History, Institutions and Cities:
A View from the Americas
Sukkoo Kim
Washington University in St. Louis and NBER
and
Marc Law
University of Vermont
Preliminary Draft: Do not quote or cite.
December 9th, 2010
Abstract
In this paper, we use the familiar strategy of exploiting the quasi-experimental distribution of
political institutions in the Americas, caused by variations in European colonial experience, to
examine the role of institutions on urban and local development in the Americas. Political
institutions—whether unitary or federal, or parliamentary or constitutional—matter for urban and
local development because they define the lines of authority among national, regional and local
governments. We argue in this paper that in Latin America, the centralization of political power
in federal governments at the expense of local governments contributed to the rise of urban
primacy whereas in Canada and the US, political decentralization fostered more balanced
patterns of urban and local development. Yet, even between US and Canada, we find that the
differences in the levels of political centralization at the state or provincial levels led to important
divergences in the organization and number of cities and local governments.
2
I. Introduction
Within a relatively short period of time, a significant literature has emerged that links
history, institutions and economic growth, especially for the European colonial economies (see,
for instance, Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2001). History matters
because variations in historical conditions at the time of European conquest—whether factor
endowments, indigenous pre-colonial development, climate, the disease environment facing
European settlers, or the conditions of European technological and political development at the
time of conquest—played vital roles in influencing the transplantation of a variety of colonial
institutions. And even though subsequent changes in economic and political conditions have
modified in important ways these initial institutions, early institutions, by placing constraints on
future institutional change, significantly shape the form of today’s institutions, which, in turn,
may help explain why some countries are rich and why others are poor.
The urban economics literature, on the other hand, has been much slower to examine the
role of institutions in influencing urban or spatial development. With some exceptions, the
literature treats the growth, location and size distribution of cities as being determined solely by
the economic forces of agglomeration and congestion. This lack of interest among urban scholars
in studying the role of institutions is surprising since cities are often viewed as “engines of
economic growth.” It is also puzzling because cities are foremost “creatures of states,” meaning
that a higher-level of government usually has the power to determine how and whether local
governments can be established, their geographic boundaries, the authority that local
governments may possess, and the revenue sources they may tap, unless explicitly constrained
by constitutional provisions or home rule legislative enactments.
3
In this paper, we explore the complex linkages among history, institutions and urban
development in the New World. In the Americas, the exogenous role played by European
colonists in influencing the path of institutional development has not been questioned (North
1990). Yet, except for the early literature on Latin American urban primacy (see, for instance,
Morse 1971 and McGreevey 1971), relatively few scholars have seriously explored the effect of
institutions on urban or spatial development. Because political institutions fundamentally define
the rights of property and the lines of political authority among national, state, and local
government units, institutions are likely to play a key role in determining the type of fiscal
federalism that emerges and the patterns of local economic development.
The impact of institutions on economic development of North and Latin America are
especially sharp. In Latin America, conditions of inequality led to poor, un-democratic
institutions that hindered economic growth (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997). The concentration of
political power in a handful of elites also favored the rise of powerful centralized national
governments and politically and fiscally weak regional and local governments (Sokoloff and Zolt
2006). Not surprisingly, this imbalance of political power between various political jurisdictions
led not only to the rise of urban primacy among national and regional capital cities (Galiani and
Kim 2010), but is also believed to have contributed to poor long-run economic performance.
In North America, on the other hand, initial conditions of equality led to the rise of
democratic institutions that are believed to have fostered innovation and economic growth. In
addition, egalitarianism and democracy were accompanied by political decentralization at the
state and local levels.1 In the US, New England towns became symbols of local autonomy.2 In
1 One of Alexis de Tocqueville’s most widely quoted passages from his Democracy in America pertains to local
governments: “The principle of sovereignty of the people governs the political systems of the Anglo-Americans... In
the nations by which the sovereignty of the people is recognized, every individual has an equal share of power, and
participates equally in the government of the state... The township, taken as a whole, and in relation to the central
4
the South, counties became important units of local government. In the Middle Atlantic, local
governments consisted of counties and towns. In the new states of the West, counties became the
most dominant form of local government that sometimes included townships.3 The status of
cities varied by region and over time. In general, cities were initially recognized as public
corporations, not unlike other corporations at the time, but with the rise of Dillon’s rule, cities
became “creatures” of state governments. Yet, even before the rise of the municipal home-rule
movement, American cities possessed considerable political autonomy.
In Canada, unlike the US, towns and counties were never as important local government
units.4 The most important unit was the municipality. Scholars generally believe that, from the
colonial years until the late nineteenth century, local municipalities in Canada had considerable
local autonomy (Crawford 1954). Indeed, in both the US and Canada, local governments were
the most important units of government at the turn of the twentieth century as evidenced by the
fact that local government expenditures exceeded the expenditures of other levels of government
in both nations. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that the political autonomy of local
governments diverged between US and Canada, especially over the second half of the twentieth
century (Kim and Law 2010). Whereas US local governments became more independent of state
governments, the provincial governments in Canada, especially in Ontario, began to exercise
greater political authority over local governments.
government, is only an individual, like any other to whom the theory I have just described is applicable. Municipal
independence in the United States is, therefore, a natural consequence of this very principle of the sovereignty of the
people. All the American republics recognize it more or less; but circumstances have peculiarly favored its growth
in New England.”
2 In New England, counties were also initially created for judicial purposes. In recent years, however, some states
(for instance, Connecticut) have eliminated their county governments.
3 In Illinois, the southern region was founded by settlers from the southern states who adopted a county form of
government. The northern portions of Illinois, however, were founded by northerners who promoted a township
form of government. Over time, as northern counties became more politically influential, the township form of
government spread to most counties in Illinois.
4 See Manke (2005).
5
While establishing a link between institutions and urban development is challenging, we
believe that variation in urban development between Latin America and North America, between
the US and Canada, and even among US states and Canadian provinces sheds considerable
information. In this paper, we explore variations in urban primacy and the size distribution of
cities among the countries in Latin America, between the United States and Canada, and among
regions of Canada and the US to show the role of political centralization in determining the
pattern of urban development. Additionally, we explore the role of political institutions between
US and Canada and among Canadian and US regions by examining differences between Canada
and the US, as well as among US states, in the number and scope of local government units.
While the institutional rules guiding the power of national, regional and local
governments change and evolve over time, we find that these changes are conditioned upon
institutional rules adopted during the colonial period. In Latin America, recent moves toward
greater political decentralization are unlikely to affect the pattern of urban development. While
there is evidence of a greater degree of political decentralization in several Latin American
countries, the legacy of highly centralized government in terms of the distribution of city sizes
and the extent of urban primacy persist to this day. In Canada, centralization of political power
within provincial governments was made possible by the adoption of the parliamentary form of
government at the provincial level. The absence of provincial constitutions combined with
powerful provincial parliaments provided little political authority for Canadian local
governments. In the US, despite the changing roles of state and federal governments and their
relations to local governments, state governments are constrained by constitutions and local
representation within state legislatures. Local governments have therefore always been able to
6
exercise considerable political autonomy. Indeed, the proliferation of local governments, all with
taxing powers, is a uniquely American development.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we outline the history of political
institutions in the Americas as it relates to the rights and authority of local governments. In
section III, we examine urban primacy and the size distribution of cities for countries in the
Americas as well as regions in the US and Canada over time. In section IV, we analyze
variations in the number, size and scope of local governments in US and Canada over time and
use differences in the degree of political centralization between the two countries to examine the
relationship between political centralization and the number of local government units across
Canadian provinces and US states, as well as between Canadian and US metropolitan areas. In
section V we exploit variation across US states and metropolitan areas to explore how
differences in the extent of political decentralization (measured by municipal home rule status)
across US states influenced the number of local government units and the fragmentation of
metropolitan areas. Finally, section VI concludes.
II. The Institutional Rules of Local Governments in the Americas
In this section, we examine the institutional rules that determine the political and fiscal
autonomy of local governments in the Americas from a historical perspective. Institutions,
whether formally defined by constitutions, informally by norms and precedents, or by the sheer
force of military rule, define the lines of authority among national, state and local governments.
In the Americas, due to differences in colonial histories, the distribution of powers granted to the
different levels of government varied significantly. In Latin America, political power has been
historically centralized within national governments, usually at the expense of regional
7
(provincial or state) and local governments. To this day, notwithstanding recent movements
toward greater local decentralization in Latin America, taxing authority continues to remain
highly centralized at the national level (Diaz-Cayeros 2006). In the US, colonial conditions led to
the creation of a federalist form of government that granted significant political autonomy to
states and their local governments. In Canada, despite the attempts by the founders of Canadian
confederation to form a more centralized federal union, federalism came to favor decentralized
provincial rights, but these rights were not extended to local governments.
A. Local Governments in Latin America
In Spanish America, just as in the Iberian Peninsula, political power was highly
centralized in the King, his council and the Viceroy. Unlike in North America, no charters were
granted to establish colonists’ rights of self-government. Local assemblies possessed few
political rights. Because the main objective of the Spanish crown was to mine silver using native
labor, there was little incentive for the Spanish to establish institutions that provided colonists
and natives with powers of local autonomy (Sokoloff and Engerman 1997). Thus, local
governments in Latin America were under the direct control of the King and his advisors.
Even after independence, civil wars and the establishment of constitutional governments
in many countries, most Latin American nations remain highly centralized at the national level.
Formally, countries such as Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Panama and Paraguay are highly centralized, as they possess a unitary form of government;
Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay are moderately centralized whereas
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela are decentralized, possessing federalist
forms of government (see Table 1).
8
Nevertheless, throughout Latin America, central governments wielded considerable
authority over local governments until very recently, even in countries with a federalist form of
government. Table 2, based on Myers (2002), presents information showing how national
governments centralized political power over capital cities and other municipalities in Latin
America during the period between 1944-1962 and 1978-1982. In the mid-twentieth century, the
most centralized countries were Mexico, Colombia and Peru. In these countries, the national
government appointed mayors for the capital city and other cities; in the next group of countries,
Brazil and Argentina, the central government appointed capital city mayors but used a mixture of
elections and appointment for mayors of other cities; in Venezuela, the national government
appointed its capital city mayor but elected other city mayors; and, in the least centralized
countries (Cuba, Guatemala, and Chile) mayors of all cities (capital or otherwise) were elected.
By the second half of the twentieth century, however, most Latin American countries moved
toward political decentralization, allowing the election of mayors for capital and other cities. The
major exceptions were Havana and Buenos Aires whose mayors continued to be appointed. The
national governments of Cuba and Venezuela also appointed the mayors of other cities. These
patterns of central government control over municipal affairs contrast sharply with the
experience in Canada and the US, where the mayors of all cities, including national and subnational capital cities, have always been elected.
Yet, despite these recent moves toward greater formal political decentralization in Latin
America, there remains considerable evidence that Latin American countries are still highly
centralized. Despite the fact that Mexico has a federal form of government, Nickson (1995)
argues that Mexico is still an extremely centralized state, even by the standards of Latin
America. In Mexico and other Latin American nations, political power was originally centralized
9
in the national capital, which in turn received the lion’s share of the national government’s
revenues. Similar histories can be told for Argentina, Colombia, Chile and elsewhere in Latin
America (Nickson 1995). Political centralization in capital cities was aided by a policy of general
neglect of other municipalities.
Sokoloff and Zolt (2007) and Willis et al (1999) note that local governments in Latin
America possessed little political autonomy and few fiscal resources. While local governments in
the US and Canada relied heavily on property taxes to fund local public goods such as roads,
infrastructure, and education, municipalities in Latin America were prevented from raising
revenues by their national and state governments. Many countries in Latin America also relied
heavily on regressive taxes on consumption such as excise taxes and taxes on foreign trade—
taxes that are usually collected by central governments--rather than on personal or corporate
income taxes. In 1930, taxes on international trade accounted for 44% of central government in
Brazil, 48% in Argentina, 54% in Chile, 55% in Colombia, 41% in Mexico, and 51% in
Venezuela (Sokoloff and Zolt 2007). Diaz-Cayeros (2006) notes that tax collection in Latin
America remains highly centralized in the national government and that state and local
governments rely primarily on transfers from the central government.
B. Development of Local Governments in the US
When British settlers arrived in North America, they attempted to establish local
institutions that were similar to those of their mother country. Contemporaneously in England,
local governments consisted of first-tier counties that had political jurisdiction over smaller
second-tier townships or manors. The King and Parliament had, by the late seventeenth century
centralized authority over most these local governments through the appointment of county
sheriffs and justices but their control was not highly systematic as local officers were chosen
10
from the local rural gentry. The larger cities, on the other hand, possessed royal corporate
charters that granted them some measure of autonomy such as commercial privileges and the
right to elect local officials.
Due to initial differences in the degree of inequality income and social status, the
American colonies varied in their adaptation of English local institutions.5 In Virginia and other
southern colonies where inequality was high, the elites closely adopted English local government
institutions and established counties as the local unit of government. Similar to England, the
governor of the colony appointed county officers in these southern colonies. In more egalitarian
New England, however, local institution diverged from that of the mother country from the
outset. Favoring compact settlements, the town became the primary unit of local government in
New England, although counties were also organized for judicial purposes. Most importantly,
however, the town officers in New England were elected. In the Middle Colonies, the local
institutions combined New England towns and southern counties but with democratic features as
both town and county officials were elected.
From the War of Independence to the Civil War period, the US county-town model of
local government evolved toward its modern form and gradually became more uniform across
the country. While local institutions continued to vary across the states, the hybrid system
developed in the Middle Colonies eventually spread to large parts of the US and, with the rise of
Jacksonian democracy, local officials even in the South were chosen by elections. As cities
increased in number, the status of municipalities in relation to their respective states also came
into question. While few cities possessed government charters as in England, Frug (1999) argues
that most courts treated cities initially as public corporations. However, as cities and other forms
5 See Kim (2009) for a detailed discussion of the divergence in legal and political institutions between
Massachusetts and Virginia.
11
of local government became integrated into state and national economies, the state legislatures
and courts began to define more clearly the lines of political authority between states and their
localities.
Under US federalism, the federal-state relationship is federal but the state-local
relationship is unitary (Elazar, 1972). Since the federal Constitution is silent on matters of local
governments, local governments became “creatures” of states because states possessed residual
rights not specified in the Constitution. Thus, according to Justice Taney, the “[c]ounties are
nothing more than certain portions of the territory into which the state is divided for the more
convenient exercise of powers of government” of the state. With the adoption of Dillon’s rule,
the cities also became “creatures” of states, but legislatures and courts made a distinction
between municipalities and counties as municipalities, unlike counties, were created mainly for
the interest of the locality and its people.6 While municipalities generally possess governmental,
corporate, and proprietary powers, counties usually lack corporate and proprietary powers.7
Yet, despite the fact that US local governments became “creatures” of state governments,
for a variety of reasons local governments continued to possess considerable political and fiscal
autonomy. First, many Americans, especially those in New England, informally viewed states as
6 The 1866 court decision by Iowa Supreme Court State case of City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids decided by Judge
John F. Dillon, as well as subsequent US Supreme Court rulings in 1903 and 1923, firmly established the principle
of Dillon’s rule, which states that “Municipal Corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. As it [the state legislature] creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge
and control.” The path to Dillon’s rule was paved by a series of court decisions. First, in the 1819 US Supreme
Court case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the court made a distinction between private and public
corporations. Since cities and other local governments were public rather than private, it was argued that these
government units were founded for public purposes. A municipal charter was not a contract between a city and a
state but an ordinary act of legislation (McBain 1916)). James Ken’s influential Commentaries on American Law of
1836 further argued that public corporations such as counties, cities, towns and villages were invested with
subordinate powers for purposes of local public services and were subject to the control of the state legislature
(Krane, Rigos and Hill 2001).
7 Governmental powers refer to ordinance making authority, use of police powers and taxation; corporate powers
include the ability to enter into contracts, to buy and sell property and can sue or be sued; proprietary powers permit
local governments to engage in commercial activities such as owning and operating a utility (Krane, Rigos and Hill
2001).
12
a federation of localities. This gave popular credence to the notion that local governments should
have their own sphere of authority. Second, many states began to recognize counties as
municipal corporations through constitutional or statutory provisions. Third, over time, state
constitutional reforms placed strict limitations on state legislatures, prohibiting them from
creating or destroying counties or cities or changing their boundaries, and outlawing special
legislation for cities. Fourth, many state legislatures granted home rule to cities and, in some
cases, to counties.8 Finally, the geographic diffusion of political power within states made it
costly for members of state legislatures to coordinate in the exercise of their authority. While
strong party discipline could at times induce state legislatures to intrude on local matters, most
state legislation was routine and was initiated by localities (Burns and Gamm 1997).
C. The Development of Local Governments in Canada
From the beginning of European settlement until the late eighteenth century, local
government scarcely existed in French and British Canada. While there were a handful of cities
with charters (e.g. Quebec City and Halifax), settlement was scattered and most settlers had no
influence over local affairs. Authority over local matters was vested in colonial governors and
their appointed councils. After the 1780’s, however, the influx of American migrants from New
York and New England increased the demand for local government autonomy. However, neither
the governors of British Canada nor the Canadian elites who held appointed offices had an
incentive to extend autonomy to local governments. Counties were created but with no municipal
8 In the 1840s and 1850s, local delegates to state legislatures enacted numerous pieces of “local privilege” or
“special privilege” legislation to manipulate municipal activity in competition with local city councils. In addition,
states also passed the so-called “ripper laws” which transferred control of certain services from the municipal
government to state-appointed officials such as the New York Metropolitan Police District. To counter state
interference, cities demanded home rule. Home rule legislation varies significantly by state but are of two general
types: the first type enumerates in detail the matters of local concern for home rule whereas the second type is
broader and reverses Dillon’s rule by giving local governments the residual powers not prohibited by state
constitutions. See McBain (1916), McGoldrick (1933), Hill (1978), and Krane, Rigos and Hill (2001) for an in depth
state-by-state analysis of the home-rule movement.
13
functions. The 1793 Parish and Town Officers Act established the election of local officers, but
assessment and rates of taxation were set by acts of the colonial legislatures rather than by local
officers. In cities, however, the increased demand for local public goods eventually led to
incorporation and greater local autonomy (Crawford 1954).
In Upper Canada, the first formal system of local government was established in 1841
with the District Councils Act. Under this act, the inhabitants of each district constituted a body
corporate and its powers were exercised by a warden appointed by the Governor and a council
elected by inhabitants. The Governor also appointed the district clerk, treasurer and surveyors,
although they were accountable to the council. In 1849, the Municipal Act, also known as the
Baldwin Act, established the local municipal system as it largely exists in Ontario today. Unlike
in the US, the county, which replaced the district, became the upper-tier of municipal
government but with no true municipal functions. Instead, rural townships, villages, towns and
cities all became independent units of municipal government.
In Canadian federalism, residual rights not specified in the federal constitution belong to
the federal rather than provincial governments. Nevertheless, under the terms of the 1867 British
North America Act (Canada’s original constitutional document) local governments, became
“creatures” of provincial governments. Similar to the US, the provincial-local government
relationship is unitary. But, unlike in the US, local governments in Canada occupy a very weak
legal/constitutional position. First, provincial governments, unlike US states, are not bound by
written constitutions.9 There are no constitutionally entrenched documents that limit the power of
provincial governments over their respective localities. Accordingly, in Canada, there is no
home-rule for local governments. Second, in contrast with the US, the parliamentary form of
9 Since the 1980s the province of British Columbia has had a written constitution; however, the Constitution of
British Columbia Act is simply an ordinary statute of the provincial legislature that can be amended by a simple
majority of the legislature.
14
government and the accompanying notion of “parliamentary sovereignty” have historically
facilitated the centralization of provincial power over local governments. Third, the development
of significant provincial government revenues from a variety of sources allowed centralization of
provincial authority over its local governments (see Kim and Law 2010 for a more detailed
discussion of these trends).
Finally, unlike in the US, the Canadian federal government does not deal directly with
local governments. Whereas in US federal government funds are often distributed directly to
local governments for disbursement, the federal government deals directly only with provincial
governments, which in turn disburse funds to local governments (usually for very specific
purposes). Thus, in Canada, intergovernmental transfers, which are very significant, re-enforce
the fiscal authority of provinces over their local governments (Goldberg and Mercer 1986).
III. Institutions and Urban Primacy in the Americas
In this section, we examine the broad correlations between institutions and urban primacy
in the Americas. Because political centralization at the national or sub-national (provincial or
state) level is more likely to lead to an unbalanced urban or local development as compared to
political decentralization at the local-level, we examine urban primacy over time (Galiani and
Kim 2010). While there is no single widely accepted definition of urban primacy, there are two
general types of measures. The first, motivated by Jefferson (1939), examines the population of
the largest city or the n-largest cities as a percentage of either the urban population or the total
population. The second, motivated by the rank-size literature, estimates the size distribution of
cities using the Pareto distribution.10
10 More generally, the size distribution of cities is defined as a Pareto distribution: R = AS-α where R is the rank or
the number of cities with population S or more, A is a constant, S is the population of city and α is the Pareto
15
Scholars generally believe that urban primacy is a salient character of urban
development in Latin America but not in North America. While opinions vary, many believe that
urban primacy arose in Latin America in the early nineteenth century or even earlier. Morse
(1971), using the share of the population of the largest city as a measure of primacy, finds that
urban primacy emerged in Argentina and Cuba around 1800, in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru in
1850, and in Brazil and Venezuela by 1900 (see Table 3). In all of these cases, the primate city
was also the national capital. McGreevey (1971), however, using a measure based on the Pareto
distribution of city sizes, dates the rise of primacy in Mexico to as early as 1750, Cuba to 1825,
Chile to 1830, Argentina to 1850, Brazil to 1880, Peru to 1925, and Venezuela and Colombia to
1950. Portes (1976) argues that, by 1970, most Latin American countries, except for perhaps
Brazil and Colombia, exhibited significant urban primacy characteristics.
In Tables 4 and 5, we present estimates of urban primacy based on the share of the urban
population accounted for by the largest city and the Pareto coefficient, respectively. The data are
based on municipalities with population greater than 25,000.11 In Table 4, we find that the largest
city in the US, New York City, accounted for 17.4% of the urban population greater than 25,000
in 1900 but that figure gradually declined to 6.8% by 2000. By this measure, Toronto, Canada,
comprising 18% of the Canadian urban population, was much more primate in 2000. In Latin
America, the largest cities in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru and Uruguay contained a much higher share of their urban population than their
exponent. The rank-size rule is met if the Pareto coefficient is equal to one. If the Pareto coefficient is less than one,
then the city size distribution is skewed toward larger cities and exhibits more urban primacy than if the coefficient
is greater than one.
11 We have also estimated primacy measures using cities whose populations were greater than 2,500. While the
absolute values differ significantly from those reported in Tables 1 and 2, the relative cross-national and time series
patterns are very similar.
16
counterparts in Anglophone North America. Importantly, in contrast with the US and Canada,
the largest cities in each Latin American country, except for Brazil, were national capitals.
We find that the Pareto coefficient for the U.S. rises from 1.06 to 1.27 between 1900 and
2000 (see Table 5), suggesting a shift in the skewness of the size distribution of cities toward
smaller-sized cities. While the Pareto coefficient for Canada and the Latin American countries
were close to one, suggesting a more balanced distribution of city sizes, the coefficients are
relatively much smaller than those of the US. The Latin American countries, however, exhibited
much greater primacy when we defined cities using a lower population threshold of 2,500. As
expected, the Pareto coefficients for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela were less than 0.9 suggesting a significantly skewed distribution toward
the largest cities in those countries.
The data shown in Tables 4 and 5 generally support the view that urban development in
Latin America has been characterized by more primacy than urban development in North
America. At any point in time, these measures indicate that the distribution of cities sizes in the
US is less primate than the distribution in Canada, which in turn is less primate than the
distribution for Latin America; over the twentieth century, the data also indicate that the city-size
distributions in the US and Canada have become less primate whereas the pattern is reversed for
those in Latin America. Thus, the difference in the level of primacy between Latin America and
English-speaking North America seems to have widened over time.
Because we have consistent population data on city sizes and for Canada and the US, we
also computed various measures of urban primacy for US and Canadian cities during the
twentieth century. A comparison of the patterns of primacy between these two countries is
informative because the two countries share much in common (language, British colonial
17
institutions and legal institutions, a common border, etc.) but, as noted earlier, the degree of
political centralization of state or provincial government authority over local governments varied
between the two countries. Accordingly, if institutions matter, we may observe different trends in
the degree of primacy in Canada and the US. Additionally, the richness of our Canadian and US
data sets allow us to investigate whether the extent of primacy varies by region and whether there
has been convergence or divergence in primacy within Canadian and US regions.
Figure 1 plots the percentage of the total population residing in the largest city and largest
metropolitan area in Canada and the US for each decade during the twentieth century. Regardless
of which measure of primacy we use, Canada is more primate than the United States.
Additionally, while the US measures of primacy have either remained fairly constant or declined
over time, there is evidence of an increase in the extent of primacy in Canada, particularly in
recent decades. Tables 7 and 8 show estimates of the Pareto exponent for US and Canadian cities
with different population cutoffs, and for different portions of the city-size distribution. We
report estimates using both log(rank – ½) and log(rank) as the dependent variable.12 While the
overall distribution of city sizes in both countries appears to be become less primate over time,
regardless of how we slice the data, the degree of primacy is less in the US, and the trend toward
less primacy more pronounced for the US than for Canada.
Tables 8 and 9 show the trends in primacy, as measured by the Pareto exponent, for US
and Canadian regions. Again, we report estimates using log(rank – ½) and log(rank) as the
dependent variable. Several interesting patterns emerge from an analysis of these tables. First, for
each US region (with the exception of East South Central), the Pareto coefficient becomes larger
over time, indicating greater equality in city sizes over time (i.e. less primacy). Accordingly, the
trend away from primacy appears fairly uniform across US regions, which is consistent with the
12 Log(rank – ½) has been shown to have superior small sample properties. See Gabaix and Ibragimov (2007).
18
perspective that political decentralization at the local level has contributed to greater equality in
city sizes across most US regions. Second, at any point in time, New England has a larger Pareto
coefficient (i.e. is less primate) than other regions. This is perhaps a long-lasting consequence of
the early diffusion of local political authority in New England within towns and villages.
Very different patterns are apparent from an analysis of the data from Canadian regions.
Interestingly, while the estimates of the Pareto distribution for Canada as a whole indicated
declining primacy over time, the estimates for most Canadian regions suggest an increase in
primacy (i.e. a smaller estimate of the Pareto coefficient) over time. While the city-size
distribution became more equal for Quebec, it became less equal for other regions. The
experience for most Canadian regions is thus consistent with the idea that political centralization
within Canadian provinces has contributed to greater urban primacy in Canada.
In recent years, a number of cross-country studies of urban primacy have appeared in the
urban economics literature.13 These papers generally find that urban primacy is not mono-causal
but that economic, demographic and geographic factors all seem to contribute to explaining
primacy. For example, GDP per capita and total population seem to increase primacy whereas
total land area, share of trade in GDP, and transportation density decrease primacy. The most
important factor, however, seems to be political as the concentration of government
expenditures, unitary political systems, political corruption, and dictatorships all seem to raise
primacy significantly. In addition, when capital city dummies are included, the correlation with
primacy was always strongly positive.
It is well known that urban primacy in Latin America is caused by disproportionately
large national and provincial capital cities relative to their non-capital counterparts (Myers 2002;
13 See Rosen and Resnick (1980), Wheaton and Shishido (1981), Ades and Glaeser (1995), Henderson (2002),
Moomaw and Alwosabi (2004) and Soo (2005) among others.
19
Portes 1976). By contrast, the national capitals in the U.S. and Canada are not their largest cities
and, in the US, state capitals are the largest city in their respective states in only half of all states.
While economic forces alone may explain urban primacy, many suspect that the excessively
large capital cities in Latin America are caused by political forces such as the centralization of
political power, corruption, and rent-seeking. On the other hand, the fact that US state capital
cities are relatively small probably reflects political decentralization within states.
In two related papers, Galiani and Kim (2010) and Kim and Law (2010) have
investigated the effect of national and sub-national capital city status on city size, using data
from Latin America and North America. Controlling for various geographic and economic
factors that are likely to affect city population, Galiani and Kim (2010) find that for Latin
American countries in 1900, national capital status increased population by 523% relative to
non-national capital cities and that this effect increased to 919% by 1990. The corresponding
estimates for sub-national (state or provincial) capitals were 70% in 1900 and 232% in 1990.
These estimates suggest substantial political centralization within Latin American countries. Kim
and Law (2010) estimate similar regressions for Canada and the US. While the impact of capital
city status on population for the two North American countries is smaller than for their Latin
American counterparts, there is nevertheless considerable evidence that political centralization
influences city size. Specifically, Kim and Law (2010) find that Washington, DC’s status as the
national capital increased its population by 68% relative to other cities in 1900 and 447% in
2000. In Canada, Ottawa’s capital city status increased its population by 159% in 1920 and the
effect increased to 589% by 2000. These trends reflect political centralization at the national
level in both countries. Within US states and Canadian provinces, Law and Kim (2010) find a
divergence in the effect of sub-national capital city status on city population. While Canadian
20
provincial capital city status increased city population by 48% in 1900 and over 100% in 2000,
the US state capital city effect increased only modestly, from 30% to 49%. Law and Kim (2010)
interpret these different patterns as evidence of diverging trends in Canadian and US federalism,
specifically, the centralization of political power within Canadian provinces, and a continued
emphasis on localism within US states.
IV. The Number, Size and Scope of Local Governments: the US versus Canada
Institutions not only affect urban primacy or the size distribution of cities across nations.
They also influence the number, size and scope of local governments. Due to data limitations, we
focus exclusively on the differences in the number and composition of local governments
between US and Canada as well as between US states and Canadian provinces. In the US, the
institutional rules that provide local governments with significant autonomy have also led to the
proliferation of the number and types of local governments to a bewildering degree. In Canada,
by contrast, the centralization of political authority by provincial over their local governments
has led to the physical and functional consolidation of cities within metropolitan areas. Thus, the
number, size and functions of cities in Canada sharply differ from the US.
Local governments vary by size, function and political hierarchy. There is no widely
accepted definition of local government, but, for Anderson (1949) the key characteristics of a
“unit of government” is that it has authority over persons within its territory, has a legislative
body composed of elected or appointed officials, has a separate legal identity, a degree of
autonomy, is empowered by law to perform governmental service, and has the power to raise
revenue by taxation, by special assessment, or by other means. By this definition, the generally
recognized units of local government in the US are counties, cities, villages, boroughs,
21
incorporated towns, towns, townships, school district and other special districts for schools,
parks, sanitation, drainage, and so forth. In Canada, they are the urban incorporated city, town
and village, rural district, county or municipality, as well as various agencies, boards and
commissions (ABCs) for education, parks, utility, and transportation, among other functions. In
general, election districts, judicial administration areas, civil administration districts are not
considered to be a unit of local government.
In the US, counties are considered as a major unit of local government because they are
the principal or the largest territorial division of state for purposes of local government. Counties
were originally designed to serve functions of general- and state-wide interest that the state
legislature desired to have performed uniformly throughout the state area. The second category
of local units is incorporated places. These are generally urban municipalities but could also
include towns, villages or boroughs. As a rule, these units are part of the county or counties in
which they are situated. The third class is rural government units, which include towns or
townships. Like the second class these units belong to a county. The fourth and final class
consists of special districts that are organized for a single special purpose such as schools,
drainage, or sanitation.
There are three striking differences in the structure of local governments between US and
Canada. First, Canada does not possess a US-style county government system. In Canada,
counties are rural units of local government in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, not much
different from other types of rural districts. In Ontario and Quebec, county boundaries are similar
to the US in that they encompass other local governments, but unlike those in the US, Canadian
counties are not technically governmental units as they do not have direct tax levying and tax
collection functions. Rather, county councils allocate amounts to municipalities based on
22
equalized assessments. In other provinces, counties simply do not exist. Second, Canada does not
have US-style special purpose districts. While ABC’s in Canada perform specialized functions,
they seem to be substantially different from US special purpose districts. Whereas US special
purpose districts are locally created and controlled, the creation and control of ABC’s in Canada
seems to be in the hands of municipal representatives or the provincial government.14 Given the
influence of provincial governments over their operation, it is therefore not obvious whether
ABC’s in Canada should be counted as units of “local” government. Third, Canada’s federal
government, unlike its US counterpart, is restricted in its interaction with local governments. In
the US, starting with Richard Nixon’s general revenue sharing and community programs in
1968, the federal government began to distribute funds to local governments directly with few
strings attached. In Canada, on the other hand, federal intergovernmental transfers are primarily
sent to provincial governments. Provinces, in turn, distribute funds to local government units,
generally for very specific purposes. The nature of Canadian fiscal federalism has therefore
increased provincial governments’ authority over local governments whereas, in the US, fiscal
federalism has strengthened the authority and autonomy of local governments with respect to
state governments (Goldberg and Mercer 1986).
The divergent trends in centralization/decentralization between Canadian provinces and
US states is likely to have different implications, not only with respect to urban primacy, but also
concerning the autonomy, scope, and number of local government units in Canada and the US. In
the US, the continued emphasis on localism within states should result in more autonomous local
government units, and also more local governments (normalized by population or land area).
14 Scholars generally believe that the idea of ABC’s was imported from the US. In particular, they point to New
York state’s creation of Metropolitan Police District whose board was controlled by state. Interestingly, these
practices in the US were met with significant local opposition and led to the movement toward home rule; in
Canada, however, these practices seem to have continued in the form of ABC’s.
23
One might expect local governments within the US not only to retain significant autonomy, but
also to have broader scope of jurisdiction. In Canada, on the other hand, political centralization
within Canadian provinces should give rise to less autonomous local government units and also
fewer local governments. Greater political centralization may manifest itself in fewer local
government units because centralization raises the cost of establishing new units of local
government, because uniform standards of regulation or public services are easier to establish
when there are fewer local governments, or because economies of scale in administration and
public service delivery are more easily achieved when there are fewer local governments. 15
Comparing metropolitan areas in Canada and the US, we might also expect greater metropolitan
fragmentation (i.e. more local government units per metropolitan area) in the US than in Canada.
While it is difficult to compare quantitatively the differing scope, functions and
autonomy possessed by the various types of local government units in Canada and the US, it is
possible, at least to some degree, to compare the number of local government units in each
country over time. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from comparing at the broadest
level the number of local government units in the two countries. While for the US, the decennial
Census of Government provides a very comprehensive portrait of all types of government within
the US (at the local level, the Census of Government provides information on counties, subcounty general purpose local government units, school districts, as well as special districts), we
only have data on the number of general-purpose local government units for Canada.16
15 Along these lines, it is noteworthy that the massive municipal/metropolitan consolidations that have occurred
within Ontario, Quebec, and Nova Scotia in recent decades was motivated largely by a desire on the part of
provincial governments to attain greater economies of scale in public service delivery, and, in so doing, reduce
provincial transfers to municipalities. The fact that these consolidations were pursued and implemented in spite of
tremendous local opposition is evidence of the extent to which political power is centralized within Canadian
provincial governments.
16 For Canada, the number of general-purpose local government units corresponds with the number of Statistics
Canada census subdivisions. Canadian urban scholars believe that this is the best estimate of the number of
municipal governments in Canada. Unfortunately, there is no Canadian equivalent to the US Census of Government.
24
Accordingly, for most of subsequent comparative analysis, we will restrict our attention to subcounty general-purpose local government units (i.e. municipalities) within the two countries,
although we will also present some data on US special districts.
Tables 10 through 12 show, for each Canadian province and US state the number of local
government units by decade from 1950 to 2000. As noted, Canadian figures include only
general-purpose local government units (i.e. municipalities). For the US we report the number of
sub-county general-purpose local governments (cities, towns, townships, villages, boroughs) as
well as the number of special districts (not including school districts). We ignore counties
because counties in the US and Canada are not comparable in terms of form or function. The raw
data show growth in the number of local government units in both countries over time, although
the growth would seem to be more dramatic for the US than for Canada, and within the US,
much of that growth is due to increases in the number of special districts. In some Canadian
provinces (Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia) the total number of local government units has
even declined in the last two or three decades, largely as a result of municipal amalgamations
imposed by provincial governments. In contrast, few US states have experienced declines in the
number of local government units.
The tables also present information on the “density” of local government units within
each state and province. We compute “density” in two ways. The first is by normalizing the
number of government units by population (per 1,000 persons) within each state or province. The
second is by normalizing by the land area (per 1,000 square miles) of each state or province. We
remain agnostic as to which normalization is more appropriate. On the one hand, we might
expect the number of local government units to increase with population since economies of
scale in local government public service delivery may depend on population size. On the other
25
hand, we might also expect the number of local government units to increase with land area since
economies of scale may also be a function of geographic size.
Restricting attention to general-purpose local governments in Canada and the US, the
tables reveal several interesting facts about trends in the density of local government units. First,
while there is substantial cross-sectional variance in the density of local governments within
Canadian provinces and US states (regardless of whether density is measured in terms of
population or land area), the variance would seem to be higher for the US than Canada. Second,
in both countries, density measured in terms of population has fallen while density in terms of
land area has increased. Third, while the number of local government units per 1,000 persons is
roughly comparable for Canada and the US as a whole, the number of local governments per
1,000 square miles is significantly higher for the US than for Canada.
Tables 13 and 14 present data on the number of local government units within the largest
metropolitan areas in Canada and the US. For Canada we show data on the number of
municipalities for each of the largest twenty metropolitan areas from 1960 to 2000. For the US
we present data on sub-county general-purpose local government units as well as for the special
districts (exclusive of school districts) for the top 50 metropolitan areas in 1997. While the US
and Canadian figures exhibit substantial variance, the US numbers are generally larger,
indicating greater political fragmentation within metropolitan areas and greater decentralization.
While these patterns are roughly consistent with our hypotheses regarding the effects of
political centralization/decentralization on the number of local government units, there are
obviously many other geographic and economic factors that may influence the number of local
government units within a political jurisdiction. To obtain sharper estimates of the effect of
political centralization on the number of local governments within US states (N = 50) and
26
Canadian provinces (N = 9 for 1960 and N = 10 for 1970 onward), we pooled the Canadian and
US data to estimate the following regression:
(1) log(LGUi) =  + log(POPi) + log(Areai) + (Canada) + Xi + i
where LGUi denotes the number of sub-county general purpose local government units in state or
province i; POPi is the population of state or province i; Areai is land area (in square miles) of
state or province i; Canada is an indicator variable equal to 1 for Canadian provinces and 0 for
US states; Xi is a vector or state or province specific control variables; and i is an error term. As
control variables we include the latitude and longitude of a province or state’s geographic centre;
an indicator equal to 1 if the province or state has access to a major port and 0 otherwise; an
indicator equal to 1 if the province or state has civil law legal origins17; and the number of years
since a state or province joined the US or Canada to approximate the number of years of
settlement within a state or province. We expect the number of local government units within a
state or province to be increasing in the population and land area, decreasing with civil law legal
origins (it is usually argued that civil law legal origins give rise to more centralizing political
institutions), and increasing with years of settlement. Finally, if political centralization within
Canadian provinces reduces the number of local government units, the coefficient on the Canada
indicator should be negative. We estimate equation (1) separately for each decade from 1960 to
2000.
Coefficient estimates are displayed in Table 15. Each column represents a separate
regression. We estimate the regression equation with and without the civil law and years of
settlement control variables. We find that the Canada indicator is negative and statistically
significant in all regressions from 1970 onward. Additionally, in absolute value, the size of the
17 The civil law indicator equals 1 for AL, AZ, AR, CA, FL, IN, IL, LA, MI, MS, MO, MN, TX and QC (Quebec).
The list of civil law states is taken from Berkowitz and Clay (2006).
27
Canada indicator has also increased over time. These findings suggest that diverging patterns of
centralization within Canadian provinces and US states have contributed to differences in the
number of local government units. Other things held constant, greater political centralization
within Canadian provinces (relative to US states) has resulted in relatively fewer local
government units in Canada, an effect that has been increasing over time.
The coefficients of the other variables generally significant and have the expected signs.
Having access to a major port has a negative and statistically significant effect on the number of
local governments. States and provinces with a major port have fewer local governments,
perhaps because ports are natural sources of agglomeration and concentrate economic and
political power. In terms of magnitude, the effect of having a port on reducing the number of
local governments is smaller, however, than the effect of being in Canada. States and provinces
with more people and greater land area also have more local governments. The coefficient on
latitude is positive and significant, implying that the number of local government units increases
as one moves northward, while the coefficient on longitude is negative and significant, indicating
fewer local government units as one moves west. The latter effect reflects denser settlement in
eastern states and provinces. Finally, the civil law indicator and years of settlement are not
statistically significant.
Pooling data on metropolitan areas for Canada in 2000 (N = 138) and the US in 1997 (N
= 314), we can also estimate the effect of divergences in the degree of political centralization
within US states and Canadian provinces on metropolitan fragmentation (i.e. the number of subcounty general local government units in each metropolitan area) within Canada and the US. To
do this we estimate a regression similar to equation (1). In these regressions, the dependent
variable is either (i) the number of sub-county general-purpose local governments within each
28
metropolitan area, or (ii) the number of sub-county general-purpose local governments per
100,000 persons. Population is the number of people residing within a metropolitan area (we
omit this variable as a control if we use governments per 100,000 as the dependent variable);
land area is the number of square miles of the metropolitan area, and the Canada dummy is an
indicator equal to 1 for Canadian metropolitan areas. As before, we predict that the Canada
indicator should be negative. Greater political centralization within Canada should result in
fewer local government units within Canadian metropolitan areas (i.e. less metropolitan
fragmentation), controlling for other factors.
As additional controls, we include the geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) of
each metropolitan area, a port indicator equal to 1 if the metropolitan area includes a major port,
and a civil law indicator equal to 1 if the metropolitan area is located in a jurisdiction with civil
law legal origins. We also include an indicator equal to 1 if the metropolitan area is located on a
major river, and climate controls (average daytime temperature and annual average
precipitation). Finally we include an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the metropolitan area
includes a national capital (i.e. Washington, DC and Ottawa) and another indicator equal to 1 if it
includes a sub-national (state or provincial) capital city.
Panel A of Table 16 shows the coefficient estimates when the dependent variable is the
log of local government units. Panel B shows the results when the dependent variable is the
number of local government units per 100,000 persons. Regardless of which dependent variable
we use, the coefficient on the Canada indicator is negative and statistically significant. Other
things equal, Canadian metropolitan areas have far fewer local government units than their US
counterparts. Divergences in the degree of political centralization may have therefore also
contributed to a divergence in the extent of metropolitan fragmentation across the two countries.
29
The effect is also economically significant and robust to the inclusion of additional control
variables. When the dependent variable is the number of local governments per 100,000 and all
controls are included in the regression (see Panel B, column 3), the estimates indicate that
Canadian metropolitan areas have eight fewer local government units per 100,000 than US
metropolitan areas, which represents over two-thirds of the average number of local government
units per capita (the sample mean is between 11 and 12 local governments per 100,000 within
Canadian and US metropolitan areas).
Metropolitan areas with more population and larger land area have more local
government units. As before we find that the number of local government units increases with
latitude, and decreases as one moves west. When the dependent variable is the log number of
local government units, we find that metropolitan areas that include a major port have fewer
local governments, which is consistent with our earlier findings using data on states and
provinces. When the dependent variable is the number of local governments per capita, the
coefficient on the major river indicator is negative and highly significant. Metropolitan areas
located on major rivers have fewer local government units per capita, perhaps because rivers
provide natural political boundaries. Temperature and precipitation do not have robust effects on
the number of local government units. Finally, the coefficient estimates suggest that capital city
status reduces the number of local government units, most significantly when the dependent
variable is the number of local governments per capita. These results are consistent with the idea
that concentrations of political power result in less metropolitan fragmentation and fewer local
government units within a metropolitan area.
V. Home rule status and the number of local governments within the US
30
The data on local government reveals substantial variation in the number and density of
local government units even within US states and metropolitan areas. In this section we use
variation in municipal home rule status—a proxy for the degree of political decentralization—to
explore the effect of political decentralization on the number of local government units within
US states, as well as the degree of metropolitan fragmentation across US metropolitan areas.
Home-rule grants the citizens an explicit right to local self-government where they can
alter, abolish and create new governments of their choice. Without home-rule, the structure of
local governments can only be altered through the actions of state legislatures or constitutional
amendments. Because home-rule significantly lowers the costs of creating local governments,
the diversity and density of local government have increased greatly in states in which home-rule
has been adopted (Ostrom, Bish and Ostrom, 1988).
Because there are many dimensions to municipal home rule, there is no single, widely
agreed-upon measure of home rule status. Various studies have categorized states according to
the type and form of municipal home rule that is present. At one extreme, home rule status could
imply significant local government autonomy in terms of form, function, and finances. At the
other, home rule status may be met if Dillon’s rule does not apply within a state. For our
purposes, we use an intermediate definition of home rule. We classify a state as having home
rule status by a given year if the municipalities within the state have some degree of formal and
functional home rule. Our information on municipal home rule within each state comes from
Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2000).18
To investigate the effect of home rule status on the number of local government units
within US states (N = 50), we estimated regressions similar to equation (1) except we omit the
18 By this definition AR, CA, CO, DE, ME, MN, MO, NJ, NY, ND, OH, TX and WI are classified as home rule
states by 1950, and all of these states plus AK, FL, GA, IA, KS, MD, MA, and SD are counted as home rule states
by 1970.
31
Canada indicator and replace it with a municipal home rule status indicator equal to 1 if the state
has home rule status by 1950 or by 1970, and 0 otherwise. We estimate the equation separately
for each decade from 1960 to 2000. For 1960 through 2000 we use home rule status in 1950 as
our measure of political decentralization. For 1980 through 2000 we also use home rule status in
1970 to proxy for political decentralization. Our identification strategy is to use home rule status
in earlier years since this provides a more plausibly exogenous source of variation in the extent
of political decentralization.
Coefficient estimates are displayed in Table 17. Each column represents a separate
regression. The estimates show that for all years from 1980 to 2000, states that had implemented
municipal home rule by 1950 or 1970 had more sub-county general-purpose local government
units, controlling for other factors. This finding is consistent with the view that the
decentralization of political power away from states and toward municipalities increases the
number of local government units. As before, we find the number of local governments is
increasing in latitude, decreasing in longitude, and increasing in both population and land area.
Additionally, there is evidence that states that include a major port have fewer local
governments, although the effect is not robust across years. Finally, years of settlement and civil
law status do not have consistent, statistically significant effects on the number of local
governments.
In Table 17 we report coefficient estimates on the effect of home rule status on
metropolitan fragmentation within US metropolitan areas (N = 314) in 1997. In Panel A the
dependent variable is the log of the number of general-purpose local governments within each
metropolitan area. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the number of local governments per
100,000 persons. These regressions are identical to those estimated using Canadian and US
32
metropolitan except that we replace the Canada indicator with the home rule indicator for either
1950 or 1970. In panel A, the coefficient on the home rule indicator is positive and significant in
most regressions. In panel B, the coefficient is positive and significant in the baseline regression,
and loses significance when more controls are included. Accordingly there is some evidence that
home rule, by decentralizing political power away from state governments and toward local
authorities, has contributed to greater metropolitan fragmentation within the US.
The other covariates generally have the predicted signs and are, mostly, statistically
significant. Metropolitan fragmentation is increasing in population and land area. As one moves
north, fragmentation increases. As one moves west, fragmentation falls. Rivers increase
metropolitan fragmentation; the presence of a major port decreases it. Finally, the degree
metropolitan fragmentation within US metropolitan areas declines for political (national and
state) capitals.
VI. Conclusion
In the Americas, the diversity of European colonial experience and local conditions
contributed to the emergence and persistence of a variety of institutional structures. These initial
sets of institutions not only shaped the patterns of long-run development in the Americas, but
also the structure of their regional and local economies. In much of Latin America, the Spanish
and Portugese rule, in conjuction with factor endowments which fostered income inequality, has
led to the emergence of non-democratic institutions where political power was centralized at the
federal-level at the expense of regional and local levels. In North America, by contrast, British
rule and factor endowment conditions which fostered relative equality led to the rise of
democratic institutions and a federalist form of government which granted significant autonomy
33
to regional and local governments. Yet, even between US and Canada, their forms of federalism
diverged causing significant differences in their patterns of urban and local development.
In this paper, we present a variety of evidence that suggests that differences in the extent
of national or regional political centralization, which has strong colonial roots, affects the degree
of urban primacy, the size distribution of cities, and the number and mix of various local
governments. First, political centralization at the national or regional levels is generally
associated urban primacy or a skewed distribution of city sizes toward the largest cities. Second,
political centralization is associated with a greater use of general general purpose (cities,
counties, towns, etc.) as compared to special purpose (school districts, water, sewage districts,
etc.) governments. Third, political centralization limits the number, density and the variety of
local governments. Fourth, political centralization generally increases the jurisdictional land area
of local governments.
Because it is difficult to estimate the productivity of local governments, it is also
challenging to determine the economic impact of institutions on local governments and their
national economies. In comparing North America and Latin America, however, there is a general
belief that political institutions mattered. In Latin America, political centralization at the national
level often went hand in hand with the absence of voting rights, lower levels of investment in
public schooling, fewer public goods, as well as weak local governments. In these countries,
political centralization contributed to the rise of urban primacy, or unbalanced urban
development. While estimates of the static costs of urban primacy might not be large, there are
reasons to believe that dynamic costs might be fairly high, especially from the standpoint of
(absent) innovations in political institutions and policies. For instance, in North America,
gasoline taxes were first tried and implemented in Oregon but quickly spread to the rest of the
34
states, as well as to Canadian provinces. Likewise, the modern income tax was successfully
implemented in Wisconsin before it spread elsewhere. Excessive political centralization may
impede the ability of local or regional authorities to experiment with new institutions and new
public policies.
For the US and Canada, the difference, while significant, is one of degree rather than kind
in terms of the level of decentralization between the federal and regional (state or provincial)
governments, and especially between regional and local governments. For economists, the
general benefits of centralization or consolidation include economies of scale and administration
and tax collection, the capture of external economies, and perhaps a more equitable distribution
of taxes and public spending. The costs are lack of competition, less “voting with one’s feet,” a
weaker matching of preferences for local public goods, and less policy innovation and
experimentation. Whether the proliferation of local governments in the US as compared to
Canada is seen to increase welfare by facilitating the matching of local preferences to the
provision of local public goods (Ostrom, Bish and Ostrom, 1988) or is seen to increase inequality
and ultimate reduce welfare (Burns, 1994), it is likely that institutions play a non-neutral role in
the long-run development of local and national economies.
35
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39
Table 1
Political Centralization in Latin America circa 1995
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Country
Constitutional Structure
Selection of Executive
Democratic
Formal Overide
Provincial
Local
Transition
Authority
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Centralized
Costa Rica
Unitary
Appointed
Elected (1970)
1948
Yes
Dominican R.
Unitary
Appointed
Elected
1966
Yes
Ecuador
Unitary
Elected/App.
Elected
1978
Yes
El Salvador
Unitary
Appointed
Elected
1982-1984
Yes
Guatemala
Unitary
Appointed
Elected (1985)
1985
Yes
Panama
Unitary
Appointed
Elected (1994)
1990-1994
Yes
Paraguay
Unitary
Appointed
Elected (1991)
1991
Yes
Moderately Centralized
Bolivia
Unitary
Chile
Unitary
Honduras
Unitary
Nicaragua
Unitary
Peru
Unitary
Uruguay
Unitary
Appointed
Appointed
Appointed
Appointed
None
Elected (1984)
Elected (1987)
Elected (1992)
Elected (1990)
Elected (1992)
Elected (1987)
None
1985
1990
1986-1990
1990
1980
1984
No
No
No
No
No
-
Decentralized
Argentina
Federal
Elected (1983)
Elected (1983)
1983
No
Brazil
Federal
Elected (1982)
Elected (1982)
1985
No
Colombia
Unitary
Elected (1992)
Elected (1988)
No
Mexico
Federal
Elected
Elected
No
Venezuela
Federal
Elected 91989)
Elected (1989)
No
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Willis et. al (1999), Nickson (1995).
40
Table 2
Political Centralization of Capital Cities and Other Municipalities, 1944-1962 and 1978-1990
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1944-1967
Selection of Capital Mayor
Selection of Other City Mayors
Power Sharing with Municipal Council
Centralized
Elected
Appointed
Elected
Appointed
Mixed
Mexico
X
X
No
Peru
X
X
Yes
Colombia
X
X
Yes
Argentina
X
X
Partial
Brazil (Rio de J.)
X
X
Yes
Brazil (Brazilia)
X
X
Yes
Venezuela
X
X
Partial
Less Centralized
Guatemala
X
X
Yes
Cuba
X
X
Some
Chile
X
X
Yes
Brazil (Sao Paulo)
X
X
Yes
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1978-1990s
Selection of Capital Mayor
Selection of Other City Mayors
Muncipal Council Powers
Centralized
Elected
Appointed
Elected
Appointed Mixed
Increase Decrease No Change
Cuba
X
X
X
Argentina
X
X
X
Less Centralized
Mexico
X
X
X
Peru
X
X
X
Guatemala
X
X
X
Brazil (Rio de J.)
X
X
X
Brazil (Brazilia)
X
X
X
Brazil (Sao Paulo)
X
X
X
Colombia
X
X
X
Venezuela
X
X
X
Chile
X
X
X
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Myers (2002).
41
Table 3: Urban Primacy in the Americas, 1750-1920
(Percent of total population in largest city)
Country
1750 1780 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Argentina
13
12
10
8
7
10
17
20
Bolivia
Brazil
3
2
2
2
3
4
4
4
Chile
11
8
6
7
6
7
7
9
10
14
Colombia
2
3
2
1
2
2
Costa Rica
Cuba
19
13
12
16
14
14
El Salvador
Equador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
3
2
2
2
3
4
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
5
4
3
5
Uruguay
Venezuela
7
4
5
3
3
3
4
Canada
5
7
7
United States
4
5
5
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Morse (1971) plus calculations by authors for Canada and the US.
42
Table 4: Urban Primacy in the Americas
(percent share of urban population of the largest city)
Country
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Canada
>2,500
>25,000
31.7 30.1 27.7 26.1 24.0 21.8 17.4 11.3 7.4
18.0
United States
>2,500
>25,000
17.4 17.5 15.3 14.6 14.1 12.8 10.2 9.0
7.6
7.0
6.8
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Argentina
>2,500
10.7 16.9 20.1 18.9 14.9 12.8 10.5 9.1
7.7
>25,000
64.1 45.6 29.5 22.1 18.1 14.8 11.7 10.0 8.3
Bolivia
>2,500
19.0 16.6 21.5 22.8
>25,000
23.1 19.8 23.5 24.2
Brazil
>2,500
6.6
6.2
>25,000
9.2
8.1
Chile
>2,500
12.6 11.2 8.7
6.6
2.5
3.3
>25,000
25.4 19.1 12.7 8.5
3.0
3.9
>2,500#
23.8 28.0 31.1 39.1 32.4 30.9
>25,000#
44.2 45.2 44.0 49.5 39.2 36.8
Colombia
>2,500
3.9
16.3
>25,000
14.3 20.5
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
43
Table 4: Urban Primacy in the Americas - continued
(percent share of urban population of the largest city)
Country
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Costa Rica
>2,500
21.1 17.8 16.3 13.3 14.0 12.6 11.5 10.0 8.1
>25,000
19.3 13.6 9.3
Cuba
>2,500
13.4 12.6 13.7 13.4 >25,000
28.4 21.5 18.9 17.0 El Salvador
>2,500
8.1
9.9
10.6
9.7 8.2 >25,000
27.9 20.4 13.0 Equador
>2,500
12.7 17.5 16.1 16.7
>25,000
14.8 19.3 18.9 18.9
Guatemala
>2,500
8.5
9.5
5.8
10.2 12.5 8.4
>25,000
19.0 33.4 23.9 10.9
Honduras
>2,500
9.3
14.1
>25,000
33.1 22.5
Mexico
>2,500
14.3 14.3 8.5
>25,000
24.6 20.2 9.9
Nicaragua
>2,500
18.6 20.7
>25,000
46.6 28.2
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
44
Table 4: Urban Primacy in the Americas - continued
(percent share of urban population of the largest city)
Country
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panama
>2,500
28.7 29.6 26.7 35.4 29.4
>25,000
51.7 47.7 38.4 33.4 47.1
Paraguay
>2,500
15.2 12.3
9.9
>25,000
28.8 21.1 15.0
Peru
>2,500
8.4
19.0 26.8 26.7 27.5
>25,000
9.1
19.8 27.4 27.4 28.0
Uruguay
>2,500
25.8 25.2 >25,000
30.7 46.8 44.8 44.4 42.5 40.9
Venezuela
>2,500
8.3 10.6 10.1 8.0
>25,000
14.1 16.2 11.8 8.8
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Primate cities are as follows: Montreal (1900-1990) and Toronto (2000), Canada; Mexico City, Mexico; New York City (+ includes
Brooklyn), USA; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Santa Cruz, Bolivia; Sao Paulo, Brasil; Santiago, Chile; Bogota, Colombia; San Jose,
Costa Rica; Habana, Cuba; San Salvador, El Salvador; Guayaquil, Equador; Guatemala City, Guatemala; Tegucigalpa (Distrio
Central), Honduras; Managua, Nicaragua; Panama City, Panama; Asuncion, Paraguay; Lima, Peru; Montevideo, Uruguay; Caracas,
Venezuela. All of the primate cities are national capitals except for Sao Paulo, Brasil (Brasilia since 1960 and Rio de Janeiro from
1763-1960), Toronto, Canada (Ottawa), New York, USA (Washington DC) and Guayaquil, Equador (Quito);
** Uruguay’s sample of cities consists of 19 largest cities.
45
Table 5: Size Distribution of Cities in the Americas
(Pareto coefficient estimates of log rank on log population)
Country
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Canada
>2,500
>25,000
0.94 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.91 0.95 1.05 1.05 1.11 1.05
United States
>2,500
>25,000
1.06 1.07 1.08 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.18 1.22 1.27 1.28 1.27
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Argentina
>2,500
1.69 1.29 1.03 0.87 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.74 0.73
>25,000
1.00 1.40 1.24 1.19 1.12 1.06 1.05 1.04
Bolivia
>2,500
0.99 0.96 0.65 0.75
>25,000
1.54 1.31 0.65 0.99
Brasil
>2,500
0.96 0.92
>25,000
1.21 1.17
Chile
>2,500
1.19 1.10 1.00 0.86 0.80 0.80
>25,000
1.35 1.36 1.31 1.19 1.16 1.15
Colombia
>2,500
1.43 0.93
>25,000
1.53 1.06
Costa Rica
>2,500
1.12 1.20 1.25 1.33 1.24 1.10 1.11 1.04 1.01
>25,000
1.56 1.58 1.49
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
46
Table5: Size Distribution of Cities in the Americas - continued
(Pareto coefficient estimates of log rank on log population)
Country
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Cuba
>2,500
1.19 1.25 1.13 1.02 >25,000
1.21 1.55 1.43 1.28 El Salvador
>2,500
1.44 1.32 1.20 1.10 0.99 >25,000
1.22 1.42 1.34 Equador
>2,500
1.01* 0.87 0.85* 0.89 0.84 0.81
>25,000
1.17* 1.36 0.96* 1.09 1.15 1.11
Guatemala
>2,500
1.41 1.48 1.28 1.35 1.15 1.07
>25,000
1.69 0.92 1.56 1.66
Honduras
>2,500
1.41 1.03
>25,000
1.13
Mexico
>2,500
1.08 0.98 0.81
>25,000
1.42 1.31 1.12
Nicaragua
>2,500
1.14 0.96
>25,000
1.31
Panama
>2,500
1.08 1.00 0.95 0.84 0.88
>25,000
0.98 0.93
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
47
Table 5: Size Distribution of Cities in the Americas - continued
(Pareto coefficient estimates of log rank on log population)
Country
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Paraguay
>2,500
1.08 1.01 0.95
>25,000
1.31 1.35 1.30
Peru
>2,500
1.06 1.03 0.91 0.88 0.87
>25,000
1.59 1.38 1.17 1.14 1.11
Uruguay**
>2,500
1.55 >25,000
1.30 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.89 0.89
Venezuela
>2,500
1.13 1.13 0.86 0.87
>25,000
1.59 1.71 1.17 1.14
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Mexico City is defined as Distrito Federal and includes the 16 boroughs.
** Uruguay’s sample of cities consist of the 19 largest cities.
48
Figure 1: Urban Primacy in the US and Canada:
Percent of total population in the largest city and metro
18
16
Percent of total population
14
12
10
Largest City_US
Largest Metro_US
8
Largest City_CAN
Largest Metro_CAN
6
4
2
0
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
Year
49
1970
1980
1990
2000
Table 6: Pareto exponent for US and Canada, 1900-2000 using log(rank) as dependent variable
Panel A: US and Canadian cities
1900
US
1.06
Pop>25K (0.01)
N=160
1910
1.07
(0.01)
N=184
1920
1.08
(0.01)
N=252
1930
1.10
(0.01)
N=310
1940
1.11
(0.01)
N=410
1950
1.10
(0.01)
N=478
1960
1.18
(0.01)
N=674
1970
1.22
(0.01)
N=839
1980
1.27
(0.01)
N=952
Canada
0.94
Pop>25K (0.10)
N=10
0.86
(0.07)
N=14
0.85
(0.06)
N=18
0.86
(0.04)
N=24
0.91
(0.03)
N=34
0.95
(0.02)
N=43
1.05
(0.05)
N=72
1.05
(0.03)
N=100
1.11
(0.04)
N=125
1.05
(0.02)
N=145
Canada
Pop>5K
1.00
(0.03)
N=85
0.98
(0.02)
N=109
0.95
(0.01)
N=134
0.95
(0.01)
N=149
1.00
(0.01)
N=203
0.99
(0.03)
N=306
0.93
(0.02)
N=353
0.91
(0.02)
N=404
0.87
(0.01)
N=467
1.00
(0.03)
N=56
1990
1.28
(0.01)
N=1077
2000
1.27
(0.01)
N=1065
Panel B: Largest 50 US and Canadian cities
US
Canada
1900
1.05
(0.02)
1910
1.07
(0.03)
1920
1.10
(0.03)
1930
1.11
(0.03)
1940
1.10
(0.03)
1950
1.16
(0.04)
1960
1.26
(0.05)
1970
1.31
(0.06)
1980
1.33
(0.06)
0.99
(0.04)
0.94
(0.03)
0.95
(0.04)
0.92
(0.03)
0.94
(0.02)
0.96
(0.02)
0.85
(0.19)
1.16
(0.04)
1.17
(0.07)
50
1990
1.36
(0.06)
2000
1.37
(0.06)
1.08
(0.03)
Panel C: Largest 100 US and Canadian cities
US
Canada
1900
1.05
(0.02)
1910
1.09
(0.02)
1920
1.10
(0.02)
1930
1.10
(0.01)
1940
1.10
(0.02)
1950
1.10
(0.02)
1960
1.17
(0.02)
1970
1.21
(0.02)
1980
1.28
(0.03)
0.98
(0.03)
0.95
(0.02)
0.96
(0.01)
1.00
(0.01)
1.01
(0.10)
1.05
(0.03)
1.13
(0.04)
51
1990
1.33
(0.03)
2000
1.33
(0.03)
1.10
(0.02)
Table 7: Pareto exponent for US and Canada, 1900-2000 using log(rank – ½) as the dependent variable
Panel A: US and Canadian cities
1900
US
1.11
Pop>25K (0.02)
N=160
1910
1.11
(0.01)
N=184
1920
1.12
(0.01)
N=252
1930
1.13
(0.01)
N=310
1940
1.13
(0.01)
N=410
1950
1.12
(0.01)
N=478
1960
1.19
(0.01)
N=674
1970
1.24
(0.01)
N=839
1980
1.28
(0.01)
N=952
Canada
1.17
Pop>25K (0.17)
N=10
1.04
(0.11)
N=14
0.99
(0.10)
N=18
0.98
(0.07)
N=24
1.01
(0.05)
N=34
1.05
(0.05)
N=43
1.13
(0.06)
N=72
1.11
(0.05)
N=100
1.16
(0.05)
N=125
1.10
(0.02)
N=145
Canada
Pop>5K
1.06
(0.03)
N=85
1.04
(0.03)
N=109
1.00
(0.02)
N=134
1.00
(0.02)
N=149
1.05
(0.01)
N=203
1.02
(0.03)
N=306
0.95
(0.02)
N=353
0.92
(0.02)
N=404
0.90
(0.01)
N=467
1.09
(0.04)
N=56
1990
1.30
(0.01)
N=1077
2000
1.29
(0.01)
N=1065
Panel B: Largest 50 US and Canadian cities
US
Canada
1900
1.16
(0.03)
1.08
(0.05)
1910
1.18
(0.02)
1.03
(0.04)
1920
1.20
(0.02)
1.04
(0.05)
1930
1.21
(0.02)
1.01
(0.04)
1940
1.22
(0.02)
1.03
(0.04)
1950
1.28
(0.02)
1.05
(0.04)
52
1960
1.38
(0.02)
0.93
(0.21)
1970
1.45
(0.03)
1.26
(0.07)
1980
1.47
(0.04)
1.26
(0.01)
1990
1.50
(0.04)
2000
1.50
(0.02)
1.17
(0.03)
Panel C: Largest 100 US and Canadian cities
US
Canada
1900
1.11
(0.02)
1910
1.15
(0.02)
1920
1.16
(0.02)
1.04
(0.03)
1930
1.17
(0.01)
1.00
(0.02)
1940
1.16
(0.01)
1.01
(0.02)
1950
1.16
(0.02)
1.07
(0.03)
53
1960
1.24
(0.02)
1.07
(0.10)
1970
1.28
(0.02)
1.11
(0.05)
1980
1.36
(0.02)
1.20
(0.06)
1990
1.41
(0.02)
2000
1.41
(0.01)
1.17
(0.02)
Table 8: Pareto exponent for US and Canadian regions, 1900-2000 using log(rank) as the dependent variable
Panel A: US Regions using cities with population greater than 25,000
New England
Mid Atlantic
East North
Central
West North
Central
South Atlantic
East South
Central
West South
Central
Mountain
Pacific
1900
a
1.27
(0.09)
0.81
(0.05)
0.82
(0.03)
0.90
(0.03)
0.84
(0.04)
1.12
(0.05)
0.80
(0.10
0.82
(0.08)
0.87
(0.04)
N
30
40
31
18
11
11
7
4
8
1920
A
1.25
(0.06)
0.86
(0.05)
0.93
(0.02)
0.90
(0.04)
1.03
(0.04)
1.07
(0.14)
1.10
(0.05)
0.80
(0.05)
0.81
(0.08)
N
39
56
61
19
47
11
16
7
15
1940
a
1.31
(0.05)
0.92
(0.06)
1.02
(0.03)
0.89
(0.03)
1.12
(0.04)
0.92
(0.09)
0.95
(0.06)
0.95
(0.06)
0.83
(0.02)
N
60
79
101
31
47
20
29
11
33
54
1960
a
1.40
(0.06)
0.96
(0.07)
1.16
(0.04)
1.03
(0.04)
1.13
(0.02)
1.04
(0.05)
0.97
(0.04)
1.01
(0.05)
1.10
(0.03)
N
64
94
155
53
77
38
63
31
97
1980
a
1.54
(0.07)
1.00
(0.10
1.30
(0.04)
1.23
(0.05)
1.20
(0.03)
0.97
(0.05)
1.01
(0.02)
1.14
(0.02)
1.28
(0.03)
N
69
92
206
78
116
46
89
61
187
2000
a
1.52
(0.07)
0.98
(0.11)
1.35
(0.05)
1.29
(0.05)
1.27
(0.04)
1.03
(0.05)
1.02
(0.02)
1.07
(0.04)
1.29
(0.02)
N
71
84
214
85
141
47
104
71
249
Panel B: Canadian regions using cities with population greater than 25,000
1900
a
N
West
Ontario
0.78
(0.08)
4
Quebec
1920
A
0.98
(0.08)
0.63
(0.02)
0.34
(0.01)
N
7
6
3
Atlantic
1940
a
0.90
(0.13)
0.78
(0.05)
0.56
(0.06)
1.19
(0.19)
N
7
15
8
4
1960
a
0.76
(0.10)
0.93
(0.12)
0.92
(0.17)
1.52
(0.22)
N
15
26
24
7
1980
a
0.85
(0.07)
1.00
(0.06)
1.20
(0.12)
1.41
(0.31)
N
27
50
41
7
2000
a
0.86
(0.06)
0.94
(0.02)
1.27
(0.12)
0.78
(0.55)
N
30
60
49
6
Panel B: Canadian regions using cities with population greater than 5,000
West
Ontario
Quebec
Atlantic
1900
a
0.74
(0.11)
0.97
(0.06)
0.60
(0.05)
0.93
(0.15)
N
7
28
11
10
1920
A
0.77
(0.04)
0.93
(0.06)
0.77
(0.10)
1.11
(0.07)
N
20
46
25
18
1940
a
0.70
(0.04)
0.92
(0.03)
0.85
(0.09)
1.08
(0.05)
N
27
62
40
20
55
1960
a
0.83
(0.04)
0.84
(0.06)
1.11
(0.08)
0.96
(0.10)
N
56
94
123
32
1980
a
0.77
(0.03)
0.78
(0.03)
1.03
(0.03)
1.05
(0.05)
N
87
124
147
44
2000
a
0.78
(0.02)
0.76
(0.02)
1.07
(0.03)
0.94
(0.04)
N
114
131
180
40
Table 9: Pareto exponent for US and Canadian regions 1900-2000 using log(rank – ½) as dependent variable
Panel A: US Regions using cities with population greater than 25,000
New England
Mid Atlantic
East North
Central
West North
Central
South Atlantic
East South
Central
West South
Central
Mountain
Pacific
1900
a
1.44
(0.06)
0.91
(0.03)
0.92
(0.04)
1.05
(0.06)
1.04
(0.08)
1.39
(0.05)
1.08
(0.10)
1.18
(0.08)
1.12
(0.05)
N
30
40
31
18
11
11
7
4
8
1920
A
1.39
(0.06)
0.94
(0.03)
1.01
(0.02)
1.04
(0.08)
1.17
(0.05)
1.30
(0.22)
1.29
(0.10)
1.05
(0.07)
0.95
(0.13)
N
39
56
61
19
47
11
16
7
15
1940
a
1.42
(0.04)
0.99
(0.04)
1.09
(0.02)
1.00
(0.07)
1.23
(0.05)
1.05
(0.13)
1.06
(0.10)
1.18
(0.05)
0.93
(0.04)
N
60
79
101
31
47
20
29
11
33
56
1960
a
1.52
(0.06)
1.03
(0.05)
1.21
(0.02)
1.12
(0.06)
1.20
(0.05)
1.15
(0.08)
1.04
(0.06)
1.14
(0.09)
1.17
(0.02)
N
64
94
155
53
77
38
63
31
97
1980
a
1.66
(0.08)
1.08
(0.08)
1.35
(0.03)
1.31
(0.07)
1.26
(0.05)
1.06
(0.08)
1.08
(0.04)
1.23
(0.05)
1.34
(0.02)
N
69
92
206
78
116
46
89
61
187
2000
a
1.66
(0.07)
1.05
(0.9)
1.41
(0.03)
1.36
(0.08)
1.32
(0.05)
1.12
(0.08)
1.07
(0.04)
1.14
(0.06)
1.33
(0.02)
N
71
84
214
85
141
47
104
71
249
Panel B: Canadian regions using cities with population greater than 25,000
1900
a
N
West
Ontario
1.12
(0.08)
4
Quebec
1920
A
1.26
(0.17)
0.85
(0.03)
0.51
(0.04)
N
7
6
3
Atlantic
1940
a
1.15
(0.22)
0.95
(0.04)
0.74
(0.05)
1.65
(0.32)
N
7
15
8
4
1960
a
0.89
(0.14)
1.08
(0.14)
1.09
(0.15)
1.97
(0.36)
N
15
26
24
7
1980
a
0.96
(0.11)
1.07
(0.09)
1.35
(0.09)
1.79
(0.48)
N
27
50
41
7
2000
a
0.95
(0.09)
1.02
(0.03)
1.41
(0.09)
1.05
(0.05)
N
30
60
49
6
Panel B: Canadian regions using cities with population greater than 5,000
West
Ontario
Quebec
Atlantic
1900
a
0.95
(0.18)
1.11
(0.04)
0.76
(0.04)
1.15
(0.23)
N
7
28
11
10
1920
A
0.89
(0.08)
1.03
(0.03)
0.90
(0.09)
1.30
(0.11)
N
20
46
25
18
1940
a
0.79
(0.07)
0.99
(0.02)
0.96
(0.07)
1.26
(0.10)
N
27
62
40
20
57
1960
a
0.90
(0.06)
0.89
(0.07)
1.18
(0.06)
1.07
(0.13)
N
56
94
123
32
1980
a
0.82
(0.04)
0.81
(0.04)
1.08
(0.03)
1.15
(0.08)
N
87
124
147
44
2000
a
0.81
(0.03)
0.79
(0.03)
1.11
(0.03)
1.04
(0.02)
N
114
131
180
40
Table 10: Number and density of local government units in Canadian provinces, 19602000
Panel A: Number of local government units
Alberta
British Columbia
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
Ontario
PEI
Quebec
Saskatchewan
Canada
1960
360
126
206
179
88
938
94
1684
798
1970
390
232
274
277
321
110
916
104
1654
839
1980
416
285
282
285
403
113
932
112
1619
889
1990
394
406
270
277
389
107
878
124
1516
861
2000
452
816
298
275
381
98
586
113
1476
1002
4473
5117
5336
5222
5497
Panel B: Number of local government units per 1,000 persons
Alberta
British Columbia
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
Ontario
PEI
Quebec
Saskatchewan
Canada
1960
0.27
0.08
0.22
0.30
0.19
0.15
0.90
0.32
0.86
1970
0.24
0.11
0.28
0.44
0.61
0.14
0.12
0.93
0.27
0.91
1980
0.19
0.10
0.28
0.41
0.71
0.13
0.11
0.91
0.25
0.92
1990
0.15
0.12
0.25
0.38
0.68
0.12
0.09
0.96
0.22
0.87
2000
0.15
0.21
0.27
0.38
0.74
0.11
0.05
0.93
0.20
1.02
0.25
0.24
0.22
0.19
0.18
58
Panel C: Number of local government units per 1,000 square miles
Alberta
British Columbia
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
Ontario
PEI
Quebec
Saskatchewan
Canada
1960
1.45
0.35
0.96
6.49
0.61
2.65
43.02
3.19
3.49
1970
1.57
0.65
1.28
10.04
2.22
5.34
2.59
47.6
3.14
3.67
1980
1.58
0.80
1.32
10.33
2.79
5.49
2.63
51.26
3.07
3.89
1990
1.59
1.14
1.26
10.04
2.69
5.20
2.48
56.75
2.87
3.77
2000
1.82
2.28
1.39
9.97
2.64
4.76
1.65
51.72
2.80
4.39
2.1
2.41
2.51
2.46
2.59
Notes:
1. The number of local government units is estimated by the number of Statistics
Canada Census Subdivisions.
2. The total for Canada excludes the territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, and
Nunavut), which are under federal jurisdiction.
59
Table 11: Local government units in the United States, 1952-2002
Panel A: Sub-county level general purpose local government units (cities, towns and
townships)
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
USA
1952
302
28
48
360
306
241
185
49
294
475
1
193
2590
1549
934
2119
313
215
263
146
351
1753
2640
263
1110
121
1010
15
234
567
72
1542
401
1741
2242
499
208
2554
39
239
1397
241
738
209
309
223
310
216
1815
86
33756
1962
349
40
61
417
373
253
186
51
366
561
1
200
2684
1555
944
2164
365
258
266
152
351
1768
2667
266
1221
124
1015
17
234
567
80
1544
449
1743
2260
533
222
2558
39
255
1379
280
866
212
306
236
329
224
1834
90
34915
1972
396
112
65
454
407
258
183
52
390
530
1
197
2699
1554
951
2143
378
287
270
151
351
1780
2652
270
1237
126
1013
17
237
567
89
1549
454
1726
2256
547
231
2564
39
262
1342
316
981
214
298
231
305
226
1838
87
35283
60
1982
434
142
76
472
428
267
182
56
391
533
1
198
2714
1572
955
1994
424
301
292
152
351
1777
2650
292
1251
126
1005
17
234
568
96
1543
484
1725
2259
581
241
2568
39
265
1308
335
1121
224
294
229
265
231
1849
91
35603
1992
438
148
86
489
460
266
178
57
390
536
1
199
2715
1574
952
1980
435
301
490
155
351
1776
2657
294
1257
128
986
18
234
567
98
1548
516
1714
2256
588
239
2570
39
269
1279
339
1171
228
287
230
268
231
1849
97
35934
2002
451
149
87
499
475
270
179
57
404
531
1
200
2722
1575
948
1926
424
302
489
157
351
1775
2647
296
1258
129
977
19
234
566
101
1545
541
1692
2250
590
240
2546
39
269
1248
349
1196
236
284
229
279
234
1850
98
35914
Panel B: Special districts
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
1952
70
11
34
231
1390
297
166
40
188
154
10
395
1546
293
170
724
130
144
128
158
220
84
71
254
886
133
485
44
78
81
78
968
94
94
140
94
407
29
49
78
56
85
491
106
70
42
644
23
73
1962
202
6
52
299
1962
566
204
63
264
301
16
469
2126
560
263
880
179
241
125
176
194
99
115
266
742
192
752
85
85
295
102
970
246
246
177
124
727
1398
56
142
80
268
733
142
72
46
867
55
68
1972
286
90
366
2223
812
231
78
315
366
15
543
2407
832
305
1136
446
419
126
229
268
139
211
282
820
258
1081
134
94
341
99
954
561
561
275
402
826
1777
73
182
136
457
1215
176
74
58
1021
172
121
1982
390
6
130
505
2506
1030
281
139
417
390
14
659
2602
897
361
1370
517
39
195
264
354
184
356
315
1195
450
1157
134
113
454
101
923
692
692
377
406
825
2050
80
242
199
469
1681
211
83
83
1130
292
263
1992
487
14
261
561
2797
1252
368
196
462
421
16
728
2920
939
388
1482
590
30
199
223
396
277
377
320
1386
556
1047
156
116
374
116
980
722
722
513
524
835
2006
83
291
262
477
2266
329
104
129
1157
350
377
2002
525
14
305
704
2830
1414
384
260
626
581
15
798
3145
1125
542
1533
720
45
222
85
403
366
403
458
1514
592
1146
158
148
276
628
1135
319
764
631
560
927
1885
75
301
376
475
2245
300
152
196
1173
342
684
WY
USA
91
12327
144
18442
203
24196
225
28448
373
31955
546
35051
61
Panel C: Sub-county general purpose local governments plus special districts
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
USA
1952
372
39
82
591
1696
538
351
89
482
629
11
588
4136
1842
1104
2843
443
359
391
304
571
1837
2711
517
1996
254
1495
59
312
648
150
2510
495
1835
2382
593
615
2583
88
317
1453
326
1229
315
379
265
954
239
1888
177
46083
1962
551
46
113
716
2335
819
390
114
630
862
17
669
4810
2115
1207
3044
544
499
391
328
545
1867
2782
532
1963
316
1767
102
319
862
182
2514
695
1989
2437
657
949
3956
95
397
1459
548
1599
354
378
282
1196
279
1902
234
53357
1972
682
112
155
820
2630
1070
414
130
705
896
16
740
5106
2386
1256
3279
824
706
396
380
619
1919
2863
552
2057
384
2094
151
331
908
188
2503
1015
2287
2531
949
1057
4341
112
444
1478
773
2196
390
372
289
1326
398
1959
290
59479
62
1982
824
148
206
977
2934
1297
463
195
808
923
15
857
5316
2469
1316
3364
941
340
487
416
705
1961
3006
607
2446
576
2162
151
347
1022
197
2466
1176
2417
2636
987
1066
4618
119
507
1507
804
2802
435
377
312
1395
523
2112
316
64051
1992
925
162
347
1050
3257
1518
546
253
852
957
17
927
5635
2513
1340
3462
1025
331
689
378
747
2053
3034
614
2643
684
2033
174
350
941
214
2528
1238
2436
2769
1112
1074
4576
122
560
1541
816
3437
557
391
359
1425
581
2226
470
67889
2002
976
163
392
1203
3305
1684
563
317
1030
1112
16
998
5867
2700
1490
3459
1144
347
711
242
754
2141
3050
754
2772
721
2123
177
382
842
729
2680
860
2456
2881
1150
1167
4431
114
570
1624
824
3441
536
436
425
1452
576
2534
644
70965
Table 12: Density of local government in the United States, 1950-2000
Panel A: Sub-county general purpose local government per 1,000 population
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
USA
1952
0.10
0.04
0.07
0.19
0.03
0.19
0.10
0.16
0.11
0.14
0.01
0.33
0.30
0.40
0.36
1.12
0.11
0.09
0.29
0.07
0.08
0.28
0.89
0.13
0.29
0.21
0.77
0.10
0.44
0.12
0.11
0.11
0.10
2.81
0.29
0.23
0.14
0.25
0.05
0.12
2.15
0.08
0.10
0.31
0.82
0.07
0.14
0.11
0.53
0.30
0.23
1962
0.11
0.03
0.05
0.23
0.02
0.14
0.07
0.11
0.07
0.14
0.01
0.30
0.27
0.33
0.34
0.99
0.12
0.08
0.27
0.05
0.07
0.23
0.78
0.12
0.28
0.18
0.72
0.06
0.39
0.09
0.08
0.09
0.10
2.76
0.23
0.23
0.13
0.23
0.05
0.11
2.03
0.08
0.09
0.24
0.78
0.06
0.12
0.12
0.46
0.27
0.19
1972
0.12
0.07
0.04
0.24
0.03
0.12
0.07
0.10
0.06
0.12
0.01
0.28
0.25
0.30
0.34
0.96
0.12
0.08
0.28
0.04
0.07
0.21
0.70
0.13
0.27
0.19
0.69
0.04
0.33
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.09
2.80
0.22
0.22
0.12
0.22
0.05
0.11
2.02
0.09
0.09
0.21
0.68
0.05
0.09
0.13
0.42
0.27
0.18
63
1982
0.12
0.06
0.03
0.21
0.02
0.10
0.06
0.10
0.05
0.10
0.01
0.21
0.24
0.29
0.33
0.85
0.12
0.08
0.26
0.04
0.07
0.20
0.66
0.12
0.26
0.17
0.65
0.03
0.26
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.09
2.65
0.21
0.20
0.10
0.22
0.05
0.09
1.90
0.08
0.08
0.16
0.58
0.05
0.07
0.12
0.40
0.20
0.16
1992
0.11
0.05
0.03
0.21
0.02
0.09
0.06
0.09
0.04
0.09
0.01
0.2
0.24
0.29
0.35
0.80
0.12
0.08
0.40
0.04
0.06
0.20
0.61
0.12
0.25
0.17
0.63
0.02
0.22
0.08
0.07
0.09
0.08
2.69
0.21
0.19
0.09
0.22
0.04
0.08
1.84
0.07
0.07
0.14
0.51
0.04
0.06
0.13
0.38
0.22
0.15
2002
0.11
0.24
0.02
0.19
0.02
0.07
0.06
0.08
0.03
0.07
0.01
0.16
0.22
0.26
0.33
0.72
0.11
0.07
0.39
0.03
0.06
0.18
0.54
0.11
0.23
0.15
0.58
0.01
0.19
0.07
0.06
0.09
0.07
2.64
0.2
0.18
0.08
0.21
0.04
0.07
1.66
0.07
0.06
0.11
0.47
0.04
0.05
0.13
0.35
0.20
0.13
Panel B: Sub-county general purpose local governments plus special districts per 1,000
population
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
USA
1952
0.13
0.06
0.11
0.31
0.17
0.41
0.18
0.28
0.18
0.19
0.03
1.00
0.48
0.47
0.43
1.50
0.16
0.14
0.43
0.13
0.13
0.29
0.91
0.24
0.51
0.43
1.13
0.37
0.59
0.14
0.23
0.17
0.13
2.97
0.30
0.27
0.41
0.25
0.12
0.15
2.23
0.10
0.16
0.46
1.01
0.08
0.41
0.12
0.55
0.61
0.31
1962
0.17
0.04
0.09
0.41
0.15
0.47
0.16
0.26
0.13
0.22
0.03
1.01
0.48
0.46
0.44
1.4
0.18
0.16
0.41
0.11
0.11
0.24
0.82
0.25
0.46
0.47
1.26
0.36
0.53
0.15
0.2
0.15
0.16
3.15
0.26
0.29
0.54
0.35
0.12
0.17
2.15
0.16
0.17
0.4
0.97
0.08
0.42
0.15
0.49
0.71
0.30
1972
0.2
0.07
0.09
0.43
0.14
0.49
0.14
0.24
0.11
0.2
0.03
1.04
0.46
0.46
0.45
1.46
0.26
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.11
0.22
0.76
0.25
0.44
0.56
1.42
0.31
0.45
0.13
0.19
0.14
0.2
3.71
0.24
0.38
0.51
0.37
0.12
0.18
2.23
0.20
0.20
0.37
0.84
0.07
0.39
0.23
0.45
0.88
0.30
64
1982
0.22
0.06
0.08
0.43
0.13
0.45
0.15
0.33
0.09
0.17
0.02
0.91
0.47
0.45
0.46
1.43
0.26
0.09
0.44
0.10
0.13
0.22
0.74
0.25
0.50
0.74
1.38
0.19
0.38
0.14
0.16
0.15
0.2
3.71
0.25
0.33
0.41
0.39
0.13
0.17
2.19
0.18
0.20
0.3
0.74
0.06
0.34
0.27
0.45
0.68
0.29
1992
0.23
0.05
0.1
0.45
0.11
0.47
0.17
0.38
0.07
0.15
0.02
0.93
0.50
0.46
0.49
1.40
0.28
0.08
0.57
0.08
0.13
0.23
0.70
0.24
0.52
0.86
1.29
0.15
0.32
0.13
0.15
0.15
0.19
3.82
0.26
0.36
0.38
0.39
0.13
0.17
2.22
0.17
0.21
0.33
0.70
0.06
0.30
0.33
0.46
1.04
0.28
2002
0.22
0.26
0.08
0.45
0.10
0.40
0.17
0.41
0.07
0.14
0.02
0.78
0.48
0.45
0.51
1.29
0.29
0.08
0.56
0.05
0.12
0.22
0.62
0.27
0.50
0.80
1.25
0.09
0.31
0.11
0.41
0.15
0.11
3.83
0.26
0.34
0.35
0.37
0.11
0.15
2.16
0.15
0.17
0.25
0.72
0.07
0.25
0.32
0.48
1.31
0.26
Panel C: Sub-county general purpose local governments per 1,000 square miles
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
USA
1952
5.96
0.05
0.43
6.92
1.97
2.33
38.19
25.08
5.46
8.07
0.16
2.34
46.60
43.19
16.72
25.90
7.88
4.94
8.53
14.94
44.78
30.87
33.17
5.61
16.12
0.84
13.14
0.14
26.10
76.45
0.60
32.66
8.24
25.25
54.76
7.27
2.17
56.99
37.33
7.94
18.41
5.85
2.82
2.55
33.41
5.64
4.66
8.98
33.42
0.89
9.54
1962
6.88
0.07
0.54
8.01
2.40
2.44
38.4
26.11
6.79
9.53
0.16
2.42
48.29
43.36
16.90
26.45
9.19
5.93
8.62
15.56
44.78
31.13
33.51
5.68
17.73
0.86
13.21
0.16
26.10
76.45
0.66
32.71
9.22
25.28
55.20
7.77
2.32
57.08
37.33
8.47
18.18
6.8
3.31
2.59
33.09
5.97
4.95
9.31
33.77
0.93
9.87
1972
7.81
0.20
0.58
8.72
2.61
2.49
37.78
26.62
7.24
9.00
0.16
2.39
48.56
43.33
17.03
26.2
9.52
6.59
8.75
15.45
44.78
31.34
33.32
5.76
17.96
0.87
13.18
0.16
26.43
76.45
0.74
32.81
9.33
25.03
55.10
7.97
2.41
57.22
37.33
8.71
17.69
7.67
3.75
2.61
32.22
5.84
4.59
9.39
33.85
0.90
9.98
65
1982
8.56
0.25
0.67
9.07
2.75
2.58
37.57
28.66
7.26
9.05
0.16
2.40
48.83
43.83
17.10
24.38
10.68
6.91
9.47
15.56
44.78
31.29
33.29
6.23
18.17
0.87
13.08
0.16
26.10
76.59
0.80
32.69
9.94
25.01
55.17
8.47
2.52
57.30
37.33
8.81
17.24
8.13
4.29
2.73
31.79
5.79
3.99
9.60
34.05
0.94
10.07
1992
8.64
0.26
0.76
9.40
2.95
2.57
36.74
29.18
7.24
9.10
0.16
2.41
48.85
43.89
17.04
24.21
10.95
6.91
15.88
15.86
44.78
31.27
33.38
6.27
18.25
0.88
12.83
0.17
26.10
76.45
0.81
32.79
10.60
24.85
55.10
8.57
2.49
57.35
37.33
8.94
16.86
8.23
4.48
2.78
31.04
5.81
4.03
9.60
34.05
1.00
10.16
2002
8.89
0.27
0.77
9.59
3.05
2.61
36.95
29.18
7.50
9.02
0.16
2.42
48.98
43.92
16.97
23.55
10.68
6.94
15.85
16.07
44.78
31.25
33.25
6.32
18.27
0.89
12.71
0.18
26.10
76.32
0.84
32.73
11.11
24.54
54.95
8.60
2.51
56.81
37.33
8.94
16.45
8.47
4.57
2.88
30.71
5.79
4.20
9.72
34.07
1.01
10.15
Panel D: Sub-county general purpose local governments plus special districts per 1,000
square miles
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
USA
1952
7.34
0.07
0.73
11.36
10.88
5.19
72.45
45.55
8.94
10.68
1.72
7.11
74.42
51.36
19.77
34.75
11.16
8.25
12.67
31.11
72.84
32.34
34.06
11.03
28.98
1.75
19.45
0.54
34.8
87.37
1.24
53.17
10.17
26.61
58.17
8.64
6.41
57.64
84.22
10.53
19.15
7.91
4.7
3.84
40.98
6.7
14.34
9.93
34.77
1.83
13.03
1962
10.86
0.09
1.00
13.76
14.98
7.90
80.5
58.35
11.69
14.64
2.65
8.09
86.54
58.97
21.61
37.21
13.70
11.46
12.67
33.56
69.52
32.87
34.95
11.35
28.50
2.18
22.99
0.93
35.58
116.22
1.50
53.25
14.27
28.84
59.52
9.57
9.89
88.28
90.91
13.19
19.23
13.30
6.11
4.31
40.87
7.13
17.98
11.59
35.03
2.41
15.08
1972
13.45
0.20
1.37
15.75
16.87
10.32
85.45
66.54
13.08
15.22
2.50
8.95
91.87
66.53
22.49
40.08
20.75
16.21
12.84
38.88
78.96
33.79
35.97
11.77
29.87
2.64
27.25
1.38
36.91
122.43
1.55
53.02
20.84
33.16
61.81
13.83
11.02
96.87
107.18
14.75
19.48
18.76
8.39
4.75
40.23
7.30
19.93
16.54
36.08
2.99
16.81
66
1982
16.24
0.26
1.82
18.77
18.82
12.51
95.57
99.8
14.99
15.67
2.34
10.36
95.65
68.84
23.56
41.12
23.69
7.81
15.78
42.57
89.93
34.53
37.76
12.95
35.51
3.96
28.13
1.38
38.70
137.80
1.63
52.24
24.15
35.05
64.38
14.38
11.11
103.05
113.88
16.84
19.86
19.51
10.71
5.30
40.77
7.88
20.97
21.73
38.89
3.26
18.11
1992
18.23
0.29
3.06
20.17
20.89
14.64
112.7
129.48
15.8
16.25
2.65
11.21
101.38
70.07
23.99
42.32
25.81
7.60
22.33
38.68
95.29
36.15
38.12
13.09
38.37
4.70
26.45
1.59
39.03
126.88
1.77
53.55
25.42
35.32
67.63
16.20
11.19
102.11
116.75
18.60
20.31
19.80
13.13
6.79
42.28
9.07
21.42
24.14
40.99
4.85
19.19
2002
19.24
0.29
3.45
23.11
21.20
16.24
116.21
162.24
19.10
18.88
2.50
12.07
105.56
75.28
26.67
42.28
28.80
7.97
23.04
24.76
96.18
37.70
38.32
16.08
40.25
4.96
27.62
1.62
42.60
113.53
6.01
56.77
17.66
35.61
70.36
16.75
12.16
98.87
109.10
18.94
21.41
20.00
13.15
6.53
47.15
10.74
21.83
23.93
46.66
6.64
20.06
Table 13: Number and density of municipalities within the 20 largest Canadian
metropolitan areas, 1960-2000
Panel A: Number of municipalities, by metropolitan area
Metro area
Toronto, ON
Montreal, QC
Vancouver, BC
Ottawa-Hull, ON/QC
Calgary, AB
Edmonton, AB
Quebec City, QC
Winnipeg, MB
Hamilton, ON
London, ON
Kitchener, ON
St. Catherines, ON
Halifax, NS
Victoria, BC
Windsor, ON
Oshawa, ON
Saskatoon, SK
Regina, SK
St. John's, NF
Greater Sudbury, ON
1960
28
84
17
13
6
7
33
16
12
3
9
3
8
8
8
4
1
1
10
10
1970
29
104
24
25
1
10
37
14
12
9
9
8
8
9
12
3
1
2
14
12
67
1980
20
100
35
18
1
11
41
6
8
8
5
8
10
16
10
2
1
1
20
6
1990
28
104
39
23
9
35
46
8
8
12
5
10
10
21
11
3
21
17
19
7
2000
24
109
39
13
9
35
45
11
3
7
5
10
4
23
5
3
24
17
13
3
Panel B: Number of municipalities per 100,000 people, by metropolitan area
Metro area
Toronto, ON
Montreal, QC
Vancouver, BC
Ottawa-Hull, ON/QC
Calgary, AB
Edmonton, AB
Quebec City, QC
Winnipeg, MB
Hamilton, ON
London, ON
Kitchener, ON
St. Catherines, ON
Halifax, NS
Victoria, BC
Windsor, ON
Oshawa, ON
Saskatoon, SK
Regina, SK
St. John's, NF
Greater Sudbury, ON
1960
1.53
3.98
2.15
3.03
2.15
2.07
9.23
3.36
3.04
1.65
5.81
2
4.34
5.19
4.14
4.94
1.05
0.89
11
9
1970
1.1
3.8
2.22
4.15
0.25
2.01
7.7
2.6
2.41
3.15
3.97
2.64
3.59
4.6
4.64
2.49
0.79
1.42
10.62
7.72
68
1980
0.67
3.54
2.76
2.41
0.17
1.67
7.12
1.02
1.48
2.82
1.74
2.63
3.6
6.85
4.06
1.3
0.65
0.61
12.92
4
1990
0.72
3.33
2.44
2.5
1.19
4.17
7.12
1.23
1.33
3.15
1.4
2.74
3.12
7.29
4.2
1.25
10
8.87
11.06
4.44
2000
0.51
3.16
1.96
1.21
0.95
3.73
6.55
1.62
0.45
1.61
1.21
2.65
1.11
7.37
1.52
1.01
10.62
8.92
7.52
1.93
Table 14: Number of local government units within the largest 50 metropolitan areas in
the United States, 1997
New York
Los Angeles--Long Beach
Chicago
Philadelphia
Washington
Detroit
Houston
Atlanta
Boston
Dallas
Riverside--San Bernardino
Phoenix--Mesa
Minneapolis--St. Paul
San Diego
Orange County
Nassau--Suffolk
St. Louis
Baltimore
Pittsburgh
Oakland
Seattle--Bellevue--Everett
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater
Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria
Miami
Newark
Denver
Portland--Vancouver
Kansas City
San Francisco
San Jose
Cincinnati
Fort Worth--Arlington
Sacramento
Norfolk--Virginia Beach--Newport
San Antonio
Indianapolis
Fort Lauderdale
Orlando
Columbus
Milwaukee--Waukesha
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill
Bergen--Passaic
Las Vegas
New Orleans
Salt Lake City--Ogden
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--Hi
Nashville
Buffalo--Niagara Falls
Hartford
Providence--Fall River--Warwick
General purpose
(GP) local
gov’ts
80
88
455
354
96
212
79
107
380
145
48
32
331
18
31
110
300
20
412
32
56
35
200
27
129
31
56
171
32
15
198
60
13
11
33
184
28
36
178
90
52
86
10
17
41
43
43
63
58
33
69
Special
districts
(SD)
GP per 100,000
population
65
196
662
296
49
44
669
109
409
98
223
105
97
113
86
199
357
55
334
142
191
51
55
6
35
378
163
231
111
42
101
27
221
15
32
220
35
33
48
48
25
7
47
5
91
27
58
37
110
69
0.93
0.96
5.73
7.16
2.06
4.75
2.02
2.86
11.57
4.53
1.55
1.10
11.70
0.66
1.14
4.12
11.72
0.81
17.57
1.39
2.43
1.56
9.00
1.26
6.63
1.61
3.08
9.85
1.91
0.92
12.25
3.77
0.84
0.71
2.15
12.12
1.86
2.40
12.09
6.17
3.77
6.44
0.76
1.31
3.25
3.69
3.73
5.48
5.08
2.95
GP plus SD
per 100,000
population
1.68
3.08
14.06
13.15
3.12
5.73
19.05
5.77
24.02
7.59
8.70
4.68
15.13
4.74
4.30
11.57
25.65
3.03
31.82
7.52
10.69
3.82
11.47
1.54
8.42
21.12
12.04
23.15
8.5
3.48
18.49
5.47
15.06
1.68
4.23
26.6
4.18
4.60
15.35
9.46
5.57
6.96
4.32
1.69
10.45
6.00
8.74
8.69
14.70
9.10
Table 15: Determinants of the log number of general-purpose local government units within Canadian provinces and US states,
1960-2000
Constant
Log(population)
Log(land area)
Latitude
Longitude
Major port
Canada indicator
(1a)
1960
-7.29***
(2.11)
0.81***
(0.15)
0.26*
(0.14)
0.06***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.89***
(0.29)
-0.75
(0.46)
(1b)
1960
-7.24***
(2.26)
0.79***
(0.14)
0.23
(0.15)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.93**
(0.50)
-0.75
(0.50)
0.00
(0.00)
0.27
(0.27)
(2a)
1970
-6.77***
(1.88)
0.68***
(0.13)
0.37***
(0.12)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.69***
(0.23)
-0.88**
(0.40)
(2b)
1970
-6.57***
(1.91)
0.68***
(0.15)
0.32**
(0.14)
0.08***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.73***
(0.23)
-0.91**
(0.42)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.29
(0.26)
(3a)
1980
-6.35***
(1.94)
0.63***
(0.15)
0.40***
(0.12)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.62***
(0.23)
-0.91**
(0.41)
(3b)
1980
-6.21***
(0.19)
0.62***
(0.16)
0.34**
(0.15)
0.08***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.66***
(0.22)
-0.92**
(0.43)
0.00
(0.00)
0.34
(0.27)
(4a)
1990
-5.47***
(1.95)
0.55***
(0.14)
0.45***
(0.12)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.52**
(0.23)
-1.06**
(0.42)
(4b)
1990
-5.47***
(1.98)
0.51***
(0.15)
0.41***
(0.15)
0.08***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.56**
(0.22)
-1.03**
(0.44)
0.00
(0.00)
0.36
(0.27)
(5a)
2000
-6.25***
(1.97)
0.53***
(0.13)
0.45***
(0.12)
0.09***
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.41*
(0.21)
-1.15***
(0.41)
(5b)
2000
-5.93***
(2.06)
0.49***
(0.16)
0.42***
(0.15)
0.08***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.57**
(0.23)
-0.92*
(0.49)
0.00
(0.00)
0.39
(0.28)
0.72
59
0.72
59
0.70
60
0.72
60
0.70
60
0.71
60
0.68
60
0.69
60
0.66
60
0.68
60
Years of
settlement
Civil law
indicator
R-squared
N
Notes: See text.
70
Table 16: Determinants of the number of general-purpose local governments in Canadian
and US metro areas for 1997/2000
Panel A: Dependent variable is the log of the number of local government units
(1)
Baseline regression
Log(population)
Log(land area)
Latitude
Longitude
River
Port
Canada
(2)
Include climate
controls
0.52***
(0.04)
0.19***
(0.04)
0.10***
(0.03)
-0.02***
(0.00)
0.22**
(0.09)
-0.11
(0.11)
-1.46***
(0.18)
0.01
(0.03)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.52***
(0.04)
0.19***
(0.04)
0.09***
(0.01)
-0.02***
(0.00)
0.21**
(0.09)
-0.10
(0.12)
-1.43***
(0.16)
Temperature
Precipitation
National capital
indicator
Prov/state capital
indicator
Civil law indicator
R-squared
N
0.68
452
0.68
452
71
(3)
Include climate and
political controls
0.54***
(0.04)
0.18***
(0.04)
0.11***
(0.03)
-0.02***
(0.01)
0.22**
(0.09)
-0.13
(0.12)
-1.48***
(0.19)
0.01
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.78***
(0.23)
-0.06
(0.13)
0.17**
(0.08)
0.69
452
Panel B: Dependent variable is the number of local government units per 100,000 persons
(1)
Baseline regression
Log(land area)
Latitude
Longitude
River
Port
Canada
1.73**
(0.66)
1.14***
(0.17)
-0.12***
(0.04)
0.76
(1.48)
-5.597***
(1.23)
-6.91***
(2.82)
Temperature
Precipitation
(2)
Include climate
controls
1.80***
(0.65)
0.80**
(0.33)
-0.08*
(0.04)
0.86
(1.48)
-5.59***
(1.26)
-8.44***
(3.19)
-0.44
(0.36)
0.00
(0.00)
(3)
Include climate and
political controls
2.08***
(0.67)
0.83**
(0.37)
-0.09*
(0.05)
1.02
(1.45)
-5.62***
(1.29)
-8.32***
(3.22)
-0.44
(0.38)
0.00
(0.00)
-15.66***
(2.05)
-5.51***
(1.43)
0.35
(1.06)
0.22
452
0.25
452
National capital
indicator
Prov/state capital
indicator
Civil law indicator
R-squared
N
0.22
452
Notes: For Canada, the data on local governments and population are from 2000. For the
US the data are from 1997. Local government units only include sub-county general
purpose governments (cities, towns, townships, boroughs).
72
Table 17: Effect of home rule status in 1950 and 1970 on the number of sub-county general-purpose government units in US states,
1960-2000
Log(population)
Log(land area)
Latitude
Longitude
Major port
Years since statehood
Civil law indicator
HR in 1950
1960
0.71***
(0.16)
0.45***
(0.12)
0.06
(0.03)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.62***
(0.27)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.04
(0.31)
0.40
(0.27)
1970
0.65***
(0.17)
0.41***
(0.12)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.52**
(0.25)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.13
(0.30)
0.39
(0.26)
1980a
0.58***
(0.18)
0.53***
(0.13)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.44*
(0.25)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.17
(0.30)
0.46*
(0.26)
HR in 1970
R-squared
N
0.77
50
0.75
50
0.76
50
1980b
0.56***
(0.18)
0.51***
(0.13)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.49*
(0.24)
0.00
(0.01)
0.26
(0.27)
0.45*
(0.25)
0.77
50
1990a
0.45***
(0.17)
0.60***
(0.13)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.06***
(0.01)
-0.30
(0.24)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.18
(0.31)
0.52**
(0.26)
0.76
50
1990b
0.44**
(0.17)
0.59***
(0.12)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.35
(0.24)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.28
(0.28)
0.48*
(0.25)
0.76
50
2000a
0.45***
(0.15)
0.61***
(0.12)
0.08***
(0.02)
-0.06***
(0.01)
-0.22
(0.25)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.23
(0.30)
0.49*
(0.25)
0.75
50
2000b
0.45***
(0.15)
0.58***
(0.12)
0.08***
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.29
(0.25)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.32
(0.28)
0.49*
(0.24)
0.74
50
Note:
1. The dependent variable is the log of the number of sub-county general-purpose government units within a state. Sub-county
general-purpose government units include cities, towns, townships and boroughs.
2. A state is classified as HR in 1950/70 if it has structural and functional home rule by 1950/70. Home rule status is taken from
Table A1 of Home Rule in America.
Table 18: Effect of home rule status on the log number of sub-county general-purpose government units in US metro areas, 1997.
Panel A: Dependent variable is the log of local government units
Log(population)
Log(land area)
Latitude
Longitude
River
Port
(1a)
Baseline
(1b)
Baseline
0.60***
(0.07)
0.18*
(0.10)
0.08***
(0.01)
-0.03***
(0.01)
0.23**
(0.11)
-0.15
(0.11)
0.61***
(0.06)
0.17*
(0.09)
0.09***
(0.01)
-0.03***
(0.01)
0.23**
(0.11)
-0.18
(0.12)
Temperature
Precipitation
Home rule status in
1950
Home rule status in
1970
National capital
indicator
State capital
indicator
0.33***
(0.09)
(2b)
Include climate
controls
0.62***
(0.07)
0.16*
(0.09)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.03***
(0.01)
0.22*
(0.12)
-0.11
(0.10)
-0.07*
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.29***
(0.09)
0.21**
(0.09)
(2b)
Include climate
controls
0.64***
(0.06)
0.15*
(0.09)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.03***
(0.01)
0.22*
(0.11)
-0.13
(0.11)
-0.08**
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.18**
(0.09)
Civil law indicator
R-squared
N
0.61
314
0.60
314
(3a)
Include climate and
political controls
0.65***
(0.07)
0.15*
(0.09)
0.03
(0.04)
-0.03***
(0.01)
0.21*
(0.11)
-0.14
(0.10)
-0.08**
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.22**
(0.01)
0.62
314
74
0.62
314
(3b)
Include climate and
political controls
0.67***
(0.07)
0.14
(0.09)
0.03
(0.04)
-0.03***
(0.01)
0.21*
(0.11)
-0.16
(0.11)
-0.09**
(0.03)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.63**
(0.18)
-0.12
(0.14)
0.12
(0.09)
-0.66***
(0.19)
-0.15
(0.14)
0.29***
(0.11)
0.63
316
0.33
(0.14)
0.63
314
Panel B: Dependent variable is the number of local government units per 100,000 persons
Log(land area)
Latitude
Longitude
River
Port
(1a)
Baseline
(1b)
Baseline
0.47
(0.97)
1.00***
(0.18)
-0.19***
(0.06)
0.89
(1.65)
-5.08***
(1.42)
0.54
(0.99)
1.03***
(0.19)
-0.19***
(0.06)
0.95
(1.63)
-5.21***
(1.45)
Temperature
Precipitation
Home rule status in
1950
2.41*
(1.58)
Home rule status in
1970
National capital
indicator
State capital
indicator
Civil law indicator
R-squared
N
(2a)
Include climate
controls
0.49
(0.91)
-0.10
(0.31)
-0.14***
(0.05)
0.86
(1.63)
-3.81***
(1.63)
-1.34***
(0.37)
-0.00*
(0.00)
1.91
(1.26)
2.28*
(1.38)
0.26
314
0.26
314
(2b)
Include climate
controls
0.56
(0.93)
-0.10
(0.32)
-0.14***
(0.05)
0.92
(1.62)
-3.90***
(1.37)
-1.37***
(0.38)
-0.00*
(0.00)
(3a)
Include climate and
political controls
0.71
(0.97)
-0.03
(0.37)
-0.16***
(0.07)
0.95
(1.59)
-4.05***
(1.46)
-1.42***
(0.38)
-0.00*
(0.00)
1.12
(1.28)
1.94
(1.32)
0.26
314
75
0.29
314
-11.10***
(1.28)
-4.80***
(2.65)
2.32
(1.52)
0.32
314
(3b)
Include climate and
political controls
0.76
(1.00)
-0.01
(0.38)
-0.15**
(0.07)
1.00
(1.58)
-4.12***
(1.48)
-1.43***
(0.38)
-0.00*
(0.00)
1.33
(1.30)
-10.83***
(2.60)
-4.79***
(1.37)
2.39
(1.50)
0.32
314