General Welfare Committee Staff:
Andrea Vazquez, Counsel
Elizabeth Hoffman, Policy Analyst
Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism,
Drug Abuse, & Disability Services Committee Staff:
Jennifer Wilcox, Counsel
Michael Benjamin, Policy Analyst
Aging Committee Staff:
Kelly Taylor, Counsel
Robert Cornegy, Policy Analyst
Health Committee Staff:
Dan Hafetz, Counsel
Crystal Gold-Pond, Policy Analyst
Oversight & Investigations Staff:
Shannon Manigault, Counsel
Jennifer Montalvo, Policy Analyst
THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
BRIEFING PAPER OF THE HUMAN SERVICES &GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISIONS
Robert Newman, Legislative Director
Terzah Nasser, Deputy Director, Human Services
Alix Pustilnik, Deputy Director, Governmental Affairs
COMMITTEE ON GENERAL WELFARE
Hon. Annabel Palma, Chair
COMMITTEE ON AGING
Hon. Jessica Lappin, Chair
COMMITTEE ON HEALTH
Hon. Maria del Carmen Arroyo, Chair
COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY,
ALCOHOLISM, DRUG ABUSE & DISABILITY SERVICES
Hon. G. Oliver Koppell, Chair
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS
Jumaane Williams, Chair
February 5, 2013
Oversight: Emergency Planning and Management
During and After Hurricane Sandy: Shelter Management
1
I.
Introduction
On February 5, 2013, the Committee on General Welfare, chaired by Council Member
Annabel Palma; the Committee on Aging, chaired by Council Member Jessica Lappin; the
Committee on Health, chaired by Council Member Maria del Carmen Arroyo; the Committee on
Oversight and Investigations, chaired by Council Member Jumaane Williams, and the
Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and
Disability Services, chaired by Council Member G. Oliver Koppell (collectively “the
Committees”), will hold an oversight hearing entitled “Emergency Planning and Management
During and After the Storm: Shelter Management.” This hearing will explore and review the
management and conditions of evacuation shelters and the services provided to evacuees, storm
victims’ access to shelters, the treatment of populations with special medical needs in evacuation
shelters, and the system of hotels used as transitional shelters. Witnesses invited to testify
include representatives of the New York City Department of Homeless Services, the New York
City Department for the Aging, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,
the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, advocates and volunteers. This is the fifth
in a series of Hurricane Sandy related oversight hearings conducted by the Council.
II.
Hurricane Sandy and Emergency Sheltering
The extreme weather conditions during Hurricane Sandy created an unprecedented need for
emergency shelter in New York City. Logistics to relocate and shelter those in need were
planned by the Office of Emergency Management (“OEM”) and administered by the Department
of Homeless Services (“DHS”) in partnership with several other City agencies.
According to OEM Commissioner Bruno’s testimony at a January 16th New York City
Council hearing on Emergency Planning and Management During and After Hurricane Sandy:
2
Disaster Management (“the January 16th hearing”), OEM activated the City’s Coastal Storm Plan
(“CSP”) and its Flash Flood Emergency Plan on Thursday, October 25th. By activating these
plans several City agencies transitioned to emergency operations, which includes increasing
staffing plans, notifying City employees who are designated as emergency shelter staff that they
could be called on to volunteer, opening evacuation centers and shelters, including Special
Medical Needs Shelters, and mobilizing the Emergency Shelter Supply Stockpile.1 By Friday,
October 26th OEM activated the Emergency Operations Center, which was the central
management center for the City’s response to the storm. Concurrently, the Logistic Center
opened where supply requests were sent and the Emergency Shelter Supply Stockpile was
deployed to the City’s shelter system. By Friday evening shelter staff were notified they must
report for shelter duty at 8:00 am Saturday morning when the Unified Operations Resource
Center (“UORC”) was activated, which serves as the shelter management center as identified in
the CSP.2
III.
Evacuation Shelters
Examining how displaced residents were able to access adequate shelters
Accessing temporary evacuation centers
The City disseminated information concerning temporary evacuation shelters through
varied means: in addition to announcing where shelters were located during press conferences
and in press releases, details were posted on the OEM website and were available via 311. 3
1
Testimony of OEM Commissioner Joe Bruno before the Committee on Public Safety, the Committee on Fire &
Criminal Justice Services, the Committee on Aging, the Committee on General Welfare, the Committee on Health
and the Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse & Disability Services.
January 16, 2013 (on file with Committees).
2
Id.
3
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Issues Order for Mandatory Evacuation of Low-Lying Areas as Hurricane
Sandy Approaches (Oct. 28, 2012); Press Release, Statement of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg On Preparations for
Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 29, 2012).
3
Mayor Bloomberg encouraged evacuees to access the shelters via public transportation. 4 He also
suggested that evacuees unable to make it to shelters on their own reach out to 311 to arrange
transportation.5 For evacuees seeking to drive to shelters, Mayor Bloomberg cautioned that the
school buildings being used as shelters might not have available parking. 6 The website of the
Mayor's Office for People with Disabilities also provided information about accessible
transportation to the shelters.7 Each of the shelters had at least one wheelchair accessible
entrance.8 Buses provided by the Department of Education were sent to all of the 26 public
housing developments in Zone A to help take the 45,000-plus residents of these developments to
dedicated shelters.9 To help relay information regarding the availability of temporary evacuation
shelters and the bus transportation to the shelters for public housing residents, the City
telephoned residents, knocked on doors, circulated flyers, and used loudspeakers.10
As temperatures dropped, on November 3rd, 2012, the City also offered bus service from
the City’s disaster assistance centers to transport individuals from hard-hit areas lacking heat and
electricity to temporary evacuation shelters.11 As part of this effort, NYPD officers distributed
flyers detailing bus location addresses, hours of operation and issued announcements using patrol
4
Id.
Id.
6
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Issues Order for Mandatory Evacuation of Low-Lying Areas as Hurricane
Sandy Approaches (Oct. 28, 2012).
7
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Updates New Yorkers on City Preparations for Hurricane Sandy and Steps
New Yorkers Should Take to Prepare (Oct. 27, 2012); Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Issues Order for
Mandatory Evacuation of Low-Lying Areas as Hurricane Sandy Approaches (Oct. 28, 2012); Press Release,
Statement of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg On Preparations for Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 29, 2012).
8
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Updates New Yorkers on City Preparations for Hurricane Sandy and Steps
New Yorkers Should Take to Prepare (Oct. 27, 2012); Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Issues Order for
Mandatory Evacuation of Low-Lying Areas as Hurricane Sandy Approaches (Oct. 28, 2012); Press Release, Mayor
Bloomberg Visits One of City's 76 Evacuation Centers and Urges New Yorkers in Low-Lying Areas to Comply With
Mandatory Evacuation Order (Oct. 28, 2012); Press Release, Statement of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg On
Preparations for Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 29, 2012).
9
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Issues Order for Mandatory Evacuation of Low-Lying Areas as Hurricane
Sandy Approaches (Oct. 28, 2012).
10
See Press Release, Statement of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg On Preparations for Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 29,
2012).
11
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Updates New Yorkers on City Response To Hurricane Sandy (Nov. 3,
2012).
5
4
car loudspeakers.12 Information regarding shelter locations, bus shuttle schedules and daytime
warming centers was listed on their website at www.nyc.gov.13
Options once temporary evacuation shelters were closed when schools reopened
Initially, Hurricane Sandy evacuees sought refuge in City temporary evacuation shelters,
all of which were housed in public school buildings.14 As the City consolidated evacuation
shelters in the aftermath of the storm, in order to better allocate resources and manage the
disparate population of evacuees in shelters and to prepare for the re-opening of City schools
after the storm, many evacuees needed to be transferred to other available facilities.15
Some evacuees were assigned to existing homeless shelters or YMCAs throughout the
City.16 Other evacuees, approximately 1,000 individuals from temporary evacuation shelters,
were assigned to one of 29 hotels located throughout the five boroughs funded by the City,
where the Red Cross and City agencies assisted evacuees in obtaining long-term and short-term
living assistance from FEMA.17 FEMA provided some evacuees with a $1,000 per month
stipend to help pay for temporary housing. 18
To the extent that DHS authorized the transfer of evacuees as it deemed appropriate
and/or necessary, today, the Committees hope to learn what criteria, if any, DHS used in
determining where to assign evacuees—including determinations of both assignments to shelters
12
Id.
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Advises of Cold Weather Precautions as City Provides Buses to Shelters,
Opens Warming Centers and Distributes Blankets (Nov. 3, 2012).
14
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Updates New Yorkers on City Preparations for Hurricane Sandy and Steps
New Yorkers Should Take to Prepare (Oct. 27, 2012); Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Issues Order for
Mandatory Evacuation of Low-Lying Areas as Hurricane Sandy Approaches (Oct. 28, 2012); Press Release,
Statement of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg On Preparations for Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 29, 2012).
15
See Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Updates New Yorkers on City Response to Hurricane Sandy (Nov. 1, 2012);
Press release, Mayor Bloomberg Updates New Yorkers on City Response to Hurricane Sandy (Nov. 2, 2012).
16
Id.
17
Lisa W. Foderaro, City-Paid Hotel Rooms Are No Panacea for 1,000 New Yorkers Displaced by Storm, NEW
YORK TIMES, Nov. 29, 2012, available at , http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/nyregion/1000-nyc-stormevacuees-find-hotels-no-panacea.html?_r=0. (last visited Jan. 29, 2013
18
Id.
13
5
versus hotels and the specific assignments within those categories—and what role, if any,
evacuees’ placement requests were taken into account.
Tracking residents of temporary evacuation centers
The reported number of evacuees staying in 76 temporary evacuation shelters ranged
from 3,000 on October 29th, 2012 to 6,800 on November 1st, 2012. 19 However, DHS was unable
to maintain a daily count of the number of residents in each shelter on each day of the storm.
Today’s hearing will explore the challenges that occurred during and after the storm in terms of
tracking evacuees, from initial intake, to shelter-to-shelter transfer, to ultimate withdrawal from
the temporary evacuation shelter system.
Shelter Conditions and Supplies
In total, 76 different evacuation shelter facilities were opened in public schools
throughout the five boroughs.20 However, according to advocates and newspaper articles, the
City’s plan and preparation for evacuees was inadequate. When discussing the evacuation
shelters at the January 16th hearing a representative from the Legal Aid Society testified that,
“the City failed to prepare food, medical, and other special needs; failed to avoid the co-location
of children, adults, and seniors; and failed to anticipate the plan for long-term displacement.”21
Additionally, it was said that there was confusion about the shelter process, which left evacuees
and advocates unsure of who was in charge and where to go to get basic supplies such as food,
19
See Press Release, Statement of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg On Preparations for Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 29,
2012); Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg Updates New Yorkers on City Response to Hurricane Sandy (Nov. 1,
2012).
20
Danielle Tcholakian, Bloomberg Urges Evacuation to Emergency Shelters Intensifies Homeless Outreach,
METRO, October 29, 2012. http://www.metro.us/newyork/local/article/1155221--bloomberg-urges-evacuation-toemergency-shelters-intensifies-homeless-outreach (last visited Dec. 2012).
21
Testimony of The Legal Aid Society before the Committee on Public Safety, the Committee on Fire & Criminal
Justice Services, the Committee on Aging, the Committee on General Welfare, the Committee on Health and the
Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse & Disability Services. January
16, 2013 (on file with Committees).
6
medical and social services.22 In order to grapple with the confusion, some evacuation shelters
relied on volunteers from the community to coordinate food, services and medical care for the
evacuees.
A week after the storm, students had to return to school and evacuees had to be
transferred out of the school-based evacuation shelters to additional shelters, including armory
open drill floors in existing DHS shelters. It has been reported that conditions at some of the
armories were unacceptable. According to an article in the New York Times, there were
complaints of, “chaotic, unsanitary conditions,” which led to the removing evacuees from
existing DHS shelters to hotel rooms across the city.23 The New York Times described the
conditions at the Franklin Avenue Armory in the Bronx by saying:
“It’s like you were being processed to go to jail,” Mr. Etienne said, echoing many others
who described waiting for hours in the cold to enter a vast sea of cots under constant
fluorescent lights, with one shower for everybody and one toilet for men, where guards
yelled into two-way radios all night and, Mr. Etienne and a Salvation Army official said,
a couple had sex in the open.”24
Supplies were made available to evacuation shelters through a network of City, State,
Federal, non-profit and community partners. MENLO, a private vendor contracted by the City,
manages the Emergency Shelter Supply Stockpile and was responsible for the delivery of cots,
blankets, food, water, medical supplies, baby and pet supplies.25 Two days after the storm hit,
the Red Cross “realized that the scope of the disaster would require large-scale assistance from
outside the city. But, at that point a host of logistical problems made it difficult to expedite
22
Id.
Nina Bernstein, Storm Bared a Lack of Options for the Homeless in New York, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November
20, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/nyregion/storm-worsens-shortage-of-nyc-housing-forhomeless.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Jan. 28).
24
Id.
25
Testimony of Joseph Bruno, supra note 1.
23
7
deliveries overland.”26 By November 1st, the City and the National Guard set up a food and
water distribution site at Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn where Meals Ready to Eat (“MREs”)
and water were distributed. Beginning November 10th, the City began serving hot meals in
partnership with the NYC Food Truck Association.27
In many cases non-profit organizations and volunteers in the community rallied to
distribute needed supplies to evacuation shelters. However, according to some of the non-profit
organizations called upon to help distribute food, a more coordinated approach was needed to
adequately service shelters, as well as impacted neighborhoods. According to testimony at the
January 16th hearing, the Food Bank and other emergency food providers received phone calls
from government and community leaders to report local food needs and to ask for assistance,28
but “it quickly became clear that without a central clearinghouse for these requests, it was
impossible to insure against duplication of efforts and limited resources.” 29 According to the
Salvation Army, the organization was notified “at a moment’s notice” that evacuees were going
to be moved into their existing shelter.30 Due to the rapid pace of relocating evacuees, it has
been reported that some armories did not have the supplies needed to house families. For
example, according to the New York Times, the Franklin Avenue Armory did not have cribs for
babies the first night it was open and some babies fell out of cots onto the floor. 31
Staffing
David Carry, American Red Cross Carries on with Hurricane Sandy Recovery After Being Branded a ‘Disgrace’,
THE HUFFINGTON POST, November 4, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/04/red-cross-carries-ondesp_0_n_2073855.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
27
Testimony of Joseph Bruno, supra note 1.
28
Testimony of the Food Bank for New York before the Committee on Public Safety, the Committee on Fire &
Criminal Justice Services, the Committee on Aging, the Committee on General Welfare, the Committee on Health
and the Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse & Disability Services.
January 16, 2013 (on file with Committees).
29
Id.
30
Bernstein, supra note 23.
31
Id.
26
8
The following agencies had staff trained by OEM as hurricane and evacuation shelter
operators under the Coastal Storm Plan: the Department of Education, the Human Resources
Administration, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, the Administration for
Children’s Services, the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Housing
Preservation and Development, the Department of Homeless Services, the Department of
Finance, the Department of Transportation, the Law Department, the Department of Citywide
Administrative Services, the Department for the Aging, the School Construction Authority, the
Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications, the Mayor’s Office, the City
University of New York, and the Health and Hospitals Corporation. Staff from these agencies
reported to evacuation shelters during the storm, however, staff levels varied at each shelter
depending on where staff lives and how easily they could reach a shelter. Staff received varying
levels of training by OEM and today, the Committees are interested in learning about the
different types of training provided.
IV.
Special Needs Populations
Special Medical Needs Shelters
Evacuation shelters, often located in school buildings, provide for basic needs for those
with no other place to go. However, OEM recognized that certain individuals have special
medical needs and as a result, the City’s Coastal Storm Plan calls for the opening of special
medical needs shelters, which are run by the City’s Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”).32
Wherever possible, the special medical needs shelters were to be co-located with general
shelters.33
32
Testimony Joseph Bruno, Commissioner, Officer of Emergency Management, before the Committee on Fire and
Criminal Justice Services, the Committee on Public Safety, and the Committee on Waterfronts, Oct. 12, 2010, at p.
16-17.
33
Id.
9
According to testimony by NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
(“DOHMH”) Commissioner Thomas Farley, when the Healthcare Evacuation Center found a
critical need for evacuation of nursing home and adult care residents, but receiving facilities
were not available, those residents were transported to Special Medical Needs Shelters, where
HHC took responsibility for the medical needs of residents.34 DOHMH Commissioner Farley
additionally testified that in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy 1,800 residents of adult homes and
nursing homes were temporarily housed at Special Medical Needs Shelters.35
HHC was assisted by federal Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (“DMATs”), which
were 25-person interdisciplinary teams of doctors, nurses, mental health professionals and
clinical personnel. Shelters also received assistance from the City’s Medical Reserve Corp, a
group of medical professional volunteers organized and managed by DOHMH.36 They provided
medical and mental health support in shelters and assisted DOHMH in their efforts to track
patients evacuated from chronic care facilities. During the storm, the Medical Reserve Corp
included 1,200 volunteers working over 1,500 shifts and logging over 18,000 hours.37
In
addition to HHC staff, DOHMH placed a minimum of two mental health professionals in each
shelter and five in high-volume locations, like the Park Slope Armory.38
After the storm, health care facility residents were transferred to City shelters, hotels, and
other nursing and adult homes in the City and as far north as Albany. 39 Reports indicate that
34
Testimony of Dr. Thomas A Farley, Commissioner, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, before the
Committee on Aging, the Committee on General Welfare, the Committee on Health and the Committee on Mental
Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse & Disability Services, January 24, 2013 (on file with
Committees).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Jennifer Preston, Sheri Fink, and Michael Powell, Call That Kept Nursing Home Patients in Sandy’s Path, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/nyregion/call-that-kept-nursing-homepatients-in-sandys-path.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Jan. 2013).
10
thousands of evacuated residents were placed in medical shelters that were not set up to provide
nursing home care.40
There are also widespread reports that many nursing and adult home residents were
transferred without medical records and were not accompanied by facility staff – both violations
of State regulations.41 According to Federal and City workers, of the more than 100 residents
sent to one City shelter, few had medical records or proper medication.42 Other emergency
workers echoed similar concerns, even going so far as to conduct blood tests on evacuees to
ensure they would be properly treated.43 A nurse working with the DMAT in the Bronx reported
that some records were sent, but with the wrong patients.44 Reportedly, a lack of medical records
also emerged as a problem during the evacuation conducted in advance of Hurricane Irene.45
DMATs are expected to arrive at disaster sites with sufficient supplies and equipment to
sustain themselves for a period of 72 hours while providing medical care at a fixed or temporary
medical care site.46 However, reports indicate that patients in adult homes and nursing homes
with mental health conditions were routinely evacuated to shelters without medical records or
medication to manage their symptoms.47 Further, advocates have testified that such shelters
were overly restrictive and barred residents from leaving the shelter unless accompanied by
40
Id.
Id.; Sheri Fink, In Hurricane’s Wake, Decisions Not to Evacuate Hospitals Raise Questions, ProPublica, Nov. 1,
2012, available at http://www.propublica.org/article/in-hurricanes-wake-decisions-not-to-evacuate-hospitals-raisequestions (last visited Jan. 2013).
42
Michael Powell and Sheri Fink, Queens Nursing Home Is Faulted Over Care After Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/nyregion/queens-nursing-home-is-faulted-over-care-afterstorm.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Jan. 2013).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT),” available at
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/ndms/teams/Pages/dmat.aspx .
47
Nina Bernstein, Storm Weakened a Fragile System for Mental Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/nyregion/new-yorks-mental-health-system-thrashed-by-services-lost-tostorm.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
41
11
shelter personnel. Advocates have also reported that the residents were denied their full SSI
benefits which left them without money to attend to their basic needs.48
Evacuees with Disabilities
In New York City, it is estimated that there are 889,219 individuals with disabilities,
making up 11% of the population.49 Regarding the type of disability, 183,651 individuals have a
serious hearing difficulty, 210,903 have serious vision difficulties, and 535,840 individuals have
difficulty walking or climbing stairs.50 Within Zone A, which was subject to a mandatory
evacuation order during Hurricane Sandy, there are at least 118,000 people with disabilities.51
Despite the large number of people with disabilities living in Zone A, many of the City’s
evacuation shelters were not accessible. Advocates reported inaccessible entrances at shelters,
dangerously steep ramps, and locked doors at accessible entrances.52 Once inside the shelters,
people with disabilities faced significant difficulties due to a lack of accessible bathrooms and
cots.53 There was also a lack of accessible communication within the shelters due to a failure to
provide ASL interpreters or large-print or Braille written materials.54 Individuals with mental
health disorders also reportedly lost access to their medications while in the shelter system. 55
Elderly Evacuees
48
Testimony of Shelly Weizman, Senior Staff Attorney, MFY Legal Services, before the before the Committee on
Aging, Committee on Health, and the Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug
Abuse, and Disability, January 24, 2013 (on file with Committees).
49
Center for Independence of the Disabled, Disability Matters, Unequal Treatment and the Status of People with
Disabilities in New York City and New York State 7 (2011) (on file with Committees) (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
50
Id. at 31-37.
51
Testimony of Susan M. Dooha, Executive Director, Center for Independence of the Disabled, before the
Committee on Public Safety, the Committee on Fire & Criminal Justice Services, the Committee on Aging, the
Committee on General Welfare, the Committee on Health and the Committee on Mental Health, Developmental
Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse & Disability Services. January 16, 2013 (on file with Committees).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Bernstein, Storm Weakened Fragile System, supra note 47.
12
Advocates claim that many shelters were not properly set up to accommodate elderly
evacuees.56 One shelter in the High School of Graphic Communications Arts only had one
operational men’s bathroom, located on the third floor – presenting a serious challenge for those
with mobility issues.57 Other shelter locations were not fully accessible to those in wheelchairs
or walkers, while others had limited signage directing evacuees to accessible entrances.58
Reports also indicate that some families who arrived with a relative with dementia were turned
away from shelters.59
The mass evacuations of dozens of nursing homes in the City following flooding and the
loss of power further complicated the task of providing proper care to the elderly in shelters. Due
to the impact of Hurricane Sandy, more than 6,000 hospital, nursing home, and adult home
patients were evacuated from their facilities.60 When these patients could not be transferred to
other health care facilities, they were sent to City shelters.61 While these patients were sent to
Special Medical Needs Shelters, which were designed to provide some degree of medical
support, the shelters were not set up to provide nursing home care.62
While shelter medical workers and volunteers struggled to care for nursing home
evacuees missing medical records, family members struggled to locate loved ones in the days
56
Testimony of Leah Ferster, Chief Services Officer of JASA, before the City Council Committees on Public
Safety, Fire & Criminal Justice Services, Health, General Welfare, Aging, and Mental Health, Developmental
Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and Disability, Jan. 16, 2013 (on file with Committees).
57
Nina Bernstein, As Students Move Back In, Some Evacuees Are Set Adrift Again, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2012,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/nyregion/some-hurricane-sandy-evacuees-are-set-adriftagain.html?_r=0.
58
Testimony of Susan Dooha, supra note 51.
59
Testimony of Jed Levine, Executive Vice President of the New York City Chapter of the Alzheimer’s
Association, before the City Council Committees on Public Safety, Fire & Criminal Justice Services, Health,
General Welfare, Aging, and Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and Disability,
Jan. 16, 2013 (on file with Committees).
60
Testimony of Andrea Cohen, Director of Health Services of the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Health and
Human Services, before the City Council Committees on Aging, Health, and Mental Health, Developmental
Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and Disability, Jan. 24, 2013(on file with Committees).
61
Testimony of Dr. Thomas Farley, supra note 34; Preston, Fink, & Powell, supra note 39.
62
Preston, Fink, & Powell, supra note 39.
13
and weeks following the evacuations.63 Most facilities lost not only power, but also phone and
voice-over-internet systems, making the notification of relatives difficult or impossible.64
Families reported calling nursing homes, the Red Cross, various City agencies, the police, and
311 in search of information on transferred relatives, all generally to no avail.65 As DOHMH
became aware of issues surrounding the tracking and identification of evacuated nursing home
residents, it launched the Long-Term Care Patient Tracking Project.66 DOMHM posted staff
members at Special Medical Needs Shelters who worked with the shelters and nursing home
staff to identify residents and confirm their locations.67 DOHMH then relayed the information to
staff at a Health Department Call Center, who assisted approximately 300 families.68 However,
despite this effort, reports indicate that many relatives of seniors located in shelters waited days
before they were able to confirm the location of their loved ones.69
Today the Committees hope to further learn how Special Medical Needs Shelters
prepared for evacuees with special needs.
The Committees also hope to explore what
preparations were done, if any, to prepare all other evacuation shelters for vulnerable
populations.
V.
Hotels as Transitional Housing
After sheltering evacuees in public schools, and subsequently armories, the third phase of
transitional sheltering for Sandy victims was hotel rooms. Currently there are over 3000 New
63
Ben Hallman, After Sandy, Communication Breakdown Hampered Efforts to Find Evacuated Seniors,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 18, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/16/sandy-communicationevacuated-seniors_n_2141699.html (last visited Jan. 2013).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Testimony of Dr. Thomas Farley, supra note 34.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Hallman, supra note 63.
14
York City households displaced by Hurricane Sandy living in hotels.70 The system of hotels as
transitional housing is bifurcated; while some evacuees are in hotels with vouchers from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), others are in hotels paid for by New York
City, and run by DHS. The hotel program has so far cost $50 million in New York City.71
FEMA System
FEMA first used hotels to house storm victims after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and
FEMA’s Transitional Sheltering Assistance (“TSA”) Program was officially adopted in 2008.72
TSA is a short-term program to shelter families while they transition into longer-term housing
after a disaster. In response to Hurricane Sandy, the TSA program began housing people on
November 3rd in New York.73 In order to qualify for assistance, Sandy victims are required to
register with FEMA and then select a hotel.74 FEMA will cover the costs of the hotel and taxes,
but will not pay for hotel meals or telephone calls.75 Every two weeks FEMA determines
whether households are still eligible to receive assistance. 76 As of January 1st, 3,183 households
from New York have checked out of TSA hotels,77 and more than 2,200 households are currently
living in hotels under the FEMA TSA program.78
70
Heather Haddon, Alison Fox & Jennifer Weiss, Hotel Policies Rile Victims of Storm, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Jan. 1, 2013, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324274404578211642044105754.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013)
(listing more than 2,200 households in FEMA hotels); Greg B. Smith, City wasting Hurricane Sandy FEMA cash on
roach-infested hotels and single room occupancies, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Jan. 27, 2013, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/city-wasting-hurricane-sandy-fema-cash-roach-infested-hotels-article1.1248619 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (listing 800 households in City hotels).
71
Laura Kusisto, No Panacea for Sandy’s Displaced, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 27, 2013, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324539304578263983439125290.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
72
Heather Haddon, Alison Fox & Jennifer Weiss, Hotel Policies Rile Victims of Storm, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Jan. 1, 2013, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324274404578211642044105754.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
73
Id.
74
Id. A list of participating hotels is available on the FEMA website available at
http://www.femaevachotels.com/index.php (last visited Jan. 2013).
75
Haddon, Fox & Weiss, supra note 72.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
15
The TSA program was originally scheduled to expire on November 16th, but was
extended to December 14th at the urging of New York State.79 When that deadline arrived, in
order to allow families to remain in hotels during the holidays, the program was extended from
December 14th through January 12th.80 Again, at the request of New York State, the program was
increased a third time through January 27th.81 The TSA program was extended for another two
week period through February 10th to help those who are still eligible remain in hotels as longerterm housing solutions are identified.82 Each time a two week period expires, FEMA determines
on a case-by-case basis whether families are allowed to remain in the TSA program.83
According to FEMA, if people have received rental assistance, have a viable housing option, an
insurance settlement or can return to a repaired home, they are no longer eligible for hotel
assistance.84 FEMA officials have stated that they work with people in the hotels on a daily basis
to assist them in securing alternative housing options.85
New York City System
According to the New York Times, as of November 29th there were 1,000 storm evacuees
being temporarily housed by the City in 416 rooms in 29 hotels,86 through a program
79
FEMA, FEMA Extends Traditional Sheltering Assistance Program in New York, Release No. 4085-030 (Nov. 16
2012) available at, http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2012/11/16/fema-extends-transitional-sheltering-assistanceprogram-new-york (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
80
FEMA, Governor Cumo Announces FEMA Extends Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program in NY for an
Additional Four Weeks, Release No. NR-095 (Dec. 14 2012), available at http://www.fema.gov/newsrelease/2012/12/14/governor-cuomo-announces-fema-extends-transitional-sheltering-assistance. (last visited Jan. 29,
2013).
81
FEMA, FEMA Extends Traditional Sheltering Assistance Program in NY for an Additional 14 Days, Release No.
NR-135 (Jan. 11, 2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/01/11/fema-extends-transitionalsheltering-assistance-program-ny-additional-14 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
82
FEMA, Deadlines Extend for FEMA registration and Transitional Sheltering Assistance program in New York,
Release No. NR-149 (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/01/25/deadlinesextended-fema-registration-and-transitional-sheltering-assistance (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
83
Kate Zezima & Meghan Barr, For Sandy’s Homeless, Lives of Anxiety in Hotels, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
25, 2013, available at http://nation.time.com/2013/01/25/for-sandys-homeless-lives-of-anxiety-in-hotels/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2013).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Foderaro, supra note 17.
16
administered by DHS.87 As of January 25th, 800 households were living in 50 hotels and single
room occupancies (“SROs”) in the City.88 When the program was established after moving
people from armory drill floors, City officials were concerned with securing hotel rooms for
evacuees during the busy tourist season; 93.2% of City hotel rooms were occupied in the week
which ended on November 17th.89 According to DHS Commissioner Seth Diamond, a number of
unused rooms were set aside so City officials do not have to turn people if away if more come
out to seek shelter.90
Further, according to Commissioner Diamond, DHS did significant
outreach and communication with people to get them out of homes with no heat, and into hotel
rooms, as there is concern that people could freeze to death in unheated apartments.91 The City
will be eligible for reimbursement from FEMA if it can show that the bookings were necessary
to keep people safe.92
Services are being provided in the City hotels by various agencies. The Red Cross is
providing services, and has reported that they fill debit cards with hundreds of dollars for
families to buy food.93 Through emergency contracts with DHS, case management is being
provided to evacuees in hotels by Samaritan Village and SCO Family of Services primarily for
families, and the Bowery Residents Committee for single adults and adult families.94 The case
87
Andrew Grossman & Andrew Strickler, Paid-for Hotel Rooms Sitting Vacant, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov.
28, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324705104578147693604669494.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2013).
88
Greg B. Smith, City wasting Hurricane Sandy FEMA cash on roach-infested hotels and single room occupancies,
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Jan. 27, 2013, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/city-wastinghurricane-sandy-fema-cash-roach-infested-hotels-article-1.1248619 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Winnie Romeril, Story: Hotels are No Place to Raise a Family, American Red Cross Disaster Newsroom, Jan. 15,
2013, available at http://newsroom.redcross.org/2013/01/14/story-hotels-are-no-place-to-raise-a-family/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2013).
94
Information provided to the General Welfare Committee staff from a DHS representative on Jan. 30, 2013.
17
management provided includes help with gathering documents, connecting people to benefits,
referrals, and transportation.95
The hotels the City is using to shelter Sandy victims range from the upscale W
Downtown Hotel to SROs in the Bronx. According to an investigation by the Daily News, at
least five of the 50 hotels and SROs housing Sandy victims had numerous health and safety
issues.96 In one location, an SRO at 1038 Faile Street in the Bronx, has been cited repeatedly for
vermin and fire safety issues.97
Another SRO housing Sandy victims, 1033 Faile Street,
currently has 45 open housing code violations.98 Neither building is registered with the City
Department of Housing Preservation and Development.99
According to the report, some
evacuees feel unsafe where they are currently living.100
Difficulties with Hotels as Transitional Shelters
One issue for evacuees in hotels is a lack of stability. Hotels with long-scheduled
reservations participating in transitional hotel programs have asked evacuees to leave their
rooms. According to media reports, while hotel managers claim to have gone out of their way to
accommodate evacuees, many have been asked to leave as FEMA allows participating hotels to
honor reservations.101 For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that a 49-year-old mother
and her two sons were asked to leave the Beekman Tower Hotel in Manhattan five times since
they were displaced from their home in Far Rockaway, but they have returned each time because
it is one of the very few hotels with a kitchenette.102
95
Id.
Smith, supra note 88.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Zezima & Barr, supra note 83.
102
Haddon, Fox & Weiss, supra note 72.
96
18
Additional complications arise for evacuees who are provided rental assistance from
FEMA and must then leave the hotel. According to the Legal Aid Society, evacuees are given
FEMA checks which are insufficient to cover first month’s rent and a security deposit, and then
asked to leave the hotel and find alternative housing in a 24-48 hour time frame.103 A lack of
affordable housing options has emerged as a significant difficulty for Sandy victims living in
hotels. As of January 27th, only one apartment lease has been signed since 2,500 affordable
units were set aside to house victims of Hurricane Sandy after a deal between government
officials and landlords.104 According to the Wall Street Journal, “many of those displaced by the
storm are too poor to pay rent even for apartments restricted to city residents with low or middle
incomes, while others don't want to move far from their homes in the Rockaways or Staten
Island.”105
Another significant issue for evacuees in hotels raised by the media and advocates is
access to adequate food. Despite reports from the Red Cross that every few weeks they are
loading hundreds of dollars onto debit cards for families living in hotels,106 evacuees have
reported that food has become one of their top expenses since the storm.107 As the majority of
hotels are not equipped with cooking facilities, and often not near affordable supermarkets or
locations that accept food stamps, families may have to eat out for three meals a day. One family
who spoke with the media had to use the money allocated to them from FEMA for home repairs
and short-term rentals to buy food.108
103
Foderaro, supra note 17.
Kusisto, supra note 71.
105
Id.
106
Romeril, supra note 32.
107
Foderaro, supra note 17.
108
Zezima & Barr, supra note 83.
104
19
At today’s hearing the Council intends to further explore the use of hotels as transitional
shelter for Hurricane Sandy evacuees, including how the decisions were made to shelter
evacuees in City-run versus FEMA shelters and how these programs differ; what types of
services are being provided in the hotels and who is administering those services; and how
services and conditions differ among the various hotels.
VI.
Conclusion
From the days before Hurricane Sandy made landfall through the present, thousands of
New York City residents sought emergency shelter.
While some evacuees only needed
temporary shelter, three months later thousands of people are on their third or fourth stop since
the storm and continue to need assistance. Today the Council hopes to learn about the entire
emergency sheltering process – the initial evacuees who sought shelter in New York City public
schools, those who were transferred to open drill floors at armories, and finally the children and
families who are still living in hotels across the City and in other locations. In particular, the
Council hopes to learn about the information disseminated to the public about accessing
emergency shelter, the staff, supplies, conditions and services in shelters and hotels, and the care
provided to vulnerable populations.
20