TOKEN STATES
Guy Longworth1
Warwick University, February 2009
1. Introduction. According to James Higginbotham, ‘There is no doubt that
reference to events and states is a pervasive feature of human thought and
language.’2 But Higginbotham’s claim might appear to be falsified by the
doubt Helen Steward expresses in the following passage:
There are certainly facts about pain which relate to particular people
and which we could refer to by means of gerundive nominals—e.g., my
being in pain—and there are individual pains, like headaches and
toothaches, and there is the phenomenon of pain in general. But why
should we add to all these a further mysterious class of entities: token
pain states? No natural-language category refers to them, no
philosophical purpose is served by introducing them. My claim is that,
in view of these facts, we should say that there simply are no such
things.3
In fact, Higginbotham’s claim is compatible with the existence of Steward’s
doubt. Steward makes clear, in her ubiquitous talk of states, that she does not
deny that—in a suitably broad sense of ‘reference’—reference to states is a
(pervasive) feature of human thought and language. What she denies is that
reference is made to what she calls token states. And here she is in
disagreement with another of Higginbotham’s claims, one for which he, and
others, have presented argument: the claim that states play a role in natural
language semantics analogous to that played by token events.4 And Steward
is joined in doubting that token states play such a role by, amongst other
philosophers, Jennifer Hornsby and, perhaps, Timothy Williamson.5
1
My thanks to Tom Crowther, Jennifer Hornsby, Keith Hossack, Fraser MacBride, Christian
Nimtz, David Papineau, Richard Samuels, Gabriel Segal, Mark Textor, Charles Travis for
very helpful discussion. An early version was presented at the University of East Anglia.
Thanks to that audience, and especially to Nadine Cipa, John Collins, and Peter SheldonGreen, for comments on that occasion.
2 Higginbotham (2000: 49).
3 Steward (1997: 129).
4 Higginbotham (1985), (2000: especially 54–56); Larson and Segal (1995), 496-505;
Parsons (1987/88), (1990: 186–286); Pietroski (2005); Bennett (1988). Steward argues for
such a role for token events (1997: 19–74).
5 Hornsby (1997: 19–20, 134–35, 151, 176, 242n8), Williamson (2000: 40). See also Galton
(1984); Katz (2000); Pianesi and Varzi (2000); Maienborn (2005). For discussion of some of
this work, focussing especially on Maienborm, see the issue of Theoretical Linguistics in
which her article appears.
1
At an abstract level, we can characterise the locus of disagreement as
follows. Consider sentences involving stative predication, for example (1),
and nominalizations of such predications, for example (2):6
(1)
(2)
Kim is happy.
Kim’s happiness…
For each sentence like (1), we might propose either of the following semantic
treatments where ‘EQ’ is one or another type of existential quantifier,
restricted or sorted so as to quantify over states:
(3)
(4)
happy (Kim).
EQV [subject(V, Kim) & happy(V)].
Nominalizations like (2) will then be open analogues of (4), with a definite
quantifier—i.e., a quantifier requiring exhaustion of the nominal—in place of
EQ, as in (5):
(5)
DEF/EQV[subject(V, Kim) & happy(V) & …
Now ‘EQ’ (and ‘DEF/EQ’) might be taken either to quantify properties or to
quantify what only has properties (so isn’t ‘had’)—e.g., particulars.7 The
former option threatens to make (3) and (4) equivalent. The latter leads to
further options. For if we take ‘EQ’ to quantify what only has properties, then
it might quantify plurally or non-plurally, and it might quantify count-wise
or mass-wise.8 A sufficient condition for a semantic analysis to invoke token
states will be that it takes (4) as a model for the treatment of stative
predication and takes ‘EQ’ to quantify tokens, so definitely excluding
properties and definitely including, amongst what only has properties, plural
and non-plural countables.
Necessary conditions are more delicate to specify. Steward appears to
argue that ‘EQ’ cannot quantify tokens since it quantifies mass-wise rather
than count-wise.9 But she also appears to hold that the existence of an
appropriately related type suffices for tokenhood.10 And types of what only
6
I explain the distinction between stative, processive, and eventive predication in the next
section. For the present, (1) may be taken as a paradigm of stative predication.
7 Although I shall write as if there were a single principled distinction between properties
and what only has properties, all that is required for present purposes is that within a
formalisation such a distinction may be imposed. So for present purposes, I needn’t take
issue with MacBride’s scepticism about the discernibility of a single quite general distinction
between properties and what only has properties. See his (2005).
8
Of course, if mass and plural quantification come to the same thing, that will reduce the
options. For discussion, see Chierchia (1998), Borer (2005).
9 Steward (1997: 110–134). I discuss some reasons for thinking ‘EQ’ to be a mass quantifier
below.
10 Steward (1997: 120–134). Steward elsewhere imposes another requirement on
tokenhood—her ‘secret life requirement’, which an entity meets if and only if ‘it is
2
has properties—including masses—are cheap. They are derivable via a
seemingly productive formal operation—perhaps intensional abstraction
over an open position, as in (6):
(6a)
(6b)
X
V
gold(X, V)
happy(x, V).
I propose to take the locus of dispute over token states to turn on the
question whether ‘EQ’ quantifies over what only has properties, for the most
part ignoring distinctions amongst those. I shall return briefly to this issue
below. So for purposes of this paper, the dispute concerns the question
whether a generalisation of (4), with ‘EQ’ an existential quantifier over what
only has properties, supplies the proper treatment of (at least some) stative
predications, with Higginbotham et. al. affirming, and Steward et. al. denying,
that it does. I shall refer to the affirmation as the State Hypothesis.
Before expounding the case in favour of the State Hypothesis, I note a
complication. Compare the nominalization in (2), repeated here, with the
gerundive in (7):
(2)
(7)
Kim’s happiness…
Kim’s being happy…
As has often been pointed out, there are numerous distinctions between these
two constructions.11 For instance, one can admire Kim’s happiness, but not
her being happy. Crudely, (2) appears to make reference to some sort of
token, or particular, while (7) appears to make reference to something more
like a fact, or state-of-affairs.12 Without wishing to prejudge their semantical
intelligible to suppose’ that one might understand two expressions which make genuine
reference to the entity, and yet be ignorant as to their co-reference (1997: 32). It is unclear to
me how the issues about quantification bear on whether states meet the latter requirement.
Plausibly, the requirement is supposed to foreclose on the claim that tropes—property
instances—should count as tokens. I discuss Steward’s views on tropes further below.
11
See, e.g., Woltersdorff (1970). For recent discussion, see Moltmann (forthcoming).
12
Steward commits to treating gerundive nominalisations as making reference to facts (1997:
112–115, 129). If facts are viewed as true propositions, that treatment is subject to a number
of difficulties. For example, gerundives sit unhappily with ascriptions of truth-value, as in
(i), and cannot serve as complements to psychological verbs, as in (ii).
(i)
??Kim’s being happy is true.
(ii)
??Jo believes/remembers/knows Kim’s being happy.
Even if facts are distinguished from true propositions, the view may be questioned. One
ground for concern is that not every occurrence of a gerundive is factive. Thus, for instance,
(iii) might be true, while (iv) appears contradictory:
(iii)
We prevented Kim’s being sad by giving her cigarettes.
(iv)
We prevented the fact that Kim is sad by giving her cigarettes.
A second ground for concern is that we appear to speak of knowing facts, as in (v), but not,
as noted above, of knowing states of affairs.
(v)
Jo knows the fact that Kim is happy.
For solid discussion see Zucchi (1993: 69–71, 207–15, 218).
3
differences, or the basis for those differences, let us label (2) a stative
nominalization and (7) a state-of-affairs nominalization. The complication is that,
while I’ve characterised the dispute over token states as concerning stative
predications and their nominalizations as in (2), Steward often characterizes
her target in terms of state-of-affairs nominalizations.13 Moreover, she
appears to allow that constructions like (2) can make reference to a sort of
token, namely a trope or property instance.14 It might seem, then, that my
characterization of the dispute means that Steward is not really a participant.
In fact, however, Steward’s major target is the claim that stative
constructions, like (1), are to be given the same treatment as eventive
constructions, like (8).
(8)
Kim smoked a cigarette.
And she argues that the latter involve quantification over tokens in the sense
specified above and not over tropes. Dispute can be reinstated, then, at two
points. First, Steward is committed to the claim that the analogue for the
eventive nominalization in (9) is the state-of-affairs nominalization in (10),
rather than the stative nominalization in (11).
(9)
(10)
(11)
Kim’s smoking a cigarette…
Kim’s being happy…
Kim’s happiness…
The defender of the State Hypothesis is committed to denying Steward’s first
claim. As we shall see, the denial is underwritten by provision, and defence,
of a unified treatment of (9) and (11). Steward’s first claim appears to be
driven by her believing, first, that (11) makes reference to a trope and,
second, that (9) makes reference, not to a trope—something that is a property
instance—but rather to something that—in my terms—only has properties.15
Given those beliefs, (11) couldn’t be the required analogue of (9), forcing
consideration of the next most plausible candidate, (10). A second source of
dispute, then, concerns the fundamental claim made by the defender of the
State Hypothesis, namely that (9) and (11) should be given analogous logicosemantical treatment. The defender of the Hypothesis will therefore disagree
13
Steward (1997: 96, 107–9, 111–114, 118–9, 129).
Steward (1997: 41–3, 45–52, 54–5, 137n.).
15
It appears to be a widespread assumption in the literature on tropes that they—property
instances—are what stative nominalisations make reference to. This has lead to some
questionable terminological decisions. For instance, Moltmann (forthcoming), in an
otherwise insightful discussion, calls stative nominalisations ‘trope nominalizations’,
reserving ‘state nominalization’ for state-of-affairs nominalisations. In my view, ‘trope’ is
more appropriately used as a label for property-instances, if such exist. First, that is the
standard usage in the metaphysics literature (although much of the literature, as noted,
assumes that state nominalisations provide a means of making reference to them). Second,
that usage is less misleading as to the status of the hypothesis that state nominalisations
make reference to tropes.
14
4
with Steward in taking arguments against a tropist treatment of (9) as, inter
alia, arguments against a tropist treatment of (11), and vice versa.16
The remainder constitutes a defence of the State Hypothesis. I shall
begin by expounding some elementary observations that have been offered in
favour of generalising the token-quantificational treatment of predication
from eventive to stative predication. Although this will involve a brief
rehearsal of parts of the case in favour of token events, I shall be assuming
that case to have been made.17 I shall also be allowing that the proper
treatment of token events is whatever it is, compatibly with its invoking
tokens. Hence, I will be neutral over the question whether token events are
tropes.18 The question I wish to address here concerns the generalisation, not
the precise nature of its eventive basis. As should be expected, given the
differences between eventive and stative predication, not every observation
carries over from one case to the other. But in light of its potential for
underwriting a fully unified treatment of predication, the case in favour of
token states is compelling.19 However, at least one failure of generalisation is
ostensibly problematic for the unified treatment of predication. On the basis
solely of its quantificational form, the unified treatment appears to be
encumbered with a prediction that fails to square with reflective judgement.
An important aim in what follows is to defend the State Hypothesis in the
face of the apparent failure.
2. Token Events and States. In this section, I shall begin by marking some
basic aspectual distinctions amongst types of predication. Then I shall detail
some of the evidence that has been marshalled in favour of appeal to token
16
It may be that Steward would prefer to restrict her attack to the view that state-of-affairs
nominalisations make reference to tokens. For three reasons, I think that that would be
unfortunate. First, it would undercut her characterisation of her target through appeal to
aspectual distinctions amongst predications. Second, it would mean that many of her
arguments were inappropriate for their proper target, for instance those turning on ‘EQ’
being some sort of mass-quantifier. Third, it would severely reduce the significance of her
conclusion. The claim that no stative predication—so, much commonsense psychological
discourse—fails to make reference to tokens would, if true, disturb large tracts of theorising.
By contrast, the claim that state-of-affairs nominalization makes no reference to tokens
would, at best, force some reformulation.
17
For extensive discussion, see Davidson (1980); Higginbotham (1983, 1985, 1987, 2000);
Landman (2000); Parsons (1990), Larson and Segal (1995); Schein (1993), Pietroski (2005).
18 For some discussion, see Bennett (1988), (1991), and Parsons (1991). I cannot afford to be
wholly neutral on this matter, since not every trope theorist allows that tropes are what only
have properties. Those who do not will invoke a relation of having between a trope and a
non-trope subject—so that, for instance, Kim has a trope (of) happiness. Having may be a
notational variant of the thematic relation—roughly, participation in—between a subject and
a token state or event. If it is, then the trope theory may, for present purposes, be treated as a
notational variant of the token event/state theory. (For other purposes, for example in
understanding meta-linguistic predications of properties to events or states, space may open
between the theories.) If it is not, then there may be a genuine conflict between the token
event/state theorist and the trope theorist. But that conflict is best joined over the more solid
ground afforded by reflection upon eventive predication.
19
For detailed discussion, see Pietroski (2005).
5
events in the semantics of a certain range of those predications, the eventives.
Then I shall indicate how related arguments have been used in an attempt to
motivate the State Hypothesis generalisation to non-eventive predications.
The purpose is to motivate and explain the generalisation and its
commitment to token states.
2.1. States, Events, and Processes. Numerous aspectual distinctions between
types of predicate have been proposed.20 For present purposes, we require
only a tripartite classification of predicates into eventives, processives, and
statives.21 One major distinction is between those predicates that accept
temporal modification by ‘in  time’ and resist modification by ‘for  time’—
eventive predicates—and those that exhibit the converse pattern—stative and
processive predicates. Thus, the VPs in (12a) and (12b) fall within the range of
eventive predicates, while those in (12c) and (12d) fall without.
(12a) Kim finished the cigarette in a few minutes/*for a few minutes.
(12b) Kim smoked the cigarette in a few minutes/*for a few
minutes.22
(12c) Kim smoked for a few minutes/*in a few minutes.
(12d) Kim was a smoker for a few months/*in a few months.23
(12c) involves an example of a processive predication. (12d) involves an
example of stative predication.
The first distinction tracks a second. Eventive predications are telic, in
that each has a semantically specified telos, a required upshot, outcome, or
eventuality. Thus, the lexically specified upshot of ‘smoked a cigarette’ is that
a cigarette be, or become, smoked. Processive and stative predications are, by
contrast, atelic. With a little simplification, we can see the temporal
modification, ‘in  time’ as measuring an event from instigation to
The following classification of predications, and many of the behavioural differences on
which it is based, can be found in Aristotle, Metaphysics , 1048b: 18–36. Seminal
discussion may be found in Kenny (1963) and Vendler (1967). See Graham (1980) for
discussion of Aristotle’s classifications. For detailed references to the role of these and other
features in linguistics and philosophy up to 1978, see Mourelatos (1979). For more recent
references, see Rothstein (2004). For an excellent annotated bibliography to 1997, see Casati
and Varzi (1997). I should mention here the debate over the locus of classification. Some
theorists, following Mourelatos amongst others, take the locus of classification to be the
whole predication; others hold that the locus is lexical components of the predication. The
difference will not matter at the level of generality required here. For recent discussion, see
Higginbotham (2000); Krifka (1998); Rothstein (2004).
21
Ultimately, eventives should be further distinguished into accomplishments and
achievements. But that distinction will not play a major role in what follows.
22 (7a) and (7b) have irrelevant readings for which ‘for a few minutes’ is appropriate, roughly
‘Kim was in the process of finishing/smoking…’. On those readings, the VPs would fall
outside the relevant range.
23 (7d) has an irrelevant ‘in a few months’ reading on which Kim became a smoker a few
months after some contextually supplied time—perhaps, e.g., her first exposure to cigarettes.
20
6
completion and, hence, as requiring an outcome to have been specified.24
Manfred Krifka has proposed the following as a sufficient condition
for telicity:
If V satisfies ‘VP’, then all parts of V that satisfy ‘VP’ must have the
same starting and stopping point as V.25
The point of the condition is that a telic VP specifies a particular outcome, so
that no event that ends sooner, and so lacks the specified outcome, can satisfy
the VP. For that reason, ‘starting and’ should be excised from Krifka’s
condition. As Susan Rothstein points out, this amendment allows that we can
classify ‘run to Paris’ as an eventive (telic) VP, in line with its pattern of
acceptable temporal modification. Parts of a run to Paris can satisfy ‘run to
Paris’ even if they start later, as long as they end at the same point. 26 Even
with that amendment, Krifka’s condition does not specify what it is in the
nature of telic predicates that underwrites their meeting it. On the
assumptions, first, that each distinct application of a telic predicate requires
exactly one achievement of its telos and, second, that each such achievement
occupies the same temporal stretch, the initial characterisation can supply the
required account. The characterisation of telic predicates in terms of lexically
specified upshot requirements is therefore more basic. Stative and processive
predications are atelic.
A third distinction, based upon the first two, can be seen by
considering what Alexander Mourelatos calls nominalization equivalents of
predications.27 Thus, (13a) seems to be equivalent to (13b), with the event
reference apparently made explicit in (13c):
(13a) Kim smoked a cigarette.
(13b) There was a smoking of a cigarette by Kim.
(13c) There was an event that was a smoking of a cigarette by Kim.
The apparent equivalence between (13a) and (13c) is a major reason why
these predications are classified as eventives, and are taken to refer to—or to
involve quantification over—events. Compare here the putative analogues of
(13) for processives—(14a)–(14c)—and statives—(15a)–(15c).
(14a) Kim smoked.
(14b) ??There was a smoking by Kim.
(14c) ??There was an event that was a smoking by Kim.28
24
For insightful discussion of event measurement, see Larson (2003).
Krifka (1998: 207), with inessential reformulation. Here, and in the remainder, I shall use
‘part’ as a placeholder for the appropriate inclusion relation amongst events, states, and
processes. I do not mean to commit to its appropriateness.
26 Rothstein (2004: 8).
27
Mourelatos (1979: 428). See also Steward (1997: 110–115).
28 The reading on which a telos is supplied by context is irrelevant.
25
7
(15a) Kim was a smoker.
(15b) ??There was a being a smoker by Kim.
(15c) ??There was an event that was a being a smoker by Kim.29
Although the relevant judgements are not perfectly transparent, many find
(14b, c) and (15b, c) unacceptable. On this basis, Mourelatos claims that
eventive predications are distinctive in allowing count quantification in their
nominalization equivalents. Compare here the (16a)/(16b) alternation with
those in (16c)–(16f), with ‘sm’ the unstressed mass existential:
(16a)
(16b)
(16c)
(16d)
(16e)
(16f)
There was at least one smoking of a cigarette by Kim.
?There was sm smoking of a cigarette by Kim.
?There was at least one smoking by Kim.
There was sm smoking by Kim.
??There was at least one being a smoker by Kim.
?There was sm being a smoker by Kim.30
On its more acceptable reading, (16b) appears to involve a processive
predication, hence to be compatible with Kim’s failing to complete her
smoking of the cigarette. Not just any mere quantity of a process aimed
towards the smoking of a cigarette satisfies the eventive VP ‘smoke a
cigarette’; to satisfy the latter VP, such a process would have to have a
cigarette’s becoming smoked as its outcome.31 Whether or not the
appropriate forms of quantification are reflected at the linguistic surface, we
can see this third feature as a natural upshot of telicity/atelicity alternation.
Thus, atelics are akin to mass nominals in being homogeneous, where a
predicate is homogeneous if and only if it is both divisive and cumulative:
The reading on which Kim is pretending to be a smoker is irrelevant.
Some theorists, especially Mourelatos and Steward, appear to view such mass-like
quantifications as straightforwardly acceptable and obviously derivable from their processive
and stative counterparts. It seems to me that the issue is less straightforward, but perhaps
their understanding of the mass-quantifications differs from mine. That said, the status of the
natural language formulations is strictly irrelevant. The crucial point is that the forms of
quantification appropriate at logical form appear to be dictated by atelicity, whether or not
those forms appear on the linguistic surface.
31 Of course, the requirements on the latter may be quite minimal—so, for example, not
requiring the cigarette to be smoked up. That wouldn’t show the predication to be atelic. At
most, it would make attainment of the telos a more or less trivial upshot of the process
leading to it. Compare Higginbotham’s discussion of mass teli, as in (i):
29
30
(i)
Kim ate sm apple.
Such cases are often thought to show that the telic/atelic distinction is not determined by the
head verb of the predicate, but only by the whole projection. See Krifka (2000). But as
Higginbotham indicates, the data are compatible with the view that ‘ate’ is, in this use,
uniformly telic, while any process that counts as eating (directed at sm apple) will thereby
count as eating sm apple, since sm—a small quantity of—apple must be consumed. See
Higginbotham (2000: 67).
8
(Divisiveness)
P is divisive iff V1[P(V1)  V2(P(V2) & V2  V1)]
& V1V2[P(V1) & P(V2) & V2  V1  P(V1  V2)].
(Cumulativity)
P is cumulative iff V1V2[P(V1) & P(V2)  P(V1 
V2)].32
(Where ‘’ is ‘part of’, ‘’ is ‘remainder’, and ‘’ is ‘sum’.) The analogy
between telics and ordinary count predicates is that both are satisfied only by
what has met the standard for being an individual of the relevant sort, either
a completed event or a complete object. By contrast, atelics—statives and
processives—seem to behave like mass predicates in being satisfied by stuffs.
The major difference between countables/masses and telics/atelics is that the
relevant notion of part-hood for the former is (crudely) spatial while for the
latter it is (crudely) temporal.
To the list of differences amongst predicates considered thus far, we
can add two especially distinctive features of stative predications. First,
statives differ from eventives and processives in their reaction to progressive
modification. Like some eventives, stative predications ordinarily do not
accept progressive modification at all—(17a, b). If they do accept
modification, they either take a reading equivalent to the normal stative
reading33—most natural in (17c, d)—or, where one is available, a processive
reading—a possibility with (17d):
(17a)
(17b)
(17c)
(17d)
*Kim is resembling Jo. (??=resembles Jo.)
*Kim is knowing Jo. (??=knows Jo.)
?Kim is desiring a cigarette. (=desires a cigarette.)
Kim is smoking. (=is a smoker/=is in the process of smoking.)
In neutralising progressive modification, statives differ from processives, as
in (18a), and from eventives, as in (18b) and (18c), all of which have, or are
induced
straightforwardly
by
the
progressive
to
have,
a
34
processive/progressive interpretation.
(18a) Kim is running.
(18b) Kim is smoking a cigarette.
(18c) Kim is finishing a cigarette.
Here I follow Borer’s (2005: 127) definitions, with inessential reformulation. For
alternatives, see e.g., Higginbotham (1994). The definition of divisiveness should be read
with the usual qualifications as to smallest parts.
33 This feature is emphasised by Kenny (1963).
34 I do not mean to suggest that the semantic treatment of the progressive forms is
straightforward; far from it. For some recent discussion, see Higginbotham (2004); GendlerSzabó (2004); Landman (1992).
32
9
Second, and more distinctively, stative predications differ from all other
predications in occurring naturally in the non-reportive simple present
without change of meaning:
(19a)
(19b)
(19c)
(19d)
Kim smokes.
Kim is happy.
Kim resembles Jo.
Kim knows Jo.
By contrast, (20a–20c) show the non-reportive simple present inducing
habitual readings of processive and eventive predication.
(20a) Kim smokes.
(20b) Kim smokes a cigarette.
(20c) Kim finishes smoking a cigarette.
The latter two features of stative predication appear to reside in what we
might think of as their lack of dynaminicity. Unlike processives or (some)
eventives, statives fail to characterise their satisfiers as having stages through
which the predicate is, or comes to be, applicable.35
The distinctions are summarised in the following table.36 For
completeness, the table includes an additional distinction between types of
event between achievements, as in (21), and accomplishments, as in (22).
(21)
(22)
Kim finished the cigarette.
Kim smoked the cigarette.
Telic
Dynamic
+
+
-
+
+
States
Events (achievements)
Events (accomplishments)
Processes
2.2. Token Events. The Event Hypothesis is that the behaviour of eventive
predications is best organised and explained as follows. The argument places
of eventive predicates are filled, not only by their superficial arguments, but
also by variables ranging over token events. Thus, consider (22):
(22)
Kim smoked a cigarette.
Here, ‘Kim’ and ‘a cigarette’ superficially appear as the subject and object
arguments, respectively, of the verb ‘smoked’. However, according to the
proposed account, the most basic application of the predicate ‘smoked’ is to
35
Here I follow Landman (1992).
36
Here I follow Rothstein (2004: 12) with inessential changes.
10
an existentially bound variable for events.37 The superficial arguments of the
verb—‘Kim’ and ‘a cigarette’—are then assigned subject and object status by
the verb through their relations to the variable. Thus, (22) is understood to
have the (simplified) form given in (23):38
(23)
e [subject(Kim, e) & smoke(e) & object(a cigarette, e)].
Ultimately, the motivation for the Event Hypothesis resides in its capacity to
underwrite detailed explanation of the behaviour of eventive predications.39
For present purposes, it will suffice to outline six elementary observations.
One observation in support of the hypothesis is supplied by its ability
to explain the relation between sentences that make explicit reference to
events and sentences involving eventive predication. Thus, we saw above
that (13a–c), repeated here, appear to be equivalent.
(13a) Kim smoked a cigarette.
(13b) There was a smoking of a cigarette by Kim.
(13c) There was an event that was a smoking of a cigarette by Kim.
A natural explanation of the apparent equivalences is that the explicit
quantification in (13b)/(13c) is reflected in our understanding of (13a).
Similarly, second, we can explain why event nominalizations, as in (24) seem
obviously to entail ordinary eventive predications, as in (25).
(24)
(25)
Kim’s smoking (of) a cigarette was quick.
Kim smoked a cigarette quickly.
This is easily explained on the assumption that the nominalization in (24)
involves a definite quantification over cigarette-smokings by Kim, while (25)
involves an existential over the same nominal.40
A third motivation for the Event Hypothesis derives from the
behaviour of small clause complements of perceptual verbs like ‘see’ or ‘feel’.
Thus, (26a) is not equivalent to (26b) or (26c).
(26a) Jo saw Kim smoke a cigarette.
(26b) Jo saw that Kim smoked/was smoking/had smoked a
cigarette.
(26c) Jo saw Kim while Kim smoked a cigarette/was smoking a
cigarette.
Existential binding of the event position is induced by the head of the minimal clausal
phrase that dominates the verbal complex—perhaps INFL or some other carrier of tense.
38
I assume that the quantification in (23) is restricted to events, but wish to remain neutral
over the mechanism of restriction. Perhaps, for example, the restriction is carried by a
predicate like Parsons’ ‘occurs’. See his (1990).
39
For more details, see Davidson (1980), Higginbotham (1983), (1985), (1989), (2000);
Parsons (1990); Schein (1993); Landman (2000); Larson and Segal (1995); Pietroski (2005).
40
See, for instance, Higginbotham (2000).
37
11
(26a) does not entail (26b), since Jo might have seen Kim smoke a cigarette
without realising—in whatever way is required for (26b)—that that is what
Kim was doing. (26b) does not entail (26a), since the latter, unlike the former,
requires that Jo saw Kim’s smoking, and did not merely come to know on the
basis of seeing that Kim’s smoking was afoot. (26a) does not entail (26c), since
(26c), unlike (26a), requires that Jo saw Kim. (26a) can be true when Jo has
merely seen Kim’s smoking, perhaps having seen only the glow of Kim’s
cigarette brighten through inhalation in an otherwise dark room. Finally,
(26c) does not entail (26a), since (26c), unlike (26a), can be true even though
Kim carefully concealed her smoking from Jo. The relevant distinctions can
be explained if (26a) has the structure given (in simplified form) in (27).
(27)
e1e2[subject(e1, Jo) & see(e1) & subject(e2, Kim) & smoke-a
cigarette(e2) & object (e1, e2)].41
A fourth observation that supports the hypothesis is supplied by
consideration of the availability of anaphoric reference apparently through an
event position. Thus, consider (28):
(28)
Kim smoked a cigarette. It worried her mother.
One understanding of ‘it’ here has it refer back to the fact expressed in ‘Kim
smoked a cigarette’; another, less obvious reading has it refer back to the
cigarette. But a third understanding allows that ‘it’ refers back to the event of
Kim’s smoking.42 On this reading, the fact that Kim smoked is not what
worries her mother. Rather, it is the particular event of her smoking. Perhaps,
for example, Kim’s smoking was punctuated by coughing. On the relevant
reading, (28) is broadly equivalent to an eventive reading of the
nominalization in (29):
(29)
Kim’s smoking (of) a cigarette worried her mother.
Although the fourth observation is closely connected to the third, they should
be distinguished. In particular, the fourth motivation depends on the
explanatorial role of reference to events, not only in psychological contexts,
as in (26a) and (28), but also more generally. Consider first (30a–30b).
(30a) Kim smoked a cigarette. It caused her mother to faint.
(30b) Kim’s smoking a cigarette caused her mother to faint.
The observation, and suggested treatment, may be found as early as Ramsey (1927). For
further discussion, see Higginbotham (1983), Vlach (1983), Parsons (1990).
42
The first appearance of the third and fourth observation that I am aware of is in Lees
(1960).
41
12
Here the relevant readings of the sentences in (30) are ones in which the
particular event of Kim’s smoking plays an essential role in the causal
explanation. Perhaps, for example, Kim smoked the cigarette with her ear,
and it was that feature of the event that explained her mother’s fainting. And
even the indirect appeal to parental psychology in (30) is inessential to the
point. The sentences in (31) each have readings on which the event of Kim’s
smoking—or specific but unmentioned features of the event—is crucial to the
explanation of the upshot.
(31a) Kim smoked a cigarette. It caused a fire.
(31b) Kim’s smoking a cigarette caused a fire.
Perhaps, for example, the fire was due to the careless way in which Kim
smoked, flicking ash amongst the dry brush.
The fifth and sixth observations concern a characteristic pattern of
entailment and entailment failure revealed by sentences involving eventive
predications, especially as modified by adverb and preposition phrases. In
effect, these patterns reflect what was revealed in the fourth observation, that
eventive predications do not exhaustively specify the properties of their
semantic values. Rather, they involve reference to particulars, or tokens, with
whatever properties those particulars, or tokens, have. Fifth, then, an
explanation is wanted for why (32a) obviously entails each of (32b)–(32h):
(32a) Kim smoked a cigarette nonchalantly with a cigarette holder in
the kitchen.
(32b) Kim smoked a cigarette nonchalantly in the kitchen.
(32c) Kim smoked a cigarette in the kitchen with a cigarette holder.
(32d) Kim smoked a cigarette with a cigarette holder in the kitchen.
(32e) Kim smoked a cigarette nonchalantly.
(32f) Kim smoked a cigarette in the kitchen.
(32g) Kim smoked a cigarette with a cigarette holder.
(32h) Kim smoked a cigarette.
It might be possible to explain the acceptability of these inferences by appeal
to the meaning of a simple predicate: ‘smoked a cigarette nonchalantly with a
cigarette holder in the kitchen’, or the interactions of various type-shifting
operations through which the complex predicate may be composed and
decomposed. But it is not clear that such an account would really explain the
obviousness of the inferences, or the fact that none appears more obvious than
do the others. Moreover, there is no clear upper limit to the number of
available modifications that we can immediately recognise as carrying the
same load of entailments. And, as Fred Landman argues, type-shifting
accounts face special difficulties in accounting for permutation inferences—
for instance, between (32c) and (32d).43 By contrast, a straightforward
explanation can be provided if we take (32a) to be understood as in (33):
43
Landman (2000: ch. 1).
13
(33)
e [subject (e, Kim) & smoke-a-cigarette(e) & nonchalantly(e) &
with-a -cigarette-holder(e) & in-the kitchen(e)]
With (32b)–(32h) understood in an analogous way, they follow from (32a) by
simple applications of conjunction elimination.
Sixth, there is the need to explain certain failures of entailment. So, in
particular, although each of (34a) and (34b), and so their conjunction, is
entailed by (34c), their conjunction fails to entail (34c).
(34a) Kim tickled Jo absent-mindedly.
(34b) Kim tickled Jo with a feather.
(34c) Kim tickled Jo absent-mindedly with a feather.
The intuitive failure of entailment can be seen by considering that (34a)
would be true if Kim had tickled Jo absent-mindedly with her hand, while
(34b) would true if Kim had tickled Jo attentively with a feather. Again, the
pattern of entailment and entailment failure is predicted, and explained, via
ordinary predicate logic if we assume that (34a)–(34c) are understood as in
(35a)–(35c), respectively:
(35a) e [subject(e, Kim) & tickle(e) & object(e, Jo) & absentminded(e)].
(35b) e [subject (e, Kim) & tickle(e) & object(e, Jo) & with-afeather(e)].
(35c) e [subject (e, Kim) & tickle(e) & object(e, Jo) & absent-minded(e)
& with-a-feather(e)].
Indeed, the failure of entailment would appear to be a more or less trivial
upshot of the Event Hypothesis, and will therefore be of some importance in
considering its generalisation in the State Hypothesis.
2.3. Token States. We have now seen some elementary observations in
support of the Event Hypothesis. The hypothesis at issue here—the State
Hypothesis—is that (at least some) stative predications should be treated in
an analogous way. The hypothesis, then, is that stative predicates carry an
argument place (for tokens) in addition to those ordinarily reflected in
superficial form. According to the hypothesis, the logical form of (36a) is not
to be represented as in (36b), as may be suggested by its superficial form and
interpretation. Rather, (36c) better approximates its true logical form.
(36a) Kim is happy.
(36b) happy(Kim).
14
(36c) s [subject(s, Kim) & happy(s)].44
The motivations for the Hypothesis are twofold. First, and foremost, it is a
crucial element in a unified treatment of natural language predication. If we
can treat statives in the same way as eventives, then we should. The second,
related motivation is the extent to which observations analogous to those
driving the Event Hypothesis can be replicated with regard to statives.
First, then, we should consider whether stative predications exhibit
obvious entailment relations with sentences making explicit reference to
states. And the evidence here is somewhat equivocal. As Higginbotham
points out, there appears to be a fully productive construction through which
reference to states may be made. The construction is exemplified in (37):
(37a) The state of being happy…
(37b) The state of resembling Jo…
(37c) The state of knowing Jo…
Now if we follow Higginbotham, and view the examples in (37) as involving
PRO, we can complete them with, e.g., duration modifiers, and consider
whether, with PRO afforded the relevant reference, they entail, or are
entailed by, state predication analogues, as in (38).45
(38a) The state of [PRO] being happy lasted for some years.
(38b) Kim was happy for some years.
Especially if we treat (38a) as following (38b) in a discourse, possibly
conjoined with an elaboration marker like ‘That is to say, …’, Higginbotham’s
proposal has some plausibility.46 And on the purported reading, (38a)
appears to entail, and perhaps to be entailed (in context) by, (38b). But it is
not obvious that state nominalizations like those in (37) involve PRO, rather
than being generics or type-terms formed by abstraction just over their
superficial argument position. That is, it is not obvious whether (37a) should
be treated as an analogue for states of the particular event nominalization in
(39a) or as an analogue of an apparently generic event reading of the
As with the eventive hypothesis, I am ignoring issues about the nature of the restrictions
attending quantification over states. Perhaps, for example, the restriction is carried by a
predicate like Parsons ‘obtains’. See his (1990).
45
The relevant readings would be akin to (i), with (ii) making the implicit pronoun ‘PRO’
explicit:
(i)
The memory of being happy…
(ii)
The memory of [PRO being happy]….
46 The relevant intuitions appear better to favour Higginbotham if we replace (37a) with the
somewhat less productive (i):
(i)
The state of happiness lasted for some years.
This is related to the distinction between state of affairs nominalizations and state
nominalizations discussed earlier.
44
15
nominalization in (39b) (i.e., a reading that may seem not to require PRO), or
in some other way.
(39a) The event of Kim’s smoking a cigarette…
(39b) The event of smoking a cigarette…
As Higginbotham notes, state nominalizations that would, on his view,
involve lexical replacement of PRO are ‘somewhat awkward’: 47
(40a) ??The state of Kim’s being happy…
(40b) ?Kim’s state of being happy…
Especially since this awkwardness is not observed with eventive
nominalizations, this might be taken as evidence against Higginbotham’s
proposed treatment. But he urges that
…this syntactic feature should not obscure the fact that [state
nominalizations], too, can be understood as definite descriptions,
purporting to refer to particular states if the subject is realised
circumlocutorily, as in…48
(40)
The state of being happy that Kim is in…
Higginbotham’s opponent may not be convinced by this, since (40) might
appear to admit to being read either as a prolix attribution to Kim of a
property she might share with others or as an attribution to Kim of a
particular sub-type/determinate of the property/determinable happiness.
However, the oddity of (41)—plausibly located in the use of ‘in’—may give
such an opponent pause.
(41)
??The property of being happy that Kim is in…
And further evidence in favour of Higginbotham’s proposal is provided by
the fact that (42b) is less awkward than (42a), suggesting, perhaps, that Jo and
Kim each require their own state of happiness.
(42a) Kim and Jo are in the state of happiness.
(42b) Kim and Jo are in a state of happiness.
But the evidence is, at best, inconclusive. The status of the state analogue of
the first observation, then, is somewhat equivocal.
Higginbotham (2000: 56).
Higginbotham (2000: 56). The example to follow is an almost exact analogue of
Higginbotham’s (33).
47
48
16
The analogue of the second observation fares better. Shorn of explicit
reference to states, state nominalizations like (43a) seem perfectly acceptable,
and also seem clearly to entail their predicative analogues, as in (43b):
(43a) Kim’s happiness lasted some years.
(43b) Kim was happy for some years.
This observation is easily explained if (43a) and (43b) both involve
quantification over states, the former definite and the latter existential.49
As a third test of the State Hypothesis, we should consider the
behaviour of stative small clauses embedded within perceptual verbs.
Consider the examples in (44):
(44a) Jo saw Kim happy.50
(44b) Jo saw that Kim was happy.
(44c) Jo saw Kim while Kim was happy.
Although the data are less clear here than they were with the eventive
analogue in (26a), (44a) seems not entail (44b), since Jo might have seen Kim
happy without realising—in whatever way is required for (44b)—that Kim
was happy. (44b) appears not to entail (44a), since the latter, unlike the
former, seems to require more of Jo than that she came to know, on the basis
of seeing, that Kim was happy. We might try saying that, for (44a) to be true,
(45) must be true:
(45)
Jo saw Kim’s happiness.
And if that entailment were clear, we would have a clear analogue of the
situation with eventive small clauses. But as Terence Parsons notes, sentences
like (45) have an archaic ring, and are not obviously acceptable paraphrases
of their small clause counterparts.51 It is also far less clear than in the
eventive case that (44a) fails to entail (44c). That is, while it seems plausible
that Jo can have seen Kim smoke without seeing Kim, it is far from clear that
Jo can see Kim happy without seeing Kim. Finally, (44c) might appear not to
entail (44a), since (44c), unlike (44a), can be true even though Kim carefully
concealed her happiness from Jo when they met. But in fact it is not clear that
one must see symptoms of a state in order to see the state, so again the
distinction is less clear than with eventives. To the extent that the relevant
distinctions hold, they can be explained if (44a) has the structure given in
(46).
For more detail, see Higginbotham (2000: 54–56). A concern here is that state-of-affairs
nominalizations appear able to take duration modifiers, as in (i):
(i)
Kim’s being happy lasted for some years.
50
More appropriate stative small clauses may be provided by ‘being’ constructions, as in (i):
(i)
Jo saw Kim being happy.
But it might be argued that ‘being’, like ‘exhibiting’, brings events into play.
51
Parsons (2000:86). See also Parsons (1990: 192–94).
49
17
(46)
se[subject(Jo, e) & see(e) & subject(s, Kim) & happy(s) &
object(e, s).]
It might be suggested that the apparent awkwardness of some stative
small clause constructions—especially those involving non-transitory
statives, like ‘is tall’—is due to a sort of converse of whatever explains the
observation that stative verbs shun eventive or processive objects, so that the
structures with a stative main verb and eventive complement, as in (47), are
unacceptable.
(47a) *Jo wanted Kim run (to the shop).
(47b) *Jo knew Kim run (to the shop).
On the basis of that suggestion, we might expect stative verbs to sit more
happily with stative small clause complements than do eventive verbs. And
that prediction appears to be borne out by (48):
(48a) Jo wanted Kim happy.
(48b) Jo wanted Kim’s happiness.
The relevant reading of (48a) would be one on which Jo wanted, not mere
relief from Kim’s happiness-less-ness, but, say, the retention of a particular
obtaining of Kim’s happiness.52 But it might be held that ‘want’ enforces an
intensional reading, perhaps with a reduced form of a propositional
complement, analogous to (49).
(49a) Jo wanted Kim (to be) happy.
(49b) Jo wanted Kim (to have) happiness.
Although I do not think that that is obviously the correct treatment of (48),
ruling it out is not straightforward. A somewhat clearer case appears to be
provided by (50), with ‘know’ given its acquaintance reading.
(50a) Jo knows Kim happy.
(50b) Jo knows Kim’s happiness.
The use of ‘knew’ is clearly stative, and (50a) appears to be distinct in
meaning from either of the sentences in (51).
(51a) Jo knows that Kim is happy.
(51b) Jo knows Kim while Kim is happy.53
52
53
Cf. Quine (1956: 177).
Constructions involving ‘aware of’ work at least as well here:
(i)
Jo is aware of Kim’s happiness.
18
The distinction between (50a) and (51a) is obvious. And since acquaintance
knowledge can be retained beyond confrontation with its object, (50a) can be
true even if the time of Jo’s knowing Kim fails to coincide with the time of
Kim’s happiness (since the end of their first meeting, Kim has been unhappy),
so that (51b) is false. Plausibly, things are similar in the other direction: Jo can
know Kim for a period during which Kim is uniformly happy without
thereby knowing Kim happy—because, for example, Kim failed to reveal her
happiness to Jo when they met. Moreover, ‘state state’ constructions of this
sort seem to admit non-transitory states as object, as in (52a) and (perhaps
less convincingly) (52b).54
(52a) Jo loves Kim tall.
(52b) Jo knows Kim tall.
Especially if the latter suggestion can be made out, it appears that an
analogue of the third observation may be available in the case of statives.
The fourth observation also appears to be replicable in the case of
statives. That is, at least some statives appear to sustain anaphoric reference,
apparently through a quantified position. Thus, consider (53):
(53)
Kim was happy. It worried her mother.
The most natural understanding of ‘it’ here has it refer back to the fact
expressed in ‘Kim was happy’. But a second understanding appears to be
available. On this understanding, ‘it’ refers back to the particular state of
Kim, her happiness. On this reading, it is not the mere fact that Kim is happy
that worries her mother. Rather, it is the particular happiness. Perhaps, for
example, her mother’s worry is due to her judging the degree of Kim’s
happiness to be dramatically out of proportion to her circumstances.
As in the eventive case, the fourth motivation for the State Hypothesis
depends on the explanatorial role of reference to events not only in
psychological contexts, but more generally. Consider (54).
(54a) Kim was happy. It caused the happiness detector to click.
(54b) Kim’s happiness caused the happiness detector to click.
Here the relevant readings of the sentences in (54) are ones in which Kim’s
particular state of happiness plays an essential role in the causal explanation.
Perhaps, for example, the detector is set only to detect happiness above a
certain degree. The mere fact that Kim is happy will not cause the machine to
click; for that, she must be very happy. If such readings are sustainable, the
fourth motivation also carries over the State Hypothesis.
54
‘State state’ constructions differ from ‘event state’ constructions in this respect. So, for
instance, (i), with non-transitory ‘tall’, is far less acceptable than (ii), with transitory ‘drunk’:
(i)
?Jo saw Kim tall.
(ii)
Jo saw Kim drunk.
19
We turn now to the fifth observation. Statives interact less
productively with modifiers than do eventives. However, the stative
modifiers there are do appear to exhibit some of the behaviour exhibited by
eventive modifiers. In particular, entailments involving modifier dropping
are sustained by stative modification. Parsons provides the examples given
here in (55)–(58), involving, respectively, stative verbs, adjectives,
prepositions, and nouns.55 In each case, (a) entails (b) and (c).
(55a) The TV sits on the desk by the lamp.
(55b) The TV sits on the desk.
(55c) The TV sits by the lamp.
(56a) The board is coarsely grooved along its edge.
(56b) The board is coarsely grooved.
(56c) The board is grooved along its edge.
(57a) Socrates is in the market under the awning.
(57b) Socrates is in the market.
(57c) Socrates is under the awning.
(58a) Socrates is a boy under 1.5 metres tall.
(58b) Socrates is a boy.
(58c) Socrates is under 1.5 metres tall.
Moreover, we can also replicate at least some permutation entailments. For
instance, (55a) and ‘The TV sits by the lamp on the desk’ are mutually
entailing. It seems, then, that the fifth observation can be replicated.
The major difficulty for the State Hypothesis comes from its handling
of the sixth observation. As with the Event Hypothesis, it seems to be a clear
prediction of the State Hypothesis that the converse entailments, from (b) and
(c) to (a), are not sustained by quantificational logic. Thus, for instance, (59a)
is not logically entailed by (59b) together with (59c).
(59a) s [object(s, the TV) & sits(s) & on(s, the desk) & by(s, the
lamp)].
(59b) s [object(s, the TV) & sits(s) & on(s, the desk)].
(59c) s [object(s, the TV) & sits(s) & by(s, the lamp)].
The difficulty is that, except perhaps for some rather special cases, reflective
judgement finds the purported natural language analogues of these
entailments obvious and faultless. Thus, the State Hypothesis appears to
make a clear prediction that is rarely, if at all, fulfilled by the phenomena.
As Parsons notes, it is possible to at least cast doubt on at least some of
the apparent entailments. He attempts to motivate doubt about (55) with the
following:
55
The examples are from Parsons (2000: 84–88). See also his (1990: 186–206).
20
Imagine a TV set perched partly on a desk and partly on a table with a
lamp on the table next to it.56
The idea is that, given the scenario, we might think that the TV’s on-thedeskness is not by the lamp, despite the TV itself being so located. But, as
Parsons admits, the data here are inconclusive.57 A plausible alternative to
the State Hypothesis’ explanation of the effect of Parsons’ story is that (55a)
admits a reading on which ‘by the lamp’ modifies ‘the desk’ rather than ‘sits’,
a reading on which it would be false of the imagined situation, since the desk
is not by the lamp. A similar explanation may be available for Parsons’
example of entailment failure for prepositional predication (again, from (b)
and (c) to (a)):
(60a) IBM is in a hilly region in Paris.
(60b) IBM is in a hilly region.
(60c) IBM is in Paris.58
The case is slightly different with respect to the clear failure of entailment of
(56a) by (56b) and (56c). But as Parsons’ observes, these constructions
typically occur only when the adjective is spelled like the past participle of a
verb, as with ‘grooved’. And he suggests a potential explanation of this
special case:
…we can imagine that the adjectives derive from the verbs by a
somewhat regular process, and that the adverbs come along for the ride
without there being any underlying states.59
We can add that in cases where statives are derived productively from
processives or eventives—for instance, in ability predications—a similar
effect is observed:
(61a) Kim is able to tickle Jo nonchalantly with a feather.
(61b) Kim is able to tickle Jo nonchalantly.
(61c) Kim is able to tickle Jo with a feather.
In these cases, the relevant pattern of entailments appears to be explicable
through the event position of the object of ‘able’, and so not to require the
invocation also of a position for states.
In sum, at least many of the cases where the entailments can appear to
fail seem, in one way or another, special. That may suggest, first, that the
range of the State Hypothesis is restricted just to those special cases.
56
Parsons (2000: 85).
Parsons, op. cit.
58
Parsons (1990: 195), (2001: 87). Parsons attributes examples of this sort to Barry Schein.
59
Parsons (2000: 93, fn.2). See also Parsons (1990: 250–53).
57
21
Alternatively, a second suggestion would be that special cases may be
accounted for via specific lexical hypotheses, which need not make play with
quantification over states. And the second suggestion may be favoured for
two reasons. First, a central plank in the case for the invocation of token states
is their potential to underwrite a unified treatment of natural language
predication. Absent that plank, the case for invoking them in any particular
case would be weakened considerably. Second, the case for states, like the
case for events, depends on the convergence of a variety of observations. But
if the mooted restriction of the State Hypothesis meant that there is a
mismatch between cases that exhibit the only the first five pieces of eventish
behaviour and cases that also exhibit the sixth, convergence would be lost. In
particular, we would seem to require an alternative to the State Hypothesis’
account of the first five observations for those cases where the sixth
observation was absent, weakening the case for a unified treatment of all six
observations where they do co-occur.
The State Hypothesis appears to be supported by analogues of some of
the observations that support the Event Hypothesis. In combination with its
potential to unify the theory of predication, the evidence assembled above
provide the Hypothesis with significant support. However, it appears to be of
the nature of the Hypothesis to predict the failure of entailments that native
speakers are willing to make as a matter of course. And the generality of the
entailment pattern suggests quite strongly that it is sustained by structure
rather than by appeal to extra-logical assumptions or the lexical content of
each stative predicate. If the State Hypothesis is to be maintained, then, it is
critical that this apparent failure be explained away. Moreover, the
explanation must not simply neutralise the State Hypothesis, on pain of
running a dogleg through states in order to reproduce the effects of the
standard account.60 In the next section, I shall consider Parsons attempt to
provide an explanation for the apparent entailments. I shall argue that
Parsons’ account fails.
3. The Logic of State Modifiers. The question whether the appearance of an
entailment is to be explained by logico-semantics is ultimately to be decided
by the construction and comparison of theories. But, as Parsons points out,
the evidential basis of that inquiry should not be restricted to simple
judgements about the modal distribution of truth-values. Parsons writes:
People often wish to make statements having certain (obvious)
necessary consequences, where these consequences are not intended to
follow from those statements when they occur within certain
embeddings. In particular, a statement S may be made in describing an
unreal situation, and in the real world S may require the truth of S, but
S is not intended to apply to the unreal situation. In such a case, S
60
A version of this type of concern can be found in Katz (2000).
22
follows necessarily from S, but S should not be built into the logical
form of S.61
Parsons’ point is that not every necessary consequence of a claim is logically
necessary; some such consequences depend upon—perhaps, obvious—extralogical facts. In certain contexts—for instance, discourse about dreamed or
imagined situations—it may be possible to bracket the extra-logical facts
without disrupting the semantics of a claim or its logic. The consequences of
the claim in that context will be those determined by its semantics and logic.
Hence, investigation of the consequences of a claim within such special
contexts may facilitate the uncovering of its logically operative structure, by
isolating behaviour due to that structure from behaviour due also to extralogical knowledge or assumption.62
Parsons seeks to apply this method to the case in hand. His proposal
is that in reflecting on the question whether, for instance, (57b) and (57c)
entail (57a) (the examples are repeated below), we should consider the
possibility of time-travel, and hence should drop the following typical default
assumption: the subjects in question are not in two places at once.
(57a) Socrates is in the market under the awning.
(57b) Socrates is in the market.
(57c) Socrates is under the awning.
If we suppose that Socrates has travelled back in time and that his earlier self
remains in situ, we can suppose that earlier-Socrates is in the market and that
time-travelling Socrates is under the awning, without being forced to concede
that Socrates is in the market under the awning. And that supposition
appears to require a view of the semantics of the target constructions on
which they are afforded at least the structure imposed by the State
Hypothesis. For the supposition requires that earlier-Socrates can be in a
certain state without later-Socrates being in that state, and vice versa.
Prima facie our reflection need not depend on the genuine possibility
either of time-travel or of multiply located entities. All that appears to matter
is that their possibility is not foreclosed just by the logico-semantics of the
constructions in (57). If that is correct, then we will have explained away the
apparent predictive failure of the State Hypothesis: the apparent entailments
are explained, not by the semantics of stative predications, but rather by the
extra-logical assumption that state-participating entities are not multiply
located. Moreover, insofar as we have independent reason to think multiplelocation a genuine possibility, we have reason to affirm the State Hypothesis
as clarifying the nature of that possibility.
61
Parsons (1990: 98).
The procedure is somewhat akin to the attempt, in some proposed applications for twodimensional semantics, to isolate a primary component in lexical meaning that is uniform
across worlds considered as actual. As we shall see, it is subject to related difficulties. For an
excellent discussion of two-dimensional semantics and attempts to apply it to natural
language, see Soames (2005).
62
23
Recall, however, the presupposition of this procedure. Successful
application of the procedure depends upon it not disrupting the semantics of
the target constructions. Thus, the procedure will fail to reveal semantically
determined behaviour if that behaviour is under the control of the
assumptions we drop in following the procedure. To see one sort of problem
this can cause, consider the following case where adjusting our assumptions
can affect the acceptability of a construction. (62) appears to be unacceptable.
(62)
?Kim saw Jo tall.
We face the question whether to view the unacceptability of (62) as due to the
semantics of the construction or to our extra-semantic knowledge about
tallness. Since the example in (63) appears acceptable, it is natural to think
that responsibility for the unacceptability of (62) is due in part to the fact that
tallness, unlike drunkenness, is a non-transitory state.
(63)
Kim saw Jo drunk.
And now applying our procedure would appear to support that hypothesis,
since we can find (62) more acceptable if we imagine Jo’s height varying over
the same sort of timescale as her drunkenness (or, perhaps, if we imagine that
seeing takes far longer than it in fact does). But now we face the following
question. In imagining tallness to be a transitory state, have we imposed a
different logico-semantics upon the predicate ‘tall’? If we have, then although
the explanation for the unacceptability of examples like (62) will advert to the
transitory nature of the predicated state, it will go via our semantic
knowledge, rather than our knowledge of extra-semantic fact. Hence, the
attempt to hold that knowledge in abeyance will serve, not to reveal, but only
to disrupt, the targeted elements of our semantic knowledge.63
In the present case, one relevant alternative to the State Hypothesis
explanation of discourse about time-travel would be that such reflection acts
to coerce the semantics of strings like those in (57) out of their usual state-free
reading, and into one involving states.64 The first sort of problem, then, is that
Parsons’ procedure provides no way of apportioning responsibility for the
effects it induces.
The first problem with the procedure concerns the potential impact of
counterfactual imagining on particular bits of the semantics. But a far more
serious problem is that such imagining has the potential to disrupt the logical
foundations of the entire semantics, as might occur, for one (extreme)
63
For a proposal according to which transitory states involve an additional layer of
quantification, see Kratzer (1995). I emphasise that the point is not made in support of such
proposals, but as indicating that Parson’s method cannot help us to decide either way.
64
There are, of course, other salient alternatives. One would be that when imagining timetravel, we bring into play additional subjects, in the present case a counterpart for Socrates.
Another would be that disruption to the time-line induces us to bring in additional structure
to our reference to times, so that Socrates’ states are not simultaneous along all temporal
dimensions.
24
example, if the attempted supposition involved a contravention of logic. And
it appears that the supposition Parsons employs in defence of the State
Hypothesis may have this sort of effect. Thus, consider that with respect to
time-travel, we might expect states to be as mobile as the objects they involve.
For instance, future-Socrates, we might suppose, retains his state of
contentment when he travels back in time to confront his earlier self. As it
happens, past-Socrates was already in that state. Thus, we have the following:
(64)
Socrates is content under the awning and Socrates is content in
the market and Socrates’ contentment under the awning is
Socrates contentment in the market.
From (64), together the State hypothesis, we appear able to derive (65):
(65)
s1[(s2[object(s2, Socrates) & content(s2) & under(s2, the
awning) & s2 = s1) & (s3[object(s3, Socrates) & content(s3) &
in(s3, the market) & s3 = s1])].65
Now (65) simplifies to (66):
(66)
s[object(s, Socrates) & content(s) & under(s, the awning) &
in(s, the market)].
And (66) is the State Hypothesis’ representation of (67):
(67)
Socrates is content under the awning in the market.
But given the assumptions of our story, (64) should not entail (67). In order to
avoid the seemingly faulty entailment of (67) by (64), we would need to allow
for the same state to be in different locations, whilst precluding either the
simple representation of (64) in (66) or, equivalently, denying that (66) gives
the logical form of (67). The simplest way to do this would be through
imposing an additional layer of quantification over states. But, although it is
not obvious that the manoeuvre must lead eventually into a regress, it
certainly threatens the simplicity of the account. Moreover, insofar as no
regress is forthcoming, that can only be because the relevant pattern of
entailments is now sustained despite a quantificational treatment that predicts
its failure. For we can ask, of the new layer of states, whether they are capable
of multiple-location. If states in the new layer are capable of multiplelocation, then the representation of (67) will require another layer. And if they
are not, then a new conflict will arise between the quantificational treatment
and the observed pattern of entailments. It seems that the basic difficulty for
the State Hypothesis will re-emerge at each additional level of quantification.
65
The reason (65) takes the form it does is to avoid complications due to existential closure
of state positions by clausal phrases, so that quantification cannot wait for the whole
sentential conjunction.
25
An alternative would be to deny that it is possible for states to be
located multiply. But now we face a version of the first problem. For the
denial can only preserve the semantic treatment insofar as it is enforced by
semantics and logic. So it would need to be argued that states are unlike
state-participants in that the former, unlike the latter, are precluded from
being multiply located by logic and semantics. Absent such argument, we
should expect the required assumption to be repressible, consistent with the
proper functioning of the logico-semantics. And since it is not, the differential
treatment of states and their participants would be, in the absence of reason
to think the restriction on states to be a matter of logico-semantics, quite
unmotivated.
4. Telicity and counting. What is required is an explanation for the failure of
quantification over states to enable entailment failures of the sort exhibited
with event quantifications. And a satisfactory explanation must be principled
in at least the following sense. It must exploit only differences between
statives and eventives that are driven by their respective logico-semantical
differences. In the remainder, I shall present such an explanation.
Let’s begin with eventives and with a question: What, about the
functioning of eventives, is responsible for their facilitation of entailment
failures, as from (68a) and (68b) to (68c)?
(68a) Jo tickled Kim with a feather.
(68b) Jo tickled Kim nonchalantly.
(68c) Jo tickled Kim nonchalantly with a feather.
I suggested above that the failure is, in effect, a trivial result of each ‘tickle’
introducing a proprietary event. But the suggestion is in one-way misleading.
For the consequence only follows on the assumption that different events
may be introduced by each ‘tickle’. And that only follows if events may be
counted independently of their subjects.66 It is only because the same
predicate applied to the same subject can introduce more than one entity that
those entities can then differ in which predications they accept. Our opening
question becomes: What, about eventives, is responsible for their introducing
entities that may be so counted? The answer, I shall propose, is their telicity.
****POSITIVE PROPOSAL SUPPRESSED****
5. Conclusion. The fundamental semantical motivation for pursuing the State
Hypothesis is that it offers to form a central component in a unified treatment
of natural language predication. We have good reasons for thinking that
eventive predication involves something like quantification over tokens.
Analogues of most of those reasons carry over to processive and stative
predication. In the absence of theories that are both genuine competitors—so
not, for instance, particular implementations of the same general account—
66
Here, as above, I assume univocal reference to times across cases.
26
and able to cover the same range of phenomena, there is limited scope for
philosophical objection. In my view, we are now in a position where the most
pressing philosophical tasks are to clarify the nature of the tokens involved in
the varieties of predication, and to detail the ways in which reference to those
tokens is mediated semantically and psychologically. As I hope to have
indicated above, such reflection is apt to reveal putative objections to the
unified treatment as resting upon an underdeveloped conception of the
character of the entities in question. I shall conclude by presenting a
diagnosis in that vein of one source of opposition to the State Hypothesis.
One source of animus towards accounts that invoke token states in the
treatment of predication is the thought that, especially with respect to
psychological discourse, they are bound to underplay the role of genuine
subjects of predication—ordinary individuals, including persons—in favour
of their states. Worse, such accounts have sometimes treated states, as well as
events and processes, as occupants of subjects—for instance, as sub-personal
goings-on of one or another aspectual stripe.67 I agree with the opponent of
token states that the latter treatment is disastrous for a satisfactory
understanding of predication. But the villain here is, not the invocation of
token states, but rather a misunderstanding of their relations to subjects. As I
explained above, one motivation for the Event Hypothesis is the fact that
eventive predications carve more finely than would be expected if they only
made reference to their subject, a property, and a time. Thus, a subject can, at
a time, participate in more than one event of the same kind. One way of
trying to understand that fact would be to attempt to articulate the subject, so
that each eventive predication is viewed as a simple predication to a proper
part of the subject. But I hope to have indicated the mistake in that attempt.
The true source of fineness of grain is rather the availability of a variety of
ways for a subject to achieve a telos. Similarly, it would be a mistake to
construe stative predication as simple predication to a proper part of the
subject. On the view defended here, states should not be viewed as occupants
of subjects. Rather, insofar as there is anything to the metaphor, subjects are
occupants of states.
References
Bennett, J. (1988) Events and their Names, Indianapolis: Hackett Press.
Bennett, J. (1991) ‘Reply to Reviewers,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 51, 3: 647–662.
Borer, H. (2005) In Name Only: Structuring Sense Vol. I, Oxford: OUP.
Burge, T. (1979) ‘Frege and the Hierarchy’, Synthese, 40: 265–81, reprinted in
his (2005).
Burge, T. (2004) ‘Postscript to “Frege and the Hierarchy”’ in his (2005).
Burge, T. (2005) Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege, Oxford: OUP.
67
Both sources of concern may be seen at work in Steward (1997) and Hornsby (1997).
27
Casati, R. and Varzi., A. C. (1997) Fifty Years of Events: An Annotated
Bibliography 1947 to 1997. Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling
Green (Ohio).
Chierchia, G. (1998) ‘Plurality of mass nouns and the notion of “semantic
parameter”,’ in Rothstein (1998).
Davidson, D. (1980) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: OUP.
Galton, A. (1984) The Logic of Aspect. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gendler Szabó, Z. (2004) ‘On the Progressive and the Perfective,’ Noûs, 38:
29–59.
Graham, D. W. (1980) ‘States and Performances: Aristotle’s Test,’ The
Philosophical Quarterly, 30: 117–30.
Higginbotham, J. (1983) ‘The Logical Form of Perceptual Reports’, Journal of
Philosophy, 80: 100–27.
Higginbotham, J. (1985) ‘On Semantics’, Linguistic Inquiry, 16: 547–93.
Higginbotham, J. (1987) ‘On Davidson’s Programme in Semantics’, in Lepore,
E. ed. (1987)
Higginbotham, J. (1994) ‘Mass and Count Quantifiers,’ Linguistics and
Philosophy, 17: 447–80.
Higginbotham, J. (2000) ‘On Events in Linguistic Semantics’, in
Higginbotham, J., Pianesi, F., and Varzi, A. eds. (2000): 49–79.
Higginbotham, J, (2004) ‘The English Progressive,’ in J. Guéron and J.
Lecarme eds. The Syntax of Time, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Higginbotham, J., Pianesi, F., and Varzi, A. eds. (2000) Speaking of Events,
Oxford: OUP.
Hornsby, J. (1997) Simple Mindedness, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Katz, G. (2000) Anti neo-Davidsonianism: against a Davidsonian semantics
for state sentences,’ in C. Tenny and J. Pustejovsky eds. (2000).
Kenny, A. (1963) Action, Emotion, and the Will, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
Kratzer, A. (1995) ‘Stage Level and Individual Level Predicates,’ in G. Carlson
and F. J. Pelletier eds. The Generic Book, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Krifka, M. (1998) ‘The Origins of Telicity’, in Rothstein ed. (1998).
Landman, F. (1992) ‘The Progressive,’ Natural Language Semantics, 1: 1–32.
Landman, F. (2000) Events and Plurality, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Larson, R. (2003) ‘Time and Event Measure,’ in J. Hawthorne and D.
Zimmerman eds. Philosophical Perspectives 17: Language and
Philosophical Linguistics, Oxford: OUP.
Larson, R. and Segal, G. (1995) Knowledge of Meaning, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Lees, R. B. (1960) The Grammar of English Nominalization, unpublished doctoral
dissertation, MIT.
Lepore, E. (1987) Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of
Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell.
MacBride, F. (2005) ‘The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of
Metaphysics?’ Mind, 114: 565–614.
28
Maienborn, C. (2005) ‘On the limits of the Davidsonian approach: The case of
copula sentences,’ Theoretical Linguistics, 31, 3: 275–316.
Moltmann, F. (forthcoming) ‘Events, Tropes, and Truthmaking,’ to appear in
Philosophical Studies.
Mourelatos, A. (1979) ‘Events, Processes, and States’, Linguistics and
Philosophy, 2: 415–34.
Parsons, T. (1987/88) ‘Underlying States in the Semantical Analysis of
English’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 88: 13–30.
Parsons, T. (1990) Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic
Semantics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Parsons, T. (1991) ‘Tropes and Supervenience,’ Philosophy and
Phenomenological
Research, 51, 3: 629–32.
Parsons, T. (2000) ‘Underlying States and Time Travel’, in Higginbotham, J.,
Pianesi, F., and Varzi, A. eds.: 81–93.
Pianesi, F. and Varzi, A. C. (2000) ‘Events and Events Talk: An Introduction,’
in J. Higginbotham, F. Pianesi, and A. C. Varzi eds. (2000).
Pietroski, P. M. (2005) Events and Semantic Architecture, Oxford: OUP.
Quine, W. V. O. (1956) ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,’ Journal of
Philosophy, 13, 5: 177–187.
Ramsey, F. (1927) ‘Facts and Propositions,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, supp. vol. VII: 153–170.
Rothstein, S. ed. (1998) Events and Grammar, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Rothstein, S. (2004) Structuring Events, Oxford: Blackwell.
Schein, B. (1993) Plurals and Events, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Soames, S. (2005) Reference and Description: The Case Against Two
Dimensionalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Steward, H. (1997) The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Tenny, C. and Pustejovsky, J. eds. (2000) Events as Grammatical Objects,
Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Vendler, Z. (1967) Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University
Press.
Vlach, F. (1983) ‘On Situation Semantics for Perception,’ Synthese, 54, 1: 129
–152.
Williamson, T. (2000) Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: OUP.
Woltersdorff, N. (1970) On Universals, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
29