DRAFT
Project:
Probing the Smaller Web: Participation in Regional Organizations
Principal Investigators:
Kathy Powers (klp18@psu.edu), Petra Roter (petra.roter@fdv.unilj.si), Zlatko Sabic (Zlatko.Sabic@fdv.uni-lj.si), and Thomas Volgy (volgy@u.arizona.edu).
Project participants:
Ana Bojinovic (ana.bojinovic@fdv.uni-lj.si), Katharine
Peterson (katharin@email.arizona.edu ), Elizabeth Fausett (elfauset@email.arizona.edu )
Stuart Rodgers (srodgers@email.arizona.edu )
Introduction:
Although the development of modern international governmental organizations (IGOs)
can be traced back to the beginning of the 19th century (Jacobson, Reisinger, and Mathers,
1986), their growth has been markedly spectacular over the last hundred years. Particularly
after the end of World War II, and accelerating across the remainder of the 20th century,
international politics witnessed the creation of what one scholar (Haas, 1970) dubbed the “web
of interdependence”: a growing web of global international organizations and regimes, ranging
from universal, multipurpose international organizations (i.e., the United Nations) to narrow,
technical, functional organizations (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency). 1
Much has been written about what we call here the global architecture that
encompasses not all but a very significant portion of relations between states. Far less,
however, has been written about the development of regional webs: architecture encompassing
a broad range of regional governmental organizations (RGOs), many of which either vie with
or complement the global web. Apart from the extensive focus on the European Union and
theories associated with that region’s unique experience, the literature has emphasized the
salience of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and regional economic structures (e.g., Choi and
Caporaso, 2002), but has not systematically examined the broader contours of regional
architecture outside of Europe.2
1
This project focuses on regional and global architecture in terms of actual, concrete, intergovernmental
organizations, as opposed to international (and regional) regimes. There is obviously much overlap between the
two (see Snidal, 1990; Keohane and Murphy, 1992), and ample literature on both (for details about international
regimes see, among many others, Krasner, 1983; Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Young, 1989; Rittberger, 1990;
Levy, Young and Zürn, 1995; Rittberger, 1995; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997). The study of both
formal organizations and international regimes, represent different analytical foci in studying the phenomenon
of international governance as suggested by Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986:755). Having been associated with
the process of international governance, the concept of international regimes has been envisaged as “occupying
an ontological space somewhere between the level of formal institutions on the one hand and systemic factors
on the other” (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986:760). However, the concept of international regimes has been
surrounded by a lack of clarity since its introduction into the IR discourse in the 1970s and 1980s (Strange,
1983). Additionally, several problems in the practice of regime analysis have been pointed out, above all the
subjective ontology (according to which regimes are based on convergent expectations among actors in a
particular issue-area of international relations) that is inconsistent with, and contradicts, the positivist
methodology, (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986:764-6; for a detailed account of different theories of international
regimes, see Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997).
2
For the purposes of this project we assume that the EU represents (and will continue to represent for some
time to come) a unique regional phenomenon in international relations, and as such, has received extensive
academic attention. However, far less attention has been paid to the involvement of states within the broader
European regional web (characterized by IGOs, such as the Council of Europe), or transatlantic institutions,
There is little doubt that in terms of sheer numbers, the web of regional organizations is
substantial and dynamic. For example, in the most recent systematic study of IGOs and state
membership (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, 1996:598), by 1992 “geographic” organizations
were 48 percent more prevalent than universal organizations, and over a 12 year period, grew
at a rate 25 percent faster than universal ones. At the same time, geographical organizations
were roughly three times more likely to “die” over the same time span than universal
organizations. Survival rates varied widely by region, and such variation included death rates
across groupings within Europe as well as outside the European region. Not unsurprisingly, the
highest death rate was in the former “Eastern bloc” (86 percent), while American and African
regional organizations exhibited “death” patterns below the average, and Asian and Arab
organizations above the average (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, 1996:603).
Our preliminary analysis of RGOs also indicates considerable regional variation and
growth of these organizations (see Figure 1). Over the last two decades, RGOs mushroomed in
Sub Saharan Africa, more than doubling in numbers, and especially over the last decade3. This
is the opposite from Asia, where the last ten years witnessed a net increase of only one RGO,
and the Middle East with no growth during the last time slice examined. As the table also
illustrates, the Latin American (excluding Caribbean RGOs) and Sub Saharan regions account
for nearly 70 percent of all RGOs outside of Europe. Given their numbers, and at the aggregate
level the apparent variation in regional dynamics regarding both the survivability of RGOs and
states’ involvement with them, we know all too little about why states join and participate in
this segment of the international political system.
In fact, the role of regional architecture in international politics and how it compares to
global architecture is a little understood phenomenon among IR scholars. Regional architecture
includes the complex network of connections through geographic proximity and dense
institutional ties across regional institutions. These ties exist across a number of common
political, military/security, economic, and environmental issues among member states. Global
architecture—or as some refer to it universalism—refers to universal organizations whose
membership constitutes potentially all states in the international system, such as the United
Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In principle—but not necessarily in
practice—the UN Charter provides international law that guides how member states address
mutual security issues (Bennett, 1995:233) through regional organizations4 while the WTO
Agreement affords a similar service in international trade.5 Both universal organizations
such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and within regional webs outside of Europe, and that is the central focus of our research.
At the same time, we will map out as well the web for European states, and in fact will seek to determine the
extent to which developments in Europe have impacted on regional webs elsewhere.
3
Our numbers differ somewhat from those of Shanks et. al. (1996), due to differences in definitions of RGOs and
as well the use of data bases. Their calculations are derived from the Yearbook of International Organizations. We
use the definition used by Russett, et al. (1998), and the COW criteria for identifying regional IGOs used by
Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke (2003) for their data base. Below, we explain why we prefer the Pevehouse et.
al. approach in contrast to the definition used in the Yearbook of International Organizations. Nevertheless, we
will replicate in our study both data bases in order to show that the results of our study are not a function of one
definition as opposed to another.
4
As Bennett (2002:233) notes, however, the primacy of the UN Security Council over disputes under
consideration by regional organizations has been substantially undermined.
5
Although the impact of GATT/WTO monitoring on regional organizations is also considered to be very
small. For example, while RTAs that are recognized by GATT/WTO must be notified before they are
entered into force, the GATT/WTO “working parties have had little success in bringing about changes to
2
specify the relationship between universalism and regionalism in their respective areas of
governance. Yet, and despite clear global governance guidelines regarding the linkages
between global and regional organizations, regional architecture has developed a life of its
own, and offers an alternative context in which states can operate.
Figure 1. Number of RGOs by Region, 1970-2000.
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1970
1980
Sub Saharan Africa
1990
Asia
Latin America
Caribbean
2000
Middle East
From a realist perspective on international cooperation, regional webs can thus play a
crucial role for states to pursue their goals in an anarchical international system. From a liberal
point of view, however, such regional webs can play a very different role – they can be
perceived as providing a supplementary context for states to pursue their objectives.
Theoretically, the existence of regional webs therefore poses at least two sets of questions:
does regional architecture offer an alternative, or a supplementary, context in which states can
operate? Put differently, what are the main motives for states to start cooperating with other
states?
Reflective of the second major IR debate (i.e. the neo-neo debate, see Baldwin, 1993
and Powell, 1994), the existence of regional webs and the choices states make when they
establish these webs, or when they participate in regional institutions, can be explained with the
concepts of relative and absolute gains (see Grieco, 1988; Keohane, 1989; Powell, 1991;
Milner, 1992; Baldwin, 1993a). As an alternative context, regional webs could be used when
states expect to gain more regionally in comparison to what they could gain at the universal
level (so the prime motive for cooperation would be relative gains). By contrast, if regional
RTAs agreements. It can only embarrass them into compliance”(Cohn, 2000:248). In Africa, the
GATT/WTO enabling clause has recognized only about 10 percent of regional RTAs (Powers, 2001).
3
webs are indeed used supplementary (whereby the motives for state cooperation are absolute
gains), then states may expect benefits at the universal and at regional levels.
States have choices in joining and utilizing regional versus universal architecture in a
variety of domains and policy areas, although there are concrete and subtle trade-offs to these
choices. For example, regionalists argue that “regional organizations have a special capacity
for controlling conflicts among their member states. By “making peace divisible,” regional
organizations isolate conflicts and prevent solvable local issues from becoming tangled with
irrelevant problems and thus changing them into insolvable global issues (Nye, 1971:17).”
Regionalists further argue that geographic neighbors are more likely to understand the
background of the conflict and shared norms about conflict management. Universalists counter
that such a role for regional organizations is problematic for several reasons. First, geographic
neighbors may be biased regarding the conflict. How can neutral intervention be guaranteed?
In addition, regional organizations are rarely equipped with the resources necessary to quell the
conflict (Nye, 1971).
This research project is motivated by the puzzle involving the choices that states make
regarding institutional context and international relations: Given the sheer proliferation of
RGOs and IGOs, often within the same issue areas, why would states opt to be involved with
the regional web of organizations, and is such involvement a preference for the regional over
the global web of institutions? We will address this puzzle by pursuing answers to a set of
more specific research questions:
1) Why is there substantial variation across states in their propensity to join the regional
web? Is this variation consistent across all organizations or are there different explanations
for why states may join some but not other organizations (e.g., security versus functional
organizations)?
2) Is there a similar and substantial variation in participation inside the web once states have
joined? Can we account systematically for variation in participation inside such organizations?
If so, can we provide sufficient explanations for likely variation in participation among the
joiners?6
3) What impact does joining and participating have on the states that are members of the
regional web and involved in its myriad activities? Can we find patterns of impact on their
foreign policy activities and/or their domestic political and economic activities?
6
We differentiate between what we call institutional and normative participation, with the former referring to
states’ behavior within institutions (such as holding presidencies, special seats, fulfilling their budgetary
obligations regularly, contributing additional financial resources for extra-budgetary activities, such as peacekeeping operations), and the latter to states’ support for existing norms (as shown in their signature and
ratification of international treaties, adopted within the auspices of an international institution) and to the
creation of new norms (e.g. their participation in the drafting of new politically and/or legally binding
documents). Methodologically, however, such a distinction may prove problematic, particularly in the absence
of the relevant data. We will seek to ascertain whether the data are available for each type of participation as
this would add necessary information about the “quality” of states’ participation in international organizations,
given that membership criteria appear very loose in most of international organizations. It is therefore very easy
for states to join many organizations, but we know very little (see Finnemore, 1996; Linden, 2002) about how,
if at all, states “use” their membership, or how states accustom their behavior to the normative context of
international organizations once they have become full members.
4
4) In what ways (if any) do the patterns we uncover at the regional level constitute a
dimension separate from joining, participating and being affected by the global web of
organizations? Is it possible that the regional web merely replicates dynamics at the global
level, or, does it provide alternatives to the global web and the dominance of great powers
(and possible American hegemony) in the global web?
5) Have the developments at the regional level outside of Europe been produced by
developments in Europe – in particular, has European integration caused (intentionally or
unintentionally) competition in other regions in the sense that states in other regions have set
up regional institutions, or have started to cooperate more actively at the regional level (as
opposed to their participation in the global institutional web)? In sum, to what extent have
regional webs developed as a result of the European integration? If this were the case, is it
possible to think about a completely new form of hegemony, “institutional hegemony”, in the
international system?
Theoretical Orientation:
Given the proliferation of global institutions, increased globalization (especially since
the1980s), and the success of the EU, APEC, and NAFTA at the regional level, there is a rich
and theoretically diverse literature on international institutions (Simmons and Martin, 2002),
globalization processes (Zurn, 2002) and economic regionalism (Choi and Caporaso, 2002)
and regional trade agreements and institutions (Mansfield, 1998). Yet, little of this literature
has addressed the broader regional web that has been constructed in most regions, and has
not addressed issues about why states would opt to join and to participate in varying degrees
in the regional webs available to them.
Since there is a paucity of literature on the four sets of questions noted above, this
project will construct a research orientation based on a combination of inductive and
deductive approaches.7 For example, we will examine empirically variation in joining RGOs
both over time and across regions, and compare such variation to variation in joining global
IGOs, and probe for patterns of similarities and differences across states, regions, and time
slices across the ebb and flow of international politics. Our time frame will consist of a
period cutting across both Cold War and post-Cold War epochs in international politics, and
both during areas of high and low conflict, and high and low certainty.
However, we will not be operating in a theoretical vacuum. In fact, there is a rich and
diverse set of conceptual and theoretical tools—stemming from both the broader literature in
international politics and the literatures on global institutions and regions—that will be
adapted to the project. We will address the four sets of research questions (noted above) with
the help of neorealist, liberal institutionalist, and strategic (combining domestic political
concerns with policy preferences and power concerns) perspectives.8 This literature
7
We are similarly eclectic with respect to methodology: we will conduct our research using both
quantitative data and qualitative case studies, where one methodological approach is more appropriate than
another, although we will use both types of methods when we examine “outliers” (unique cases) and where
we need substantial controls over explanatory conditions.
8
These perspective include as well the literature flowing from a “rational functionalist” perspective
(Simmons and Martin, 2002). While we are not directly addressing the concerns of constructivists, the
strategic approach, which focuses in part on the policy preferences and the domestic politics surrounding
5
overwhelming focuses on (and underscores major theoretical conflicts over) the impacts that
international organizations have on members and on international politics. Thus, existing
research, albeit often not directly addressing causes of joining behavior in the web of RGOs,
can be used to provide salient clues regarding the range of conditions under which states may
choose to enmesh themselves to varying degrees in regional and global webs.
Consider for example some preliminary, empirical patterns we have uncovered to date:
when we observe systematically the rates at which states join in RGOs across four time slices
(1970-2000), we observe that:
 Patterns of joining in 1980 and 2000 are similar; different imperatives however seem
to drive the propensity to join RGOs in 1970 and 1990;
 We note across every time slice substantial regional variation across the four regions:
Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Although there
appear to be some universally relevant predictors, each region yields substantially
different combination of variables in accounting for joining.
 Although varying somewhat by region, two global patterns emerge across time slices
and geographical areas outside of Europe: weakness in trade relations and weak
economic capabilities are related to a greater propensity to join RGOs; likewise, prior
patterns of joining seem to encourage more joining activity.
Neorealist perspectives can help explain the consistency across the 1980/2000 time
slices. Neorealists address well conditions (changes in polarity, polarization, and the
distribution of power in the system) under which increasing uncertainty and higher levels of
systemic conflict may impact on the ability and/or willingness of states to engage in a variety
of cooperative behaviors (e.g., Gowa, 1989), including joining of RGOs.
In a similar vein, neorealists may help us to explain the variation across regions: some
of the inter-regional differences are likely to be due to the nature of system leaders and the
states constituting these subsystems. Given American hegemony in Latin America, we would
expect Latin American states to display patterns of joining different than states in SubSaharan Africa. The Middle East, a key focus of major conflict during and after the Cold
War, and embedded in an ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, has operated in a substantially
different political context than Asia, and that context should have an impact on joining
behavior. Asian states conduct their affairs within the context of major and contending
political powers (and rapid changes in both military and economic capabilities of those
powers), both residing in the region (China and Japan) and intruding from outside the region
(U.S., USSR/Russia). These structural considerations are best addressed by neorealist
approaches to international politics.
Liberal institutionalists provide perspectives that may help explain the impact of
initial joining on continued joining behavior. From this perspective, and regardless of why
RGOs are initially created, involvement with regional webs should yield substantial benefits
to states and particularly for those with limited resources. All else being equal, the costs of
joining and participating in the web of RGOs should be more than offset by the benefits
gained in increased information capabilities, expertise, and potentially increased levels of
influence over the affairs of the region.
One argument made by liberal institutionalists is that institutional structures provide
predictability and reduce the costs of resolving myriad problems, leading to more successful
foreign policy elites (Bueno de Mesquita, 2001) integrates both constructivist and domestic politics
approaches to foreign policy explanations.
6
state outcomes, including for example generating more FDI and increased trade. Likewise,
changing domestic political structures in a democratic direction also provide similar payoffs
through greater transparency and predictability. Yet, since it is likely that for certain elites the
costs of democratization are very high (loss of office); is it plausible that they are able to
substitute (e.g., Most and Starr, 1984) participation in RGOs for democratization
domestically?9 The strategic perspective will help us look at this tradeoff between domestic
structural change and RGO participation, and will shed light on some of the preliminary
findings showing that it is not necessarily the strong trading states that join RGOs. Our
preliminary analysis suggests as well that there appears to be a negative relationship between
the level of democratization and RGO joining for states in some regions. The fact that this
relationship appears in some regions (e.g. Africa) but not others (e.g. Latin America)
suggests as well the interaction between sub-systemic conditions and domestic stimuli, and
appears to contradict literature focusing on the propensity of democratic states to join IGOs.10
Research Agenda:
Answering fully the four sets of questions posed above will lead us to pursue the
following research steps:
1) Delineate global and regional webs.
This phase will constitute a systematic
description of the creation, growth and decay of both global IGOs and RGOs in decade time
slices, starting with 1970 and ending with 2000.11 We will document the numbers of
organizations created, their areas of focus (security, economic, cultural, environmental,
technological/functional), and document the extent to which organizational decay and growth
intersect by areas of focus. We will undertake a similar inventory of RGOs, replicating both
time slices and classification schemes employed for global IGOs. We will delineate RGOs
both in the aggregate and by region,12 identifying RGOs that are primarily regional in scope
9
For an alternative argument indicating that it is RGOs that help nurture young demoncracies, see
Pevehouse (2002).
10
Note for example robust findings at the aggregate level, showing that democracy promotes “higher
densities of IGO membership” (Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998:461).
11
We will observe as well these webs for 2005 to determine if the 2000 pattern is changing in the post
September 11, 2001 environment. However, the half-decade interval will not allow us to perform the same
systematic comparison as with the earlier time slices.
12
We define region as a group of countries located in a geographically specified area with cultural,
economic, linguistic and political ties (Mansfield and Milner, 1999), including membership in a UN
General Assembly caucusing group. When a state is a member of more than one caucusing group, we
define its appropriate region by determining where it locates itself with respect to its principal memberships
in RGOs. Our focus is on the following regions: Sub-Saharan Africa , Middle East (including Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Oman), Asia (including 24 countries of the Asia-Pacific
region: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, India,
Bhutan, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Singapore, Brunei, Philippines, and Indonesia), Latin America (including South and Central America), the
Caribbean, and Europe.
In addition to regional membership, we will consider state membership in intercontinental
but less than universal organizations, and consider as well the extent to which states balance their
regional affiliations with not only involvement with the global web of organizations but as well with
organizations outside their regions and organizations that are basically intercontinental in nature.
7
and as well those which have a single region as their dominant membership but allow
additional members from other regions (i.e., extraregional organizations, such as OPEC).13
At the aggregate level, the delineation of global and regional webs will provide for us
important background information for the tasks we need to pursue. Particularly from a
strategic perspective, we will need to show the extent to which states have choices between
four options: joining the regional web, joining the global web, creating a mixed strategy, or
minimizing involvement in either web. This stage will allow us to observe the extent to
which these webs complement or overlap with each other and, at the nation-state level, the
range of choices available to states for the means with which they choose to pursue foreign
policy objectives.
2) Delineate state membership:
This phase of the project will pursue two
concerns. First, we will identify the extent to which states join available regional
organizations and thus, the extent to which they are embedded in the geographic web;
second, we will undertake a similar analysis of their involvement in the global web.14 Once
more, we will probe such joining behavior across four time slices, seeking to account for
changes in joining over time, and across the changes occurring in international politics.
At the same time we will seek to determine empirically the extent to which patterns
of joining the regional and the global web are related to one another. It is plausible, for
example that certain states are more likely to join global economic webs while opting to be
less extensively involved in regional security webs. Alternatively, some states may view
regional webs as a better focus of their activities than global webs. More likely, such
decisions may be in significant part dependent on the degree of resources needed in each
organization (and the resources available to states) to allow for a successful pursuit of foreign
policy objectives. However, at this stage of research, we simply wish to show the extent to
which states exhibit patterns of joining that would indicate the exercise of such choices.
3) Exploring regional joining behavior
In this section we will address the puzzles
uncovered by the data regarding a variety of correlates of states joining regional webs. Our
initial empirical explorations, for example, have uncovered the following puzzles:
For example, Australia and New Zealand (two states we could consider to be part of the Oceania
region) have extensive memberships both in Asian and European RGOs. Others with similar
patterns include Switzerland, Norway, and Japan.
13
An RGO exists when (following the Pevehouse/COW criteria):
1) Its membership is made up of states (in the COW defined state system);
2) It has a minimum of three states as members;
3) The IGO holds at least one regular plenary sessions every ten years;
4) The IGO possesses a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters;
5) Emanations—IGOs created by existing IGOs, as opposed to states creating IGOs—are not included as
RGOs;
6) It is a REGIONAL IGO (RGO) when: a majority of its membership is from one region, and the
headquarters of its secretariat is also from that region.
14
We are fortunate to be able to rely on existing databases for this effort. The global web, along with
substantial regional components is observed annually through the Yearbook of International Organizations
(2004). In addition, data on RGOs is available in annual observations through an archive made available
by John Pevehouse and ICPR (see http://polisci.wisc.edu/users/pevehous/ and http://cow2.la.psu.edu/).
.
8
“Time Slice Differences”
There appear to be different sets of variables predicting to
states joining RGOs in 1980/2000 than in 1970 and 1990.
We will provide and test an explanation of this puzzle. We suspect that while the
dynamics of regions account for substantial inter-regional variation in joining, some
commonalities occur as a function of the global political context in which RGOs operate. The
1980/2000 time slices represent points in global politics of relatively low uncertainty and
stability, compared to the other two time-points, and should provide a different opportunities
and constraints for states than during periods of greater global uncertainties.
We are also and especially interested in uncovering any potential changes in strategic
calculations made by states regarding regional versus global webs in the aftermath of the
post-Cold War period. While we obviously expect dramatic developments among the former
Warsaw Pact states and for the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, it is far
less clear how strategic calculations outside of Europe regarding regional and universal
architecture have been affected by the continued hegemony of the US in the post-Cold War
environment. Much rhetoric exists among these states about finding alternatives to US
leadership; whether such rhetoric has translated to a different pattern of architectural use
since the end of the Cold War will be interesting to ascertain.
“Regional Uniqueness”
States in different regions exhibit different sets of predictor
variables for joining their relevant RGOs, and confirming this, a regression model shows that
each region (treated as a dummy variable) creates a significant impact on joining, regardless
of the time slice examined.
What is so unique about each region that different explanations are needed across
regions for explaining joining behavior? Is there an underlying pattern that differentiates
regions from each other, either in terms of their internal dynamics, or the manner in which
these regions are embedded in the larger global political process? We will probe both sides of
this puzzle. At a first, rough glance, it appears that part of the answer is about intrusion (the
extent to which global powers have sought to control politics within a particular region),
partially about the sporadic versus consistent levels of regional conflict (e.g., in the Middle
East versus Asia)15, and partially about the nature of the states constituting the region (e.g.,
weak states more likely to seek additional resources through participation in RGOs).
“Reversing Democratization Explanations”
Much of the literature has argued that
democratic polities are likely to join and participate in international institutions (e.g., Russett,
Oneal, and Davis, 1998). This is presumably so since democracies exist with stable rules and
practices, and relatively non-violent institutionalized rules for policy making and cooperation
between political actors, akin to participation in international institutions. Yet, our
preliminary analysis suggests that RGO joining is, if anything, negatively associated with
level of democracy of the state in one or more regions.16
Why would there be a negative relationship between RGO joining and a state’s level
of democratization? Borrowing from both liberal institutionalist and strategic perspectives,
This assertion is consistent with Russett, Oneal, and Davis’ (1998:461) findings regarding the negative
effects of military disputes on joining IGOs
16
By level of democracy, we are referring to
15
9
we will argue and seek to test that this finding is consistent with both strategic thinking
among policy makers (unwilling to risk the consequences of democratization) and consistent
with the purported benefits provided by such organizations.
Societal pressures on state propensity to act within RGOs
Liberal IR theory
(Moravcsik, 1997) seeks to explain state behavior in world politics by analyzing state-society
relations – i.e. “the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in
which they are embedded” (ibid.:513). States can change their behavior, following their
changed preferences, as a result of societal ideas, interests, and institutions (ibid.). Changes
in strategic calculations of governments, such as their decision to fulfill their goals
regionally, or their decision to suspend their membership in a regional organization, can be a
result of domestic developments that have affected the formation of state preferences for
international cooperation. Some of our preliminary results may indicate that such societal
pressures may be at work in some regions. For example, we find that inflationary pressures
and what we call a misery index (combination of inflation and unemployment) may be
related to a greater propensity to join RGOs in some but not all regions.
Weak states (including weak trading states) join RGOs
The literature suggests that
regional trading is more extensive than global trading (Choi and Caporaso, 2002), even in
regions outside of the EU. It would then make sense that states that trade extensively would
be more likely to join the web of RGOs. Yet, we observe the opposite in a number of regions:
either trade as a percentage of GDP is unrelated to RGO membership in some regions, or it is
negatively correlated in others. A similar pattern appears with state capabilities (economic
and military).
Consistent with neorealist explanations and the strategic perspective, we will argue
that there are two phenomena at work here. In some regions, the weaker the state and the less
it is able to benefit on its own from global trading arrangements, the more likely it is to join
RGOs in order to increase its capabilities and to benefit from regional trade and investment
opportunities as an alternative to its inability to be extensively involved in global
arrangements. In addition, weak states may engage in RGOs where there is a strong regional
hegemonic presence either because the weak state cannot resist attempts by hegemonic
powers to create structural arrangements; and/or weak states seek to increase their
capabilities by “bandwagoning” on the heels of hegemonic states.
4) Exploring Patterns of Participation in the Regional Web
Joining the regional web is not inexpensive for states nor is it likely to be without
benefit. However, joining the regional web constitutes only one dimension of involvement,
and even extensive joining across the range of regional organizations likely fails to reflect
well the extent of actual participation and involvement within RGOs once states have joined
in the web. Therefore, it is important to determine not only joining but also the extent of
participation in the regional web, and as well to determine both the reasons for variation in
participation and the impact that such participation has on states.
Measuring actual participation and involvement in RGOs is of course much easier to
propose than to accomplish. Creating valid measures of RGO participation appears to be an
onerous task, and we are not aware of any systematic data presently available that we can
adapt to this task. Therefore, we will need to develop conceptually sound, and empirically
10
valid and reliable measures of state participation in RGOs, and create the data base necessary
with which to examine both inter-state and inter-regional variation in participation.
There are a number of measures of participation we will consider.17 These include:
1) Variation in the size of state delegations to RGOs, based on the assumption that
personnel are needed for participation, and the size of the delegation may at least
reflect the determination of the state to participate more or less extensively in an
organization’s deliberations;
2) Treaty signing: most organizations have multiple treaties used to take specific action
or to augment the structure of the organization. Participation could be observed by
number of RGO treaties signed. Particularly important would be the number of
reservations (refusal to participate in an aspect of the treaty), indicating a reluctance
to participate in the organization’s activities and objectives.
3) Participation in annual and regular meetings;
4) Presidencies, special seats (e.g. non-permenant seats in the UNSC);
5) Regular contributions to the budget of the organization
6) Additional financial contributions for special activities/tasks of RGOs.
5) Exploring the Impact of the Regional Web on Participants
17
See note 6.
11
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