Tony Blair: Prime Minister or President?
‘Blair is by far the worst of the eight prime ministers I have known’.
‘It is the presidential system he sees emerging under Mr Blair (the fault of over-large majorities,
the prime minister’s character and his well documented disdain for parliament) which he loathes’.
Guardian article on veteran maverick Labour MP, Tam Dalyell, 29/03/05.
Ever since he swept to power in 1997, Tony Blair’s unique dominance over his party and indeed, the UK’s
political scene, has attracted comparisons with a ‘presidential’ figure. Inevitably, the president most often
cited is the American one. This note seeks to analyse: the origin of this debate about the increased
importance of the British Prime Minister; the impact of Thatcher and Blair on the debate; and why the
arguments in favour of there being a British Presidency might possibly be persuasive.
The Origin of the Debate
The famous work on the British Constitution by Walter Bagehot embodied a classic conception of the office
which has informed many traditional textbook versions of British politics. This involved the idea of the PM
as essentially a chairman of the nation’s most important committee, engaged in a constant search for
consensus. The term ‘primus inter pares’- first amongst equals - used to describe a reality but could not now
be said to do so.
Emergence of the Prime Minister
Britain originally was an absolute monarchy which increasingly found it had to exchange power with an
advisory parliament in order to gain the resources to govern. Soon parliament, which developed into an
aristocratic House of Lords and gentleman-filled House of Commons, clashed with the monarch in the Civil
War 1639-1660. The decapitation of Charles I in 1649 symbolised the loss of decisive power to parliament,
confirmed by the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688 whereby the monarch agreed to be bound by the
wishes of parliament.
During the 18th century, parliament had to deal with the Hanoverian kings, who chose their ministers from
parliament to facilitate easy passage of their requests. Inevitably, the person who liaised between king and
ministers came to occupy a unique role and one which grew in power as the century progressed, especially
as the early kings were not always fully engaged with the issues or indeed the English language. The initial
conduit was the chief finance minister, the First Lord of the Treasury, but as this office increasingly became
associated with that of the ‘Prime Minister’, the Chancellor of the Exchequer came to exercise the main
control over economic policy.
The Classic View of the British Prime Minister
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Prime Minister had become the most important politician
in the land, with the monarch relegated to a position of constitutional decoration and occasional influence.
But the PM lacked the authority of former monarchs. This is the period when he was first among usually
aristocratic equals and sought to create the consensus in Cabinet, which would propel measures through
parliament without difficulty. This era of restricted PM power came to an end as: the scope of government
extended rapidly in the twentieth century; when the war imposed the need for a more muscular control of
the levers of government; when the reinforcement of party dominance required a more dominant leader;
and when the growth of the media placed the leader of the government in a spotlight which demanded a
more proactive kind of leadership. By the middle of the century, the strength of Cabinet in relation to the
PM had further weakened as a result of the former being ‘hollowed out’ by cabinet committees which dealt
with matters before they reached full cabinet. Consequently, the PM became more of a chairman of a
‘supervising’ committee, receiving and monitoring reports from subordinate cabinet committees. At the
same time, two other factors strengthened the PM further:
a) the expansion of the assistance on which he could call, like the Cabinet Office, founded in 1916 and
indispensable thereafter.
b) major improvements in media coverage, especially the introduction of television into politics in the late
fifties.
The PM versus Cabinet Government Debate
As long ago as the 1960s, commentators were claiming the increasing power of the PM had reached the
point where ‘Prime Ministerial’ government had taken over from traditional ‘Cabinet Government’.
Academic, John Mackintosh, and Labour politician, Richard Crossman, adduced a number of arguments:
the PM’s control over appointments and job jurisdictions; chairing of the Cabinet and consequent control
over its agenda and proceedings; controlling patronage, the distribution of public appointments and
honours; and the growth of the PM’s personal staff. Moreover, the evolution of Cabinet committees enabled
the PM to exercise control over their membership and chairs. The tendency of PMs to form ‘inner cabinets’
to provide close advice was also cited as a means of bypassing full cabinet on such key issues as deciding to
build a nuclear capacity just after the war. Mackintosh coined the term ‘Prime Ministerial’ government but
Crossman was the first to use the presidential analogy: ‘we in England have a president as truly as the
Americans’. Tony Benn, in 1979, sought to argue for a diminution of PM power. He criticised the use by
the PM of the ‘royal prerogative’ to extend personal power and, at the same time, avoid accountability to
parliament. George Jones of the LSE, however, ridiculed this line of argument, claiming that for each
‘increase’ in power there was a corresponding ‘decrease’ which could be perceived. Ian McLeod, the
Conservative Cabinet member supported this line of argument by pointing out that Macmillan’s dominance
over his cabinet was the reflection of his personal persuasive powers and management skills. The debate
became a familiar exchange of perspectives in British political studies, with a recognition of cogency and
weight on both sides. However, this debate was conducted before a transforming effect on British politics
occurred: the arrival of Mrs M. Thatcher.
The Thatcher Effect
Thatcher was unusual in British politics in being a ‘conviction politician’. Consequently, she was concerned
to maximise her power to achieve what she thought was necessary. She was not especially fecund in
creating new structures, however, she was perhaps better at demolishing rather than building e.g. her
dissolving of the Think Tank (CPRS) in 1983. Her impact was consequently limited [though, it must be
said, she established a template that Blair was keen to follow, albeit in his own less confrontational way].
Her style was to challenge and overcome by sheer force of argument and personality. She did not bring in
legions of her followers like an American president, though her personal staff were influential. But she did:
a) chair cabinets in a way which made resistance difficult; she began by stating her view thus making it
hard for her colleagues to dissent even if they disagreed. She also used to treat some colleagues with scant
respect, the worst victim being Geoffrey Howe. However, such behaviour has its downside as resentment
builds up and then is expressed damagingly as when Howe resigned and made the devastating resignation
speech in November 1990, and began the process leading to Thatcher’s fall.
b) reduce the number of cabinet meetings held and limit the subjects for discussion [e.g. economic policy]
during her first two years in power.
c) bypass full cabinet by holding small ad hoc meetings with the ministers and officials concerned with an
issue.
d) weed out those in her cabinet who disagreed with her so that her agenda could have precedence, e.g. her
early cabinet contained a number of leftish ‘wet’ ministers, like Ian Gilmour and St. John Stevas, but she
was able to dispense with them after a couple of years.
e) have a regal ‘Head of State’ Manner. In addition, Margaret Thatcher, while ostensibly deferring to the
Queen as head of state, in practice behaved rather like one herself and even usurped the royal ‘we’ as in ‘we
are a grandmother’ when Mark and his wife had a baby. But, on balance, it cannot be said that her period in
power proved cabinet government was dead as it was her own cabinet which when consulted, advised her to
resign; advice which she tearfully and bitterly took on 21st November 1990.
Major: a Reaction to Thatcher?
John Major was believed to be a ‘true believer’ Thatcherite by Thatcherites, but he was essentially a rightleaning One Nation Conservative. He was also a conciliator rather than a warrior, and wanted to ‘heal the
wounds’ of ten years of abrasive government. Consequently, his style was initially emollient and collegiate,
encouraging debate and allowing some dissent. However, this changed after the emergence of the
Eurosceptic rebels, whipped on behind the scenes by the deposed Thatcher. Then, his consensualism was
perceived as dithering and weak, so he attempted to change but by then his authority was fatally weakened
and his party became almost ungovernable. The result was a slow death for the Conservatives long period in
power, and the election in 1997, with a majority of 179, of another political phenomenon: Anthony Charles
Lynton Blair.
Impact of Tony Blair: Counter-Arguments
It’s a widely canvassed idea that Blair, with his huge majority, repeated in 2001, is effectively a new kind of
British president but critics argue this comparison is misleading because the US presidency is:
a) fixed term - he has to step down after four years and cannot recontest after eight.
b) elected separately - he has a national constituency, while the British PM’s democratic authority is based
on being an ordinary MP and leader of the biggest party in the Commons.
c) restricted by the constitution - he cannot exceed the historic limits of his office, while the PM can work
within the elastic limits of no written constitution.
d) not able to dominate the legislature which is also separately elected - the president has to negotiate
with Congress to coax his measures through.
e) limited by different party practices - party loyalty and discipline is much less strict in the US, and the
president is forced to use persuasion to get his own way. He can dominate the executive but not the
legislature in the way the PM can through his leadership of the majority party which can be relied upon to
support him/her.
Other critics of the ‘presidential’ thesis claim that the analogy is simplistic and that the underlying reality of
British politics is provided by the pull of the major departments of state and the collective authority of
cabinet. Look, they point out, how the elastic - which Mrs Thatcher had stretched - snapped back once she
had gone in the form of Major’s more traditional style. So, Blair cannot be compared with the
constitutionally very different president, and maybe he is just a one-off, yet another dynamic figure who has
stretched the elastic. Michael Foley in his The British Presidency, argues that Blair should be seen as a
qualitatively more powerful kind of leader compared with his predecessors, but also as the product of forces
which are likely to be permanent rather than temporary. This is because of a number of developments which
he perceives:
Leadership Politics
Foley argues that modern politics places much greater emphasis on leadership roles, and he draws on US
experience to show how this tendency has crossed the Atlantic. Blair came to power in the Labour Party in
1994, and at once proceeded to stamp his imprint. Major, at this time was suffering badly from an
impression of being indecisive and weak. Blair made much of this, saying woundingly (according to Major)
on one occasion: ‘I lead my party, he follows his’. The 1992 election, which many thought Labour could
and should have won, had a traumatic and continuing effect on Blair and the party, making them fear that
poll leads reflected ‘soft’ vulnerable support which the Conservatives could destroy with their campaigning
abilities. Having established such a theme of superior leadership, it was natural that Blair should seek to
fulfil his opposition rhetoric when in office and to establish credentials for the second term. Maybe also he
has been concerned to negate the constant challenge of Gordon Brown through assiduous cultivation of
his leadership position.
Media Campaign Requirements
Foley argues that the ‘permanent campaign’ style of modern politics requires a new approach. New Labour
based its approach on polling and focus groups to find out more about voters’ wishes and sensitivities. Such
political marketing requires a strong brand and, inevitably, party leaders or presidential candidates are
expected to provide this. Families are important too, witness Bush’s assembly of his at the 2004 Republican
Convention. Blair and Howard have already done this in British politics. Clinton had already provided
pointers about how wider popular appeal could be won through appearances on chat shows and selected
publicity winning visits. The concern of such tactics was to break through the phalanx of media personnel,
many of whom are negatively biased, and make contact with voters direct. Blair has also done regular
countrywide Q and A sessions with voters and introduced a series of events where he meets the press where
he appears unmediated by media people. Interestingly, he has adopted a tactic over Iraq, as the election
approaches, of opening himself to often scathing criticism from members of the public, often Labour voters
too. The idea here seems to be that such ‘prostration’ before the lash of criticism will exorcise the issue and
draw its sting.
‘Spatial Leadership’
Foley makes much of the American ploy of being ‘above’ or ‘outside’ the political establishment; as if the
candidate is the voters’ ally against ‘them’ in Washington. Nixon, Reagan and Clinton were past masters at
it and Bush junior too. In Britain, Thatcher was an outside ‘radical’ battling against the system. Blair also
has cultivated a certain ‘otherness’, a frustration with ‘conservatism’ for example in the public services or
Old Labour. Indeed, his record is one of taking on his own party and defeating enemies within, over Clause
Four, the Public Finance Initiative or university top-up fees. Blair offers himself as the sensible ordinary
person’s advocate against the intractabilities of political life. Foley’s argument is that this defence of the
ordinary person - ‘Mondeo’ or ‘Sierra Man’ or ‘Worcester Woman’ - is now an established element in our
politics and will impel future leaders to behave likewise. Blair also took opportunities to ‘speak for the
nation’ on occasions like the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, when he canonised her with Alastair
Campbell’s words: the People’s Princess’.
Party Control
Labour ‘modernisers’ emphasised how important it was to focus on the leader - Blair’s pollster, Philip
Gould, advising in 1995 that to win, ‘New Labour’ needed to be more flexible and innovative to react to
political situations as Mrs Thatcher had. The answer was a ‘single chain of command leading directly to the
leader of the party’. Once in power, Blair maintained the discipline of the opposition years with Labour HQ,
in Millbank Tower, issuing pagers to all MPs to keep them ‘on message’ and applying pressure to the
constituency parties of those who threatened to rebel. This approach was described as ‘Orwellian’ by one
critic. His opposition to Ken Livingstone as the candidate for Mayor of London, and Rhodri Morgan as
leader of the Welsh Labour Party, was one expression of this ‘control freakery’; both were perceived to be
too left-wing and not of the leader’s way of thinking. But, ‘Red Ken’ stood as an independent and won,
while Morgan was eventually selected as leader. Labour has traditionally been a party riven by factions,
all of which became expert at manipulating party machinery to get their views across. This appearance of
noisy disunity was not good for the party’s electability, and Blair’s modernisers did much to smooth the
party machinery away so that policy forums ventilated controversies before the annual conference, in
private if needs be. This is what critics meant by the adjective ‘Stalinist’ when applied to Blair’s party
management approach.
Downgrade Cabinet
Within a year of 1997, commentators were reporting that cabinet meetings were short and more a record of
decisions made elsewhere than major policy discussions. Peter Hennessy focused on the annual agreements
that Blair reached with each Cabinet minister and each permanent secretary of each department regarding
aims and objectives for the coming year. ‘We’ve never seen’ he writes ‘such a tangible instrument and
extension of prime ministerial power, as this before’. Reports on the decision to build the ill-fated
Millennium Dome in 1997 revealed that there was probably a majority against it but it was agreed because
‘Tony wants it’. Similarly, and even more serious, there was considerable dissent over the decision to join
the USA in invading Iraq but, again, the force of Blair’s wishes won the day, despite two resignations from
the Cabinet by Robin Cook and Clare Short. The Butler Report into the intelligence gathering surrounding
the war criticised the way in which Blair’s modus operandi - often unminuted meetings held informally
involving officials as a few ministers or ‘sofa decision-making’ - short circuited the Cabinet and subverted
accountable government.
Control of the Government Machine
As soon as he was in power, Blair’s aide, Jonathon Powell, declared the new regime would be a Napoleonic
one or centralised leadership. To assist him, he:
a) increased his political staff to nearly 80 - many of them concerned with managing the media - but also a
host of new units like the Social Exclusion Unit, the Policy and Innovation Unit and the Centre of
Management and Policy Studies. Most of these have been located in the Cabinet Office but many of them
reporting direct to the PM.
b) Blair has also developed the ability to intervene in a variety of areas as necessary, be it Northern
Ireland, welfare reform, health, education or Europe. His detachment enables him to intervene using the
skills of a ‘quasi-presidential figure above the fray’ (Foley, p.321).
c) By the same token, Blair has shown little interest in Parliament, seldom appearing in the tea-room as
Thatcher or even Callaghan did, but restricting his time in the chamber to Prime Minister’s Questions and
occasional votes: in 2003-4 he voted in only 5% of divisions.
Foreign Policy
Inevitably, foreign policy projects a Prime Minister onto a wider canvass on which he tends to look more
presidential. Blair has taken to this side of his job with élan and great enthusiasm, conferring with EU
heads, standing shoulder to shoulder with George Bush, and seeking to push his special interests like peace
in the Middle East or debt relief for Africa. It might be said that Blair’s powerful sense of moral purpose is
best shown in this sphere and, again, the result is to make him look more like a world statesman rather than
the leader of a middle ranking European power.
Conclusion
The arguments on this theme are still contested, and time alone-in the form of how future PMs behave,
will prove whether Foley’s analysis is correct. He argues that developments in democratic politics
introduced in the USA have a potent effect on Europe, especially the UK. He sees the evolution of parties
as marketing exercises for candidates, the desire of the media for a powerful brand image and the tendency
of presidents to offer themselves as ‘above the fray’ on the side of the common man, has increased the
possibility of British Prime Ministers seeking to enhance traditional roles by being more assertive and
powerful. Evidence is adduced of Blair’s drive to win popular support through overcoming internal party
support, his bypassing of Cabinet and ignoring of parliament, his concern to seize the levers of power in
Whitehall and his grandstanding on the world stage. Of course, no British PM can exercise the powers of an
American president, but, within the flexible limits of the British parliamentary system, a British Presidency
seems to have emerged.
Sources
Michael Foley, The British Presidency, MUP, 2000.
Michael Foley, John Major, Tony Blair and a Conflict of Leadership, MUP, 2002.
Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, Harper Collins, 1999.
Peter Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring, Golllancz, 1995.
Bill Jones, March 2005