Things to read:
Stanford encyclopedia articles on structured propositions, Russell, Frege, singular propositions.
Set theory in Cambridge Dictionary
Bealer's Theory of Propositions, Relations, and Properties.
Look at Blackwell companion to philosophy of logic: Stacks BC71.C65 2002; put a search on this as it's
not on the shelf yet (5/28)
Concise Encylopedia of Philosophy of Language, edited by Lemarque: Reference P 106 C5946
Kit Fine's 1982 "First-Order Modal Theories III—Facts" in Synthese, 53, 43-122 where he outlines the
notion of a truthmaker; see p. 53 See science stacks Q175 .S95 Location
Get a feel for Grice's and Bennett's naturalistic theory of meaning.
Stephen Leeds on Church's Translation Argument
Kripke's Outline of a Theory of Truth, Jessi Phil 72, 690-716.
TI: Propositions
AU: Bealer,-George
SO: Mind-. 1998; 107(425): 1-32.
IS: 0026-4423
AB: Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of
propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe,
tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to
show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to
rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically, attempts to
reduce propositions to extensional entities--either extensional functions or sets. The second group concerns
problems of fine-grained content--both traditional "Cicero"/"Tully" puzzles and recent variations on them
which confront scientific essentialism. (edited)
DE: LANGUAGE-; LOGIC-; PROPOSITION-; PUZZLE-; QUANTIFICATION-; TRUTHLA: English
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 0280855
TI: "Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality" in Objections to Physicalism, Robinson,
Howard (ed)
AU: Bealer,-George
PB: Clarendon-Oxford-Pr : New York, 1996
DE: INTENTIONALITY-; LOGIC-; MATERIALISMLA: English
DT: Contribution
AN: 0276644
Record 26 of 46 in The Philosopher's Index (1940-2002/03)
TI: "Proper Treatment of Predication" in Fine-Grained Intensional Logic in Philosophical Perspectives, 7:
Language and Logic, 1993, Tomberlin, James (ed)
AU: Menzel,-Christopher
PB: Ridgeview : Atascadero, 1993
AB: In this paper, I modify and extend a fine- grained approach to the logic of properties, relations, and
propositions (PRPs) developed most notably by George Bealer and Edward Zalter. In particular, I
introduce a "dual role" syntax that allows simple and complex predicates to occur as arguments to other
predicates. This syntax reflects the "predicative" and "objectual" roles of PRPs, i.e., the fact that PRPs can
be both predicated of other objects and referred to (e.g., by gerunds) and quantified over directly. Finally,
this perspective on PRPs is shown to lead to a much more general account of predication.
DE: INTENTIONALITY-; LANGUAGE-; LOGICLA: English
DT: Contribution
AN: 0246874
TI: "PROPERTY THEORIES" IN "HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC", GABBAY, D (ED),
133-251.
AU: BEALER,-GEORGE; MONNICH,-UWE
PB: KLUWER : DORDRECHT, 1989
DE: PROPERTY-; THEORYLA: ENGLISH
DT: CONTRIBUTION
AN: 0165679
TI: BEALER'S "QUALITY AND CONCEPT".
AU: ANDERSON,-C-ANTHONY
SO: Journal-of-Philosophical-Logic. 1987; 16: 115-164.
IS: 0022-3611
AB: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND FORMALIZATION OF INTENSIONAL LOGIC
IN GEORGE BEALER'S "QUALITY AND CONCEPT" ARE CRITICALLY REVIEWED.
OBJECTIONS ARE PRESENTED AGAINST THE UNDERLYING CONCEPTIONS OF
INTENSIONAL ENTITIES, ATTACKS ON QUINE AND CHURCH, AND AN ATTEMPTED
RESOLUTION OF THE PARADOX OF ANALYSIS. IT IS SHOWN THAT THE FORMALIZED
INTENSIONAL LOGIC IS NOT ABLE TO DEAL WITH A NUMBER OF INTUITIVELY VALID
ARGUMENTS. THE REVIEWER CONCLUDES THAT THE LOGIC FAILS OF ITS PURPOSE.
DE: CONCEPT-; ENTITY-; LOGIC-; QUALITYPS: BEALER,-G
LA: ENGLISH
DT: JOURNAL-ARTICLE
AN: 0148084
TI: Propositions and the Objects of Thought
AU: Jubien,-Michael
SO: Philosophical-Studies. 2001 May; 104(1): 47-62.
IS: 0031-8116
AB: The goals of this paper are to argue against Platonic propositions and to suggest a proposition-free way
of treating "propositional" phenomena (such as belief). The main argument against propositions is
reminiscent of Benacerraf's famous argument that numbers are not sets: there are innumerably many
incompatible ways of deploying available abstract entities to mimic the structure of propositions. (This
argument leaves other Platonic entities, like properties, unaffected.) The suggestion for treating
propositional phenomena resembles Russell's treatment of belief as a multigrade relation between the
believer and the intuitive constituents of the would-be proposition.
DE: METAPHYSICS-; OBJECT-; PROPOSITION-; THOUGHTLA: English
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 3015228
Section E1 of "The Problem of Non-existents I —Internalism" (1982) Topoi. He argues for a distinctin
between to forms of being here.
"First-Order Modal Theories II—Propositions" Studia Logica I39, 159-202.
Moore, Some problems in philosophy (I think I have this).
Michael slote holds that facts are the truth of propositions; see Slote, M.A. (19740; Metaphysics and
Essence. Oxfored: Basil Blackwell.
On facts:
Clark, R.W. (1976) 'What Facts Are', Southern Jouranl of Philosophy 14, 257268. Argues that facts aren't identical to propositions.
On there only being one state of affairs:
Donald Davidson and Gilber Harman ed.s Semantics of Natural Lnag. Dordrech:
Reidel.