C 10 2006 2 Item 12 STRATEGY IN RELATION TO LEGAL AID REFORMS Summary This paper summarises the legal aid reforms proposed by Government in the wake of the Carter Review of legal aid procurement and outlines the strategy adopted by the Law Society to date. It invites the Council to review that strategy in light of the independent economic analysis undertaken by the LECG consultancy. Recommendation The Council is invited to: 1. 2. review the Law Society’s approach to date to the legal aid reforms proposed by the Government; and agree any appropriate changes to the strategy with reference to the options outlined in paragraph 23 at the end of this paper. Financial and Resourcing implications There are no unbudgeted implications Equality and Diversity implications The Society will continue to stress that the proposed reforms should not discriminate against black and minority ethnic firms and the communities they serve Freedom of Information This paper is public. Consultation This paper has been prepared directly for the Council at the request of the Corporate Governance Board at its meeting on 21 September 2006. Director of Representation and Law Reform Author of Report Date of Report Evlynne Gilvarry Evlynne Gilvarry 29 September 2006 Strategy in relation to Legal Aid reforms Introduction 1. This paper summarises the legal aid reforms proposed by Government in the wake of the Carter Review of legal aid procurement. It outlines the strategy adopted by the Law Society to date and invites the Council to review that strategy in light of the independent economic analysis undertaken by LECG (download LECG report). Recommendations The Council is invited to: 1. To review the Law Society’s approach to date to the legal aid reforms proposed by the Government. 2. Agree any appropriate changes to the strategy with reference to the options outlined in paragraph 23 at the end of this paper. 3. The final report on legal aid procurement by the Carter Review was published on 13 July, following a year-long review in which the Law Society was closely involved. The report’s broad ranging proposals in relation to criminal, civil and family legal aid will, if fully implemented, bring about wholesale, phased change in the legal aid sector over a period up to 2010/11 when ‘steady state’ is expected to be achieved. Essentially, the Carter Report proposes a phased move over three years (up to 2009/10 in the case of criminal legal aid, 2010/11, in the case of civil) to a market model: Starting with widespread application of fixed or graduated fees Followed by contracts awarded on basis of volume resulting in a smaller number of larger suppliers; Moving to ‘best value’ competitive tendering based on quality (all suppliers in future must achieve ‘preferred supplier’ status) and price; transfer of responsibility for quality assurance from the Legal Services Commission to the Law Society; a £10 million package of grant aid to enable law firms to restructure and equip themselves with necessary IT – such aid to be administered by the Law Society A new stakeholder engagement structure (within which the Law Society would be represented prominently) to monitor the reforms A major reduction (30%) in the Legal Service Commission’s administrative costs Background 4. The background to the Carter Review was set out in the Government paper entitled ‘A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid’ published by the DCA in July 2005. It highlighted the need to improve legal aid procurement, particularly in relation to criminal defence services where the costs (in the Government’s view) were rising alarmingly and at the expense of the civil legal aid system. Page of 8 2 5. The Law Society believed the review, led by Lord Carter of Coles, offered a unique opportunity to resolve difficulties faced by the legal aid sector. The stated aim of the Review was to design a procurement system that would ensure: clients’ access to good quality legal advice and representation; a good quality, efficient, sustainable supplier base for the future; value for money for the Government and the taxpayer; and a more efficient, effective and simple justice system. 6. A major aim of the Carter Review was to achieve control over legal aid expenditure which had increased in real terms from £1.5 billion in 1997 to over £2 billion in 2005/06. That growth is largely attributable to criminal legal aid and it is acknowledged that many factors, outside the control of the defence solicitor, not the least of which is a vast quantity of recent criminal justice legislation, have contributed to the growth. 7. The Law Society engaged intensively with the year-long Carter Review from the outset. A team comprising Rodney Warren, Rob Brown and Lucy Scott Moncrieff along with staff, participated in an iterative and confidential process of talks in the lead up to publication of Lord Carter’s interim report on criminal defence services in February, and even more intensively, in the final months of the Review. 8. The final report presents a considerably modified and more flexible model for procurement of criminal legal aid services. It also proposes a new approach to procuring civil and family legal aid. In the course of Review, the Law Society argued successfully for several changes to the original scheme design. Examples of these include many features of the schemes for the police station and magistrates’ court; e.g. wider client choice; the preservation in the medium term of standard fees in the magistrates’ courts. It also secured a £10 million package of grant aid to prepare firms for the change, and agreement to a new body, comprising key stakeholders, to monitor the changes. 9. Immediately following publication of the report of the Carter Review, the Department for Constitutional Affairs and the Legal Services Commission issued a statement accepting the Carter blueprint and published a consultation document setting out an implementation schedule of the proposed reforms. As part of this, it published, for the first time, proposals for fixed and graduated fee schemes for civil, private family and public law children work. The Law Society’s approach 10. From the outset, the Law Society fully endorsed the need for reform of the legal aid system and, in response to the report of the Carter Review (download press release) stated its belief that the proposed reforms, with careful implementation, had the potential to achieve sustainability of the supplier base, thereby preserving access to justice. As part of this, the Society acknowledged that the market approach had a role to play in securing the future of the legal aid system. However, we warned that reforms on the scale envisaged would require a major restructuring of the supplier base and great care would be needed to avoid market de-stabilisation. We also warned that best value tendering would not be appropriate in all circumstances and particularly, in many geographical areas. 11. The Society stressed that the critical issue in taking forward these proposals would be to ensure not only that the current supplier base remained viable, but by Page of 8 3 attracting new lawyers into legal aid, its sustainability was secured. Crucial to this would be the level at which fees are set. The Society also highlighted the importance of preserving the diversity of the supplier base to ensure those minority communities, often served by small firms and those operated by black and minority ethnic solicitors, continue to receive the service that meets their needs. 12. The Carter Review was conducted on the basis that there would be no new money available for legal aid in the current spending round due to run to 2007/08. Indeed, as the review progressed, it became clear that a budget deficit estimated at £100 million in 2007/08 meant that efficiencies would be sought at every level of the criminal defence service, rather than largely confined to the top end of CDS work. There would be no attempt to reduce overall expenditure on civil legal aid. The final Carter report predicts that the proposed reforms will achieve legal aid cost control by 2010 (see table below), at which time, conditions should be ripe for best value tendering. This amounts to 4% efficiencies (before inflation) from the supplier base over three years. Table 6.1 - Expenditure profiles for each of the main areas of legal aid addressed by the review in the transition years up to best value tendering in 2010-11 compared to historic expenditure £m (RAB) Cash growth 1997-98 to 2004-05 Outturn 2005-06 Forecast Outturn 2006-07 Year 1 of Transition 2007-08 Year 2 of Transition 2008-09 Year 3 of Transition 2009-10 Defence in police stations and magistrates’ courts 32% 523 531 508 503 503 (+2%) (-4%) (-1%) (0%) Defence in the Crown Court* 96% 609 586 560 535 (-4%) (-4%) (-4%) (-4%) 378 390 377 377 (0%) (+3%) (-3%) (0%) 360 373 388 405 (5%) (+4%) (+4%) (+4%) 1,878 1,857 1,828 1,820 (0%) (-1%) (-2%) (-1%) 191 217 223 219 (+21%) (+14%) (+3%) (-2%) 2,069 (+2%) 2,075 (0%) 2,055 (-1%) 2,044 (-1%) Legal help scheme for nonfamily work and private family scheme n/a Public law children scheme and legal help scheme for family work n/a Sub-total All other expenditure (e.g. single asylum fund, administration costs, Court of Appeal, central funds) Total 26% n/a 37% 635 377 342 1,877 158 2,035 *Crown Court figures exclude disbursements which cost £48 million in 2005-06 and forecast to increase to £65 million in 2010-11. 13. The Law Society very reluctantly reconciled itself to the fact that no additional money would be available. It did so on an assessment that the Treasury would Page of 8 4 simply not agree to extra legal aid investment until it saw evidence that legal aid expenditure was under control. 14. However, the Society has argued forcefully that there should be no attempt to seek efficiencies, particularly from the lower end of criminal defence work, in advance of firms being able, through restructuring, to take advantage of any efficiency gains that materialise. Accordingly, it has pressed the case for appropriately designed fees schemes with fees set at levels that ensure firms remain viable during the transition phase. Independent economic analysis by LECG 15. To assist in its representations, the Society commissioned an independent economic evaluation of the legal aid reforms proposed by the Carter Review. The report by economists, LECG, identifies some potential benefits of the reforms but also highlights significant risks. It supports the Society’s stance that the reforms will require the most careful implementation in order to avoid destablising the current supplier base, which it judges to be in a fragile economic state. It draws attention to the fact that the scale of restructuring required is likely to be far greater than projected by the Carter Review. For example, it predicts that some 800 firms will need to make major adaptations though closure or merger, in order to continue doing legal work. The Carter Review put the figure at around 400. LECG also warns of the risks of seeking efficiency savings, through imposition of fixed fees, in advance of firms being in a position, through restructuring, to benefit from projected efficiencies. 16. The work of LECG focussed largely on criminal defence services where the scale of reform is arguably greatest and where, contrary to civil legal aid, details of the proposed reforms were known in time to allow for detailed analysis. However, LECG’s overall evaluation is that the reforms are on a scale that will affect every legal aid firm and practitioner. A major consequence of the reforms will be a significant constriction in the supplier base, making it necessary for many firms to merge and practitioners to seek employment in larger units if they wish to continue doing legal aid work. LECG predicts that the entire legal aid system could suffer lasting damage if the reforms proceed at a pace and in a way that undermines the current supplier base. 17. The main benefits of the reforms for practitioners as identified by LECG are: Greater certainty as a result of volume contracts. More autonomy of operation. Efficiency gains as a result of restructuring. Equalisation of bargaining power with procurer as a result of best value tendering. However, there are significant risks: Imposition of fixed fees in advance of market restructuring could render firms unviable. Government may be grossly underestimating the number of firms that will have to make major adaptations. Current timetable risks disruption or outright failure of supply. Page of 8 5 Proposals may limit ability to enter the market leading to a concentration of market power in a few, large suppliers. Feedback from the Profession 18. Since the start of the consultation period in July, the Society has actively canvassed the views of practitioners on the reforms through its Defending Legal Aid Campaign on the web (include link). It also picked up detailed feedback as a result of agreeing to host a series of 10 meetings around the country where practitioners put their views to the legal aid minister, Vera Baird, QC. 19. It is very clear that there is great apprehension amongst legal aid practitioners in the face of the reforms. It is unwise to over- generalise as some practitioners undoubtedly see opportunities in the reforms. However, even those who do, have significant concerns about aspects of the changes. In general terms, criminal legal aid practitioners express concerns about the viability of their firms if fixed fees are imposed prematurely. Many practitioners express equal concern about the effect of fixed fees on quality of work – in particular police station work where practitioners are subject to the vagaries of the system. Smaller firms, and solicitors from black and minority ethnic groups are concerned about being excluded from legal aid altogether and point to the Government’s responsibilities under discrimination legislation. 20. Concerns articulated by civil and family legal aid practitioners have related to the perceived crudeness of the design of proposed fixed and graduated fees schemes and the levels at which fees have been set. There is also deep concern at the proposal to establish Community Legal Aid Centres in locations where there is already adequate, high quality provision by existing suppliers. In contrast to their criminal legal aid peers who had earlier notice of the reforms as a result of publication of an interim report by the Carter Review in February, civil legal aid practitioners were confronted with the changes, including the fee levels, for the first time in July. With a bare 12 weeks to respond, this has made it especially difficult for them. 21. All of the issues of concern highlighted by practitioners are being taken up by the Society with the DCA and the LSC during the consultation period. Promisingly, the legal aid minister has acknowledged that the design of the fee scheme for public law children cases is inappropriate and will be amended. The minister has also undertaken to reconsider other aspects of the reforms such as the timing of introduction of fixed fees in police stations, the design of the graduated fee scheme for crown court litigators and the ‘own solicitor’ provisions . Lastly, the minister has committed her department and the Legal Services Commission to conducting a full, minority impact assessment of the reforms. 22. The Society will continue to press for these changes aided by detailed analysis of the proposed fee schemes conducted by our strategic research unit (Annex A). The Society is also preparing a proposal on how the package of transition funds £4 million for growth and consolidation, £6 million for IT investment – should be deployed to enable firms to prepare for the changes. 23. However, in light of the independent evaluation of the reforms by LECG, the Council is invited to review the Society’s strategy in relation to the legal aid reforms as outlined in this paper, to confirm that strategy or recommend any changes deemed appropriate. The following options are open to the Society: Page of 8 6 Options 1. To challenge the Government’s insistence that there is no additional money for legal aid in the current spending round. 2. To seek a delay of the civil legal aid proposals for a year to enable a proper assessment of the potential impact to be made. 3. To require that changes to fee structures ensure that the cost and risk of system inefficiencies are not passed from the government to suppliers. Option 1 To seek new investment in legal aid The case for doing this is based on the findings of the LECG report which highlights the economic fragility of the current supplier base. There is a strong case for new money to invest in a smooth transition to steady state. However, in the event that no extra money is made available, we will continue to argue that at the very least, there should be no attempt to achieve efficiency gains at the levels projected during transition through the imposition of uneconomic fixed fees. Option 2 Seek a delay of the civil legal aid proposals. The case for this is strong. Civil legal aid was not as fully considered as criminal legal aid in the course of the Carter Review, although it is arguable that it raises even more complex issues. In addition, the fee schemes proposed for civil, family and public law children cases were not known until July when the DCA and LS published its joint consultation paper in response to the Carter Review. In the course of the consultation period, very many concerns about the civil legal aid proposals have been raised. Chief amongst these are proposals for operation of Community Legal Aid Centres as monopoly providers and poorly designed fee schemes with fees set at levels that do not reflect the complexity of the work. The scale of the change envisaged for criminal legal aid practitioners has significant implications for the provision of civil legal aid as over 50% of firms do a mixture of both kinds of work. It follows that any risks to the viability of criminal legal aid practices poses similar risks to civil legal aid provision. The Government has stated the aim of preserving current levels of investment in civil legal aid. One of the ways in which it can guard against an unintended erosion of civil legal aid is to postpone the changes to enable the earlier stages of transition of criminal legal aid to proceed carefully. The extra 12 months could be used to evaluate properly the current pilots of Community Legal Aid Centres before further roll-out and to devise fee schemes that are sufficiently sensitive to the work. Page of 8 7 Option 3 To require that fee structures should not transfer cost and risk of system inefficiencies to legal aid practitioners. The case for this is also linked to the necessity of guaranteeing the viability of firms in the interests of maintaining supply. Legal aid practitioners, perhaps particularly those working in crime, are at the mercy of practices, procedures and delays by other partners in the system e.g. police, CPS. Operating on fixed fees set at uneconomic levels could see a major and unacceptable transfer of risk to them. Page of 8 8