcy,
the Director of Radio and Visual Services during the 1960s in the Office of Public
Information at the United Nations in New York. d’Arcy launched this concept in the late
1960s in his European Broadcasting Union article Direct Satellite Broadcasting and the
Right to Communicate in which he (1969) argued that:
The time will come when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will
have to encompass a more extensive right than man’s right to information,
first laid down twenty-one years ago in Article 19. This is the right of man
to communicate. This is the angle from which the future development of
communications will have to be considered if it is to be fully understood.
(1977, p. 1)
It is important to understand that the notion of communication does not include
merely the process of sending and receiving information; rather, it is argued to be the
process of social thinking, common understanding, ability to freely meet and associate
between human beings and so on. As Jean d’Arcy notes: “To cut communications within
a human group is equivalent to annihilating that group. To cut communications between
it and other groups, to prevent it practically from expressing itself tantamount, as in the
case of the individual, to destroying its personality…” (1982, p. 2).
Hence, under the conditions of anti-/counter-terrorism that currently preoccupy
most of the national and international discourse and spheres, it is argued that there is an
ongoing obstruction of the free practice of the human right to communicate both in what
are supposed to be the most democratic places in the world, such as the United States,
2
For example, Article 1 of the Virginia Declaration stated “That all men are by nature equally free and
independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life, liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety”.
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and the least democratic places, such as many countries in the developing world. Reitan
maintains that many human rights activists and observers have concluded that a number
of countries, “including China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Russia, …and
Israel are using the US led campaign against terrorism as a cover to justify repression of
all kinds, including that of non-violent activism for democratic change” (2005, p. 52).
For example, in the United States there has been an ongoing dispute as to whether
it is justifiable for the President to use his declared war on terrorism to violate many of
the basic rights and freedoms as stated in various American legal documents, particularly
the Constitution. Historically, as Macmahon (2005) notes, during the American Civil
War, President Lincoln wanted to use his power to try Americans captured in the North in
military tribunals instead of through the courts, arguing that this is a need to protect
national security. The US Supreme Court rejected his suggestion, arguing that the state of
war could never be a justification for violating citizens’ rights to a fair trial. Macmahon
comments that “even in America’s darkest hour–the Civil War–the Supreme Court
refused to allow the rule of law to be replaced by a rule that vested absolute power in the
executive branch” (2005, p. 125).
In other words, despite the fact that terrorism, as UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan, states is “by its very nature . . . an assault on the fundamental principles of law,
order, human rights, and peaceful settlement of disputes upon which the United Nations
is established” (4 October 2002), battling it is undeniably associated with possible
violation of civil liberties and freedoms such as the right to communicate.
Joyner maintains that even the United Nations, as a major international
enforcement power in the field of human rights was changed by acts of terrorism that
“destroy human rights and fundamental freedoms” (2004, p. 234); even more
importantly, the ways in which acts of terrorism are employed by nations, governments,
and states may serve as “the rationale by governments to crack down on dissident groups
and critics of a regime,” and moreover, by which its counter/anti terrorism legislations
adopted “might infringe on human rights and civil liberties of persons in those states”
(2004, p. 243).
Yet, during times of crisis such as September 11/01, the Madrid Massacre, and the
London Bombings, states derogate certain rights and freedoms. Among these is the right
to freedom of association which, as stated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, constitutes a
basic part of the right to communicate. In other words, it is civilians who are most often
the victims of terrorism. Unfortunately, “terrorists commonly justify the targeting of
civilians by denying their moral innocence, by insisting that civilian settlers who profit
from an unjust colonial occupation are not entitled to immunity from attack, since they are
either beneficiaries or accomplices of injustice” (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 94).
However, it is not just terrorists who victimize innocent bystanders in this respect:
by creating and implementing policies that do not manage the fine line between liberty
and security, governments may also be responsible for the violation of civilians’ human
rights. Paul Hoffman, the Chair of the International Executive Committee of Amnesty
International, presents Amnesty’s view that “the way in which the ‘war on terrorism’ has
been waged threatens to undermine the international human rights framework so
painstakingly built since World War II” (2004, p. 932). Hoffman argues that “abandoning
human rights in times of crisis is shortsighted and self-defeating. A ‘war on terrorism’
waged without respect for the rule of law undermines the very values that it presumes to
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protect. We must restore the balance between liberty and security by reasserting the
human rights framework, which provides for legitimate and effective efforts to respond to
terrorist attacks” (2004, p. 932).
Michael Ignatieff (2004) highlights the importance of how a nation responds to
terrorism. He claims that “it is the response to terrorism, rather than terrorism itself, that
does democracy most harm” (p. 61) and these harms are what terrorism intends. The
United States’ “war on terrorism” as exemplified after 9/11 by the sending of US troops
into Afghanistan to oust the Taliban, as well as the subsequent war on Iraq, has failed
terribly. The pre-emptive strategy of war on Iraq did not stop terrorism; instead, “Iraq has
become a recruiting ground for Al-Qaeda, a fascist Salafi group which is training agents,
including Western nationals, and sending them home to set up networks or form sleeper
cells.” (Iraq as a base, 2005).
In summary, although the actions of terrorism systematically violate human rights
and disrupt basic political processes common to liberal democracies, the actions of
nations in combating terrorism also undermine these basic human rights. Thus, the
enforcement of a human right to communicate is eradicated through the setting of
measures that limit freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly, and the right to
privacy among others. Our major concern in the future should be to find possible ways to
maintain a balance between the existence of a secure state and the effective combating of
terrorism on the one hand, and the enforcement of the human right to communicate and
the practice of democracy on the other.
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E-initiatives and the Information Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts
Georgios Terzis
Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
(Pleainlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium, Tel : +32 2 629
2821, E-mail: Georgios.Terzis@vub.ac.be)
Bert Smeets
Belgian Army
(Email: bert_smeets@hotmail.com)
Abstract: Taking the outreach of the Internet into account, ethnopolitical
violence on the net has the potential to reach a large audience and thus
have a significant influence on what we know about ethnopolitical
conflicts around the world. Cyberspace itself became a battleground where
opponents attack each other, while it is has also become a useful
organisational tool for groups involved in ethnopolitical violence, and thus
cyber attacks are seen as side effects but also as initiators to more
traditional modes of attacks. As we speak cyberspace is changing the
nature of the Iraqi War. [In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi
Insurgency, ICG Middle East Report N°50, 15 February 2006]
This paper introduces the theory and experience on media, society
and the rising role of the net in the information management of
contemporary ethnopolitical conflicts. Thereupon we state that einitiatives for the information management of ethnopolitical conflicts are
best framed into the traditional hate and peace media literature. Further we
analyse the advantages and disadvantages the Internet has over traditional
media and look at how these open up opportunities and present barriers for
e-initiatives.
At one level, the Internet is just another new communication tool that is accessible
to anyone with proper equipment and can similarly to all other forms of media be used to
disseminate or distort information that can be used for conflict management. But at
another level, the Internet, including electronic mail, the World Wide Web and its other
facets like blogs, offers the potential of changing how we interact with one another, how
we gather and disseminate information and even how we make decisions about these
conflicts (Bentivegna, 1998: 2-3). It offers opportunities for conflict management and
opens up possibilities that transcend previous traditional media boundaries. Some of them
are:
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1. The Internet entails an increase in speed. Information travels much faster
using the Internet in comparison to other media forms.
2. The Internet is inexpensive and convenient. The decrease in cost goes for the
messenger as well as for the recipient. However, this is only true if some
conditions are met. For instance, infrastructure needs to be available and costs
for the end user also depend on the costs of access (Lie, 2001: 5).
3. The Internet allows any group to broadcast their message to millions
throughout the world. Internet allows the exchange of information
dissemination without regard to geographical and national borders.
4. It allows individuals and grass-root movements to internationalise local
problems and put it on the international news agenda. And they can do this
behind the screen of anonymity what makes it easier to express opinions
without risking social sanctions (Bentivegna, 1998: 9).
5. Internet allows a bi- and multi-directional way of communication. The
interactivity is a very important tool for group building and self-determination
of groups.
6. Internet allows users to consult any time and from any place information
stored on different databases around the world.
7. Internet allows the integration and convergence of different media forms like
text, audio, visuals and moving pictures.
8. The Internet is an organisational tool “par excellence” (Danitz & Strobel,
1999: part 3, 2). The Internet is a useful tool for groups to organise and coordinate their activities. Mobilisation and enlisting world-wide support is
facilitated by using the Internet.
Besides the fact the Internet has some important advantages over other forms of
traditional media, its content also affects, and it is affected by the traditional media.
Traditional media fundamentally affects the content of the Internet since a number of
websites and e-groups download or discuss the issues that are reported on traditional
media. But the web technology also strengthens the traditional watchdog functions of
journalism for example, by giving reporters efficient ways to probe for information. The
capacity to search documents, compile background and historical context, and identify
authoritative and non-authoritative sources in the net has expanded the reporter’s toolbox.
It also has introduced a fundamentally different culture on interactivity, fewer rules, and
fewer limits (Giles, 2000: 3).
When speaking about e-initiatives for the information management of
ethnopolitical conflicts it is useful though to put these initiatives in the wider context of
the literature on Information technology and society as well. A reading of this literature
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reveals a number of contradictions that are best kept in mind when analysing e-initiatives
for the information management of ethnopolitical conflicts.
First, when analysing the impact of the internet we have to consider the dispersion
of Internet users in societies. It is impossible to assess the exact number of users in the
world, however, over 90 percent of the computers linked to the Internet are found in the
United States, Europe and Asia, while Internet users in less economically developed
countries only constitute a small percentage of total users. Thus the question of Where we
are analysing the impact of the internet is detrimental.
E-initiatives have another important limitation, the existence of language
barriers. Especially among e-peace groups who try to get in touch with the ‘other’,
English is the language used for their dialogue. That excludes large parts of populations
that don’t speak English. The question then is Who is using the peace initiatives.
Third, according to the literature the impact of media, and so the Internet, on the
attitude of its recipients is more important during times of crisis and conflict than during
everyday non-conflictual situations (Reljic, 1998: 39) and thus the question of When einitiatives are used is very important.
Finally, the fact that recipients are no longer passive and can actively participate,
and control the flow of communication can also have its downsides. Information
transmitted on the Internet often “unmediated” and can sometimes be of questionable
accuracy.
The multitude of information sources and directions that can be found on the
Internet creates as well new opportunities as pitfalls for conflict prevention and conflict
management. “Internet will bring world peace by breaking down national borders”,
Nicholas Negroponte said during an information technology conference in Brussels in
1997. Four years later, in a briefing given in late September 2001, Ronald Dick, assistant
director of the FBI and head of the United States National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC), told reporters that the hijackers of 9/11 had used the Internet, and “used it
well.” (Weimanm, 2004: 11)!
That the Internet will have a growing impact on our societies is disputed by few,
but that it will bring world peace and stop political violence is only believed by Utopians.
Some authors consider the Internet as a tool for more co-operation and democracy, while
others consider it as a cause for increased political violence and a peril for societies.
Mesthene captures a more ‘balanced’ understanding of the relationship between the
Internet and society when he states: “New technology creates new opportunities for men
and society, and it also generates new problems for them. It has both positive and
negative effects, and it usually has the two at the same time and in virtue of each other”
(Mesthene, 1986: 76).
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Critical Interpretation of Broadband Services:
Increasing Cyberterrorism in the Information Age
Dal Yong Jin
Simon Fraser University
(E-mail: daljin@uic.edu)
Abstract: This paper studies how the swift growth of broadband services
has led to negative aspects, in particular cyberterrorism and cyber crimes
in the information society by exploring the relationship between new
technology and cyberterrorism. It does not aim to provide solutions to
cyberterrorism and cybersecurity. Instead, it raises the questions of critical
values, ideas, and ethical issues of cyberterrorism and cybersecurity in
relation to broadband services. It then discusses the relationship between
humans and technology to develop a research framework that would help
to expedite research on new technology with insights drawn from the
analysis of critical considerations.
The swift growth in Internet and broadband services is blamed for the emergence
of several negative effects in our information society, including cybercrimes and/or
cyberterrorism, which have become one of the most significant global issues in recent
years. Although the Internet and broadband services have contributed to the development
of the information economy, the rapid deployment of broadband has also brought about a
number of side effects from informatization, which is expected to become more of a
challenge as society becomes more digitally sophisticated in many countries.
There is no consensus about cyberterrorism and/or cybercrimes because they are
relatively new phenomena and recent history. Several scholars and government agencies
have given different definitions of cyberterrorism; however, they cannot agree on a
unified definition on cyberterrorism because terrorism in cyberspace is difficult to
define.1 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., many scholars have particularly
focused on the nature of cyberterrorism related to the possibility of physical attacks on
people; however, they point out that cyberterrorism represents a new stage in that it
occurs in and via cyberspace, and refers to an attack on the information structure and
functions, not persons. In other words, “cyberterrorism is the execution of a surprise
attack by a subnational terrorist group or individuals with a domestic political agenda
using computer technology and the Internet to cripple of disable a nation’s electrnoic and
1
Barry Collin (1996), a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in California,
defined cyberterrorism as the convergence of cybernetics and terrorism. The U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation also defines cyberterrorism as any politically motivated attack against information, computer
systems, computer programs, and data which results in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (Cyberterrorism, 2001).
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physical infrastructures, thereby causing the loss of critical services, such as electric
power, emergency 911 systems, telephone services, banking systems, the Internet, and a
host of others” (Vernon, 2003a; xx). Examples of cyber terrorist activity include use of
information technology to organize and carry out attacks, to support group activities and
perception-management campaigns. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are
mainly a costly nuisance would not be cyberterrorism (Denning, 2002). A major aspect of
the debate is also the likelihood of cyber attacks―whether terrorists could take control of
a computer system or destroy a database that stores vital information used by a
government and corporations, as well as individual users (Thibodeau, 2001; Barsamian,
2001). Cases of privacy invasion and circulation of misinformation are on the rise, and
forms of cyberterror such as the dissemination of viruses and hacking are increasing
(Misra, 2003). As these definitions imply, computer and security experts do not take
seriously the connection between computer and physical attacks on people, although they
believe that terrorists would coordinate a cyber attack with other forms of attacks against
physical infrastructure, such as those on Sept. 11.2
The threat of cyberterrorism and/or cyber crimes growing with the deployment of
use of the Internet and broadband services—a range of service speeds from 256 Kbps to
100 Mbps and up (ITU 2003c)―cautions us about the vulnerability of the information
society. Many computer and security experts have come to understand that terrorists and
cyber criminals are using today’s information infrastructure to bring havoc to computer
traffic and thereafter safety (Sofaer et al., 2001, vii; Garfinkel, 2002). Several
governments, from the U.S. to developing countries, have also recognized that the
number, cost, and sophistication of these attacks are rising at alarming rates, with
aggregate annual damage worldwide now measured in billions of dollars (Garfinkel,
2002).
Computer and security experts fear that cyberspace could be terrorists’ next target
because they have seen a clear warning in the terrorists’ reliance on and expertise in
Internet and broadband services, in particular, after the September 11 terrorist attacks. As
Brynjar Lia (2005) points out, “terrorist groups will become increasingly adept at
exploiting information technology in a growing number of files.” It hadsbecome clear
that the computer communication infrastructure, on which wealth, information, and
power in our world depend, is highly vulnerable to intrusion, interference, and disruption
(Castells, 2001). Cybersecurity measures therefore have come to the attention of
governments and corporations as a significant means to protect society from
cyberterrorism (Kizza, 2002).
This paper studies how the swift growth of broadband services, one of the most
significant developments in information technology, has led to negative effects, in
particular, cyberterrorism and/or cybercrimes, by exploring the relationship between new
technology and cyberterrorism. It does not aim to provide solutions to cyberterrorism and
cybersecurity; instead, it raises the questions of critical values, ideas, and ethical issues of
2
Several scholars clearly differenciate between cybercrimes and cyberterrorism. For instance, Barry
Sandywell (2006) defines cybercrimes as money laundering, drug trafficking, credit card fraud from
cyberterrorism and hacking. However, as explained above, cyberterrorism is not directly related to
physical attacks on people unlike traditional terrorism, and it includes attacks in cyberspace; therefore,
one should note that the concepts of cyberterrorism and cybercrimes are more generally interchangeable
in this paper.
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cyberterrorism and cybersecurity in relation to broadband services. It then discusses the
relationship between people and technology to develop a research framework that would
help to expedite research on broadband with insights drawn from the analysis of critical
considerations.
This paper broadly employs the critical approach on technology as an analytical
framework for examining negative aspects of broadband services. As well documented,
neo-Marxists such as political economists and radical and/or cultural theoreticians
critically analyze the forms of oppression and power associated with new technology.
They emphasize that technology can mainly be understood relative to a particular set of
class interests that are shaped by a dominant class hegemony. They contribute to the
maintenance of deeply rooted inequalities in power in today’s so-called information or
knowledge societies (Mansell, 1999, 2004; Saravanamuthu, 2002).
Although the critical research on technology is not a mainstream approach in
studying the diffusion and use of new technology, it is of significance to interpret the
essence of technology, in particular, in the current capitalist society; therefore, a few
scholars have argued for a critical approach to new technology. This tradition
acknowledges that modern capitalism is symbolized by its revolution in high technology,
including computers, telecommunications, broadband, and digital systems (Sussman,
1997). Among these, Feenberg’s idea of technology (1991) significantly contributes to
theorizing about a critical approach. He calls for a Marxist-based critique and claims that
technological innovation has functioned to divide the members of capitalist industrial
societies into two groups. One group is made up of intellectually skilled managers or
technical experts, while the other groups contain much larger numbers of deskilled and
less valued labors (1991). Dyer-Withefold (1999) has also criticized hierarchical
managerial and economic models and the type of technological innovation they breed
because such technological innovation stunts human potential and undermines democratic
practices.
More importantly, the political economic approach to the mass media and
communication has contributed profoundly to developing a critical theory of technology.
Media scholars (Schiller, 1999; Garnham, 2000; McChesney, 2000; Boyd-Barrett, 2006)
have elaborated this analysis with detailed research into the operations of the capitalist
media. While several information society theorists claim that a proliferation of
technologies and channels democratizes and diversifies opinion formation (Downing,
1989; Jaffe, 1994), Nicholas Garnham (2000) emphasizes that a political economy of new
media should seek to understand the way in which power is structured and differentiated,
where it comes from and how it is renewed. This suggests an examination of new media
to show how the structuring of global networks and digital information flows and their
consumption are informed by predominant and alternative principles, values, and power
relations (Mansell, 2004).
As McChesney (2000) argues, communication and information technology should
not be influenced by exploitation. In contrast, as of today, the whole driving force for the
rapid growth of communication technology, including the Internet and broadband
services, considers new technologies as profitable business and useful for the exploitation
of society rather than as a public service agency. In fact, technologies embody social
choices made by those with power over their construction.
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As these theoreticians have argued, the critical approach to technology is
representative of a contemporary trend in social theory, although it is a less common
paradigm. A technological process achieves advances of general utility, but the concrete
form in which these advances are realized is determined by the social power under which
they are made and ensures that they also serve the interests of that power. According to
this view, technology is a dependent variable in the social system, shaped for its purpose
by the dominant class, and subject to reshaping for new purposes under a new
technology. This article aims to contribute to this ongoing debate of critical research on
new media with an example of rapidly growing broadband services and their relationship
with cyberterrorism and/or cybercrimes.
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Cyber-Terrorism, Information Warfare, and the Olympics:
An Application of Information Filter Theory (Chomsky & Herman) to Security
against Terrorism in the Modern Olympics
Michael Real
Diana Beeson
Royal Roads University
(2005 Sooke Road, Victoria, BC, Canada V9B 5Y2, Tel.: 250-3912600 ext.4436, E-mail: michael.real@royalroads.ca)
Abstract: Modern political terrorism is a form of information warfare, born in
the desire to break through mainstream information media via shock value and
countered by establishment information efforts to discredit and destroy
terrorists, their acts and their political agenda. At the same time, governments
use mainstream media, to exploit terrorist acts and threats to foster fear among
their citizenries with the aim of solidifying legitimacy and rule. In 1972 the
Black September hostage-taking of 11 Israeli athletes captured world attention
as it unfolded on TV screens around the world. Today security efforts to
control and contain information and physical access to high visibility events
like the Olympics become expensive pre-occupations of host cities and the
governments of the host countries. The media “information filter theory,”
labeled the propaganda model and developed by Edward S. Herman and
Noam Chomsky (1988), examines the processes and structures that determine
which news perspectives will predominate and which will be marginalized.
This paper applies that model to issues of cyber-terrorism and the information
sword, with particular reference to terrorism, security, and the Olympic
Games. Herman and Chomsky’s original model included “anti-communism”
as a component of their information theory model. In this paper, we maintain
that the “anti-communism” component has been replaced by “anti-terrorism.”
Unclassified literature on terrorism, security, and the Olympics is limited.
“Stochastic Modeling of a Terrorist Event via the ASAM System” (Singh et al., 2004)
was written by a group at the University of Connecticut in the U.S. The group applied its
Adaptive Safety Analysis and Monitoring (ASAM) to two hypothetical terrorist activities
at the 2004 Athens Olympics using a combination of tracking models that involve
variable at each moment of time. In another study, a large team of medical and
information specialists developed an automated syndromic health surveillance system for
the Salt Lake City Winter Games in 2002 (Gesteland et al., 2003). Both the 9/11 attack
and the first anthrax release through the U.S. Postal System occurred in the six months
prior to the start of the Salt Lake City Games. The system monitored more than 114,000
acute care encounters in order to instantly identify possible bioterrorism outbreaks. None
were detected. An extensive overview by Chris Johnson of Glasgow University (2006)
traces in great detail the history of terrorism and security arrangements for all Olympic
events since 1972.
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In Steven Spielberg’s 2005 film, Munich, Black September members explain that
their Olympic hostage-taking finally had captured the Western world’s attention and
publicized the reasons behind their actions in the mainstream Western media. In a
striking comment, a member of the Israeli assassination team, charged with eliminating
the surviving hostage-takers, analyzes the effect of having blown up several members of
Black September. He notes that, in response, Black September mounted several new and
bloody attacks. The Israeli concludes without emotion, “Now we’re in dialogue.” The
dialogue between the two death-wielding groups - one pro-Israeli, one pro-Palestinian takes place through mass media reports of the brutal successes of each. This dialogue
exemplifies information warfare in the age of terror.
Information in the mainstream Western media is essential to terrorist strategy. In a
Faustian bargain, the media inform, excite, and expand their audiences with vivid
coverage of terrorism. Terrorists depend on the same coverage to intimidate and confuse
and also to show their resilience in the face of massive efforts to contain and eliminate
them. In what can only be described as a further perverse twist in information warfare is
the way that Western governments, the U.S. most notably, initially use media coverage of
terrorism as a rallying cry, in spite of the fact that their own failures in policy, security,
and intelligence contribute to their happening in the first place. The Herman/Chomsky
model explains several aspects of these trade-offs among media, terrorists, and
governments.
First, the model clarifies the deep background of selective media emphases that
structures the readily observable polarization of world opinion, side-taking, and agendas.
Herman and Chomsky identify an institutionalized “dichotomization” in news that favors
establishment versions of world events “by controlling how ideas are presented to the
public, and also by limiting the range of credible alternatives” (Klaehn, 2005, p. 7). Since
they first articulated their theory almost two decades ago, the Internet, has accelerated
this polarization through increased self-selection of news and information sources. The
Internet allows individuals of all stripes to select information that confirms their own
worldview. This increases polarization, extremism, and conflict. Terrorists use selective
information to support their own position and attempt to influence public opinion.
Counter-terrorists do the same. Media on both sides express and confirm their audiences’
pre-conceptions, validate hard-line positions, and legitimate the status quo in governance.
Western “free” commercial media fall into this trap through what Herman and Chomsky
identify as five mechanisms that distort news. (1) Ownership and profit-orientation favors
establishment-serving information and interpretation. (2) Advertiser sponsorship and
pressure protect the system. (3) Selectivity in news sources ensures government,
corporate and accepted experts interpret the news. (4) “Flak” discredits opposing points
of view and eliminates deviance. (5) Anti-communism [we suggest inserting instead
“anti-terrorism”] forces conformity. In applying this model, they are able to explain the
elimination of legitimacy for the groups that eventually named as terrorists:
News from primary establishment sources . . . is readily accommodated by
the mass media. Messages from and about dissidents and weak,
unorganized individuals and groups, domestic and foreign, are at an initial
disadvantage in sources costs and credibility, and they often do not
comport with the ideology or interests of the gatekeepers and other
powerful parties (p. 31). . . . This tends to close out dissenting views (34).
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A second contribution of the Herman/Chomsky model is its identification of the
power of the “dominant ideology” as an information system filter. The dominant ideology
in 1988 was anti-communism, but Herman subsequently conceded this fifth filter perhaps
should have been originally labeled dominant ideology. Chomsky notes that anticommunism was replaced in the 1990s by a dichotomy of “otherness.” Since then this
fifth filter’s simple bipolar picture of the world has replaced anti-communism with “antiterrorism,” abetted by the Bush and Blair emphasis on this fundamental divide. The end
of the Cold War left a vacuum in bipolar worldviews and popular ideology. No longer
were all foreign policy decisions made simple by whether they favored the Communists
or their enemies. With the elevation of the War on Terror to an all-encompassing global
struggle, once again simple polarities can guide policy and thinking. The violence of
terrorists makes the military-industrial complex once again justified and gives it a ready
target. The villainy of the “other” confirms “our” virtue. The systematic and organized
forces behind the “Axis of Evil” and other terrorist sponsors enable anti-terrorism to
expand in scale and demand vast resources. Entrenched terrorist cells and seedbeds
require the War on Terror to continue as a permanent state, reminiscent of the
absoluteness and longevity of the Cold War. The unpredictability of terrorism requires
constant vigilance and maximum readiness. Its potential destructiveness recalls the
fearsome specter of communist nuclear aggression. Terrorism’s ability to strike with
dramatic force anywhere justifies massive military expenditures, restrictions on civil
liberties, and other actions similarly carried out by some and questioned by others during
the Cold War.
A third contribution of the Herman/Chomsky propaganda model is how it
underscores the role of information selection and flow. The potential manipulation of
information in the form of cyber-terrorism creates possibilities for disrupting or
destroying high-visibility targets with maximum dramatic effect. What are the
characteristics terrorism needs to be successful? The Olympics provide a ready example.
The symbolic association of the target with the terrorist’s enemies leads to attacks
on the ultimate monument to capitalism, the World Trade Center, and the military control
center of the West, the Pentagon. Commuters on a London subway symbolize the work of
Western capitalism. A Bali nightclub represents the decadence of consumer culture and
entertainment. The Olympics are of little meaning or attraction in the Muslim world and
within other dissident groups. The Olympics epitomize the competitive strivings of
Western culture. Rooted in ancient Greek mythology and practice, the very slogan of
“faster, higher, stronger” imply a worldly zeal and materialism less attractive to nonWestern religions and ideologies. The visibility of a terrorist target correlates with the
terrorist’s desired impact in the dominant visual media and on public emotion. Tall
buildings, large crowds, public figures all offer a physical presence that can be attacked
in ways that can be seen. The target is visual, the act is visual, and the effects are visual.
In a world in which television is the dominant medium, the visibility of terrorist targets is
essential. If “cyber-terrorism” were to impact only information systems, no matter how
profoundly disruptive, it will only be successful if the results are visible in conflagrations,
catastrophes, and death. The Olympics rely on immense, complex, inter-connected
information technologies for their preparation and execution. Profound as the effect of
hacking into the system might be, as a threat in early February to the Turin Olympics
warned, visible results are the most sought after effect of terrorist acts, even if it is as
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distasteful as the grisly beheading of a hostage. The scale of the target and its visible
destruction is important to terrorist effectiveness. Large buildings, crowds, and events
suggest themselves as targets. Timothy McVeigh chose the large, visible “federal”
building to represent the government he feared and resented. Black September knew the
world’s media attention would be focused on Munich for the Olympics. Hundreds of
millions of television viewers throughout the world would see this act. What greater
opportunity could there be for impacting public awareness? The drama of the terrorist act
plays a role. In the film Munich the assassination squad was instructed not to kill but to
“blow up” the Black September hostage-takers and planners. Bombs dominate terrorism
not only for their tactical value – remote detonation, expansive destructiveness,
portability, delivery by non-professionals, etc. – but also for their dramatic appeal. The
explosion offers rapid and partially random destruction, smoke and fire, noise, confusion,
Hollywood-like special effects. The drama of Black September members in their black
hoods with weapons visible on a balcony in the Olympic Village in Munich was clear, as
was the wait for resolution of the stand-off.
The Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) has budgeted $175 million
(CDN) for security, compared to $310 million for the Salt Lake City Games and $1.4
billion for the Athens Summer Games. The Vancouver budget is split 50/50 between the
federal and provincial governments. VANOC has created the Olympics Integrated
Security Unit which combines personnel from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP), the Vancouver Police Department, and the Department of National Defence.
The chief operations officer is RCMP Superintendent Robert Harriman. Almost twothirds of the budget, $110 million, is for police personnel. Summarizing the challenge to
Vancouver, Charlie Smith (2006) writes:
“Vancouver would be a soft terrorism target because of its geography and because
Canadian political leaders are complacent about security. The rugged terrain along
the Sea to Sky Highway is ideal for ambushes. The region’s many bridges serve
as choke points where large amounts of traffic can be disrupted. The new RAV
line, which will travel underneath Cambie Street and downtown Vancouver, will
afford opportunities for suicide bombers. The ferry system is vulnerable because
anyone could drive onto a vessel in a vehicle packed with explosives. There will
be two Olympic villages to protect, one in Whistler and one in Vancouver. And
the distances between Olympic venues stretching from the Callaghan Valley to
Richmond mean that athletes and officials will require lots of transportation,
elevating security risks.”
A major contribution of the Herman/Chomsky model is its ability to explain how
propaganda warfare is now conducted. The drive to maximize audiences and expand
advertising leads to sensationalism, papered over with lip service to the First
Amendment. It is media’s narrowed vision that accounts for the marginalization that
gives birth to terrorism. Ironically, the media’s willingness to publicize the effects of
terrorist acts sustains the very terrorist methodology that the media then condemn.
Further, governments play into the equation by exploiting media coverage of terrorist acts
to sustain, justify, and legitimize their own self-interests. Information warfare has become
a central dynamic and pre-occupation in contemporary public life. Understanding the
place of information in terrorism and counter-terrorism is a major step toward combating
cyber-terrorism and the information sword.
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Kavkaz Center vs. Kremlin:
Cyber War and Propaganda during the Second Russia-Chechnya Conflict
Elina Yalov
University of Leeds
(Dixon Lane Road, 28, Leeds LS12 4RU,
Mobile: 07738934584/+79629446390,
E-mail: iscey@leeds.ac.uk)
Abstract: One of the major differences between the two Russia-Chechnya
conflicts (1994-1996, 1999-present) was in the nature of media coverage.
While the first conflict was covered freely by the Russian, Chechen and
neutral press, the second one had been developing in the information
blockade environment.
During the years of the first conflict, the Russian government gave nearly the free
entrance to Chechnya and almost didn’t try to shape the news reports. Hundreds of
journalists had been working in the Chechen territory – showing the reality, as they saw
it. After the end of the first conflict, the Russian military and the government accused the
press in subjectivity. The “forth power” from their point of view manipulated the public
opinion in a way suitable for the Chechen rebellions, the fact that caused Russian
withdrawal from Chechnya and their signing the Hasavjurt peace agreement in 1996.
At the end of 1999, with the beginning of the second conflict, the Chechen
Goebbels, Movladi Udugov, started his propaganda campaign, which was very similar to
the one he had been leading in the previous conflict. Since it was very successful in the
few first months, the Chechens decided not to change their first conflict’s tactics, and that
turned out later to be a great mistake. From the beginning of the year 2000 it became
obvious that Russia was intending to close Chechen information borders, the fact that
demanded creation of the new propaganda strategy. The free flow of information, from
and to Chechnya, was stopped and that prevented Chechen ideologists from spreading
their ideas and gaining the support from Russian, European and American public.
During the years of the second conflict Chechen separatists and terrorists found number
of ways to break Russian information blockade. One of them was using the internet sites
and forums in order to promote their point of view. Kavkaz Center, the news agency,
which was established in March, 1999 by Movladi Udugov, became one of the most
important Chechen terrorists' sites. In its early days Kavkaz Center that was poorly
organized, written in very low English and used a lot of disinformation material, was
unpopular. People were mostly entering the site for citing it in order to make fun of its
texts. But in many cases bad publicity is better than no publicity at all, so in a while
Kavkaz Center became quite well known. Within some time, when its content and layout
improved, the site became the real threat for Kremlin’s official propaganda.
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During its first years the news agency was mostly using counter propaganda
techniques. It was revealing Russian disinformation material, publishing secret Russian
documents and orders - all that to do demonization to Russians. The site also used to
minimize Chechen and maximize Russian casualties in its reports. This tactic’s purpose
was to demoralize Russian troops and to encourage Chechens attending terrorist groups.
During its first year Kavkaz Center used to quote a lot different Chechen politicians,
fighters and leaders. Some facts that were published showed that agency’s journalists had
very good sources of information in Russian and Chechen governments and all this added
credibility to the site. It must be added here that in its early days, Kavkaz Center rarely
used Islamic themes and motives that could be widely seen since 2001.
In this year the agency started to give accent on the news and in 2002 the site’s
format and layout were totally changed. The 1999-2001 archives were blocked and
Kavakaz Center’s propaganda became much less visible. This strategy turned out to be
more effective and taking into consideration that Kavkaz Center was the only big
alternative source of information for Russian propaganda machine, it could now be
understood that its popularity grew very fast.
Different types of propaganda, like atrocities, big lie strategy, disinformation and
brainwashing started to prevail. The site tended to show Russians as barbarians, killers,
rapists and to publish different anti-Russian documents, speeches and articles. As it was
said before, the Islamic motives were also brought up by the journalists, for example
Darvin’s evolution theory was called “satanic” because it was going against the religious
texts. The calls for studying the religion and the calls for performing extremist acts were
also appearing quite frequently on the site and became the biggest part of the
brainwashing system: “The lack of literature knowledge, for example, won’t affect our
life in this or other world in any way, but lack of Allah religion knowledge will destroy
us in both worlds” (28.06.2006). “Now tell me, what Muslim scholar will dare nowadays
to insist, that the defensive Jihad isn’t mandatory for each Muslim…? Fight against them
until idolatry is no more and God's religion reigns supreme… [Koran, 2:193]”
(09.01.2005)
The disinformation tactic was also used widely by the agency. Publishing false
documents and facts, bringing false figures of supporters or dead Russian soldiers was the
regular practice of the site.
In the Constitution of Russian Federation (article 29) written: “Propaganda or
campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife are
impermissible. The propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or language
superiority is forbidden” (Russia – Constitution). This paragraph gave the Russian
government and its intelligent services the legitimate cause to start the cyber war against
the news agency, which was, from Russian point of view Violating the Constitution.
The site became the Russian intelligence’s and Russian hackers’ battlefield. While
in 1999 the group of students from Tomsk (Russia) hacked quite easily the site of the
Chechen separatists and changed it’s start page, later they failed doing that.
The first internet battle started on the 30th of August. Tomsk group changed the
front page of the site and put the picture of the famous poet Michail Lermontov, dressed
like a soldier with a gun in his hands. The text that was added to the picture said: “Misha
was here. Kavkaz.org and Amina.com (another site of the Chechen separatists – now
closed) were shut down because of the Russian citizen’s demands. This will happen to all
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terrorists’ and killers’ sites”. After a few hours the front page started to change from the
original to the hacker’s one every few minutes. The Chechens tried to restore the site
dozens of times during the day, but initially failed. They managed doing that only on the
next morning. After this cyber attack the site’s popularity grew rapidly, as the agency
wrote, but after a few days the number of visitors dropped down to a few dozens instead
of few thousands (Lebedev). The next hackers attack was in October of the same year and
it took Chechens 6 hours to restore the site. The front page showed the grave with the
epitaph “Kavkaz Center”.
Within some time the tactic of different “enthusiasts” and government groups had
changed and they started corresponding with hosting companies all over the world,
assigning permanent IP addresses to the site, in order to convince them refusing
providing the agency with the hosting services. It must be added here that most of the
“enthusiasts” weren’t independent and had contacts or worked for FSB.
After 9/11 Canada and US hosting firms became very influential and accepted
easily the demands not to provide hosting services to “Chechen terrorists”. Verio Inc.,
WebHosting.Com Inc. and XO Communications, Inc. were the first companies to refuse
providing host services to Kavkaz Center.
In 2002, when the agency became international, i.e. started publishing the news
from Afghanistan, Iraq and other Islamic countries, Tomsk group managed to hack it
once again. They changed the start page and left the massage saying: “We have pulled
out a sting from the stinky mouth of the ‘Bow-Wow Center’ and now there is silence
spreading over the den of the Chechen terrorists…” The group hacked the site after the
“Nord-Ost” terrorist act in October 2002, when Chechen terrorists took more than 700
hostages in the theater in Moscow. The Russian government sent a note to Lithuania,
where Kavkaz Center’s server was based at the time, asking to shut the agency down, and
when they refused the Tomsk group took their own steps (06.02.2002).
It must be admitted here that each time the agency had been attacked; it managed
to recover its contents very fast. The only time the site didn’t work for almost a month
was in summer, 2003. Kavkaz Center, that had very big problems with host services in
US and Canada, moved to Estonia and after that to Lithuania.
It was closed in Estonia in April 2003 after the ceaseless demands from Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was reopened two weeks after that once again in
Lithuania, where the agency was shut down for almost a month but after that was
reopened and its texts were fully recovered.
It must be added that this cyber war gave the best publicity to Kavkaz Center. All
Russian major information agencies mentioned site’s closures and as a result, all those
who never heard about the Kavkaz Center, were now following impatiently after the
development of the events.
All this changed after the 1st of September 2004, when the group of Chechen
terrorists took more than thousand hostages in the city Beslan, North Osetia. More than
300 hostages: men, women and children died in this operation. So when one of the
terrorists announced by Kavkaz Center that he had been responsible for Beslan tragedy
and the explosions of the two airplanes earlier this year – the Russian government
decided to destroy the agency once and for all. After Beslan Lithuanian government had
very dynamic debates about shutting down the site. At this time the agency moved to
Finland, where it was closed almost immediately by the Finnish internet provider
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‘Sonera’ (11.10.2004). In September of the same year the site was under attack again.
Though Kavkaz Center’s leaders wrote and explained that these attacks were useless, not
only because they had all the back-ups on 3 different servers, but also because they
became stronger and more popular after them, they continued. In December of the same
year Rimanas Pashis, the director of the private company ‘Elneta’ in Vilnus gave the
interview to radio ‘Liberty’. He explained that the mirror site was still working in
Lithuania, though the primary one operated in Sweden. It was shut down by the
government only in May 2006 (06.05.2006).
In the end of 2005 the cyber war changed its face once again. The hackers started
the spam-war and the DoS attacks. The agency’s spokesmen wrote that FSB agents were
sending a lot of spam emails signed by Kavkaz Center to different foreign users and also
managed to block the agency’s paypal account. The aim of the spam-war was to make
users complaining to internet provider on the site’s owners in order to shut it down. The
second attack was the DoS one. It was lasting for a few days and managed to disrupt the
site’s work, but as usual it was recovered fully by the agency’s technicians (18.10.2005).
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