1. Below are 2ac’s to 2 advantages for the 3 affs that people in this lab are reading.
2. You should translate these arguments to a flow and give a 2ac on case.
A. give an overview
B. read no more than 3 cards total.
***ASTEROID
***ASSIGNMENT
MINING
Shortages 1nc
1. NO RISK OF WAR – china can’t fight
Bandow 3-7-08 (Doug, former senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former columnist with Copley News Service. “Turning China into the Next Big Enemy.”
http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=12472)
But the Defense Department is even more worried that the Chinese are spending too much, which is essentially defined as developing a military which one day could
confront American forces – successfully. It's a fair concern, sinceBeijing's military build-up is transforming the international environment far
more quickly than most American analysts had expected. The PRC has numerous reasons for seeking to create a superior
military. The Pentagon notes that China probably is developing forces for use in such contingencies "as conflict over resources or disputed territories." Moreover, Beijing's
growing "capabilities will increase Beijing's options for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes in its favor." As Washington well
knows, international political influence is more likely to follow a larger military. Russia has regained regional clout, but remains a smaller global player; Europe is an economic
giant but a military midget. Beijing seems intent on twinning soft and hard power to enhance its global clout. Despite the multiple ends,
however, the
PRC appears to have two more basic goals with its military build-up. The first is to enable the PRC to compel
Taiwan, through use of military force, if necessary, to accept some form of reunification. The second is to deter the U.S. from intervening to
stop China from using coercion. As the Pentagon observes, "A potential military confrontation with Taiwan, and the prospect of U.S. military intervention,
remain the PLA's most immediate military concerns." Indeed, much of the PRC's military program seems directed at creating a credible
deterrent to America. The Pentagon reports: "China's nuclear force modernization, as evidenced by the fielding of the new DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental-range
missiles, is enhancing China's strategic strike capabilities. China's emergent anti-access/area denial capabilities – as exemplified by its continued development of advanced
cruise missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles designed to strike ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, and the January 2007 successful test of a directascent, anti-satellite weapon – are expanding from the land, air, and sea dimensions of the traditional battlefield into the space and cyber-space domains." It's an impressive
list. But America's military capabilities remain far greater. Why does the PRC need anti-ship missiles for use against aircraft
carriers? Because it lacks even one carrier, while the U.S. controls the seas with 12 carrier groups. This country dominates
most other military fields as well. America's nuclear missile arsenal is much bigger, more sophisticated, and more deadly than
that possessed by China. Washington already is reaching into space with its missile defense program. Thus, the PRC is seeking to deter America from
deploying its more powerful forces. Notes the Pentagon, "Through analysis of U.S and coalition warfighting practices since 1991, Beijing hopes to develop
approaches to waging future conflict by adapting and emulating lessons learned in some areas while seeking perceived vulnerabilities that could be exploited through
asymmetric means in others." In particular, "As part of its planning for a Taiwan contingency, China is prioritizing measures to deter or counter third-party intervention in any
future cross-Strait crisis." Thus, Beijing might be preparing to confront the U.S. But the critical question is, confront the U.S. over
what? If Beijing was plotting the conquest of Guam, Hawaii, and ultimately the North American continent, then Beijing's ongoing
military build-up would look dangerous indeed. But there is nothing in China's long history that suggests such overarching
ambitions. Unwilling to remain weak and thus subject to coercion by a trigger-happy superpower across the Pacific. Yes.
Determined to vigorously assert its perceived interests. Yes. Expecting international respect and consultation that reflects its increasingly expansive interests and growing
power. Yes. Ready to commit global aggression, initiate world war, and wreck both China's and America's futures. No. Which means
the U.S. should think carefully before responding to China's ongoing build-up. The Pentagon speaks of a situation which "will naturally and understandably lead to hedging
against the unknown," meaning Washington will need to spend even more on the military. If half of the world's military outlays aren't enough, one wonders how much would
be. Two-thirds? Three-fourths? Even more? Washington should not fret. If the goal is defending America, the U.S. possesses sufficiency
today. Just catching up with the U.S. will be a daunting task for the PRC. Explained the Pentagon: "The U.S. Intelligence Community estimates
China will take until the end of this decade or longer to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size
adversary. China will not be able to project and sustain small military units far beyond China before 2015, and will not be able
to project and sustain large forces in combat operations far from China until well into the following decade." Washington already
occupies the global summit, with the enormous military infrastructure of a superpower. China will not easily displace America with the world's most powerful military.
Assume that China, still desperately poor and surrounded by potentially hostile states, decides to deploy one new carrier group
a year, no mean task. The PRC still wouldn't match America until 2020. Even then Beijing wouldn't be strong enough to take
aggressive action against the U.S. homeland or dependencies. To develop an air force capable of dominating U.S. airspace and
ground forces capable of invading U.S. territory would be another step well beyond. Most important, the U.S. possesses what
would remain an effective nuclear deterrent against almost any imaginable Chinese missile force. It's not that the PRC couldn't
theoretically construct and deploy more and better nuclear missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear-armed subs than the U.S., though such a process would take an enormous
commitment over many years. But it's hard to imagine that China could ever deploy enough to create a first strike capability.
2. Its science fiction – decades away
Beck 09 – Associate at Kenyon & Kenyon LLP. [Brian Beck (JD from NYU), “ARTICLE: THE NEXT, SMALL, STEP FOR MANKIND: FIXING THE
INADEQUACIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW TREATY REGIME TO ACCOMMODATE THE MODERN SPACE FLIGHT INDUSTRY,” Albany
Law Journal of Science & Technology, 2009, 19 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 1
Now is the appropriate time to address the deficiencies of the treaty regime. None
of the problems addressed in this paper are far future sciencefiction technologies such as asteroid mining. They are all problems that have either already arisen or will arise within the next five to
ten years. Before commercial space ventures can take the giant leap into making space travel available for the common man, the international community has to take the
small step of clarifying the rules for those ventures.
3. Markets change – other factors will solve – Chinese dominance won’t last
Bennett 10 [JOHN T. BENNETT, “DoD Sees U.S., Allies Ending China's Rare Earths Dominance,” Defense News, Published: 9 Nov 2010 15:46, pg.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5020374&c=POL&s=TOP]
NEW YORK - The
U.S. must only survive a few more years of Beijing's dominance over rare earths minerals supply and pricing,
then American and key allies should be able to turn the tables, said Brett Lambert, U.S. Defense Department industrial affairs
chief.
"I wouldn't run out and buy a bunch of rare earths," Lambert said Nov. 9 during a conference here sponsored by Bank of America-Merrill Lynch in association with Defense
News. Though he acknowledged "the issue is in the near term," he said, "I think we'll be fine."
The markets should prompt Western nations to develop alternative to Beijing's rare earths dominance, he said.
Sources say a soon-to-be-released Pentagon study will feature a similar bottom-line conclusion.
China now controls nearly 100 percent of the global supply and production of this family of elements, which is used to make crucial components in a list of American weapon
systems, including jet engine turbines, unmanned planes, electric motors, radars, night-vision goggles, missiles, electronics and other items.
The United States imports 100 percent of the rare earths it needs, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
China's control, experts say, allows Beijing to dictate rare earths prices and global availability. This was spotlighted in recent weeks when China threatened to withhold rare
earths from Japan during an unrelated flap.
Lambert, echoing some industry officials, said DoD officials, informed by the DoD study of the issue, have concluded market forces will drive
Washington and several other Western nations to build up an alternative to Beijing's rare earths dominance.
Lambert said a "short-term squeeze" is likely, "over the longer term, the market will correct itself."
And what might that look like? He painted a picture where the United States, Australia and Japan all ramp up their respective rare
earths mining and production - eventually collectively knocking China from its rare earth throne.
4. Plan triggers Chinese unemployment
Lamb 10 [Robert Lamb, “The Ethics of Planetary Exploration and Colonization,” Discovery, Wed Feb 17, 2010 04:38 PM ET, pg.
http://news.discovery.com/space/the-ethics-of-planetary-exploration-and-colonization.html//edlee]
Last night I attended a lecture by Jesuit Brother Guy J. Consolmagno, a
U.S. research astronomer and planetary scientist at the Vatican Observatory. He
gave a very engaging talk about the ethics of exploration and planetary astronomy, touching on two particularly noteworthy items:
Asteroid Mining,”
Can you put a price tag on an asteroid? Sure you can. We know of roughly 750 S-class asteroids with a diameter of at least 1 kilometer. Many of these pass as near to the Earth
as our own moon -- close enough to reach via spacecraft. As a typical asteroid is 10 percent metal, Brother Consolmango estimates that such an asteroid would contain 1
billion metric tons of iron. That's as much as we mine out of the globe every year, a supply worth trillions and trillions of dollars. Subtract the tens of billions it would cost to
exploit such a rock, and you still have a serious profit on your hands.
But is this ethical? Brother Consolmango asked us to ponder whether such an asteroid harvest would drastically disrupt the economies of
resource-exporting nations. What would happen to most of Africa? What would it do to the cost of iron ore? And what about refining and manufacturing? If we
spend the money to harvest iron in space, why not outsource the other related processes as well? Imagine a future in which solarpowered robots toil in lunar or orbital factories.
"On the one hand, it's great," Brother Consolmango said. "You've now taken all of this dirty industry off the surface of the Earth. On the other hand, you've put a
whole lot of people out of work. If you've got a robot doing the mining, why not another robot doing the manufacturing? And
now you've just put all of China out of work. What are the ethical implications of this kind of major shift?"
Brother Consolmango also stressed that we have the technology to begin such a shift today; we'd just need the economic and political will to
do it. Will our priorities change as Earth-bound resources become more and more scarce? //Neg
That causes global power wars
Kane 01 [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn,
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm]
Despite China's problems with its food supply, the
Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation.
Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The
consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and
industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability
whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more
cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the
prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As
Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank
conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities
in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social
and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable
consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the
population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males
are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship,
not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to
secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic
measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt
form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence.
Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the
Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen
one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC
would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider
intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major
war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by
attacking adjacent countries.
5. Resource wars don’t happen
David Victor 07 , David G. Victor is a professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable
Development, November 12, 2007, What Resource Wars?, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020
RISING ENERGY prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the
world may be headed for a spate of "resource wars"-hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable
resources. Such fears come in many stripes, but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas. First is the rise of
China, which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs-such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals-and has already "gone out" to the world
with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. A second potential path down the road to
resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities,
even leaking into the hands of terrorists. And third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars,
catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations.
Most of this is bunk, and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are
good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world. To be sure, resource money can
magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere. Fixing them
requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine
whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn't a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.
Dominance 1nc
1. Obama is pursuing peace in space – wants to ban weapons & cooperate
Reynolds 09 [Glenn Reynolds, “Can Obama Ban Space Weapons Successfully?,” Popular Mechanics, October 1, 2009 12:00 AM, pg.
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/4303139]
Soon after President Obama took office, a change to the White House Web site gave
a hint to this administration’s plans for defense in space. The
site said that the administration is "seeking a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites."
These are high-priority goals, but the administration is likely to face some problems.
The first, and most obvious problem for this administration is answering the question, "What is a space weapon?" Currently, weapon systems aimed at space--like the
antisatellite capability of U.S. Aegis cruisers, demonstrated in last year's shootdown of a dead spy satellite, or the Chinese antisatellite weapon demonstrated in 2007--aren't
"space weapons" at all, and wouldn't be covered by a ban on weapons in space. At the moment, no country has much of a dedicated space-weapon
presence. But improvised or disguised space weapons are another story. In space, kinetic energies are huge, and satellites are delicate, making anything with an engine a
potential kinetic-kill vehicle. How would negotiators account for this problem? That's not clear.
According to space-weapons analyst Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, the best way to address this is to look at capabilities, not specific weapon systems, and to ban
testing of weapons in, or aimed at, space. This would also prevent the creation of more space debris, like the kind left behind by the Chinese antisatellite test. Krepon suggests
a model Code of Conduct for spacefaring powers.
But why is Obama acting now? As far as we know, neither the United States nor any other country has a program to deploy dedicated space weaponry. Is this a clever bit of
misdirection, designed to let the United States look like it supports arms control without actually having to give up any capabilities, or is there information out there that has
not been made public? Do we think the Russians, Chinese or Indians have secret orbital weapons programs?
Of course, the Obama Administration may just want to get ahead of the curve. The United States military depends on satellites more than
any other nation (and that dependence will grow if we deploy systems such as GPS-guided hypersonic cruise missiles), meaning that we have more to lose
if the world pursues a ban on orbital assets. A suggestion that this might be the reason comes from another related Obama initiative, one
to negotiate "a prohibition against harmful interference against satellites." Such a prohibition would discourage attacks. That's
long been a U.S. goal--President Jimmy Carter first announced the principle that an attack on an American satellite would be treated as an act of war--but incorporating it into
its own international agreement is a new approach.
Critics might argue that a ban on space weaponry would just breed complacency among law-abiding nations, while giving cheaters the advantage of surprise. On the other
hand, a crude improvised system probably wouldn't be that useful, while a more sophisticated space-based weapons program (one that went beyond maneuvering exploding
satellites close to their targets) would probably require a fair amount of testing, making cheating difficult.
The likeliest possibility, though, is that this is mostly about atmospherics. As China's interception demonstrated, attacks on satellites generate dangerous levels of orbital
debris--shrapnel that continues to orbit the Earth for days, weeks or even years, and that menaces anything in its path. (And because the debris consists of small, fast-moving
and widely-dispersed fragments, it's almost impossible to clean up). This means that no spacefaring power is likely to want to mount wholesale attacks on another power's
satellites. The result of any such attack would make space as unusable for the attacker as for the target. In the next decade or two, the biggest threats are likely to come from
rogue nations with some space capability, like Iran (which last week launched a satellite on its own), or North Korea--countries that have the ability to attack spacecraft from
the ground, but not a lot of their own satellites at risk. Perhaps Obama thinks that a space-weapon ban among the spacefaring nations will
encourage them to close ranks against rogue states that are a threat to everyone. That would certainly be a positive development.
2. Space doesn’t matter for soft power – Brown is wrong
Dinerman 09 - Author and journalist [Taylor Dinerman, “Space weapons: soft power versus soft politics,” Space Review, Monday, March 2, 2009, pg.
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1317/1]
National Security Space Office official Pete Hays, speaking at an International Space University (ISU) symposium in Strasbourg France
on February 19th, said unequivocally that the US has “…in terms of funded [space weapons] programs, they’re aren’t any. I can
tell you that categorically.” In contrast, Trevor Brown, writing in the spring 2009 issue of the Air and Space Power Journal, published by the Air University at
Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, claims that the US does in fact have plans to weaponize space. The difference may be simply a matter of
perception. Trevor Brown sees things like the XSS-11 as being either space weapons prototypes themselves or as precursors to such systems. With some more
justification he sees the US missile defense systems, such as the Ground Based Interceptors located in Alaska and California and the Navy’s SM-3 sea-based missiles, as
constituting “space weapons”. The argument over what is and what is not a “space weapon” is not going to go away. Similarly, the definition of what is and what is not “soft
power” is by no means settled. Brown seems to think of soft power as essentially something political, and quotes Joseph Nye to that effect: “Soft power therefore is not just a
matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the US wants…” This is one version of what it is, but there is another. Soft power, according to this
explanation, is
above all a cultural phenomena and cannot readily be manipulated by any government. It is the sum result of the
creative and imaginative efforts of a whole nation, and its influence, while profound, cannot be easily translated into political
actions.
If soft power is essentially cultural, then it may be that it is the creative artistic industries of America that are at fault rather
than the politicians. The growing cultural influence of India’s “Bollywood” is caused by the fact that they are giving their customers a product they want to see. Can
the same be said for Hollywood? For decades intellectuals throughout the world have complained about US “cultural imperialism”. This influence has been, I believe, at the
heart of what has been termed soft power. In 1999, in an article titled “Culture and Geopolitics in the Age of Oprah” published in the Journal of Social, Economic and
Political Studies, I wrote that “To Europe’s elites this is deadly serious; it is a question of who will control their children’s minds… It is a last ditch struggle to seize back
power over their civilization’s collective dreams.”
The 2006 US Space Policy would not have been better received in Europe if it had been promulgated by a president more popular than
George W. Bush, though the hysterical media reaction might have been less. Europe’s dislike of US space power is not based on America’s lack of soft power, but on the
reality of its hard power. This is not something that better public relations or better public diplomacy can ever change.
Trevor Brown believes that “The United States would do well to keep a low profile for its military space program and burnish its
technological image by showcasing its commercial and scientific space programs. Doing so would enable it to accumulate rather than hemorrhage soft power.” To a very
limited extent this is useful advice, but in fact there is little, short of censorship, the US can do to keep its military space operations under
wraps. The debates over space power and space weaponization are going to continue under the new administration, and
perhaps even gain in public prominence.
Civil space programs are indeed useful tools for enhancing international cooperation, but they cannot in the short term build soft power . Scientific
joint ventures, even with states that may not be friends or allies, are not to be sneered at. Commercial space ventures are notoriously difficult to
disentangle from their half-hidden military motives. The mess the US has created for itself thanks to the International Trade in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) is evidence of this.
Brown quite rightly points out that in a dangerous world “There is, therefore, no question of whether to proceed with space weapons—only a
question of how to do so with the requisite political skill in order to retain soft power while expanding hard power.” The problem is not with the goal but rather
with the nature of soft power. If it is essentially political, then perhaps clever diplomacy can help reconcile places like Europe to the reality of American space weapons. On
the other hand, if
this is a cultural concept then the tools of politics and diplomacy are almost entirely useless.
Impressive acts of scientific and technical prowess, such as the 1969 Apollo 11 mission, do contribute to America’s soft power. This is why so many people
who, for one reason or another despise the US, claim that the Moon landing never happened. However the impact from that event was never translated into
political success. No nation changed its policy on America’s effort to save South Vietnam because of Apollo.
At roughly the same time as Apollo, America led an effort called the “Green Revolution” that radically increased food production in many parts of the world and has made
mass starvation from natural causes more or less a thing of the past. This should have generated a huge soft power dividend. Yet millions of people whose lives were
improved or even saved by this effort detest the nation that filled their bellies. One must conclude that soft power does not grow out of good or impressive deeds.
3. Low risk of ASAT attacks
Schendzielos 08 – Major in the US Air Force [Kurt M. Schendzielos, “Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites,” School of
Advanced Military Studies Monograph, 30-04-2008, pg. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485553&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf//edlee
The ability to permanently disable an orbiting platform’s sensors, or the vehicle itself, requires massive resources and infrastructure
that currently, and in the foreseeable future, only exists at a nation-state level. Theresa Hitchins of the UN Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDR)
explains, “There are fundamental technical obstacles to the development of kinetic kill weapons and lasers both for use against
targets in space and terrestrial targets, and the costs associated with launch and maintaining systems on-orbit are staggering.”43
The only way a guerilla force, NGA or third-world nation-state would be able to achieve a level of degradation of U.S. space
superiority is if it were aided by an adversary space faring nation, such as Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Libya, or India.44 Even then, the 2007
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report on Current and Projected National Security Threats argues that because of the high costs involved only China is projected to
domestically produce a destructive ASAT system.45 The 2007 DIA report concluded that within the next five years, “Other states and non-state entities are
pursuing more limited and asymmetric approaches that do not require excessive financial resources or a high-tech industrial
base. These efforts include denial and deception, electronic warfare or signal jamming, and ground segment physical attack.”46
pg. 14-15
4. Heg doesn’t solve war
Fettweis 10 - Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College.
[Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume
52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld]
One potential explanation for the growth of global
peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The
little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the
relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly
substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To
limited evidence suggests that there is
internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst
of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet
America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United
States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none
took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security
dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was
diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the
United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending
under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the
conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.
5. Soft power is useless
Gray, PHD @ Oxford and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of
Reading and director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, 11- (“Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of
Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century.” April 08, 2011
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1059 [JUNEJA])
Unfortunately, although the concept of American soft power is true gold in theory, in practice it is not so
valuable. Ironically, the empirical truth behind the attractive concept is just sufficient to mislead policymakers
and grand strategists. Not only do Americans want to believe that the soft power of their civilization and
culture is truly potent, we are all but programmed by our enculturation to assume that the American story and
its values do and should have what amounts to missionary merit that ought to be universal. American culture is so
powerful a programmer that it can be difficult for Americans to empathize with, or even understand, the somewhat different values and their
implications held deeply abroad. The idea is popular, even possibly authoritative, among Americans that ours is not just an “ordinary country,” but
instead is a country both exceptionally blessed (by divine intent) and, as a consequence, exceptionally obliged to lead Mankind. When national
exceptionalism is not merely a proposition, but is more akin to an iconic item of faith, it is difficult for usually balanced American minds to consider the
potential of their soft power without rose-tinted spectacles. And the problem is that they are somewhat correct. American values, broadly speaking “the
American way,” to hazard a large project in reductionism, are indeed attractive beyond America’s frontiers and have some utility for U.S. policy. But
there are serious limitations to the worth of the concept of soft power, especially as it might be thought of as an
instrument of policy. To date, the idea of soft power has not been subjected to a sufficiently critical forensic
examination. In particular, the relation of the soft power of attraction and persuasion to the hard power of
coercion urgently requires more rigorous examination than it has received thus far.
***SOLAR POWERED SATELLITES
Warming 1NC
1. Satellites won’t be enough to solve energy needs or offset warming
Globus, 2008, Spring 2008 (Al, space expert, “On The Moon,” Ad Astra,
http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf)
While it has been suggested that in the long term, space solar power (SSP) can provide all the clean, renewable energy Earth could possibly need (and
then some), there has been less discussion on the most economic way to produce that power. If we want to build two or three solar power satellites, one
obvious approach is to manufacture the parts on the ground, launch them into orbit, and assemble them there, just like the International Space Station.
But a few power satellites won’t solve our energy or greenhouse gas problems. We’ll need more. To generate
all the energy used on Earth today (about 15 terawatts) would require roughly 400 solar power satellites 10 kilometers
across. Assuming advanced, lightweight space solar power technology, this will require at least 100,000 launches to bring all the
materials up from Earth. But even 400 satellites won’t be enough. Billions of people today have totally inadequate energy supplies— and the
population is growing. Providing everyone with reasonable quantities of energy might take five to ten times more than we
produce today. To supply this energy from solar power satellites requires a staggering launch rate. There are two major
issues with a very high launch rate.
2. No impact --- warming will be slow and predictable
Patrick J. Michaels, 2003, senior fellow in environmental studies at the Cato Institute, 10/16/2003 (The
Washington Times)
Here's what every American needs to know about global warming. Contrary to almost every news report and every staged hearing, including one held by
Mr. McCain on Oct. 1, scientists know quite precisely how much the planet will warm in the foreseeable future, a
modest three-quarters of a degree (C), plus or minus a mere quarter-degree, according to scientific figures as disparate as this author and
NASA scientist James Hansen. The uncertainty is so small, in fact, that publicly crowing this figure is liable to result in a
substantial cut in our research funding, which is why the hundreds of other scientists who know this have been
so reluctant to disgorge the truth in public. All this has to do with basic physics, which isn't real hard to understand. It has been known
since 1872 that as we emit more and more carbon dioxide into our atmosphere, each increment results in less and
less warming. In other words, the first changes produce the most warming, and subsequent ones produce a bit
less, and so on. But we also assume carbon dioxide continues to go into the atmosphere at an ever-increasing rate. In other words, the increase
from year-to-year isn't constant, but itself is increasing. The effect of increasing the rate of carbon dioxide emissions, coupled with the fact that more
and more carbon dioxide produces less and less warming compels our climate projections for the future
warming to be pretty much a straight line. Translation: Once human beings start to warm the climate, they do so
at a constant rate. And yes, it's a sad fact that it took $10 billion of taxpayer money to "prove" something so obvious it can be written in a mere
100 words.
3. Warming isn’t anthropogenic and is offset by volcanic cooling
S. Fred Singer, 2001, Prof Emeritus Enviro. Sciences – U. Virginia, July 2001
(http://www.sepp.org/GWbooklet/GW.html)
Such misinterpretations to the contrary, the global
temperature record of this century, which shows periods of both warming
and cooling, can best be explained in terms of natural climate fluctuations, caused by the complex
interaction between atmosphere and oceans, and perhaps stimulated by variations of solar radiation that drives the
Earth's climate system. [Fig. 1] The weather satellite record of global temperatures, now spanning nearly twenty years,
shows no global warming trend, much less one of the magnitude that computer models have led us to expect.
The discrepancies between satellite observations and conclusions drawn from computer calculations are so large
as to throw serious doubt on all computer-modeled predictions of future warming. Yet this discrepancy is never mentioned in
the IPCC Policymakers Summary; indeed, the Summary does not even admit the existence of satellites. Extrapolate the maximum allowed
temperature trend from satellites to the year 2100 the "worst-case" scenario and one might estimate an increase
in global average temperature of close to 0.5 degree Celsius one-half the very lowest IPCC estimate. But 0.5
degree C is barely detectable and completely inconsequential. Moreover, any calculated warming will be
reduced by the cooling effect of volcanoes. Even though we cannot predict the occurrence of a volcanic eruption, we have sufficient
statistical information about past eruptions to estimate their average cooling effect; yet this is one of several
factors not specifically considered by the IPCC.
4. Adaptation solves the impact
S. Fred Singer, 2001, Prof Emeritus Enviro. Sciences – U. Virginia, July 2001
(http://www.sepp.org/GWbooklet/GW.html)
The recommended policy to meet any consequences of growing atmospheric greenhouse gases is to rely on
human adaptation to any climate change, coupled with a "no-regrets policy" of energy conservation and increased
energy efficiency. ("No-regrets" energy policies are those that make economic sense even if no climate change
occurs.) Common sense is the key. Over-conservation can waste energy if it destroys energy-imbedded capital
stock that requires new energy expenditures to replace. Adaptation has been the traditional method of meeting
climate changes; it has worked over thousands of years for human populations that were not as technologically
advanced nor as materially endowed as those at present. The resources saved by not restricting energy use
through rationing or taxing can be applied to make human societies more resilient to climate change, whether
manmade or natural. After all, any effects from climate change over the next century will be minor compared to
societal changes brought about by new technology, rising incomes and population growth.
5. GHG warming is key to prevent an ice age which risks extinction
Hoyle, et al 2001, (Fred and Chandra, School of Mathematics @ Cardiff U., Astrophysics and Space
Science, “Cometary Impacts and Ice-Ages”, Vol. 275, No. 4, March, Springer)
The 18O/16O analysis of Greenland ice cores shows that an immense melting of glacier ice began abruptly about 14.5 kyr ago. The jumps shown in Figure 1 are also matched by
similar effects in the South Polar region with major temperature rises of some 12 C occurring over a timespan of only a few decades (Steig et al., 1998). On a more restricted
geographical scale, fossil insect records show that the summer temperature in Britain rose by 10 C or more in as little as 50 years (Coope, 1970) on at least two occasions
during the Younger Dryas, an essentially decisive indication of a catastrophic event as its cause. It is therefore cometary impacts that we must thank for the equable spell of
climate in which human history and civilisation has prospered so spectacularly. The renewal
of ice-age conditions would render a large fraction of the
to the extinction of most of the present human population.
Since bolide impacts cannot be called up to order, we must look to a sustained greenhouse effect to maintain the present
advantageous world climate. This might imply the ability to inject effective greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, the
opposite of what environmentalists are erroneously advocating. 6. Conclusions Ice-age conditions are dry and cold, the local temperature
world’s major food-growing areas inoperable, and so would inevitably lead
being reduced over the entire Earth. The high atmosphere probably had a haze of small ice crystals while the lower atmosphere was dusty. Such conditions were stable, capable
of persisting until a large bolide hit one of the major oceans. The water then thrown high into the stratosphere provided a large temporary greenhouse effect, but sufficient to
produce a warming of the world ocean down to a depth of a few hundred metres. It is this warming that maintains the resulting interglacial period. The
interglacial
climate possesses only neutral equilibrium however. It experiences random walk both up and down, until a situation arises in
which the number of steps downward become sufficient for the Earth to fall back into the ice-age trap. Thereafter
only a further large bolide impact can produce a departure from the grey, drab ice-age conditions. This will be so in the future unless Man finds an
effective way to maintain a suitably large greenhouse effect.
Hegemony 1nc
1. Alternate causality – Launcher shortage
Robert J. Stevens, 2007, Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin Corporation,
04/10/2007 (Lockheed Martin, 23rd National Space Symposium, The Next 50 Years of U.S. Space Leadership,
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/speeches/Next50YearsOfUSSpaceLeadership.html)
NASA Administrator Michael Griffin
warned last month that if the next generation of human spacecraft is further
delayed, and the four-year lag between the Space Shuttle and Orion grows, “we will be seen by many as ceding
our national leadership in human spaceflight at a time when Russia and China have such capabilities
and India is developing them.” As a businessman, I can’t imagine investing to develop a significant, sustainable, defining core competency
and differentiating strategic advantage only to abandon the position. As a minimum, this could lead to a situation where other
countries with space aspirations start looking for new partners.
2. Talent shortages dooms US space leadership
Robert J. Stevens, 2007, Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin Corporation,
04/10/2007 (Lockheed Martin, 23rd National Space Symposium, The Next 50 Years of U.S. Space Leadership,
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/speeches/Next50YearsOfUSSpaceLeadership.html)
Third, we need a sustained commitment to inspire and recruit our brightest minds. The space race inspired my generation to pursue careers in science
and engineering. Yet, today, U.S. colleges and universities are only producing about 78,000 engineering
undergraduates a year – and that figure hasn’t grown in a decade. This has created a serious challenge for
companies like Lockheed Martin, where one in three of our current employees is over the age of 50 – and 47% of our
workforce has earned the professional distinction of scientist or engineer. Even as the U.S. aerospace sector struggles to replenish
our workforce, there is no doubt that China is racing ahead to build the technical wave of the future,
with 50 percent of Chinese undergraduates getting degrees in natural science or engineering. Of equal concern, this
is taking place at a time of intense competition for skilled technical employees. Today, the most innovative,
ambitious young minds are being recruited by firms like Google – a firm that didn’t exist a decade ago, which FORTUNE
magazine lists as the Best Company to Work For in America.
3. US Hegemony is strong and sustainable – structurally resilient
Brian Carney, 3-5, editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal Europe and the co-author of "Freedom,
Inc.”, March 5, 2011,(Wall Street Journal, Why America will stay on top,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703559604576175881248268272.html)
In his best-selling history of the 20th century, "Modern Times," British
historian Paul Johnson describes "a significant turningpoint in American history: the first time the Great Republic, the richest nation on earth, came up against the
limits of its financial resources." Until the 1960s, he writes in a chapter titled "America's Suicide Attempt," "public finance was run in all
essentials on conventional lines"—that is to say, with budgets more or less in balance outside of exceptional circumstances. " The big change in
principle came under Kennedy," Mr. Johnson writes. "In the autumn of 1962 the Administration committed itself to a new and radical
principle of creating budgetary deficits even when there was no economic emergency." Removing this constraint on government spending allowed
Kennedy to introduce "a new concept of 'big government': the 'problem-eliminator.' Every area of human misery could be classified as a 'problem'; then
the Federal government could be armed to 'eliminate' it." Twenty-eight years after "Modern Times" first appeared, Mr. Johnson is
perhaps the most eminent living British historian, and big government as problem-eliminator is back with a
vengeance—along with trillion-dollar deficits as far as the eye can see. I visited the 82-year-old Mr. Johnson in his West London
home this week to ask him whether America has once again set off down the path to self-destruction. Is he worried about America's future?
"Of course I worry about America," he says. "The whole world depends on America ultimately, particularly Britain. And also, I love
America—a marvelous country. But in a sense I don't worry about America because I think America has such
huge strengths—particularly its freedom of thought and expression—that it's going to survive as a top
nation for the foreseeable future . And therefore take care of the world." Pessimists, he points out, have been
predicting America's decline "since the 18th century." But whenever things are looking bad, America "suddenly
produces these wonderful things—like the tea party movement. That's cheered me up no end. Because it's done more for women in politics
than anything else—all the feminists? Nuts! It's brought a lot of very clever and quite young women into mainstream politics and got them elected. A very
good little movement, that. I like it." Then he deepens his voice for effect and adds: "And I like that lady—Sarah Palin. She's great. I like the cut of her
jib." The former governor of Alaska, he says, "is in the good tradition of America, which this awful political correctness business goes against." Plus:
"She's got courage. That's very important in politics. You can have all the right ideas and the ability to express them. But if you haven't got guts, if you
haven't got courage the way Margaret Thatcher had courage—and [Ronald] Reagan, come to think of it. Your last president had courage too—if you
haven't got courage, all the other virtues are no good at all. It's the central virtue."
4. No perception internal link – their 1AC evidence doesn’t make this argument and 2AC spin is
contrived – gotta have working SPS to solve energy dependence
5. Heg doesn’t solve war
Fettweis 10 Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College.
(Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld)
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed
much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is
no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its
defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than
it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend'
endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and
Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And
yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed
to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would
suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or
arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the
world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United
States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military
spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical
analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.
***SPACE NMD
1NC Rogue States
1. Low risk of rogue state attack
Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, Professor in the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago and
Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland, 01
International Security, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy”, Summer, 2001, Vol. 26, No. 1, P. 40-92 [Marcus]
The probability of a rogue-state attack in the absence of NMD is very low. We explained above that the number of
rogue states that might acquire ICBMs over the next ten to fifteen years is small, and diplomacy may enable the United
States to prevent some of these threats from materializing. Here we argue that the United States most likely will be able
to deter any rogue ICBM threats that do emerge.
2. GOP representative are not qualified to discuss Iranian threat – if they were really hostile
they would have developed nukes in 2003
3. Stopping missiles in boost phase is nearly impossible.
Graham Spinardi, Senior Research Fellow Research Centre for Social Sciences, Science Studies Unit 09
University of Edinburgh, “Technological Controversy and US Ballistic Missile Defence: Star Warriors versus the Huntsville Mafia”, 1/1/09,
http://www.stis.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/30600/SpinardiBMDTechControversyWP.pdf [Marcus]
Boost phase interception does in theory offer great benefits in eliminating the effects of MIRVing. However,
locating defensive weapons close enough to Soviet ICBM fields was problematic. The earth’s curvature meant
that the early stage of a missile launch – the boost phase – would be out of the ‘line-of-sight’ of any surface
based weapon. Guaranteed boost phase interception of Soviet ICBMs thus seemed to require space-basing, but even if the technology was available
to achieve interception from space, there remained practical concerns. The logistics of putting sufficient defensive systems into
orbit was (and still is) daunting. There is only one orbit, known as the geostationary orbit, where satellites move at
the same speed as the earth rotates, and so stay above the same location. However, the geostationary orbit is
35800 kilometers above the equator and thus too far from boost phase targets for any realistic weapon to be
effective.55 Satellites in orbits closer to the earth move across the face of the earth, and so maintaining a capability above a particular area, such as
Soviet ICBM fields, would require a large number of satellites. In the early 1980s it was possible to be optimistic that the Space Shuttle might provide
cheap transportation into orbit, but such optimism proved unfounded.56 Thus, apart from the availability or not of suitable weapons
technologies, the cost of putting a constellation of battle stations into orbit led many to doubt the feasibility of
the space-based approach. A further concern was that battle stations based in space would themselves be
vulnerable to attack.
4. Rogue states would transport weapons in new ways if NMD was deployed.
Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, Professor in the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago and
Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland, 01
International Security, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy”, Summer, 2001, Vol. 26, No. 1, P. 40-92 [Marcus]
Opponents argue that NMD lacks value because rogue states do not need ICBMs to attack the United States with
WMD. If faced with an effective U.S. NMD, rogues could turn to short-range ballistic or cruise missiles
launched from surface ships operating in international waters off the U.S. coast, or they could smuggle
weapons into the United States by land, sea, or air. We believe that effective NMD would retain some value nevertheless, because ICBMs
possess military-operational characteristics and political uses not easily provided by other means of delivery. Alternative means of delivery
generally are far less expensive and technically challenging to develop and deploy than is an ICBM. It is much
easier to develop or purchase a short-range ballistic or cruise missile and to modify it for launch off a ship than
to develop or purchase an ICBM of equal payload, and the technical challenges associated with smuggling are trivial in comparison.
5. SBMD is expensive and not effective- Earth based solves better
Deblois et al Bruce M. is director of systems integration for BAE Systems, in Reston, Va. Richard L. Garwin (F) is IBM Fellow Emeritus at the
Thomas J. Watson Research Center, (,R. Scott Kemp is a member of the research staff of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton
University, in New Jersey. Jeremy C. Marwell is a Furman Scholar at the New York University School of Law.’05 (IEEE Spectrum, “Star-Crossed: From
Orbiting Lasers to Metal Rods that Strike form the Heavens, the Potnetial to Wage War from Space Raises Startling Possibilities- and Serious Problems,
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1402717March 2005)
A reasonable response time, then, means having an overlapping constellation of many satellites. A satellite capable of destroying a target up to 3000 km
away could cover a circular area of 28 million square kilometers, or about one-18th of Earth’s total area. In theory, 18 identical laser-weapon
satellites would be needed to cover every location on Earth. Unfortunately, the circular coverage areas of the
individual satellites would provide overkill at some points and no effectiveness at others. For example, in a 2002 Air
Force-sponsored RAND report, “Space Weapons, Earth Wars,” Bob Preston and his coauthors describe how a constellation of twenty-four 5-MW
hydrogenfluorine lasers with 10-meter-diameter mirrors would usually be able to destroy two to four ballistic missiles launched simultaneously from a
small area, but if one missile was launched every 5 minutes or so, the constellation would be able to destroy just
one. For lower-power lasers, the number of satellites escalates. For 1-MW beam power, 120 satellites could kill a launch of four missiles most of the
time, but occasionally would be able to destroy only three. The main point is that many weapons (of any type) need to be orbiting to
ensure that at least one weapon is within range to strike any possible target at any given time. An additional
challenge for space-based lasers is their vulnerability to countermeasures. As we have noted, even the highest-power
lasers do not penetrate clouds or smoke, and some wavelengths cannot penetrate Earth’s atmosphere,
including those used by the HF laser currently proposed for space-based missile defense. For ground targets, smoke
pots could disrupt an attack already in progress. Vulnerability is increased by the need to keep the laser on target for tens of seconds at least. The target
could move in an unpredictable path or simply be covered with a reflective coating or paint, which could increase the time required for a successful kill by
a factor of 10 or more. A layer of titanium oxide powder, for instance, could reflect 99.9 percent of the incident laser energy. Even a shallow pool of dyed
water would offer serious protection for structures. Detonating a nuclear warhead in space would disable hundreds of satellites 46 IEEE Spectrum |
March 2005 | NA Since a 20-MW laser boils water at a rate of 10 kg/s, a pool of water about 3 centimeters deep on the flat roof of a two-car garage would
protect against 100 seconds of illumination by a space-based laser. This all adds up to abundant opportunity to thwart laser weapons. Meanwhile, the
laser would be burning its supply of hydrogen and fluorine at a rate of 500 kg/s. Over the course of 100
seconds, it would consume 50 tons of fuel, for which the launch costs alone are about half a billion dollars. The
issue of energy requirements warrants a closer look. Today, the most efficient high-power lasers typically consume 2 to 3 kg
of chemical fuel per megawattsecond. So a pulse of 20 seconds from a 10-MW laser corresponds to about 400
to 600 kg of fuel per target in the absence of any countermeasures. At current launch costs of some $22 000/kg
into low Earth orbit, each 20-second laser shot would cost approximately $11 million. For a constellation of 17 lasers,
each loaded with a 12-shot capacity, the launch cost to maintain on-orbit fuel alone would exceed $2 billion. Weigh that against a stock of highly effective
$6 smoke grenades, a stray cloud, or a 3-cm-deep pool of water, and this multibillion-dollar weapon system starts to look like a poor investment. If lasers
are prohibitively expensive, might long tungsten rods used as high-speed penetrators be a relative bargain? Not really. To guarantee that a
single target (located near the equator, to take the easiest case) could be attacked at will, and not only when a
single orbiting rod happened to pass overhead, a distributed constellation of some 40 rods would be necessary,
with launch costs totaling some $8 billion. The additional problems of targeting at supersonic speeds and coping with the intense heat of
reentry demand extremely advanced, and therefore costly, technologies. Although one can steer the rod by shifting its center of mass, one would still
need to obtain error signals to guide the penetrator to the target. Communicating with the penetrator is complicated by the fact that the surrounding air
is heated into a radiopaque plasma, obstructing even the reception of GPS navigation signals. Although none of these problems is
insoluble, they defy inexpensive solutions.
For attacking hardened or deeply buried targets, the long rods would not outperform existing
missiles equipped with conventional penetrating warheads. That’s because the physics of highvelocity impacts limits the penetration depth; basically, too
much energy at impact causes the projectile to distribute its energy laterally rather than vertically. Tests done since the 1960s by Sandia National
Laboratories, in Albuquerque, N.M., confirm that for even the hardest rod materials, maximum penetration is achieved at a velocity of about 1 to 1.5
km/s. Above that speed, the rod tip liquefies, and penetration depth becomes essentially independent of impact speed. Therefore, for maximum
penetration, the long rods would need to be slowed to about 1 km/s, thereby delivering only one-ninth the destructive energy per gram of a conventional
explosive—or about 1.5 percent of the potential energy the rod had in LEO. The wasted energy would be immense, and the effort, cost, and complexity of
such an orbital system would be entirely out of proportion to the results. For soft targets on the surface, such as aircraft, ships, or even tanks, the United
States already has many quicker, simpler alternatives to space-based kinetic energy systems such as long rods. Explosives delivered by long-range cruise
missile, ICBM, or submarine-launched ballistic missile are all more attractive options. The space-based common aero vehicle also comes out a loser in
comparison with weapons delivered by ICBM or shorter-range missile. Although the CAV may take only 45 minutes from launch to detonation, that
would be preceded by as much as 12 hours for the target to come into range. Recall that an ICBM can get almost anywhere on Earth in 45 minutes. Of
course, populating many orbits with CAVs would reduce the response time, but that would also run up the cost.
Aircraft carriers, submarines, and even CAVs launched on demand by Earth-based missiles would all provide
better performance than a space-based CAV
1NC China
1. We are increasing cooperation with China now in lots of areas – things like economic
interdependence check Chinese aggression.
2. No risk of U.S.-China war – the PRC knows it would get crushed in a conflict
Bandow 3-7-08 (Doug, former senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former columnist with Copley News Service. “Turning China into the Next
Big Enemy.” http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=12472)
But the Defense Department is even more worried that the Chinese are spending too much, which is essentially defined as developing a military which
one day could confront American forces – successfully. It's a fair concern, since Beijing's military build-up is transforming the
international environment far more quickly than most American analysts had expected. The PRC has
numerous reasons for seeking to create a superior military. The Pentagon notes that China probably is developing forces for use in
such contingencies "as conflict over resources or disputed territories." Moreover, Beijing's growing "capabilities will increase Beijing's options for
military coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes in its favor." As Washington well knows, international political
influence is more likely to follow a larger military. Russia has regained regional clout, but remains a smaller global player; Europe is an economic giant
but a military midget. Beijing seems intent on twinning soft and hard power to enhance its global clout. Despite the
multiple ends, however, the
PRC appears to have two more basic goals with its military build-up. The first is to enable
the PRC to compel Taiwan, through use of military force, if necessary, to accept some form of reunification. The second is to
deter the U.S. from intervening to stop China from using coercion. As the Pentagon observes, "A potential military confrontation
with Taiwan, and the prospect of U.S. military intervention, remain the PLA's most immediate military concerns." Indeed, much of the PRC's
military program seems directed at creating a credible deterrent to America. The Pentagon reports: "China's nuclear force
modernization, as evidenced by the fielding of the new DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental-range missiles, is enhancing China's strategic strike
capabilities. China's emergent anti-access/area denial capabilities – as exemplified by its continued development of advanced cruise missiles, mediumrange ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles designed to strike ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, and the January 2007 successful test of a directascent, anti-satellite weapon – are expanding from the land, air, and sea dimensions of the traditional battlefield into the space and cyber-space
domains." It's an impressive list. But America's military capabilities remain far greater. Why does the PRC need anti-
ship missiles for use against aircraft carriers? Because it lacks even one carrier, while the U.S. controls the seas
with 12 carrier groups. This country dominates most other military fields as well. America's nuclear missile
arsenal is much bigger, more sophisticated, and more deadly than that possessed by China. Washington already is
reaching into space with its missile defense program. Thus, the PRC is seeking to deter America from deploying its more
powerful forces. Notes the Pentagon, "Through analysis of U.S and coalition warfighting practices since 1991, Beijing hopes to develop approaches
to waging future conflict by adapting and emulating lessons learned in some areas while seeking perceived vulnerabilities that could be exploited through
asymmetric means in others." In particular, "As part of its planning for a Taiwan contingency, China is prioritizing measures to deter or counter thirdparty intervention in any future cross-Strait crisis." Thus, Beijing might be preparing to confront the U.S. But the critical
question is, confront the U.S. over what? If Beijing was plotting the conquest of Guam, Hawaii, and ultimately the
North American continent, then Beijing's ongoing military build-up would look dangerous indeed. But there is
nothing in China's long history that suggests such overarching ambitions. Unwilling to remain weak and thus
subject to coercion by a trigger-happy superpower across the Pacific. Yes. Determined to vigorously assert its perceived
interests. Yes. Expecting international respect and consultation that reflects its increasingly expansive interests and growing power. Yes. Ready to
commit global aggression, initiate world war, and wreck both China's and America's futures. No. Which means the
U.S. should think carefully before responding to China's ongoing build-up. The Pentagon speaks of a situation which "will naturally and understandably
lead to hedging against the unknown," meaning Washington will need to spend even more on the military. If half of the world's military outlays aren't
enough, one wonders how much would be. Two-thirds? Three-fourths? Even more? Washington should not fret. If the goal is
defending America, the U.S. possesses sufficiency today. Just catching up with the U.S. will be a daunting task
for the PRC. Explained the Pentagon: "The U.S. Intelligence Community estimates China will take until the end of this decade or
longer to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary. China will not be able to
project and sustain small military units far beyond China before 2015, and will not be able to project and
sustain large forces in combat operations far from China until well into the following decade." Washington already
occupies the global summit, with the enormous military infrastructure of a superpower. China will not easily displace America with the world's most
powerful military. Assume that China, still desperately poor and surrounded by potentially hostile states, decides
deploy one new carrier group a year, no mean task. The PRC still wouldn't match America until 2020. Even then
Beijing wouldn't be strong enough to take aggressive action against the U.S. homeland
3. Military presence and Taiwan arms sales makes perception of containment inevitable
4. TMD solves better – provides stability and avoids provocation
to
Freese and Nichols 10[Joan Johnson-Freese
Director of the Center for Space Policy & Law at the University of Central Florida She is on
the editorial board of China Security, a member of the International Academy of Astronautics, the International Institute for Strategic Studies . &
Thomas Nichols Professor of National Security Affairs at Harvards Belfer science institute, Ph.D. from Georgetown University, an M.A. from Columbia
University China Security, Vol. 6 No. 2, 2010, pp. 3-24 2010 World Security Institute “ Space, Stability and Nuclear Strategy: Rethinking Missile
Defense”
A reasonable question here is why NMD threatens the Chinese deterrent in a way that TMD does not. Without doubt, TMD
efforts complicate the Chinese ability to act in their own region—viewed by the United States and many other countries as good—
since that would be the point of deploying a system in that theater. But rejecting a larger NMD system designed
to protect the United States is a signal, however tenuous, that Washington is not trying to steal a march on the Chinese by
suppressing its strategic deterrent. In a sense, a TMD deployment in the Pacific could replicate the US-Soviet dynamic, with
a great deal of stability at the strategic level, even if that means somewhat less stability at lower levels of conflict. The object is to avoid a
central nuclear exchange and NMD threatens (or implies that the Americans want to threaten) China's small deterrent. TMD by
contrast tries to maintain peace by telling the Chinese that the Americans are seeking not a perfect defense, but an updated version of escalation
dominance: neither side can prevail at the level of regional conflict and neither side can escalate because the consequences at that level will be ghastly—
and thus even a small conflict is pointless. This is not a threat to China’s existence, but it is unquestionably a warning that strategic deterrence does not
then create a situation where the PRC can run roughshod over it neighbors. Even if we accept that NMD would seem to be a threat
on a global level, this does not then logically mean we must accept that any protection from missiles at any level
is likewise a bellicose attempt to establish a “peace shield”. This was the rationale for scaling back the European program and it is a perfectly
logical approach to apply to Pacific security as well. Chinese objections to any defenses at all in this context have to seem equally as disingenuous as those
heard last year from Moscow. Theater missile defense is a threat to no one—except, of course, powers interested in launching theaterrange ballistic missiles.
5. Putting weapons into space fuels an arms race
Charles Peña and Edward Higgins, senior defense policy analyst and former director of regulatory studies at Cato institute, 02
Policy Analysis, “Should the United States “Weaponize” Space? Military and Commercial Implications”, 3/18/02,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa427.pdf [Marcus]
Advocates of a more aggressive U.S. military policy for space argue that the
United States is more reliant on the use of space than is
any other nation, that space systems are vulnerable to attack, and that U.S. space systems are thus an attractive candidate for a
“space Pearl Harbor.” But as important and potentially vulnerable as current U.S. space-based assets may be, deploying actual weapons
(whether defensive or offensive) will likely be perceived by the rest of the world as more threatening than the
status quo. Any move by the United States to introduce weapons into space will surely lead to the development
and deployment of anti-satellite weapons by potentially hostile nations. As the dominant user of space for military
and civilian functions, the United States would have the most to lose from such an arms race.
B. That leads to nuclear wars and anarchy.
Snyder and Snyder (Timothy Snyder is a historian at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. Philip Snyder is a physicist in
San Diego. The views expressed here are their own.) 01 “Why missile defense is a bad idea” 2001 “
http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0202/p11s2.html”(Pitman)
For one thing, they know how Russia and China will react. Although missile defense will not work, the Russians
and Chinese must assume the contrary. Since it is much cheaper to build nuclear missiles than it is to build
missile defense, they can afford to make this assumption. The Chinese, who today have only a modest nuclear
arsenal, would probably become a major nuclear power. A Chinese buildup, combined with what the Japanese
would see as irresponsible US policy, would force the Japanese to consider building nuclear weapons. After a
Chinese buildup, India would enlarge its nuclear arsenal, and Pakistan would do the same. Iran would probably
go nuclear. Peacemaking efforts in the Mideast and Korea would suffer. Like the Chinese, the Russians would
protect their own interests by having enough missiles to be sure to overwhelm the system. Fearing that missile
defense would allow us to plan a nuclear first strike, Russia would ensure that it has enough missiles to strike back. In so doing,
Russia would bury the treaty system developed by Washington and Moscow over the past 30 years to prevent nuclear war. The fault would be ours. The
foundation of nuclear arms control is the ABM Treaty, which bans missile defense. If we build missile defense, we must either violate or withdraw from
that treaty, and we issue Russia carte blanche to do its worst. If the US builds national missile defense, we create a world full of
nuclear weapons, where our allies strike out on their own, rivals become enemies, and no one feels bound by
previous agreements. Missile defense is likely to contribute to new world anarchy, and will not protect us from
the consequences. These are matters to be considered before any final decision is taken.