Russia’s Interests and Objectives in East Asia
In Northeast Asia and the Two Koreas: Metastability, Security, and Community, edited
by Hyung-Kook Kim, Myongsob Kim, and Amitav Acharya. Seoul: Yonsei University
Press, 2008, pp. 199-224.
An earlier version of the paper appeared in Korean Observer.
ABSTRACT: Russia’s foreign policy interests in the world include greater involvement
in solving vital security issues, improvement of conditions for domestic economic
modernization, and preservation of political stability. In East Asia, such a structure of
interests suggests the following policy objectives: security multilateralism, weapons
sales, energy deals, a non-nuclear North Korea, and an orderly process of Korean
unification. A new foreign policy perspective, realities of rising energy prices, a
recovering economy, pragmatic leadership, and a relative weakening of major threats
from outside create favorable conditions for Russia’s advanced engagement with Asia
and the world. Russia stands to gain further from its involvement in the East Asian region
partly because the nation is still in a process of domestic recovery and partly because of
continued external economic opportunities.
By Andrei P. Tsygankov
Andrei P. Tsygankov is Associate Professor at the departments of Political Science
and International Relations at San Francisco State University. He is the author of
Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2006), among other works.
Associate Professor
San Francisco State University
International Relations and Political Science
San Francisco, CA
1600 Holloway Ave. HSS
San Francisco, CA 94132
Tel: (415)-338-7493
E-mail: andrei@sfsu.edu
http://bss.sfsu.edu/tsygankov
Word count: around 5,170
1
Russia’s Interests and Objectives in East Asia
I. INTRODUCTION
For a number of reasons, East Asia is a region of critical importance for Russia.
The region faces some long-standing security challenges, such as the nuclear ambitions
of North Korea and China’s relations with Taiwan, which continue to affect Russia
directly. The region also has a potential of becoming a gateway for Russia’s entrance to
the global economy. With half of the population and fifth of global trade, the Asia-Pacific
region is viewed by many as a success story of modernization/globalization. Rich in
natural resources, Russia stands to contribute to satisfying the region’s growing demand
for energy and modernizing its own domestic economy along the way.
Aware of East Asia challenges and opportunities, Russia is becoming increasingly
involved in the region’s affairs. Russia’s political class no longer views the years of
excessively pro-Western Kozyrev’s diplomacy as a viable foreign policy course. Nor do
Russia’s officials believe in engaging East Asia for the sole purpose of balancing the
United States’ power. Rather, there is a clear realization that the region is a microcosm of
the global world, in which economic opportunities and security challenges bring together
world powers from both West and East. Russia increasingly sees itself a Pacific power,
and it is interested in becoming more involved in the region for economic modernization
2
and nuclear security reasons. It advocates multilateral security institutions, and it seeks to
position itself to benefit from a future Korean unification.
The next section briefly describes several cultural perspectives on Russia’s
relations in the East Asian region. Section 3 offers a more detailed analysis of Russia’s
perceived foreign policy interests and objectives in the areas of security, economic
development, and political relations. The concluding part of the paper reviews the current
record of Russia-Asia relations and reflects on their future. Taking a mid-term
perspective, I explore some of the opportunities and constraints for strengthening
Russia’s influence in the region.
II. CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON RUSSIA’S ROLE IN ASIA
The years following the Soviet disintegration have stimulated a resurgence of
geopolitical thinking in Russia. With respect to Asia, several cultural perspectives have
emerged in the attempt to determine Russia’s role and grand strategy in the region.
One school of foreign policy thinking warns against an excessively Eurasian
concentration of Russian resources and argues for the country’s pro-Western, rather than
merely regional, orientation. This school can be referred to as Westernism because for
many years, politicians and intellectuals of this group have been challenging the wisdom
of Russia’s regional orientation and development of a special Asian strategy. To
Westernizers, Russia is essentially a European country that must associate itself primarily
3
with the Western world and its institutions. This school perceives the West as the only
viable and progressive civilization in the world, and it argues that only by incorporating
Western institutions and working together with Western countries will Russia be able to
adequately respond to various economic and political challenges in Asia. Westernizers
maintain that, if Russia must have any special role in Asia, it should be the role of setting
standards of liberal democracy, rather than stabilizing or unifying the essentially antiliberal region. Just as Westernizers are fearful of Islam,1 they want to maintain a
considerable cultural distance from the world of Asia. At best, Westernizers acknowledge
the need for Russia to develop bilateral relations with its regional neighbors, including
China and the Central Asian countries.2 But it is only in partnership with the West and its
multilateral institutions, the school maintains, that Russia will be able to address its
regional dilemmas.
The Westernist vision has important historical roots. The early Westernizers were
not liberal and, instead, sought to present Russia as a loyal member in the family of
European monarchies. A different group of Westernizers identified with the West of
constitutional freedoms and political equality. After the era of Great Reforms and Russia
shifting its relations from Germany to France and Britain under Alexander II, the czarist
government seemed more willing to embrace the new European values of
constitutionalism. Even Westernizers within the Soviet system saw Russia as not standing
too far apart from Europe by placing the emphasis on social-democratic ideas. For
1
In the aftermath of 9/11, some Russia’s Westernizers contrasted the Western “civilization” with a
cultural “barbarianism” and proposed that Russia make a decisive choice between “barbarians” and
“civilized nations.” See, for example, interview with an ideologist of the Union of Right Wing Forces
(Kara-Murza 2001).
2
For a more detailed presentation of this philosophy, see, for example, Trenin (2001).
4
instance, one of Gorbachev’s favorite lines of thinking was that Soviet Union had to
“purify” itself of Stalinist “distortions” and become a democratic, or “human,” version of
socialism (gumannyi sotsializm). More recently, Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yelstin’s
vision of “integration” and “strategic partnership with the West” assumed that Russia
would develop liberal democratic institutions and build a market economy after the
manner of the West.
A principally different perspective advocates a vision of Russia as a culturally
Asian and anti-Western power. Asianists, or Eurasianists, view Russia as a land-based
civilization with strong ties in Asia, and the Muslim world. They seek to rebuild Russia’s
historical identity by emphasizing the notion of great power (derzhava) and distinctive
cultural values, such as religion, strong state, and collectivist economy.3 The intellectual
roots are in Russia’s traditionalist philosophy that has always seen Russian values as
principally different from—and often superior to—those of the Western civilization. This
philosophy dates back to the dictum “Moscow is the Third Rome” adopted under Ivan the
Terrible. In the nineteen century, traditionalists defended the notion of Slavic unity, and
their ideology of Pan-Slavism affected some of the czar’s foreign policy decisions. AntiEuropean attitudes were also shared by the late Slavophiles, such as Nikolai Danilevski
and Konstantin Leontyev, as well as by classical Eurasianism of the 1920s. Within the
USSR, socialist traditionalists challenged the West by promoting their own idea of the
new civilization. Thus, the Lenin-Trotski doctrine of world revolution was predicated on
the notion of Soviet civilizational superiority relative to the “decadent” and “rotten”
3
The literature of Eurasianism is growing. For some key statements, see Panarin, 1998; Zyuganov,
1999; Dugin, 2002.
5
Western capitalist civilization. In the post-Soviet era, Russia’s second foreign minister
Yevgeni Primakov thought of his nation as a part of the “Eurasian,” rather than
European, continent. His cultural priorities included restoration of Russia’s great power
status and dominance in the former Soviet region, more restrained relations with the
West, and strengthening of ties with Asia and the Muslim world.
Westernist and Eurasianist perspectives represent opposite poles of Russia’s
civilizational identification and therefore inadequately describe Russia’s cultural role in
Asia. While Westernizers have a tendency to be negationist toward Russia’s relations
with Asia, Eurasianists are prone to exaggerated sense of pride and isolationism from the
West. The Westernist vision uncritically reproduces maxims of a Francis Fukuyamainspired vision of world politics, according to which the culturally pluralistic history has
ended under the dominance of Western standards of liberal democracy. Eurasianists, on
the other hand, tend to agree with a leading Western critic of Fukuyama and the author of
the “clash of civilizations” thesis, Samuel Huntington. Following an old line of thinking
about Russia as an essentially anti-European culture, Eurasianists go too far in denying
Russia’s European roots and relations.4 In a rapidly changing world of globalization,
these cultural perspectives cannot serve as reliable guides for Russia’s future
international policies. It is not surprising that Kozyrev’s and Primakov’s foreign policy
courses, inspired by each of these two perspectives, respectively, have brought few
dividends to Russia. While Kozyrev’s diplomacy sought to maintain distance from China
4
For a detailed exploration of Russia’s perception of the two American ideas, see Tsygankov,
2004.
6
and isolate North Korea, Primakov attempted to build a security alliance with China and
India against the United States.
Russia’s contemporary perspective on Asia is more sophisticated. Rather than
emphasizing either one or the other cultural poles, Russia has been developing a
culturally dialogical and non-essentialist perspective, which synthesizes from both of the
above-mentioned traditions. For instance, the philosopher Aleksandr Panarin pioneered
the idea of Civilized Eurasianism, which too was respectful of democracy and human
rights, but saw Eurasianism as Russia’s cultural and geopolitical distinctiveness.5
President Vladimir Putin’s advisor Gleb Pavlovski (2004a, b) coined another term —
“Euro-East” (Yevrovostok) which seeks to position Russia as culturally European, yet
poised to preserve a special influence in Asia and former Soviet region. In their own way,
“Civilized Eurasianism,” “Euro-East,” and other similar visions each seek to connect
with both Western and Asian cultural values, while preserving a historically special
national identity of Russia. In practical terms, this cultural perspective translates into
flexible and issue-specific security arrangements with both Western and Asian nations as
participants, as well mutually as advantageous economic projects.
III. RUSSIA’S INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN EAST ASIA
To understand Russia’s interests in East Asia, one must take into consideration
both ideas and material power dimensions of the nation’s foreign policy. Moscow’s
See, for example, Panarin, 1994, 1995. After 1996, Panarin’s views became closer to radical
Eurasianists and Traditionalists. See especially, Panarin, 2000, 2001.
5
7
contemporary conceptualization of its interests and objectives is informed by the latest
intellectual efforts to present Russia as transcending both Western and Asian influences.
As far as power capabilities are concerned, Russia is recovering from the economic
depression of the 1990s and rebuilding its status as a world player. While this process
may take a generation, Russia has turned an important corner and is actively engaging the
world in all geographical directions. Increasingly, its behavior demonstrates a forwardlooking vision and a good grasp of new international opportunities. After years of
searching, Russia has found firm ground from which to proceed—a successful economic
modernization. New realities of rising energy prices, a recovering economy, pragmatic
leadership, and a relative weakening of major threats from outside create favorable
conditions for Russia’s advanced engagement with Asia and the world.
Having resisted the eastern enlargement of NATO without much success during
the 1990s, Russia has found a positive national idea. In early 2000, President Vladimir
Putin warned of the danger of Russia turning into a third-world country and insisted on
priorities of national economic recovery and secure borders. He argued that “it would
take us fifteen years and an eight percent annual growth of our GDP to reach the per
capita GDP level of present-day Portugal” (Putin, 1999), the EU’s poorest member.
Putin’s policy was not unlike that of Prince Alexander Gorchakov’s concentration after
Russia’s defeat in the Crimean war in 1856. Gorchakov too was brutally honest in his
characterization of Russia as a weakened nation, or a “great, powerless country.”
8
Today, however, Russia is no longer “powerless,” and it has moved from a
primitive accumulation of capital to the stage of generating a stable flow of investments
in the economy. Internally, it is now in a position to develop more comprehensive social
policies and address its status as a “third-world” country. Externally, it is turning its
forward-looking vision and growing resources into a more aggressive foreign policy.
Russia’s recent, much discussed effort to correct a heavily-distorted price structure for
energy in relations with Ukraine and other nations is a projection of confidence, not fear
or revenge. The reduction of subsidies, particularly for those who chose to orient their
policies away from Russia, is the rational response of a growing and energy-rich nation in
a world of skyrocketing energy prices. The key priority here is still internal
modernization, but in a context of considerably enlarged international opportunities.
These realities and imperatives of internal development prompted President Putin to
formulate Russia’s objectives in the following way:
“The main aim of our policies is not to achieve favorable external conditions for
the development of Russia…. We will form a multi-vector foreign policy, we will
work with the United States, with the European Union, and with other countries
of Europe. We will work with our Asian partners, with China, with India, and
countries of Asia-Pacific region.”6
Russia’s foreign policy interests in the world include greater involvement in solving vital
security issues, improvement of conditions for domestic economic modernization, and
Putin, as cited in Kerr, 2005: 416. For an additional analysis of Putin’s foreign policy vision, see
Tsygankov, 2005.
6
9
preservation of political stability. In East Asia, such structure of interests suggests at least
four foreign policy objectives (see Table 1 for a summary).
First, Russia is interested in increasing its role in solving vital security issues in
East Asia. For years, Russia’s officials have argued for the development of a multilateral
security framework in the region and outside. In the post-Soviet era, Russia opposed
NATO’s military intervention in Yugoslavia and America’s war in Iraq as lacking
support of the United Nations. The Kremlin does not believe in solving security problems
in unilateral fashion, insisting that they can only be solved successfully through
systematic coordination of state efforts, and not through use of force by ad hoc coalitions.
For instance, it has developed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with China
and four Central Asian states, for addressing threats from terrorism and the security
vacuum in the area. In East Asia, Moscow has advocated multilateral solutions to the
nuclear crisis with North Korea, and contributed considerably to creating the 6-party
format for dealing with the crisis.
Table 1. Russia’s Interests and Objectives in East Asia
Institutional participation

Security multilateralism
Economic modernization

Weapons sales and energy deals
Nuclear security

Non-nuclear North Korea
Political stability

Orderly changes / Korean unification
10
Second, Russia’s key priority remains economic modernization, and that requires
determination to win markets in arms and energy. Moscow was interested in selling its
arms in the West as well, but many Western forces were dismissive of Russian products
as inferior. China and India, on the other hand, have emerged as Russia’s largest buyers.
These are commercially-driven objectives, and Asia buys more than 90 percent of
Russia's $5 billion annual arms exports (Lavelle, 2005). Characteristically, while
promoting weapons sales in Asia, at no point did Putin raise the issue of balancing the
United States or creating some new strategic “axis” to serve this purpose. Rather, he
views Russia and Asia as connected into an economically open region, in which Russia,
due to richness of natural resources, occupies an appropriately important role and reaps
considerable economic, as well as political, benefits.
The Russian foreign policy community had been debating the benefits of such
geoeconomic thinking for quite some time. For instance, in his Eurasian Strategy for
Russia, Sergei Rogov (1998, 2000) proposed that Russia focus on building the
“communicational bridge” linking its southern, western, and eastern peripheries through
the development of ground, air, and electronic transportation routes. Economically, the
project could, in the author’s view, shorten the length of networks of communication that
were linking Europe and East Asia twice, and this was to be mutually beneficial for all
participants involved. Although market-oriented, this vision meant to preserve Russia’s
leadership in the region and was broadly supported by various political movements, as
well as the regionally oriented private sector.
11
The third foreign policy interest is to enhance nuclear security in the region, and
that translates into Russia’s commitment to a non-nuclear status of North Korea. In case
of a nuclear explosion on the Peninsula, Russia will be confronted by the threat of a
radioactive cloud and an influx of refugees. Russia has revived much of its special
relations with the North, which had suffered greatly during the early years of Westernist
transformation under the leadership of Boris Yelstin and Andrei Kozyrev (Soh, 1995).
Close relationships with the North helped Russia to increase its participation in security
negotiations, and it was ultimately Pyongyang that demanded that Moscow join the sixparty format. Since 2000, Moscow has worked to develop its ties with North Korea, and
it has stayed engaged with Pyongyang during the nuclear crisis. For instance, Russia
offered the North electricity at the time when the DPRK demanded guarantees of reliable
energy sources (Blank, 2005).
Last but not least, it is critical for Russia that the region remain politically stable
and that changes, such as reunification of the two Koreas, are orderly and not
destabilizing in nature.7 On several occasions, Putin extended his support for unification
of the two Koreas if it takes place in orderly fashion and on the basis of inter-Korean
dialogue. Russian analysts consider a unified Korea a potential strategic partner provided
that the shape of unification is not overly determined by the United States. In the words
of Chairman of State Duma International Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev, such
an independent and strong Korea “would balance Chinese and Japanese aspirations in the
7
In August 2003, Russia conducted massive military exercises in the Far East to rehearse actions
for accepting up to 100,000 North Korean refugees in case of a US-North Korea military confrontation
(Joo, 2006: 23).
12
area of Russia beyond the Urals.”8 For these reasons, Russia insists on preserving special
and even-handed relations with both Koreas. Although Moscow has restored much of its
old ties with Pyongyang, this has in no way impeded the relationship with Seoul. For
instance, Russia worked particularly closely with Seoul and Beijing in resolving the
nuclear stalemate, and it was ultimately a similar Russia-South Korea-China position on a
denuclearizing North Korea that helped to negotiate a settlement. Moscow also sought to
increase mutual investment and bilateral trade, and in November 2005, Russia’s Minister
of Economics and Development, German Gref, even proclaimed, "We now perceive
South Korea as our strategic partner in the region and political relations between our
countries are very favorable" (Blank, 2005).
IV. CURRENT RECORD AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
After the years of political and economic turmoil, Russia’s relations in East Asia
are beginning to pick up. Relative to those years, the current record of these relations is
encouraging.
While in a position of weakness, Russia has successfully entered several
multilateral security arrangements in the region. In addition to the already-mentioned
SCO with China and several Central Asian nations, Moscow has succeeded in becoming
a member of the 6-party talks, which has a potential of greater institutionalization over
time. Considering that the USSR was hardly recognized as a member of the North-East
Asian region and that Russia has promoted the idea of security multilateralism for many
8
As cited in Joo, 2006: 5.
13
years, the 6-party talks are a major accomplishment for Moscow. After the U.S. had
designated North Korea as part of the “axis-of-evil” in President Bush’s speech in
January 2002, it was particularly challenging on the part of Russia, China, and South
Korea to institutionalize the arrangement.9 Needless to say, the arrangement has been a
critical contribution to the area of nuclear security in the region. For instance, in February
2007, agreement an was reached according to which North Korea would stop production
of plutonium and begin closing down its nuclear program in exchange for $300 million in
energy supplies. Russia believed the deal became possible due to prominent role played
by China and the U.S. reversing its previously hard-line position.10
In the area of economic modernization, Russia has closely cooperated with India,
China, and other East Asian nations. Although its energy markets are primarily in Europe
and accounted for about 50% of foreign trade, Russia has aggressively moved to position
itself as an energy pipeline hub connecting Asia, Europe, and North America. In the
South, one key idea had been to build the so-called North-South transport corridor that
would pave the way for goods from India and the Arabian Peninsula through Iran and the
Caspian region to Russia and Europe, and vice versa.11 Russia has also made clear its
plans to capitalize on Siberian rich oil reserves by building pipelines to the neighboring
countries. During his recent visit to China, President Putin confirmed Russia’s
determination to build additional energy pipelines with Asian nations. Two of them will
connect Russia and China and—through China—South Korea. An additional project
9
For interests and positions of Japan, South Korea, and China, see Cho, 2006.
“Russian Expert: US Awareness of Mistakes Made Led To Success in N Korea Talks,” Interfax,
February 13, 2007.
11
RFE/RL Newsline, February 28, 2002 <http://www.rferl.org>.
10
14
plans to connect East Siberia to Nakhodka and, from there, to Japan and the United
States. Trade with China has been growing at a rate of about 30% annually over the last
few years, and China is Russia’s single most important arms buyer. Trade turnover with
South Korea in 2004 amounted to $6.1 billion relative to $146 million with the North.
Moscow’s military sales to Seoul have also grown.12
Russia also remained committed to the objective of a non-nuclear Korean
Peninsula. Desire to stay engaged explains Moscow’s mute official reactions to North
Korea's nuclear test in September 2006. Most officials condemned it, yet they ruled out
the use of force and possible efforts to isolate North Korea by applying tough sanctions.
Putin stressed, "We need to move from talk of ultimatums and sanctions toward seeing
international law prevail in international matters."13 After much hesitation, Russia
supported U.N. resolution 1718 imposing sanctions on the Pyongyang regime, yet
Moscow clearly favored return to negotiations.
Finally, by remaining even handed in its relations with both Koreas and by
making clear its support for their orderly unification, Russia has contributed to preserving
balance between stability and change in the region. Its position on Taiwan and the
Kuriles can also be understood in terms of Russia’s perception and usage of this dynamic
stability framework. From Ukraine to the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has been a
conservative power that does not initiate changes, but supports them when they can no
12
13
Joo, 2006: 7.
As cited in: Blank 2006.
15
longer be avoided. It has therefore adopted a pro-Chinese view on Taiwan, and it has
defended the status quo on the issue of Kuriles with Japan.
Russia’s relative success can be attributed to three main reasons: its commitment
to a dialogical cultural perspective, growing economic opportunities, and domestic
political stabilization. A dialogical and non-essentialist perspective on global East Asia
has served Russia well and should continue to inform its foreign policy in the region. In
an increasingly globalized world, pursuing mutually advantageous economic and security
projects with both East and West is a far more appropriate strategy than seeking
economic blocs or firm security commitments (alliances). The Kremlin seems to
understand that today, a greater engagement in Asia cannot be achieved without a greater
engagement in Europe / The West, and vice versa. Opportunities from exploiting growing
demands for energy and the relative recovery of the economy after the August 1998
financial collapse too have been extremely helpful in facilitating Russia’s engagement
with global East Asia. Last but not least, dynamic leadership is important. The Kremlin
has revived the state’s role in foreign policy and made the best of the favorable global
conditions.
Russia stands to gain further from its involvement in the East Asian region partly
because the nation is still in a process of domestic recovery and partly because of
continued external economic opportunities. Increasingly, the world around Russia is
competing for its energy resources and access to its markets, which provides Russia with
an improved environment in which to advance its economic and security interests. China-
16
Japanese competition for East Siberian energy pipelines is but one example of how
Russia can benefit. Beijing initially wanted the right to bring in tens of thousands of
Chinese workers to build the pipeline from Irkutsk. China also wanted control over oil
and gas, but offered to pay Russia only as much as Moscow sold gas for domestically. In
this case, Russia opted for the Japanese Nakhodka route, but with an extension to China.
For China, as one scholar noted, this setback is “unlikely to alter the long-term prospects
for energy cooperation.”14 China and India, are also attempting to buy stakes in Russia’s
energy companies.
It is therefore logical for Russia to strive to gain membership in the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum. Although it accounts for about 1% in trade with the
organization’s members, it is in a position to contribute greatly to their economic growth.
Major modernizing nations facing the greatest shortages in energy supply are located in
East Asia, and that makes the region especially important to Russia. Their demands for
energy are only going to grow, and because of Russia’s resources and willingness to
aggressively export them to Asia, it has reasons to argue for its status as a Pacific
power.15 With half the world's population and a fifth of global trade, East Asia lends itself
to Russia’s legitimate interest in becoming an important player in the region. Energy
Minister Viktor Khristenko estimated that by 2020, 30% of the country's oil exports
would go to Asia, compared with the current 3%.16
14
Kerr, 2005: 417. For developments in Russia-China relations, see Lo, 2004.
For Russia as a Pacific power, see Shkuropat, 2002.
16
As quoted in: Lavelle, 2006.
15
17
All said, of course, none of this means that Russia faces no constraints on
advancing its greater influence in the region. One such constraint has to do with
progressive power differentials. As Russia continues to supply China with energy and
weapons and China continues to grow at a considerably higher rate than its northern
neighbor, the risk of Moscow becoming a junior partner in a Beijing-led coalition
increases. Given Russia’s expressed interests in Korea’s unification and China’s
preferences for the status quo,17 that might present a serious problem for the Kremlin. A
way out of this “relative gains” dilemma is not to reduce bilateral interactions, as
neorealist scholars might argue,18 but rather to continue strengthening multilateral
security institutions in the region. In addition, it is important to be versatile in developing
economic relations. Strengthening relations with the United States is one option, and
Russia has been working to supply up to 10-15% of US energy needs through oil and
liquid natural gas exports (Kuchins, 2005).
Putin’s plan for trilateral cooperation between Russia, South Korea, and North
Korea is another promising avenue in this regard. Assuming reduction of nuclear
tensions, Russia is interested in three developments: the link of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad to the Trans-Korean Railroad (the so-called “iron silk road”), the East Siberian
gas pipeline from Irkutsk’s gas-condensate field, and supply of electricity from the
Russian Far East.19 All three projects potentially tie the three nations together, thereby
diversifying Russia’s ties in the region and preparing the ground for a smoother future
unification of Korea. Developing these projects will remain a major challenge, given the
On China’s position, see Kerr, 2005 and Cho, 2006: 18-24.
On relative gains and the neorealist-neoliberal debate, see Baldwin, 1993.
19
For details, see Joo, 2006: 19-21.
17
18
18
status quo position favored by China and occasional ambiguities on the part of South
Korea.20 Yet, it is only through development of multiple ties in the region with all the
sides involved—China, South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and Japan—that
Russia stands a chance to reap economic and security benefits.
20
In November 2005, for example, South Korean President Roh refused to sign the pipeline deal
that would deliver gas from southeast Siberia to South Korea along a route that would cross Chinese
territory and run under the Yellow Sea. The main reason has to do with Russia’s proposal that the pipeline
would transit North Korea, rather than go independently to South Korea (Yasmann, 2005).
19
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