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Separation of Religion and State in Stable Christian Democracies: Fact or Myth?
Jonathan Fox
Department of Political Studies
Bar Ilan University
Abstract: This study compares separation of religion and state (SRAS) as it is
conceived in theory to whether it exists in practice in 40 stable Christian democracies
between 1990 and 2008 using data from the Religion and State round 2 dataset. There
is no agreement in the literature on how SRAS ought to be conceived but many argue
that SRAS is a necessary precondition for liberal democracies. Accordingly this study
examines four models of SRAS found in the literature as well as a non-SRAS model
that addresses the appropriate role of religion in democracies: secularism-laicism,
absolute SRAS, neutral political concern, exclusion of ideals, and the acceptable
support for religion model. An analysis of the extent of religious legislation and
restrictions on the religious practices and institutions of religious minorities shows
that depending on the definition of SRAS used between zero and eight of these 40
countries have SRAS. Based on this, I conclude that either SRAS is not a required
precondition for liberal democracy, or many states that are commonly considered
liberal democracies are, in fact, not liberal democracies.
Within some intellectual circles, there is an assumption that Christian liberal
democracy and separation of religion and state (SRAS) go hand in hand. Yet many
dispute this notion. This study examines and tests the actual extent of SRAS among
40 stable Christian democracies between 1990 and 2008 using the Religion and State
round 2 (RAS2) dataset, focusing on two aspects of SRAS: religious legislation and
religious discrimination.
Conceptions of Religion and State
The assumption that the proper and natural relationship between religion and
state, at least in Christian democratic states, should be SRAS is present in many
intellectual circles. For example, a recent call for papers by the Journal of Law,
Religion, and State states that:
The relations between religion and the democratic state are based to a
large extent on separation between public and private domains. In the
public domain the state enjoys full supremacy while in the private domain
every person enjoys freedom of religion. In the public domain neutral and
secular discourse should prevail and there is no room for religious
arguments per se, especially not for recourse to religious authority. In the
private domain religious authorities can preach and invoke religious
principles. This separation is based on a certain assumption, grounded in a
Protestant conception regarding the nature of religion. It assumes that
religion's prime concerns lie in the realm of belief and private life.
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Therefore, the demand that religion won’t interfere with state affairs does
not clash with religious principles.
Stepan (2000: 39-40) in his classic study of religion and toleration similarly describes
this school of thought:
Democratic institutions must be free, within the bounds of the constitution
and human rights, to generate policies. Religious institutions should not
have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to mandate
public policy to democratically elected governments. At the same time,
individuals and religious communities...must have complete freedom to
worship privately. In addition, as individuals and groups, they must be able
to advance their values publicly in civil society and to sponsor
organizations and movements in political society, as long as their actions
do not impinge negatively on the liberties of other citizens or violate
democracy and the law.
Perhaps the most well known version of this normative plea can be attributed to
Rawles (1993: 151) who argues that we must “take the truths of religion off the
political agenda.”1
However, this normative plea is not unopposed. Classically, de Tocqueville is
usually paired against Rawls to argue that there is room for religion in democracy. In
fact he argues that a “successful political democracy will inevitably require moral
instruction grounded in religious faith.” (Fradkin, 2000: 90-91) Greenawalt (1988: 49,
55) similarly argues that liberal democracy tolerates people who want to impose their
religious convictions on others “just as it tolerates people who wish to establish a
dictatorship of the proletariat” and that without resort to religion there are often
insufficient “grounds for citizens to resolve many political issues.” Bader (1999)
argues that excluding religion from the public sphere or even just from government is
discriminatory and violates liberal values. For instance, why should it be only secular
institutions that can receive government contracts to provide services? Some go as far
as to argue that aggressive secularism can become hostility to religion which violates
liberal values. (Durham, 1996: 19)
On a more practical level, many argue that this assumption of universal SRAS
among Christian democracies does not fit the facts. (Cassanova, 2009: 1058; Fox,
2008) and there is no shortage of democracies which openly endorse specific
religions. (Fox, 2008; Stepan, 2000: 41-43) Some go as far as to argue that democracy
is not possible in religiously plural societies. (Mill, 1951: 46; Horowitz, 1985: 86-86)
Lijphart (1997), among others, developed the concepts of consociationalism and
power sharing to describe religiously plural societies that could only endure
democracy through complex power sharing arrangements.
There is also a strain of arguments which posit that under the correct
circumstances, state support for religion does not harm democracy. Mazie (2004;
2006) argues that this is possible because there are some elements of religion are
compatible with democracy while others are not. He differentiates between supporting
a religion and making it mandatory with the former being acceptable and the latter
not. Driessen (2010) argues that as long as a government has sufficient autonomy to
make decisions independent of religion–without religious actors being able to
1
For additional versions of this argument see, among others, Demerath (2001: 2) and Shah (2000).
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overrule its decisions—further separation is not necessary in order to have high levels
of democracy. Marquand & Nettler (2000) similarly argue that religion and
democracy can co-exist if there is mutual tolerance, or at least mutual self-restraint on
the part of both religion and government, and a right got the non-religious to abide by
their own values.
Even among those who advocate some form of SRAS, there are multiple
conceptions of the concept, many of which do not confirm to the normative pleas
cited above. Western conceptions of SRAS can be divided into four categories. These
categories basically represent different answers to the following questions: (1) May
the state support religion? (2) May the state restrict religion? (3) Is religious discourse
and expression appropriate in the public sphere? The four conceptions of SRAS
discussed below are presented in Table 1 below in light of these three questions.
Table 1 also presents the theory of acceptable support for religion as discussed by
Mazie (2004), Driessen (2010), and Marquand & Nettler (2000) above. This final
theory, while not a theory of SRAS, does address the appropriate role of religion in
democracies.
[Table 1 about here]
The secularist-laicist model not only bans state support for any religion, it also
restricts the presence of religion in the public sphere. Thus not only are restrictions on
religion in the public sphere allowed, they are mandated. Religion is a wholly private
matter and the state enforces this through restrictions on public religious activities and
on religious institutions. (Kuru, 2009; Hurd, 2004a; 2004b; Haynes, 1997; Keane,
2000; Stepan, 2000; Durham, 1996: 21-22; Esbeck, 1988) These restrictions are
placed on all religions equally, including the majority religion. France's 2004 law
banning any overt religious symbol in public schools, including the head coverings
worn by Muslim women, is a classic example of this model. While someone from
another tradition might consider this law a restriction on religious liberty, from the
French perspective these religious symbols constitute an aggressive encroachment of
religion—something that should be a private matter—on the public sphere.
The other three models are variations on the expectation that the state should
maintain neutrality toward religion. While these models do not require a particular
stance on religion as a negative or positive influence on society, they are compatible
with a view of religion as a positive influence. This is qualitatively different to
laicism-secularism in that laicist-secularist governments act as if religion is a negative
influence and must be relegated to the private sphere. These neutralist models take the
stand that the state should not be privileging any particular religion, but accomplish
this in different ways. While the terms for these models differ across the literature I
will rely on those developed by Fox (2007; 2008), Madely (2003) and Raz (1986).
The second model is absolute SRAS. This conception requires that the state
neither support nor restrict any religion. This is perhaps the strictest of the 'neutral'
models because it allows no government involvement or interference in religion at all,
though within this trend, opinions on the proper role of religion in civil society and
political discourse differ. (Esbeck, 1988; Kuru, 2009) The US is often considered the
prime example of this model. While there is a difference of opinion within supporters
of this model on specifics, there is general agreement that religion should not be the
business of government but the expression of religion in public life is not only
acceptable, it is a positive influence. (Kuru, 2009)
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Esbeck (1988) identifies three trends in US thought within this tradition. Strict
separationists, believe that public policy should be decided on a secular basis, and
there is “no universal, transcendent point of reference or ethical system exists or is
required for judging the state.” This is also known as the "Jeffersonian" wall between
religion and state. That being said, within this school of thought the public expression
of religion is not excluded. The pluralist separationist school of thought accepts that
"religion may influence issues of civic government" but recoils "at the thought of a
religiously generated cultural mandate employing the offices of government to
achieve religious ends.” (Esbeck, 1988: 45) Finally, institutional separationists allow
for religious moral traditions to influence political discussion but are against state
support for religion or the use of state instruments to advantage a particular religion.
The third model, neutral political concern, has a different conception of state
neutrality toward religion. This model "requires that government action should not
help or hinder any life-plan or way of life more than any other and that the
consequences of government action should therefore be neutral." (Madeley, 2003: 56) That is, government support for religion and restrictions on religion are acceptable
as long as they are applied equally to all religions.
The fourth model, exclusion of ideals, has a similar conception of neutrality
but focuses on intent rather than outcome. It mandates that "the state be precluded
from justifying its actions on the basis of a preference for any particular way of life."
(Madeley, 2003: 6) Thus religions can in practice be treated differently as long as
there is no specific intent to support or hinder a specific religion.2
The fifth model, which is not a form of SRAS, is based on theories of
acceptable support for religion in democracies as discussed by Mazie (2004),
Driessen (2010), and Marquand & Nettler (2000) above. It is in some ways stricter
than all but the absolute SRAS model. This set of theories allows support for a single
religion but otherwise fully protects religious freedom in general and the religious
expression of minorities. Thus, governments may support a religion, but it may not
restrict any religion, especially minority religions, and it may not make any aspect of
religion mandatory.
While the differences between the four models of SRAS models are
significant, it is important to emphasize that they all, along with the model for
acceptable support for religion, have one thing in common: that religious minorities
should be as free to practice their religion as the majority religion. That is, all five of
these models agree that a lack of religious freedom for religious minorities that is not
shared by the majority is unacceptable. For absolute SRAS and the acceptable support
model, any restriction on minorities is unacceptable. Such restrictions, effectively
creates two categories of religion: (1) the favored religion (or favored religions) and
(2) all other religions. This lack of equality in how religions are restricted runs
counter to all four models of SRAS, as well as the standard for acceptable support
form religion in democracies but for different reasons. Also, in the exclusion of ideals
model it is possible for a religion to receive benefits not given to other religions.
Also, on a more general level, the normative calls for SRAS, even though they
focus on state support for religion include this requirement for religious freedom. The
call for papers noted above explicitly states that "in the private domain every person
enjoys freedom of religion." Similarly, Stepan (2000: 39-40) states that "individuals
and religious communities...must have complete freedom to worship privately."
2
For a discussion of what types of state support for religion can violate the principle of state neutrality
toward religion see Driessen (2010) and Mazie (2006). For a review of the Western intellectual history
of the concept of separation of religion and state see Laycock (1997) and Witte (2006).
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It is important to emphasize that while in theory, any limitation on religion is a
limitation of religious freedom, all states restrict religion in some instances. For
example, should a religion call for human sacrifice, no government would grant an
exception to laws banning murder despite that doing so would technically violate the
right to practice one's religion freely. This is an extreme example of the general
concept that governments must balance priorities, of which freedom of religion is
only one. A more common example is zoning laws which might limit the ability to
build places of worship in particular locations. If this is applied equally to all
religions, this would be an instance of general regulations that apply to all equally
and, for the purposes of this study, would not be considered religious discrimination.
It is arguably not even a restriction on religious freedom if places of worship can, in
general, be built in places other than these particular locations, especially if any
denomination that wishes to build one can find a reasonable place to do so. An
example of this would be a ban on any structures non-residential structures in an area
zoned exclusively for residential structures. Zoning laws applied selectively to limit
the ability of only certain religions to build places of worship are another matter
entirely.
This means that a state which maintains no support for religion but limits the
religious freedom of minorities in ways not applied to the majority religion clearly
violates basic elements of the principles of all manifestations of SRAS doctrines and
even standards for democracies that do not require SRAS. Accordingly in this study, I
examine religious discrimination in addition to religious legislation.
As is demonstrated below, most Christian democratic states either declare
official religions or openly support one or a few religions more than others, totally
eschewing any adherence to this aspect of SRAS. In addition most of them somehow
limit the religious freedom of religious minorities in a manner not applied to the
majority religion. The purpose of this study is to examine to what extent SRAS,
exists, if it exists at all, in stable Christian democracies.
Research Design
This study uses the Religion and State round 2 (RAS2) dataset to examine the
presence of religious legislation and discrimination in Christian democracies. RAS2
includes data on 51 specific types of religious legislation (which are listed in table 4)
and 30 specific types of religious discrimination (Which are listed in table 6) for 177
countries coded yearly for the 1990 to 2008 period. This study selects from these 177
countries, all 40 countries which have the following characteristics: (1) They are all
stable democracies. I operationalized this by defining a democracy as a state which
scores 8 or higher on the Polity scale of democracy. This scale measures democracy
on a scale of -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). Furthermore, to qualify a
country must have scored 8 or higher for the entire 1990 to 2008 period.3 Countries
which came into existence after 1990 were included if they were democracies since
their independence. (2) Because the Polity dataset is my yardstick for democracy, I
did not include states which were not included in the polity dataset. This resulted in
the removal of several Western countries with populations of less than one million
which are in the RAS2 dataset but not the Polity dataset which generally includes
states with a population of one million or higher. (3) They are Christian majority
3
For more on the Polity dataset see Jaggers & Gurr (1995) and the Polity website at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
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states. This is because the literature links the tradition of SRAS to Christian
democracies.
These criteria combined provide the 40 states which are most likely to have
SRAS according to the theory that Christian liberal democracies are expected to meet
this requirement. As, in theory, these states constitute the most favorable
environments for SRAS, if they do not have SRAS, this falsifies claims that SRAS is
central to democracy.
For the purposes of analysis I categorize these states as follows. First, I divide
them into world regions: Western Democracies (21 states), the former Soviet bloc (8
states), and a combined Latin America and Asia group (11 states). This is primarily
because the tradition of Christian democracy is most strongly associated with the
West. I combine Latin America and Asia because there are too few Christian
democratic states which meet the criteria for this study in Asia for a separate analysis
(2 states). This categorization allows an evaluation of whether the SRAS assumption
holds true in these states. I also analyze separately Catholic and non-Catholic states,
both having 20 states, because the literature associates democracy more with
Protestantism. Both of these variables are included in RAS2
The analysis includes five stages. The first examines whether these countries
have an official religion or prefer some religions over others—a violation of all of the
concepts of SRAS noted above. RAS2 includes a 15 category variable which
measures this which I simplify here into the following categories:





The state has an official religion.
The state has no official religion but gives privileges and preferences to a
single religion.
The state has no official religion but gives privileges and preferences to more
than one religion.
The state supports all religions equally.
No support or minimal support for religion.
I test how many states fall into each category for both 1990 (or the earliest year of
data available) and 2008 to check whether states, on a basic level, meet the
expectations for SRAS in liberal Christian democracies. In all analyses after this one,
states with official religions are treated separately because assumptions of separation
of religion and state clearly do not apply to them.
The second stage analyzes mean levels of religious legislation in 1990 (or the
earliest year available) and 2008. This is accomplished by adding all of the 51
separate categories of religious legislation to form a scale of 0 to 51. Put differently,
this scale measures the number of types of religious law that exist in a country. I
examine these results for all cases as well as based on the categorizations noted above
separating out states with official religions, by world region, and by majority religious
denomination. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether religious
legislation is, in fact, prevalent in Christian democracies. A significant presence of
religious legislation in Christian democratic states would falsify predictions of SRAS
in these states.
The third stage analyzes each of the 51 types of religious legislation
separately. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the more specific nature of the
religion laws that exist in Christian democracies. As noted in the literature review
section, there are different types of support for religion which have different
implications. In addition, this is also to determine whether any findings of the
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presence of religious legislation are being driven by a small number of types of
legislation or whether it represents a wider range of types of legislation. Due to the
large amount of information this analysis must present and that (as is discussed in
detail below) there was little change over time in the amount of religious legislation I
limit this analysis to 2008.
The fourth stage analyzes the religious discrimination variable in the same
manner as stage two analyzes religious legislation. The religious discrimination
variable is coded on a scale of 0 to 34 so its 30 components added up form a scale of 0
to 90. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether religious discrimination is,
in fact, prevalent in Christian democracies. If found to be present, this would falsify
predictions of SRAS in these states. It is important to note that religious
discrimination measures restrictions placed on the religious practices or institutions of
any minority religion in a state that are not placed on the majority religion. While
restrictions placed on all religions, including the majority religion, can be restrictions
on religious freedom, they are not discrimination because discrimination implies
differential treatment. This operationalization is also consistent with theories of SRAS
which demand equal treatment for minority religions. Thus, unequal treatment would
not include cases where minority religions are restricted in the same way as the
majority religion.
The fifth stage analyzes the 30 types of religious discrimination in the same
manner as stage three analyzes the various types of religious legislation. The purpose
of this analysis is to examine the more specific nature of the religious discrimination
that exist in Christian democracies.
Space limitations prevent a full description of RAS2 but some relevant aspects
require discussion. RAS2 focuses on government policies, institutions, practices, and
laws rather than on civil society or religiosity. The variables are coded at the national
level and do not include the behavior of regional or local governments unless a
significant plurality of these governments engage in a codeable behavior. They reflect
either laws on the books or consistent government policy.5 (Fox, 2008). The coding
procedures and sources for the dataset are set out in detail in the RAS2 codebook.6 In
brief each variable is coded separately for each year between 1990 and 2008. The
codings are based on multiple sources listed in detail the RAS Round 2 codebook
which include human rights reports from government and private organizations,
academic sources, news sources from the Lexis/Nexis database and primary sources
including state constitutions and laws.
Data Analysis and Discussion
Official Religions and Support for Religion
The extent of state support for religion, presented in table 2, in and of itself
falsifies the Christian democracy SRAS assumption. As will be recalled while some
conceptions of SRAS require no support for any religion, some allow for support as
long as it is provided equally to all religions. In 2008, these two categories constitute
respectively 15% and 10% of all Christian democratic states, a total of 25% of all
4
The scale is as follows: 0- Not significantly restricted for any minorities; 1- The activity is slightly
restricted for some minorities; 2- The activity is slightly restricted for most or all minorities or sharply
restricted for some of them; 3- The activity is prohibited or sharply restricted for most or all minorities.
5
This focus on national level behavior and government policy is similar to other major data collections
on religion and human rights such as Grim & Finke (2006) and Cingranelli & Richards (2006).
6
Available at the RAS website at www.religionandstate.org.
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relevant states. When looking at the categorizations this ranges from 0.0% for former
Soviet states to 36.3% for Latin American and Asian states. Thus, in all categories of
Christian democratic states, including Western democracies which are the core of the
Christian democracy SRAS assumption, a significant majority of states do not have
SRAS because some religions are privileged over others.
[Table 2 about here]
Furthermore, seven of these states had official religions in 2008, eight if one
counts Sweden which had an official religion until 2000. Yet these countries, Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, and the UK are all established
democracies and five of them are Western democracies. In fact these five Western
democracies number are perfectly balanced by the five Western democracies which
are coded in RAS2 as having SRAS—Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and
the US. If we add in countries which privileged a single religion without having an
official one, in 2008 40% of all Christian democracies including 42.8% of Western
democracies in some way supported a single religion more than all others. This runs
directly counter to the proposition that "the relations between religion and the
democratic state are based to a large extent on separation between public and private
domains."
An additional 35.0% of states favored some religions over others. In some
cases this is a simple system with some religions being granted privileges and some
not. For example in Belgium there are currently six "recognized" religions—
Catholicism, Protestantism, Anglicanism, Judaism, Islam and Christian Orthodoxy as
well as “Laïcité”, which is an organization of Secular Humanism that, for all practical
purposes, is considered the seventh recognized religion. These religions receive
privileges including government funding and privileged access for chaplains.7 In more
complicated cases there are multiple tiers of religions. Hungary, for example, has
three tiers: (1) four "historical" religions which receive most state funding. (2) Other
religions can register and receive some funding. (3) Non-registered religions are not
officially limited but receive no state support and since they are not registered entities,
do not get the tax benefits of registered and historical religions.8
Lithuania is a particularly complicated case with four tiers: (1) "Traditional"
religions are those nine denominations that have been in Lithuania for at least 300
years. They receive annual subsidies from the government, may provide religious
instruction in public schools and maintain chaplains in the military. Their clergy and
theological students are exempt from military service, and the highest clergy are
eligible for diplomatic passports. They may register marriages, establish subsidiary
institutions and do not have to pay social and health insurance for clergy and other
employees. (2) State-recognized religious groups, a status that can be achieved only
after being registered in the country for 25 years, are entitled to perform marriages
and are entitled to certain tax-breaks, but do not receive subsidies from the
7
U.S Department of State International Religious Freedom Report 2003, 2004,2005,2006,2007,2008
Online: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108437.htm; Human Rights Without Frontiers, Online:
www.hrwf.net “Denial of Spiritual Assistance to Prisoners Not Professing a State-Recognized
Religion”
8
US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on
International Religious Freedom 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009: Hungary, Available
at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/index.htm; Uitz, Renata, “Aiming for State Neutrality in Matters of
Religion: The Hungarian Record,”.
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government or exemptions from military service. Since 2005, both State-recognized
and traditional religious groups receive social security and health care subsidies for
spiritual leaders and employees. (3) Registered communities require at least 15 adult
Lithuanians and can act as legal entities, open bank accounts, act in a legal capacity
and own property for constructing religious buildings. (4) Unregistered communities
have no privileges, but are not prevented from worshipping.9
All of these cases represent the giving of privileges to religions considered
indigenous, excluding religions that are less established in the country from these
benefits. When combined with states that support a single religion, either officially or
unofficially, this covers 75.0% of Christian democracies in 2008. This is an
overwhelming lack of SRAS.
Religious Legislation
The analysis of the extent of religious legislation, presented in table 3,
provides similar results. The average Christian democratic state with no official
religion had over six and a half types of religion laws in 2008. This remained
relatively consistent over categorizations which ran from 5.22 in Latin American and
Asian states to 8.25 in former Soviet states. More interestingly, in 2008 no state had
less than two types of religious legislation. Thus, if one uses the standard of no
religious legislation to measure SRAS, no Christian democracy meets this standard.
[Table 3 about here]
Furthermore, most states have substantially more than two types of religious
legislation. Among states without official religions, 59.4% had at least five types and
12.5% had at least nine types. This finding that many Christian democratic states have
many types of religious legislation is consistent across all categorizations. Not
surprisingly, the most religious legislation is found in states with official religions.
As shown in table 4, there is a wide variety of specific types of religious
legislation with 35 of the 51 types of religious legislation being present in at least one
Christian democracy, 31 of them in Christian democracies with no official religion. In
this analysis of table 4, I focus only on states with no official religions. This is in
order to demonstrate that even in Christian democratic states with no official religion
there is considerable support for religion.
[Table 4 about here]
The most common type of legislation is financial support for religion. Of the
ten most common categories of legislation, five of them involve financial support for
religion. 63.3% of states with no official religions financially support private religious
schools. This is common in all categories but least common in Latin America where
only 45.5% of Christian democracies without official religions support private
religious education. For example, the Australian government provides financial aid to
private schools—a majority of which are faith based—and which are attended by
approximately 33% of Australian students.10 Brazil also makes federal aid available to
9
US State Department Report on Religious Freedom, 2003 to 2008 Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/127321.htm
10
Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), June 26, 2008
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religious schools for education purposes.11 These cases are typical of the larger
pattern.
42.4% of states with no official religions financially support clergy. For
example in Belgium, the Federal Government pays the salaries, pensions and other
expenses of ministers from recognized religions.12 Similarly, Hungary, which as noted
above gives special privileges to its four "historical" religions funds the clergy for
these religions in small towns.
33.3% of these states directly fund religious organizations from the national
budget. For example, the Swedish government's Commission for State Grants to
Religious Communities is a government entity which consists of 22 registered
religious groups (and 15 sub-groups) who are entitled to some form of direct financial
aid.13 Similarly, in Trinidad and Tobago, the Office of the Prime Minister's Social
Service Delivery oversees the annual financial grants to religious organizations, and
issues recommendations on land use by those organizations.14
The above category is separate from the 27.3% of these states which collect
taxes on behalf of religions. While in the above category, the government gives
money to religious organizations from its general budget, a religious tax is a separate
tax which is explicitly for religion. Exactly half of the Western democracies with no
official religion engage in this practice. Austria collects a tax of 1.1% of income on
behalf of its 13 officially recognized religions. It is compulsory for Catholics. In
Belgium, tax-payers can direct their tax to a designated religion but the tax is
compulsory whether or not one is religious. In Germany the tax is 8% to 9% of the
amount paid in income tax but is compulsory only for members of recognized
religious communities. In Italy, some recognized religions get funds from a voluntary
check off on income tax forms which designates that some of this income tax be given
to the religious organization. In Portugal, the Catholic Church maintains an agreement
with the government allows citizens to donate 0.5 percent of their annual income
taxes to the Church. Spain similarly allows citizens to donate up to 0.7 percent of their
taxes to the Catholic Church. In Sweden, taxpayers may choose to divert the tax to the
religious group of their choice or receive a tax reduction. In Switzerland the issue is
decided by the Canton's government. In some Cantons, the church tax is voluntary, in
others, a person opting to not pay the Church tax is forced to leave the church, or the
tax may be non-negotiable.15
30.3% of states with no official religions fund the building, maintaining or
repairing of religious sites. France, despite its militant secularist policy, still
occasionally finds ways around an official ban on such funding. In June of 2006, a
International Coalition for Religious Freedom, “Brazil” (2009) Available at:
http://www.religiousfreedom.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118&Itemid=29
12
U.S Department of State International Religious Freedom Report 2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008
Online: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108437.htm
13
US Department of State Report on Religious Freedom, 2006, 2007, 2008. Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71410.htm, The Wall Street Journal, “In Europe, God is (Not)
Dead”, by Andrew Higgins, July 14, 2007
14
US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, 2003,2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008. Online: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24523.htm
15
Department of State Report on Religious Freedom, 2002-2008. Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71410.htm; "Church Tax" Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_tax; Human Rights Without Frontiers, Online: www.hrwf.net
“Human Rights in Belgium Annual Report”; “Are Swedes Losing Their Religion?” by Charlotte
Celsing, September 1, 2006. Online: http://www.sweden.se/eng/Home/Work-live/Societywelfare/Reading/Are-Swedes-losing-their-religion/, The Washington Post, “Sweden Separates Church,
State”, by T.R. Reid, December 30, 2000.
11
10
‫י‬C
municipal council decided to facilitate the building of a mosque in Marseille by
providing land for a nominal fee; the decision- considered to be a violation of the
separation of church and state- was annulled in April of 2007.16 In April of 2009, the
municipal government of Epinay-sur-Siene opened a 1400 seat “prayer hall” that was
financed with public money; in reality the center functions as a mosque.17 In Paris,
there are plans to use public funds for the building of a cultural institute on Islam; the
“institute” will also function as a house of prayer.18 Despite vocal opposition, the
local mayor of the town of Ploermel has used public funds to erect a giant statue of
Pope John Paul II, next to a cross.19
While it is possible to argue that the other forms of funding here are what
Mazie (2004; 2006) would consider support that does not restrict the religious
freedom of non-funded religions, it is more difficult to say this with regard to
religious taxes. In some cases these are compulsory taxes which are given to religions.
One aspect of religious freedom is the freedom not to be religious. The concept of
requiring a non-religious person to pay a religious tax, I posit, violates this principle.
Also, the collection of religious taxes by governments is a serious entanglement
between religion and state.
The other five most common forms of religious laws are not directly related to
financing religion. The most common is the presence of religious education in public
schools which occurs in 87.5% of Christian democratic states with no official
religions. With the exception of Cyprus, where the courses are mandatory for
members of the Greek Orthodox Church, in all of these countries the classes are
optional or there is a mechanism for students to opt out of the classes. With the
exception of Australia, Cyprus, Ireland, Sweden and Trinidad and Tobago, there are
no classes available for at least some significant religious minorities. Interestingly in
17 of these countries, the classes are taught by clergy or teachers appointed by
religious institutions. Thus, this very common support for religion often allows
religious organizations to send representatives to teach religious theology during
school time for primary and secondary school students and does so only for some
religions and not others.
Two of the top ten types of legislation are bureaucratic. 48.5% of these
countries have government departments concerned with religions. In 66.6% there
exists a process for registering religions which is somehow different from registering
other non-profit organizations. However, this registration is technically mandatory
only in Bulgaria, Peru, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and Uruguay, and in
practice religions which do not register are not restricted even in these countries.
In 33.3% of these countries people married by clergy receive civil recognition
for their marriages. This is not referring to cases where a civil license is obtained but
the ceremony is performed by clergy. Rather, a religious marriage is automatically
recognized.
Finally, abortion is restricted in 45.5% of these countries. While, this is not
strictly supporting religion, abortion is an issue that is linked strongly to religious
16
U.S Department of State Religious Freedom Report, 2007. Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90175.htm
17
Human Rights Without Frontiers, “Financing of Islam: When Public Powers Circumvent the Sacred
Principal of Laicite”, April 21, 2009. Online: www.hrwf.net
18
Human Rights Without Frontiers, “Financing of Islam: When Public Powers Circumvent the Sacred
Principal of Laicite”, April 21, 2009. Online: www.hrwf.net
19
Human Rights Without Frontiers, “Pope Statue Goes Up in France Despite Protests”, December 4,
2006. Online: www.hrwf.net
11
‫י‬C
beliefs. These restrictions are considerably more common in Catholic majority
countries, especially in Latin America where all Christian democracies restrict
abortions.
If one accepts the state officially supporting no religion more than others as
the appropriate standard for democracies, as noted in the previous section, in 2008
only ten of the 40 Christian democracies meet this standard. If one requires stricter
standards, this number drops. For example, of one requires, in addition to not
supporting some religions more than others, no more than a minimal amount of
religious legislation, say five or less of the types of laws included in RAS2, it drops to
eight. If one requires no laws whatsoever, no Christian democracy meets this
standard. Thus, even under the most generous applied definitions which look only at
religious legislation, a large majority of Christian democracies, do not have SRAS
based on a definition of no preference for any religion and no government
entanglement with religion.
Also, while RAS2 does not collect systematic information on whether
government financial support for religion is given equally to all religions, the
anecdotal evidence cited above demonstrates that this is rarely the case. Thus, most of
these states also violate the concept of neutrality—treating all religions equally.
Religious Discrimination
The final element of SRAS tested here is freedom of religion for all residents,
especially minority religions. Any religious discrimination—defined here as
restrictions placed on minority religious practices or institutions not placed on the
majority—would violate this standard which is an element of all four models of
SRAS noted in this study, as well as the acceptable support model.
As shown in table 5, religious discrimination is ubiquitous in Christian
democracies. 32 (80%) of these states engage in at least some religious
discrimination. This includes all of the eight states which had official religions at
some point during the 1990 to 2008 period and 24 of the 32 (75%) states with no
official religion. These results remain consistent when controlling for region and
majority religion with the sole exception of religious discrimination being particularly
low in Latin American Christian democracies. This runs directly counter to
assumptions that the strongest support for religious freedom can be found in Western
democracies.
[Table 5 about here]
In 2008 the mean level of religious discrimination was 6.00. This means that
the average state engaged in the most extreme levels of two types of religious
discrimination or in less extreme manifestations of as many as six types. This
indicates non-trivial levels of restrictions. Furthermore, the extent of religious
discrimination increased between 1990 and 2008, with statistical significance for all
cases as well as for several of the sub-categories.
While we would not expect states with official religions to refrain from
legislating religion, we can expect them to refrain from religious discrimination. This
is precisely the argument set out in the acceptable support model by by Mazie (2004;
2006), Driessen (2010), and Marquand & Nettler (2000)—that a state can support a
religion without limiting the religious freedom of members of other religions. As
already noted, none of the states which have official religions meet this standard.
12
‫י‬C
They all place at least some restrictions on religious minorities, as do 75% of states
with no official religions.
An examination of the specific types of religious discrimination in all 40
Christian democracies, presented in table 6, shows the presence of a wide range of
types of restrictions on minority religious practices and institutions. 22 of the 30 types
of religious discrimination measured by RAS2 are present in at least one Christian
democracy.
[Table 6 about here]
Seven of these are present in more than 20% of these states. The most
common restriction is that minority religions must register in order to be legal or
receive a special tax status that is automatically granted to the minority religion. This
type of law which is present in 52.5% of Christian democracies involves a registration
process specific to religions—as opposed to religions registering on the same manner
as any nonprofit or charitable organization—is usually benign in that the registration
is usually pro forma, all religious communities which seek to do so are able to register
and those which choose not to register can practice their religions freely.
However, there are numerous exceptions to this. For example in Greece,
religions such as the Bahai are denied registration. Such religions cannot receive
"house of prayer" permits, must operate as civil “associations”, and cannot function as
legal entities.20 13 of these states require a minimum number of members to register
and eight mandate a waiting period—that is religions must be present for a minimum
number of years in the country before they can register. Austria, Belgium, Germany
and Sweden all have both of these requirements. For example, a religion in Belgium
must fulfill five poorly defined criteria to register. These include having a ‘sufficient’
number of members, having a structure or hierarchy, offering a ‘social value’ to the
public, existing in the country for a ‘long period’ of time, and abiding by state laws.
Groups must apply to the Ministry of Justice, which conducts a time consuming
comprehensive review before submitting its recommendation to Parliament. However,
once this process is completed registration is rarely denied.21
40% of Christian democracies limit the ability of minority religions to build,
lease, or repair places of worship. As noted above, in some cases this applies to
unregistered religions. This type of discrimination is increasing. Between 1990 and
2008, Austria, Bulgaria, Spain and Switzerland all either began engaging in this type
of restriction or increased the intensity of existing restrictions. In Austria, for
example, several provinces have used zoning laws to restrict the building of Mosques
or Minaret's.22 In Switzerland, the codings, which end in 2008, predate the national
law against Minarets passed by referendum in 2009 and, like Austria, are due to the
use of local zoning laws to deny permits for building Mosques or Minarets.23 This
20
US Department of State Report on Religious Freedom, 2008, 2009. Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/71383.htm
21
U.S Department of State International Religious Freedom Report
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008 Online: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108437.htm
22
Reuters (27.07.2007) (via. Human Rights without Frontiers website) “Austria’s Haider Says to Ban
Mosque Building” Website: http://www.hrwf.net; BBC Monitoring Europe “Austrian People's Party
opposes construction of mosques, immigration” July 9, 2007
23 23
US State Department Report on Human Rights, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008. Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78842.htm; The Independent, “Switzerland: Europe’s Heart
of Darkness?”, September 7, 2007; Human Rights Without Frontiers, “Swiss Nationalists Force
Referendum on Minaret Ban”, by Elaine Engeler,July 8, 2008. Online: www.hrwf.net.
13
‫י‬C
pattern indicates the possibility that national government policies of restrictions on
religious minorities can be foreshadowed by the actions of local and regional
governments.
35% of these countries place limitations on the entry of foreign clergy and
missionaries. This type of law is becoming increasingly prominent with four
countries, Costa Rica, Denmark, Panama, and the Ukraine, either beginning or
increasing the intensity of these restrictions between 1990 and 2008. While this
practice is most prevalent in former Soviet Christian democracies, it is present in all
categories of states in this study. These restrictions are usually minor. In the Ukraine,
for example, the law limits permissible activities by clergy from "nonnative"
religions. However, in practice, there have been few reported cases of this law being
enforced. Though, in 2007 Mormons claimed that a local government in the Rivne
Oblast region banned preaching outside of their places of worship.24 In 2004 Denmark
passed a more serious set of restrictions known as the "Imam Law." The law is widely
believed to be targeted against Muslim clergy but restricts all minority religions. It
limits the number of residence visas for foreign clergy to numbers proportional to the
size of the religious community. Visas are only granted to those who are selffinanced, associated with a recognized religion and who can demonstrate possession
of a relevant background for religious work. Visas may be denied if there is “reason to
believe the foreigner will be a threat to public safety, security, public order, health,
decency or other people's rights and duties." 25
32.5% of these countries limit the access of chaplains from minority religions
to places where majority religion chaplains have access. In Peru, for example, the law
states that the military may hire only Catholic clergy as chaplains, and Catholicism is
the only recognized religion of the military. In addition, a 1999 Government
compelled members of the armed forces and the police, as well as their civilian coworkers and relatives, to participate in Catholic services.26
30% of these countries have anti-sect laws which declare some sects
dangerous and require monitoring and perhaps restrictions on these religions. This
type of law is rapidly increasing with Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, and Sweden all adding this type of law or practice between 1990 and 2008.
Both France and Belgium began this practice after mass suicides by cults. They also
both maintain lists of cults. These lists include groups may consider to be "cults" or
"sects" such as the Church of Scientology, the Unification Church, and Jehovah’s
Witnesses. However, both lists also include groups considered more mainstream
elsewhere. In France these include Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, and
Pentecostals.27 In Belgium these include Seventh-Day Adventists, Zen Buddhists,
Mormons, Hassidic Jews and the YWCA. In France the government created the
“Inter-ministerial Mission in the Fight against sects/cults” (MILS) in 1998, which was
dissolved in 2002 and replaced in 2003 by a similar organization called MIVILUDES.
Both organizations have been accused of abuses of religious freedom. (Fox, 2008;
24
.S Department of State International Religious Freedom Report
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008 Online: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108437.htm
25
State Department Report on Religious Freedom, 2006 Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71377.htm, The Times (London), “Denmark to Curb Muslim
Preachers” by Anthony Browne, February 19, 2004
26
US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, 2003, 2004,2005,2006,2007,2008.
Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24504.htm
27
An English translation of this report is available at
http://www.cftf.com/french/Les_Sectes_en_France/cults.html.
14
‫י‬C
Grim & Finke, 2011: 33-36; Kuru, 2009)28 In Belgium, discrimination against groups
on the list can include police surveillance, loss of jobs, denial of citizenship, and loss
of child custody.29 Thus both the Belgian and French policies seem to be targeted
against groups which are small and different rather than against dangerous groups and
groups in the list can potentially suffer from serious limitations of religious freedom.
25% of these countries engage in anti-religious propaganda against at least
some minority religions. This is often directed at those perceived as dangerous "sects"
or "cults." An extreme example of this is Germany's campaign against the Church of
Scientology. In addition to numerous other restrictions and forms of harassment
against Scientologists, German state and federal authorities routinely warn against the
"dangers of Scientology" in both print and electronic media. For example, several
German states publish derogatory pamphlets about Scientology and other religious
‘sects.’30
22.5% of Christian democracies restricted the wearing of religious symbols or
clothing. This type of restriction is targeted almost exclusively against Muslims and is
increasing significantly with Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Norway, and
Switzerland all adding this type of restriction between 1990 and 2008. In nearly all
cases these are restrictions by local governments on the wearing of headscarves by
Muslim women who are public employees or teachers. For example, in 2003 Federal
Constitutional court of Germany acknowledged that states could ban headscarves.
(Cesari 2009) By the end of 2008 at least eight of Germany's states had enacted such a
ban.31 France's 2004 law is not included in this list because, as noted above, while
also likely targeted against Muslim women, it explicitly limits the wearing of all
religious symbols in public schools and is applied to all religions in the country. All of
these other countries limit Muslim religious expression exclusively.
In another rapidly increasing form of restriction, 22.5% of these countries
engage in surveillance of minority religious activities. Between 1990 and 2008,
Belgium, France, Trinidad and Tobago, and the UK all began this type of activity.
This surveillance is primarily against Muslims in the post 9/11 era and against those
28
US Department of State Religious Freedom Report, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 . Online:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt/, BBC News Europe, “France Moves to Outlaw Cults”, June 22,
2000, ReligiousTolerance.Org, Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Online:
http://www.religioustolerance.org/rt_franc.htm, Human Rights Without Frontiers, “Public Controversy
About Miviludes”, October 17, 2007. Online: www.hrwf.net, Human Rights Without Frontiers,
“Religious Discrimination in France : CAP submission regarding the appointment of Mr. Georges
Fenech as President of MIVILUDES” October 7, 2008. Online: www.hrwf.net, MIVILUDES 2006
Report to the Prime Minister, Online: www.miviludes.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Report_Miviludes_2006.pdf.
29
International Coalition for Religious Freedom, World Reports Online:
http://www.religiousfreedom.com/; Human Rights Without Frontiers “The Institute on Religion and
Public Policy Denounces Defamation of Religion in Belgium at the UN” Online: www.hrwf.net;
Human Rights Without Frontiers, “Defamation of Religions in Belgium”; International Christian
Concern, “Institute Report to UN Details Systematic Religious Discrimination in Belgium” online:
www.persecution.org.
30
US State Department Report on Religious Freedom, 2006, 2007,2008. Online;
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/127312.htm
; Spiegel, “Munich Closes Scientologist Day-Care Center”, February 26, 2008
31
European Studies on Religion and State Interaction, “State and Church in Germany”, January 2008.
Online: http://www.euresisnet.eu/Pages/ReligionAndState/GERMANY.aspx, “Germany’s Hijab Ban
Discriminatory: HRW”, February 26, 2009, DPA, “German court Upholds Headscarf Ban”, December
10, 2007,
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1235628698092&pagename=ZoneEnglish-News/NWELayout
15
‫י‬C
perceived as "sects" or "cults." This variable was only coded if the surveillance was of
religious activities and beyond what would be expected for basic security concerns.
This widespread, serious, and increasing religious discrimination in Christian
democracies clearly violates all conceptions of SRAS. The secularist-laicist doctrine
accepts the maintenance of a secular public space but would mandate the same
restrictions on all religions, not restrictions focused on minority religions. The neutral
political concern and exclusion of ideals models also could tolerate some forms of
restrictions placed on all religions but targeting only minority religions violates their
conception of equality. The absolute SRAS model tolerates no government
interference in religion at all. The only category of states with relatively low levels of
religious discrimination among Christian democracies are those in Latin America and
Asia.
Figure 1 presents a graphic representation of these 40 countries' scores on
religious legislation and religious discrimination. That very few states are even close
to 0-points on the x-y axis further demonstrates the lack of SRAS in Christian
democracies.
[Figure 1 about here]
Conclusions
The results of this study show that, at a minimum, a large majority of Christian
democracies, and perhaps all of them, engage in levels of religious legislation and
support for religion sufficiently high that they violate any reasonable notion of SRAS.
In 2008, 75% of them supported some religions over others and all of them had at
least some religious legislation. In addition 80% of these states place at least some
restrictions on the religious freedom of religious minorities.
Based on this, few democratic states meet any of the four standards for SRAS.
Neutral political concern demands equality across religions. Thus, it requires no
religions discrimination (restrictions placed on minorities not placed on the majority
religion) and that should the government support religion, it must do so equally for all
religions. Only Canada, New Zealand, and Uruguay meet this standard. Exclusion of
ideals similarly demands neutrality, but neutrality of intent rather than neutrality in
the outcome. Thus it is difficult to measure but a clear level of non-neutrality in
outcome can arguably reflect an absence of neutrality in intent so the results for
exclusion of ideals are, in practice, the same as those for neutral political concern.
No states meet the absolute SRAS standard, as any religious legislation or
religious discrimination would violate this model. The secularism-laicism model also
prohibits support for religion and religious discrimination so no state meets this
standard in a strict sense.
When looking at religious legislation and support for religion alone it is
possible to argue that many or even all of these states meet the minimal standards for
democracy set out by Mazie (2004; 2006), Driessen (2010), and Marquand & Nettler
(2000). These standards allow support for religion and even a preference for certain
religions is acceptable as long as a religion is not made mandatory, religious actors do
not have a veto power over government decisions, and religious freedom is
maintained for minorities. There is very little evidence of Christian democracies
violating the first two elements of this standard. With the possible exception of antiabortion laws, few Christian democracies make any aspect of Christianity mandatory.
Blasphemy laws exist and are likely a violation of the freedom of speech and
expression, but a ban on insulting Christianity does not prevent one from practicing
16
‫י‬C
another religion. Religious education in public schools is common, but there are no
instances of anyone being forced to take classes in a religion other than their own.
However, even these standards are not met by most Christian democracies when we
add in the element of religious discrimination which only eight (20%) of these states
avoid.
Even if we create a more lenient standard which allows some religious
discrimination and legislation, based on the argument that states can violate standards
in small ways and still hold to their spirit, few democratic states meet this standard. If
we set very lenient standards of a score of 3 or below on religious discrimination, a
score of 5 or below on religious legislation, and that the state not declare an official
religion or support some religions more than others only eight of the 40 countries in
this study qualify: Australia, Brazil, Italy, Jamaica, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Slovenia, the US, and Uruguay.
Thus, there is arguably no standard for SRAS sufficiently lenient to allow for a
majority of Christian democracies to meet that standard which also would even
minimally resemble any recognizable conception of SRAS. In fact, no such standard
allows for more than 20% of democratic Christian countries to be considered to have
SRAS.
The debate over whether SRAS is an essential element of liberal democracy is
one that receives much attention when discussing theory. However, when viewing the
facts on the ground, there is little room for debate. An overwhelming majority of
Christian democracies have substantial levels of religious legislation and give de-jure
and de-facto preferences to a single religion or a few religions. This finding is
consistent across world regions and denominations of Christianity. Most of these
states, especially outside of Latin America and Asia, also engage in religious
discrimination against minority religions.
As Christian democracies constitute the group most expected to maintain state
neutrality on the issue of religion, these results require a recognition that these ideals
are rarely, if ever, achieved in practice. This lack of observance of these ideals
arguably reaches the point where state practice disproves the relevance of these ideals.
That is, since the countries in this study are among the most democratic in the world,
these results also show that state support for religion and democratic government can
be compatible. While it is not possible to argue that democracy and discrimination
against minorities are compatible, the evidence shows that it is possible for a state to
be engaged in such discrimination and still be considered by many to be a liberal
democracy. The only other possible argument to explain these results is that most
states considered liberal democracies are, in fact, not liberal democracies.
Given this, many theoretical and ideological conceptions of the role of religion
in democracies, including Western and other Christian democracies need to be
reevaluated in the face of reality. Consequently, future research agendas should
include the following: (1) An examination of how much deviation from the ideal of
religious freedom is, in practice, acceptable in democracies and under what
circumstances. (2) Developing a model of state support for religion in democracies
that reflects the reality of ubiquitous state support as well as a theoretical and perhaps
ideological justification for this model. Such a model would include how religion can
contribute to democracy, as argued by de Tocqueville, as well as what forms of
government support for religion are compatible with democracy and which forms of
government support are not compatible. As discussed above, Mazie (2004; 2006),
Driessen (2010), and Marquand & Nettler (2000), among others, have begun
developing such a model but tend to focus on a limited number of cases. A more
17
‫י‬C
comprehensive model would take into account the wide variety of government
support for religion revealed in this study.
18
‫י‬C
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Table 1: Models for Separation of Religion and State and for Acceptable
Support for Religion in Democracies
SecularismLaicism
Absolute
SRAS
State support
for religion?
No
No
State
restrictions on
religion?
Yes, in
public
sphere and if
applied
equally
Yes, if
applied
equally
Restrictions on
religion in
public
discourse and
expression?
Neutral
political
concern
Yes, if
applied
equally
Exclusion of ideals
Acceptable Support
for Religion
Yes, as long as there
is no ideological
preference for any
religion.
No
Yes, if
applied
equally
Yes, as long as there
is no ideological
preference for any
religion.
Yes, as long as
religion isn’t
mandatory and there
is no religious veto
on state policy
No
No
Yes, if
applied
equally.
Yes, as long as there
is no ideological
preference for any
religion.
21
No
‫י‬C
Table 2: State Support for Religion
Western
Democ.
By Region
Former
Soviet
1990 (or earliest)
Official Religion
Single Religion Preferred
Some Religions Preferred
Equal Support for All Religions
No or minimal support
28.6%
19.0%
23.8%
4.8%
23.8%
0.0%
25.0%
62.5%
12.5%
0.0%
18.2%
27.3%
18.2%
27.3%
9.1%
10.0%
35.0%
30.0%
10.0%
10.0%
30.0%
5.0%
30.0%
15.0%
20%
20.0%
22.5%
30.0%
12.5%
15%
2008
Official Religion
Single Religion Preferred
Some Religions Preferred
Equal Support for All Religions
No or minimal SUPPORT
23.8%
19.0%
28.5%
4.8%
23.8%
0.0%
25.0%
75.0%
0.0%
0.0%
18.2%
27.3%
18.2%
27.3%
9.1%
10.0%
40.0%
30.0%
10.0%
10.0%
25.0%
5.0%
40.0%
10.0%
20%
17.5%
22.5%
35.0%
10.0%
15.0%
21
8
11
20
20
40
N
22
Latin
Amer. &
Asia
By Religion
Catholic
Other
Christian
All
‫י‬C
Table 3: Average Levels of Religious Legislation
N
Mean
% with this number or less types
1990 or Earliest
2008
3
5
9
3
5
10.0%
35.0%
75.0%
10.0%
32.5%
9
75.0%
All Cases
40
1990
7.10
2008
7.35
By Official Religion
Official Religion
No official Religion
Sweden*
7
32
1
10.29c
6.25c
12.00
10.14b
6.62ab
11.00
0.0%
12.5%
--
0.0%
43.8%
--
42.9%
87.5%
--
0.0%
12.5%
--
0.0%
40.6%
--
42.9%
87.5%
--
Countries with No Official
religion*
By Region
West. Democracies
Former Soviet
Latin Amer. & Asia
15
8
9
6.40
7.38
5.00
6.60
8.25
5.22
13.3%
12.5%
11.1%
46.7%
25.0%
55.5%
86.7%
75.0%
100.0%
6.7%
12.5%
22.2%
40.0%
25.0%
55.6%
86.7%
75.0%
11.1%
By Religion
Catholic
18
6.00
6.50a
5.6%
44.4%
94.4%
11.1%
38.9%
Other Christian
14
6.57
6.79
21.4%
42.9%
78.6%
14.3%
42.9%
*Sweden had an official religion in 1990 and none in 2008 so it is treated separately. It is not included in countries
with no official religion.
a = Significance (t-test) between marked value and value for 1990 < .05
b = Significance (t-test) between marked value and other values in same row < .01
c = Significance (t-test) between marked value and other values in same row < .001
23
94.4%
78.6%
‫י‬C
Table 4: Specific Types of Religious Legislation in 2008
Types of Religious Law*
All
Cases
Official
Relig.
No Official Relig
All
cases
West.
Dems
Former
Soviet
Lat.
Amer.
& Asia
11.1%
44.4%
11.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
88.9%
0.0%
44.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
11.1%
0.0%
11.1%
22.2%
0.0%
11.1%
11.1%
11.1%
11.1%
Cath.
Personal status defined by religion or clergy
7.5%
14.3%
6.1%
6.3%
0.0%
5.6%
Religious marriages given automatic civil recognition 37.5%
57.1%
33.3%
31.3%
25.0%
38.9%
Homosexuality illegal
2.5%
0.0%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Blasphemy laws: protect majority religion
17.5%
42.9%
12.1%
12.5%
25.0%
22.2%
Blasphemy laws: protect minority religion
10.0%
14.3%
9.1%
12.5%
12.5%
16.7%
Businesses closed on holidays, Sabbath, etc.
15.0%
28.6%
12.1%
25.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Other restrictions: during holidays, Sabbath, etc.
7.5%
0.0%
9.1%
18.8%
0.0%
0.0%
Religious education in public schools
87.5%
100.0% 87.5%
87.5%
75.0%
83.3%
Official prayers in public schools
15.0%
42.9%
9.1%
18.8%
0.0%
0.0%
Fund religious schools: primary or secondary
65.0%
71.4%
63.6%
75.0%
62.5%
55.6%
Fund seminary schools
12.5%
28.6%
9.1%
0.0%
37.5%
11.1%
Fund religious education in university
17.5%
28.6%
15.2%
25.0%
12.5%
0.0%
Public schools segregated by religion
5.0%
0.0%
6.1%
12.5%
0.0%
5.6%
Fund religious charitable organizations
20.0%
0.0%
24.2%
25.0%
37.5%
16.7%
Government collects religious tax
27.5%
28.6%
27.3%
50.0%
12.5%
33.3%
Salaries positions of funding for clergy (not chaplain) 45.0%
57.1%
42.4%
50.0%
62.5%
44.4%
General monetary grants to religious organizations
40.0%
71.4%
33.3%
31.3%
50.0%
27.8%
Fund, maintain, or repair, religious sites
30.0%
28.6%
30.3%
31.3%
62.5%
16.7%
Free air time on public television or radio
22.5%
14.3%
24.2%
18.8%
50.0%
22.2%
Fund religious pilgrimages such as Haj
2.5%
0.0%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
5.6%
Other funding for religion
22.5%
28.6%
21.2%
18.8%
37.5%
11.1%
Religious leaders given diplomatic status or
5.0%
0.0%
6.1%
0.0%
12.5%
11.1%
immunity
Official government religious ministry/department
47.5%
42.9%
48.5%
25.0%
100.0%
44.4%
55.6%
Religious police force to enforce religious laws
2.5%
0.0%
3.0
0.0%
12.5%
0.0%
0.0%
Gvt. official given automatic religious position
2.5%
14.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Religious officials given automatic gvt. Position
2.5%
14.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Religious criteria for holding public office
7.5%
42.9%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Rel. courts: jurisdiction over family law/inheritance
5.0%
14.3%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
11.1%
5.6%
Rel. courts: jurisdiction over other matters
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Seats in legislature or cabinet granted along rel. lines
5.0%
14.3%
3.0%
6.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Prohibitive restrictions on abortion.
45.0%
42.9%
45.5%
31.3%
12/5%
100.0% 61.1%
Religious symbols on the state’s flag.
20.0%
71.4%
9.1%
12.5%
12.5%
0.0%
5.6%
Religion listed on identity cards or gvt. Documents
2.5%
0.0%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
11.1%
5.6%
Special registration process for religions.
67.5%
71.4%
66.7%
56.3%
100.0%
55.6%
72.2%
Other restrictions or religious laws
12.5%
28.6%
9.1%
6.3%
12.5%
11.1%
16.7%
*= The following types of religious law are not included on the table because no countries are coded as positive: Dietary laws;
Restrictions: sale of alcoholic beverages; Restrictions: interfaith marriages; Laws of inheritance defined by religion; Religious
definitions of or punishment for crimes; Charging interest is illegal or significantly restricted; Women may not go out in public
unescorted; Restrictions: the public dress of women; Other dress requirements in public; Restrictions: unmarried heterosexual
couples; Restrictions: conversions from dominant religion; Censorship 'anti-religious' publications; Restrictions: public music or
dancing; Female testimony in court given less weight; Restrictions: access to birth control; Restrictions on women not listed
above.
24
Other
Christ.
6.7%
26.7%
6.7%
12.1%
0.0%
26.7%
20.0%
86.7%
20.0%
73.3%
6.7%
33.3%
6.7%
33.3%
20.0%
40.0%
40.0%
46.7%
26.7%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
40.0%
6.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
6.7%
26.7%
13.3%
0.0%
60.0%
0.0%
‫י‬C
Table 5: Average Levels of Religious Discrimination
N
Mean
All Cases
40
1990
4.48
2008
6.00b
% with this number of less types
1990 or Earliest
2008
0
3
9
0
3
20.0%
52.5%
82.5%
20.0%
45.0%
By Official Religion
Official Religion
No official Religion
Sweden*
7
32
1
5.86
4.16
5
6.86
5.69b
10
0.0%
25.0%
--
28.6%
59.4%
--
85.7%
81.3%
--
0.0%
25.0%
--
28.6%
53.1%
--
85.7%
78.1%
--
Countries with No Official
religion*
By Region
West. Democracies
Former Soviet
Latin Amer. & Asia
15
8
9
4.80
5.88
1.94c
6.80a
7.85
2.20c
26.7%
12.5%
3.33%
53.3%
37.5%
8.89%
80.0%
62.5%
100.0%
26.7%
12.5%
3.33%
53.3%
25.0%
8.89%
80.0%
62.5%
100.0%
By Religion
Catholic
18
3.67
5.22a
27.8%
61.1%
88.9%
27.8%
50.0%
Other Christian
14
4.79
6.29
21.4%
57.1%
71.4%
21.4%
57.1%
*Sweden had an official religion in 1990 and none in 2008 so it is treated separately. It is not included in countries
with no official religion.
a = Significance (t-test) between marked value and value for 1990 < .05
a = Significance (t-test) between marked value and value for 1990 < .01
c = Significance (t-test) between marked value and other values in same row < .01
25
9
77.5%
77.8%
78.6%
‫י‬C
Table 6: Specific Types of Religious Discrimination in 2008
Types of Religious Discrimination*
All
Cases
Official
Relig.
No Official Relig
All
cases
West.
Dems
Former
Soviet
Lat.
Amer.
& Asia
0.0%
Cath.
Restrictions: public observance of religious services,
10.0%
14.3%
9.1%
12.5%
12.5%
11.1%
festivals and/or holidays, including the Sabbath
Restrictions: build/lease/repair places of worship.
40.0%
42.9%
39.4%
50.0%
62.5%
0.0%
33.3%
Restrictions: access to existing places or worship.
7.5%
28.6%
3.0%
0.0%
12.5%
0.0%
0.0%
Restrictions: formal religious organizations.
15.0%
0.0%
18.2%
18.7%
25.0%
11.1%
22.2%
Restrictions: religious schools or education.
10.0%
28.6%
6.1%
12.5%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Restrictions: make/obtain religious materials.
7.5%
14.3%
6.1%
12.5%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Mandatory education in the majority religion
10.0%
28.6%
6.1%
6.3%
0.0%
0.0%
5.6%
Arrest/continued detention/ severe official
17.5%
14.3%
18.2%
31.2%
12.5%
0.0%
22.2%
harassment for activities other than proselytizing
Surveillance of rel. activities not placed on Majority.
22.5%
14.3%
24.2%
25.0%
37.5%
11.1%
33.3%
Restrictions: publish/disseminate rel. publications.
7.5%
0.0%
9.1%
12.5%
12.5%
0.0%
00.0%
Restrictions: religious personal status laws (marriage, 12.5%
28.6%
9.1%
18.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
divorce, and burial)
Restrictions: wearing of rel. symbols or clothing.
22.5%
14.3%
24.2%
31.2%
25.0%
11.1%
11.1%
Restrictions: ordination of and/or access to clergy.
7.5%
14.3%
6.1%
6.3%
12.5%
0.0%
0.0%
Restrictions: proselytizing by permanent residents of
15.0%
28.6%
12.1%
12.5%
12.5%
11.1%
5.6%
state to members of the majority religion.
Restrictions: proselytizing by permanent residents of
12.5%
0.0%
15.2%
12.5%
12.5%
22.2%
11.1%
state to members of minority religions.
Restrictions: proselytizing by foreign
35.0%
71.4%
27.3%
25.0%
27.5%
22.2%
27.8%
clergy/missionaries.
Minority religions must register to be legal or receive
52.5%
71.4%
48.5%
50.0%
75.0%
22.2%
44.4%
special tax status.
Custody of children granted based on religion.
2.5%
0.0%
3.0%
6.3%
0.0%
0.0%
5.6%
Restricted access of minority clergy to hospitals,
32.5%
42.9%
30.3%
31.2%
50.0%
11.1%
27.8%
jails, military bases, etc.
Legal policy declaring some minorities dangerous
30.0%
14.3%
33.3%
43.7%
50.0%
0.0%
44.4%
cults/sects.
Anti-religious propaganda in official or semi-official
25.0%
14.3%
27.3%
31.2%
50.0%
0.0%
27.8%
government publications.
Other restrictions.
17.5%
0.0%
21.2%
37.5%
0.0%
11.1%
22.2%
*= The following types of religious discrimination are not included on the table because no countries are coded as positive:
Restrictions: private observance of religious services, festivals and/or holidays, including the Sabbath; Forced observance:
religious laws of another group; Restrictions: import religious publications; Restrictions: conversion to minority religions; Forced
renunciation of faith by recent converts to minority religions; Forced conversions of people who were never members of the
majority religion; Efforts/campaigns to convert members of minority rel. to the majority rel. not involving force; Restrictions:
religious publications for personal use.
26
Other
Christ.
6.7%
46.7%
6.7%
13.7%
13.3%
13.3%
6.7%
13.3%
13.3%
20.0%
20.0%
40.0%
14.7%
20.0%
20%
26.7%
53.3%
0.0%
33.3%
20.0%
26.7%
20.0%
‫י‬C
Figure 1: Scatterplot of Religious Legislation and Religious Discrimination in
2008
27