A LIST OF SOME MAIN ISSUES IN MORAL THEORY
The following is an incomplete list of some main issues in moral theory. The first half of our first
class will be devoted discussing big picture issues in moral theory in general. The point of the
discussion is simply to give you a chance ask general questions about areas of moral theory with
which you are not familiar. I will have no agenda. We’ll simply discuss the questions that
students raise. (The second half of the first class will be devoted background issues specifically
related to the topic of our course.)
1. Normativity
A normative viewpoint is one that classifies actions, etc. in terms of their permissibility (e.g.,
optional, obligatory, or impermissible) or in terms of their goodness (e.g., good, neutral, or bad).
Normative viewpoints are concerned with how things should be, and not necessarily with how
things are. There are many normative viewpoints: moral, prudential, legal, etiquette, club rules, etc.
Descriptive vs. Critical Normativity: The descriptive norms (moral, prudential, etc.) of a given
individual or society consists of the norms reflected in the verbal and other behavior of that
individual or society. It is an empirical matter and is part of what social science studies. The
descriptive norms of a given individual or society (e.g., of Nazis) may be deeply defective. Critical
normativity is not merely descriptive matter. It concerns the correct norms, and thus provides a
basis for criticizing the prevailing descriptive norms of a given individual or society. We will be
concerned with critical normativity.
Some main perspectives of critical normativity include morality, prudence (rational self-interest),
and epistemic rationality (as opposed to club rules, etiquette, or the laws). How is morality
distinguished from the other perspectives? There is no crisp answer, but here is a start: Morality
is a normative viewpoint the concern of which is to impartially protect and/or promote the basic
interests of all individuals. (Prudence is only concerned with the interests of the agent. Epistemic
rationality is only concerned with a very specific set of interests.)
2. Metaethics:
What is the ontological nature of morality? How, if at all, do we have knowledge of morality?
What are the semantics of our moral utterances/beliefs?
Semantics:
Non-cognitivism: Moral utterances do not express propositions. They express pro/con attitudes.
Naturalism: Moral utterances express propositions that have natural (e.g., empirical) truth
conditions.
Non-Naturalism: Moral utterances express propositions that have non-natural truth conditions.
(These can be recast as positions about moral judgment as well.)
Metaphysics:
Moral realism (one version): There are true moral (natural or non-natural) propositions that have
objective (mind-independent) truth conditions.
Moral constructivism (one version): There are true moral natural propositions that have minddependent truth conditions.
Moral nihilism: There are no true moral propositions.
Error theory (non-naturalism plus nihilism): Our moral utterances express non-natural
propositions, but they are all false (since there is not non-natural moral order).
3. Justification of moral judgments
Particularism: Only particular moral judgments (about specific cases) have justificatory force.
General principles merely summarize and extend (where incomplete) these judgments. Note that
particularism allows that the justificatory force of one particular judgment one might change
after reflecting on another particular judgment.
Principlism (Generalism): Only judgments about general moral principles have justificatory
force. Particular judgments are merely derived from these and empirical judgments.
Method of Reflective Equilibrium (a method for justifying moral claims): We start with
intuitions about the plausibility of both general moral principles and about moral judgments in
particular cases. We gather more information and reflect upon our views. Given our background
views, the totality is not consistent. Our views are almost always based on false assumptions,
confused notions, and unforeseen implications. We then revise based on “minimum mutilation”
(to plausibility) towards an equilibrium based on information and reflection (in which our
background views, abstract moral views, and concrete moral views cohere). Sometimes this
involves abandoning or revising an abstract view and sometimes modification of a concrete
view. Each kind of view has some independent justificatory force (neither is merely derivative).
Particularistic Reflective Equilibrium: Particular judgments are deemed especially plausible
relative to general judgments.
Principlist Reflective Equilibrium: Judgments about general moral principles are deemed
especially plausible relative to particular judgments.
The method of reflective equilibrium can be understood merely as a useful methodology (and
thus compatible with moral realism) or as constitutive of morality (and thus a form of moral
constructivism).
4. The Role of Principles in Moral Theory
Pro tanto (prima facie) principles: These principles apply but can be outweighed or overridden,
in a particular case, by other pro tanto principles. For example, there may be a pro tanto principle
that killing innocent people is wrong, but it may, in a particular case, be overridden by the pro
tanto principle that one is required to save a thousand people from death. It is only when all pro
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tanto principles are taken into account that one gets a conclusive judgment of permissibility in a
particular case.
Conclusive principles: These principles apply conclusively whenever they apply. Thus, if there is
a conclusive principle that killing innocent people is wrong, then, it is always wrong to kill
innocent people.
Those who advocate pro tanto principles claim that there is no way of specifying with complete
generality how the various pro tanto fit together (what outweighs what). Particularists claim that
this is so as a matter of moral reality, but some may claim this merely as a matter of moral
methodology or moral epistemology.
Those who advocate conclusive principles claim that pro tanto principles are merely implicitly
highly qualified conclusive principles that, in principle, can be specified.
5. Normative Ethics and Political Morality
Two basic moral questions:
(1) What are the criteria for moral goodness (or betterness)?
(2) What are the criteria for moral permissibility (wrong = impermissible, optional = permissible
and permissible not to, obligatory = permissible and not permissible not to)?
Entities that can be morally assessed: states of affairs, characters, actions, practices, rules, laws,
constitutions.
Ethics is morality applied to individual conduct. Political morality is (something like) morality
applied to the use of force (typically by the state).
Justice vs. moral permissibility: Justice is understood in many different ways, but two useful
understandings are (1) as interpersonal morality (the duties that we owe each other; excludes
impersonal duties), and (2) as our enforceable duties (duties that someone is morally permitted to
enforce).
Some theories of ethics or political morality: (1) Divine Command Theory, (2) Libertarianism,
(3) Consequentialist (utilitarianism, prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, egalitarianism,
desertism), (4) Contractarian (Hobbesian (e.g., Gauthier), Lockean, Kantian (e.g., Rawls and
Scanlon), (5) Kantianism
Many of these theories can take a direct form and an indirect form. The direct form assesses
actions direction in terms of the criterion (e.g., maximizes total wellbeing). The indirect form
assesses actions on the basis of whether they comply with the set of rules that satisfies the
criterion.
6. Assessing the person vs. assessing the action
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Assessing character: A morally virtuous person is (roughly) a person whose character is morally
desirable. A virtuous person who is not perfectly virtuous may occasionally perform actions that
are morally impermissible.
A person’s choice (action) may be morally blameworthy even if it is morally permissible. For
example, someone may kill another, believing her to be innocent, in order to steal her money. In
fact the other may be a horrible criminal about to commit another horrendous crime. The action
may be morally permissible (because of its good effects), but the person may be blameworthy for
her choice, given that she believed that she was wrongly killing an innocent.
A person’s choice (action) may be morally blameless even if it is morally impermissible. For
example, someone may kill another, believing her to be a horrible criminal about to commit
another horrendous crime. In fact, the other may be fully innocent. The choice may be morally
blameless if the agent could not have known that the person was not a criminal about to commit
another horrendous crime.
7. Exemptions, Justifications, and Excuses
An exemption is something that establishes that the individual did not exercise sufficiently
autonomous choice for there to be moral (or legal) assessment of the permissibility of an action
(e.g., because of age, insanity, being pushed or wind-blown, or temporary loss of autonomy).
A justification is, roughly, something that makes an otherwise impermissible action permissible.
An undercutting justification nullifies an otherwise sufficient condition for impermissibility
(e.g., the wrongness of killing another may be undercut when suitably done in self-defense). An
overriding justification does not nullify the sufficient condition for impermissibility. Instead, it
leaves it in place but outweigh is (e.g., wrongness of killing another may be overridden when
necessary to save a million people).
An excuse reduces the blameworthiness of an action that is impermissible. (It is mitigating if
only partial and exonerating if full.) There are three main kinds of considerations that can reduce
(and sometimes eliminate) blameworthiness for acting wrong:
(1) reduced but not eliminated autonomous agency (reduced rationality): (e.g., because of age,
cognitive impairment, intoxication, panic, or inner compulsion [e.g., almost irresistible
impulses]);
(2) external compulsion (which make it rationally difficult to do otherwise): duress (i.e., threat of
wrongful harm; coercion), provocation, necessity (lack of acceptable alternative due to dire
natural circumstances);
(3) mistaken beliefs and ignorance (epistemic limitations on what the agent could have known).
Complete absence of autonomous agency is an exemption and entails that the behavior is not
subject to moral evaluation. In particular, it is neither permissible nor impermissible. Thus,
complete absence of autonomous agency is not an excuse (since excuses apply to impermissible
actions). Thus, reduced autonomous agency functions as an excuse only when it is not too large
(leaves enough autonomous agency for the action to be impermissible).
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Note that duress and necessity function as justifications (rather than excuses) when the moral
value of the consequences of doing otherwise is sufficiently bad (e.g., hit the child or I’ll kill a
million people). They function as excuses when the moral value of the consequences of doing
otherwise are not sufficiently bad to provide a justification, but the value for the agent of doing
otherwise is sufficiently bad (making it difficult for her to do otherwise).
A defense in the narrow sense (e.g., insanity defense) establishes that the act was not
impermissible. It is either a justification (establishing that act was permissible; e.g., killing in
self-defense) or establishes lack of sufficient autonomous agency (establishing that act was
neither permissible nor impermissible; e.g., insanity defense).
Defense in broad sense: establishes that the agent was not agent-responsible for acting wrongly
(includes full excuses, justifications, and lack of autonomous agency).
8. Some deontological distinctions
Deontologists (non-consequentialists) claim that moral constraints on action are highly sensitive
to one or both of the following distinctions.
Do (Bring About) vs. Allow: One does something, or brings about a result, roughly speaking,
when the result would not have come about had one “done nothing”. Thus one kills, or brings
about his death, when one pushes a baby into shallow pond, but one merely allows his death, if
one stands by and offers no help. Many deontologists believe that the moral constraint against
harming (bringing about harm) is much stronger than that against merely allowing harm.
Intend (as end or as means) vs. Merely Foresee: One intends a result as an end just in case one is
aiming at the result for its own sake (e.g., to aim to kill because I want you dead). One intends a
result as a means just in case (very roughly) one is aiming at the result as way of achieving some
further end (e.g., I aim to kill you as way of stopping you from killing me). One merely foresees
a result if one does not intend it but is aware that it will accompany something one does aim at
(e.g., I merely foresee that blood will be on the floor when I kill you; I am not aiming at this).
Intending a result (under a given description) as a means can be understood narrowly in the sense
of aiming at the result (under the given description) as way of achieving some further end. This
is probably not the relevant sense, since one can foreseeably kill millions of people but this
would not be intentional in this sense as long as one was aiming at “causing them to stop
breathing for an hour” rather than “killing them”. The relevant notion is probably best
understood broadly in the sense of being foreseen to be a highly likely result of one’s choices.
One intends someone’s death as a means in this broad sense when one shoots them in the head to
stop them from crushing one but not when fatally pushing them to the ground foreseeing only a
very small chance of serious injury.
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