Contested Identity and Foreign Policy: Interpreting Russia’s International Choices
In International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 1, March, 2013.
Abstract
This paper develops a framework for interpreting state international policy by treating
national identity as inherently contested. Building on insights from constructivist
literature, it proposes a technique for establishing the meaning of foreign policy action on
several inter-related levels: state-based, society-based, and international. The paper
illustrates the benefits of the approach by selecting the example of Russia’s European
diplomacy under President Dmitri Medvedev. By studying how officials themselves
justify their policies and how these policies are then perceived in broader social and
international settings, we have an opportunity to develop a rich understanding of a
particular state action, as well as tentatively assess the chances of this action’s success or
failure.
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Contested Identity and Foreign Policy:
Interpreting Russia’s International Choices
Identity is “the name of what we desire but can never fully attain”
Jacques Lacan (as cited in Nabers 2007, 195)
Introduction
Studying foreign policy remains a challenge for international relations scholars.
Sometimes it seems as though the more we research and teach the subject, the more we
discover the limitations of existing tools and approaches. One enduring dilemma in
foreign policy studies is how one can understand state actions during periods of rapid
change and domestic uncertainty. Here, some analytic tools prove less appropriate than
others. For instance, focusing on the belief systems of the ruling elites may prove less
reliable than analyzing the whole spectrum of existing foreign policy views and
examining the international discourse extant in the society. Yet, the fact that every state is
influenced by ideas coming from across the social spectrum may present not only a
dilemma, but also an opportunity for those seeking to understand a particular state policy.
This paper develops a framework for interpreting state international policy by
treating national identity as inherently contested. Foreign policy is subject to constant
discussion by politicians, scholars, and the general public. As an interplay of ideas
developed within a nation, foreign policy may be interpreted from both a state and
society perspective. It may also be either supported or rejected by other nations. Building
on insights from constructivist literature, I propose a technique for establishing the
meaning of foreign policy action on several inter-related levels: state-based, societybased, and international. By studying how officials themselves justify their policies and
how these policies are then perceived in broader social and international settings, we have
an opportunity to develop a rich understanding of a particular state action, as well as
tentatively assess the chances of this action’s success or failure.
The paper is organized in three sections. The next section explains the importance
of studying the social contexts of state actions, as well as the choices available to foreign
policy actors. Such a context-specific and actor-sensitive approach provides the necessary
balance for understanding the role that identity contestation plays in foreign policy
formulation. The following section proposes five necessary steps for developing a
compelling interpretation of state policy. These steps include recording state policy,
establishing its official explanation, locating policy and its level of support within the
national context, tracking policy’s international recognition, and comparing policy to
other relevant cases. The final section illustrates the benefits of the approach by selecting
the example of Russia’s European diplomacy under President Dmitri Medvedev.
Foreign Policy and Identity Contestation
Foreign Policy: the Challenge of Interpretation
A practically relevant theory of foreign policy must begin by establishing a
meaningful context in which a policymaker acts and seeks to achieve his/her goals. In the
world of human interactions, beliefs and emotions are often behind what ostensibly are
rationally-calculated decisions. Rather than assuming what an action means to those
2
initiating it, scholarly responsibility demands that we are to establish it by studying the
relevant social and political contexts. This paper proceeds on the assumption that any
foreign policy action is a social phenomenon and cannot be adequately understood
without fully exploring the context in which it is formed.1 Studying such context is
indispensable to recovering the meaning of action.
The approach advocated in this paper seeks to avoid the extremes of positivism
and relativism. I do not treat interpretivist and explanatory/positivist perspectives on
foreign policy as incompatible.2 While each perspective has its own ontological and
epistemological assumptions, some room should be granted for juxtaposing and
comparing various questions about state international behavior generated by diverse
perspectives. Although positivists typically privilege the “why” question, it is not the
only important question about state foreign policy, and it should not be explored at the
expense of questions, such as “how” and “in which context” state action takes place and
what it may mean for future international interactions. On the other hand, the position
that takes any interpretation as relative and sensible only to the interpreter is also limited
in terms of theory development. If no two scholars can agree on how a particular action
may be interpreted, then the chosen approach has failed to specify its validity criteria
(Pouliot 2007, 363; Howard 2010, 398).
Rather than adopting either of these views, this paper’s approach combines
insights from both interpretivism and positivism. I retain the interpretivist commitment to
viewing the world as a social interaction, not a natural necessity, and I view the
establishment of action’s context as ultimately the most important scholarly task. I take it
for granted that even the so-called “objective” factors that provide foreign policy agents
with choices cannot be fully separated from the context in which they act. Capabilities of
material power, for example, serve as such only when they are socially processed and
socially embedded (Mattern 2001; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Guzzini 2005). Conversely,
states and other agents have options regarding the international system. The social
context is therefore thick enough to shape the inter-subjective meanings of all involved
actors, but not enough to deprive them of meaningful choices. As Michael Barnett (2002,
61) writes, while “cultural foundations make possible and desirable certain actions”,
these actions also depend on institutional and ideational environment, and actors’
strategies of shifting the cultural landscape. The logic of the approach requires that we
treat the social context as layered, heterogeneous, and one with multiple possibilities for
all participants.
Such context-specific and actor-sensitive of an approach places limitations on
employing grand theories for interpreting action or policy, especially if such theories are
generated outside a meaningful context. IR scholarship is grounded in certain social
conditions and reflects ideological and cultural premises of a certain community. For
1
For examples of works that emphasize importance of social context in studying
foreign policy, see Doty 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Hopf 2002; Telhami and Barnett 2002;
Clunan 2009. For advise on approaching empirical research from interpretivist
standpoint, see Miliken 1999; Klotz and Lynch 2007; Pouliot 2007; Hopf 2010.
2
For interpretivism-positivism controversy, see Dallmayr and McCarthy 1977.
For early work that has sharply differentiated between “explaining” and “understanding”
in foreign policy see Hollis and Smith 1990.
3
example, Western international relations research often reflects political, ideological, and
epistemological biases of Western, particularly American, culture (Hoffmann 1977;
Crawford and Jarvis 2001; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Jones 2006; Tsygankov and
Tsygankov 2010). If adequate interpretation of a locally-meaningful action or policy is to
be constructed, existing IR knowledge ought to be tested in the indigenous context. For
instance, the three Rs of international relations thinking introduced by the British scholar
Martin Wight3 may only serve as a starting point for researching the foreign policy of a
non-Western country, but this classification will not be able to capture what is culturally
specific or unique to that country’s context. Local intellectual currents and local types of
political, historical and moral reasoning regarding the country’s international behavior
should be explored on their own terms. Those seeking to escape intellectual dependence
on socially-external knowledge should therefore try to address the threat of subverting
indigenous theoretical impulses explicitly (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007; Tickner and
Waever 2009; Pellerin 2010; Hamati-Ataya 2011).Russia is a case in point. Its foreign
policy has been explored from variety of analytical angles, and its actions have elicited a
number of disagreements among scholars and policy makers. While some interpret
contemporary Russia as largely accommodationist and non-threatening to the West,
others perceive the Kremlin’s objectives as expansionist and disrespectful of existing
international rules. Whatever aspects of Russia’s foreign policy they research – relations
with its neighbors, Western countries, or Asia and the Middle East – scholars frequently
find themselves arguing over what Russia is trying to achieve in international politics and
how it perceives its contemporary national interests.4 In each of these areas, the debate on
Russia’s international objectives and their meaning remains central. The arrival of Barak
Obama to power and his attempts to “reset” relations with Russia is yet to clarify the
question of the motives of the Kremlin’s international behavior.5 The question remains
which policy the Western nations should advance toward Russia. If its interests and
ambitions are legitimate, the West is better off trying to engage Russia as an equal
contributor to shaping the global system. If, however, Moscow harbors revisionist plans,
it may represent a threat to Western interests and must be either contained or
fundamentally transformed. This debate may not be resolved without studying how
Russians themselves reason about their international options.
Identity Contestation
3
The realists emphasize international anarchy; the rationalists concentrate on
international interactions; and the revolutionists focus on international society (Wight
1992).
4
For recent examples of scholarship on Russia’s foreign policy, see Lucas 2008;
Trenin 2009; Mankoff 2009; Bugajski 2009. Kanet 2009; Tsygankov 2010.
5
Those on the skeptical side argue that the reset advocates misread Russia’s
intentions and undermine Western allies (See, for example, Kramer 2010a, 2010b; Cohen
2010; LeVine 2010). According to this line of reasoning, Russia’s authoritarian culture
and political system require for the Kremlin to depend on the Western threat image at
home and engage in revisionist behavior abroad (Shlapentokh 2009; Cohen and Dale
2010; Shevtsova 2010a, b). For opposing views, see Legvold 2009; Armstrong 2010;
Charap and Petersen 2010; Gvosdev 2010; Mankoff 2010.
4
The debate on Russia’s foreign policy orientation and its historical salience6
suggests the importance of exploring an identity-based interpretation of state international
behavior. Not just Russia but all national governments are, to a certain extent, open to the
influence of ideas across the political and intellectual spectrum. Ideas are markers of
identity, and examining their historical and contemporary salience is essential in
revealing a country’s foreign policy alternatives. American culture, for example, has
developed not one but many ways of making sense of the world, and scholars have
identified several influential schools in the country’s international thinking. Different
schools among the American elite have reacted to the world differently, and their
reactions have evolved over time (Callahan 2004). According to Walter Russell Mead
(2002), American traditions of thinking about international politics included Alexander
Hamilton’s promotion of American enterprise abroad, Woodrow Wilson’s commitment
to spreading the United States values, William Jefferson’s belief in the preservation of
American democracy in a dangerous world, and Andrew Jackson’s pride in honor,
independence and military power. To the extent they have endured, these traditions of
thinking continue to shape the country’s foreign policy. For example, this competition
within American identity has been vital in determining the country’s direction after 9/11.
If Al Gore had defeated George W. Bush in 2000, the United States post-9/11 policy
might have been very different, and probably would have not included the decision to
intervene in Iraq militarily.
The identity contestation cautions us against overestimating the thickness of
cultural norms and the restraints it places on a nation’s behavioral choices. Identity
should be viewed as a variable and ever-evolving product of interacting ideas and
practices, rather than something constant. As scholars of identity (Abdelal et al. 2006,
700) argue “[t]he content – the collective meaning – of identities is neither fixed nor
predetermined. Rather … [i]ndividuals are constantly proposing and shaping the
meanings of the groups to which they belong.”7 Even if “shared” in some important
sense, cultures are not homogeneous and resemble more an “open-ended text,” than a
“closed book” (Inayatullah and Blaney 1999, 320). They can be usefully viewed as
existing among multiple levels and attitudes. First, they exist among three distinct and
mutually interrelated groups—leadership, the political elite, and larger society—each
with their own attitude and internal structure or institutions. These groups can be
relatively independent; they move, adapt to changes, and react to external ideas with
various speeds and intensities. Second, even when ideas cut across the elites’ and
society’s levels, and represent some larger patterns of discursive agreement, the discourse
incorporates both hegemonic and recessive trends, rather than being able to form an
For historical studies of changes and continuity in Russia’s foreign policy, see
especially Lederer 1967; Ragsdale 1993; Legvold 2007.
7
According to these scholars, contestation of identity “includes the degree of
within-group agreement about the constitutive norm of an identity, consensus and
cogruence of the social purposes ascribed to an identity, agreement about meanings
attached to out-groups; and coherence of shared cognitive models” (Abdelal et al. 2006,
701).
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ultimate unity.8 For example, national discourse can be viewed as competition of globally
and nationally oriented visions, in which Globalists support cooperation in world politics,
whereas Nationalists emphasize national interests and the struggle for power.
Russia, again, suggests itself as a testing ground for the thick/thin identity
controversy. The thick constructivist believes that identity is a given social reality, not a
choice to be made, and individuals do not have the luxury of thinking outside their
identity boundaries. Alternatively, the thin constructivist allows for an identity to be
fundamentally contested and reinterpreted, even as s/he grants that identity cannot be
chosen. Examples of thick constructivism may be drawn from scholarship on
international norms that, once established, travel across the world and teach nations how
to think about their interests (e.x. Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
Another relevant body of research is that on the emergence of security communities
(Adler and Barnett 1998; Acharya 2001; Adler 2005). For example, building on the latter
research, Vincent Pouliot’s (2010) study of NATO-Russia interaction seeks to document
the emergence of a security community between the two after the Cold War. The study
argues that in process of intense interactions within the framework of the NATO-Russia
Council, the two sides learned to normalize disputes and cooperate on the ground. The
security norm has proven strong enough to exclude possible violent confrontation
between Russia and NATO. As a result, crises in their relations with each other –
Kosovo, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, and the Georgia War – did not lead to a military
standoff. Other scholars documented the importance of interactions with the West for
Russia’s identity construction (Wendt 1987; Neumann 1996; Ringman 2002). In this
perspective, Russia develops its self-understanding through relationships with Western
nations and in response to European norms of human rights, networks of experts, and
respect for great power status (Herman 1996; Evangelista 1999; English 2000; Larson
and Shevchenko 2010).
What is less appreciated by the thick constructivists is Russia’s intense debate
over identity construction and the domestic contestation of the benefits of adopting
Western norms (Hopf 2002; Clunan 2009; Tsygankov 2010). For interpreters of foreign
policy, ignoring the politics of identity may come at the cost of misunderstanding the
policy’s sources and future direction. Although the external “other” exerts the decisive
influence on the self, the self and the other are not uniform in transmitting or receiving
the identity message. In the case of Russia, it is one thing if the West demonstrates
accomplishments in institutions-building, economic prosperity and human rights
protection, yet it is an entirely different matter if Western nations use force and rely on
their great power abilities. While the former actions prompt Russia to liberalize, the latter
encourage it to maintain its strength and beat Western nations at their own power game.
Not only will the conflicting external message be interpreted differently at home, but the
local historical practices too may provide independent filters through which Russia will
8
For the approach to discourse that views it as a combination of various
intellectual influences that is fluid, interactive and dialectical, see especially Alker 1981;
Alker and Biersteker 1984; Alker, Biersteker, and Inoguchi 1989. For other studies that
treat discourse as inherently contested, see, for example, Edelman 1988; Doty 1996;
Fierke 1996; Barnett 1998; Lynch 1999, 2000. For reviews of various approaches in
discourse analysis, see Miliken 1999; Fierke 2004.
6
weigh its international options. In the post-Cold War world, Russia has already
demonstrated its divergence from the West in assessments of foreign policy interests and,
despite severe criticism from the Western other, the Kremlin has used energy coercion
and military force to affirm the identity of a great power.
Interpreting Foreign Policy: Five Necessary Steps
Interpreting foreign policy involves at least five steps. It makes logical sense to
begin with monitoring state actions and then proceed to interpreting their meaning in
various national and international contexts. A successful foreign policy is never
fundamentally disruptive to the existing system of cultural values. Such policy is
successful to the extent it is able to gain recognition in various local and global settings,
thereby objectivizing the initially subjective interpretation. The final step involves a
comparison of policy to other similar cases.
Recording State Actions
Recording state actions is equivalent to the establishment of social facts for their
subsequent holistic understanding. Any policy involves a series of state actions that,
taken together, constitute a social reality open to interpretations.9 Here, the analyst
constructs a chronology of actions and asks descriptive questions, such as: what were the
key statements issued by state officials? When and where were these statements made?
What practical steps did accompany these statements? What results did they produce?
The overall objective is to establish whether these actions constitute a coherent policy
that separates it from policies undertaken in the past.
Interpreting the Official Documents
The next step is to establish how state actions are viewed by those immediately
responsible for them. Here, analyst seeks to understand a vision that informs state actions
and motivations that inspire such vision. The analyst should avoid excessive prestructuring of his interpretation by creating categories for understanding official
documents from within, rather than outside, these documents. Metaphors, predicates,
types of expressions, sentences structure, examples, and historical analogies used should
serve as sufficient basis for developing a perspective on how a vision behind policy is
different from past visions. Some questions to guide the scholar in reconstructing a policy
vision may include the following: What language is used to characterize the
country/region toward which policy is introduced? Is the country/region or the other
viewed as partner, friend, ally or something else? What self-characterizations are
employed? Are there any specific expressions used with regard to the self’s values,
degree of confidence, and types of relations with other? Intrinsically related to
understanding policy vision is the analysis of motivations behind it. Here some helpful
questions might be: how does the state justify the need for policy? What characterizations
are employed for viewing historical, political and ethical contexts in which policy is
introduced? Is there a reflection on alternative courses of action and their consequences?
9
For a sophisticated methodology of reconstructing international action sequences
as reflecting and creating identities and constitutive rules, see Banerjee 2002, 2009.
7
Such an inductive approach may save analyst from embracing inaccurate
interpretations that may result from some strongly held ideological, theoretical, and
ethical assumptions. One example of a flawed interpretation is the view of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s New Thinking that presents him as an overseer of the Soviet retreat in the
face of the growing institutional and military strength of West-centered world (Brooks
and Wohlforth 2001). Not only does such an interpretation define Gorbachev’s emphasis
on “mutual security” in the globally interdependent world in excessively narrow terms,
but it also ignores New Thinking’s local roots (English 2001). While being prepared to
learn from other nations and social systems, Gorbachev remained a committed socialist
and a believer that the whole world would be influenced by the socialist experience. His
thinking contained elements of moral messianism10 and meant to revive, not abandon,
faith in socialism as a social system.
Locating Policy within National Schools of Thought
Having established how a state conceptualizes and justifies policy, we are ready
to move to the next level of interpretation. It is not enough to understand what actions
mean to those immediately responsible for them. One should also determine which social
actors accept policy, what explains their acceptance and how that acceptance plays into
an overall national perception of policy. By learning about the level of national support
for policy, we learn to what extent a subjective meaning of policy is shared by broader
social strata, thereby obtaining an inter-subjective quality.
An appropriate tool for learning about national acceptance of policy is the
analysis of existing schools of foreign policy thinking. The schools-of-thought approach
examines the discourse extant in the society and attitudes that it holds toward the self and
the other at a given time, as well as historically (Mead 2002; Callahan 2004; Tsygankov
2004, 2010). Each school may be defined as an idea-based community that has been
formed in response to various historical developments. Together, schools of thought
reveal the country’s competing identities that constantly evolve, but also reproduce
themselves across time and space. Employing schools-of-thought approach is invaluable
for two reasons. First, it allows us to explore the inter-subjective meaning that is
horizontally across national discourse at a given time. This may be particularly important
during times of domestic and international uncertainty, when national identity is highly
contested and foreign policy is especially open to the influence of ideas across the
political spectrum. Second, the approach allows us to historicize the policy meaning by
revealing whether it reflects the already established historical patterns in the system of
national perception.
In order to determine to what extent a subjective meaning of policy is
disseminated across its nationally defined space, some helpful questions may include the
following: what are logical possibilities of the self’s relating to the other? How do such
possibilities correlate with existing national schools of foreign policy thinking? What
images of the self and the other do each of these schools hold? What metaphors and
historical analogies do they most commonly rely on? Who are these schools’ social,
On Gorbachev as a thinker who sought to improve the Soviet Union’s world
status through an innovative strategy of engaging the West, see Larson and Shevchenko
2003.
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political and institutional supporters? Is there a school that is closest to the supporting
policy and its official meaning? If such a hegemonic school does not exist, are there
segments within different schools that may be listed as supportive of policy? Do
supporters of policy have ties to its initiators within the state? Who are the policy’s
opponents? What are their resources to challenge policy?
Russian reactions to NATO’s air strikes on Yugoslavia in 1999 may help to
illustrate the schools-of-thought approach. At the time, the official position of military
neutrality was challenged by hard-line nationalists, who argued for Russia’s involvement
on the Serbian side. According to nationalists, the efforts of NATO had nothing to do
with human rights but sought to dismember Yugoslavia into several independent states
and, by default, threatened the sovereignty of Russia as well. Nationalists relied on the
Munich analogy by drawing a historical parallel between NATO’s actions and the
beginning of the Second World War. To them, it was NATO’s actions that were equated
with those of Hitler, not those of Serbia. Russia therefore had to demonstrate the
readiness to go to war with an aggressor, and not to “appease” it. Although other schools
of thought had no stomach for confrontation with the Western alliance, Russian
nationalists helped to push the overall discourse in the direction of militant anti-Western
rhetoric. The official position of sustaining cooperation with the West was severely
undermined, paving the way for Russia’s future emphasis on the need to develop the
capabilities of a great power. Such emphasis resonated across the national discourse
partly because criticism of NATO helped to revive the historical memory of resisting the
West during the Cold War (Tsygankov 2001).
Tracking International Recognition
In addition to the national discourse, the state seeks to objectivize the meaning of
its policy on an international level. International recognition constitutes yet another
critical test of whether an initially subjective vision may be granted broader global
support. All nations have their external others and seek to engage them through their
policies. A foreign policy may generate hope for success when it is supported at home,
yet it will not be successful until it is supported by its targeted outside audience. The
reverse combination of external support and internal divide too is not likely to generate a
definitive success. Table 1 summarizes the two hypothesized conditions of foreign policy
success.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
By providing moral, diplomatic, financial and institutional support for the state, the
outside world legitimizes its behavior and encourages it to stay on the chosen path and
not deviate to revisionist behavior. In this case, rather than following the reception by
national schools of thought, the scholar monitors reactions from representative members
of the international community. In particular she may ask: what reactions from other(s)
did the policy generate? May these reactions be viewed as generally supportive,
cautiously supportive, or critical? Which parts of policy are accepted and rejected? Is
there a position that is especially close to supporting policy? Do this position’s supporters
have connections to the policy’s initiators? Who are the policy’s opponents? What are
their reasons to oppose the policy and what resources are there to challenge it? What
explanations for such reactions are provided by governments and experts? Relative to the
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national reception, does the international reception run in the same or the opposite
direction?
Russia has historically sought to be recognized by the West and achieve its
objectives in cooperation with Western nations. With progressive leaders in the Kremlin,
Russia has been responsive to the behavior of the West and prepared to pursue
cooperation, rather than confrontation. However, each time Russia has begun its
movement toward its significant other, Moscow has only continued so long as it felt a
sufficiently progressive recognition of and reciprocation from Western capitals. Russia’s
cultural lenses are different from those of Western nations, and such lenses are formed by
locally distinct historical memory, ties with historic allies and contemporary challenges.
In the absence of the external recognition of Russia’s actions, the reform-minded
leadership in the Kremlin historically runs into opposition from advocates of antiWestern policy.
An example of the negative recognition dynamic is the role played by NATO’s
expansion in Russia’s shift from cooperative to assertive policy toward the West. In the
early 1990s, NATO leaders ignored Gorbachev’s proposal to build a pan-European
security architecture by pursuing a strategy of preserving the alliance and keeping Russia
out of it (Sarrotte 2010). The West then embarked on several waves of enlarging NATO
by incorporating Russia’s neighbors and continuing to ignore Moscow’s increasingly
vocal demands to recognize its security interests. While insisting that they did not view
Russia as a threat, the Western nations concluded two rounds of NATO expansion. Since
the second half of the 2000s they began pushing for Georgia and Ukraine to join the
alliance. In 2009, NATO even developed secret contingency plans to protect the Baltic
States against Russia as a potential threat.11 Russia responded by shifting from a policy of
partnership with the West to demonstrating independence and a determination to stop
NATO's expansion. The Kremlin strengthened its ties with Georgia's separatist territories,
went to war with Tbilisi and recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Outside the Caucasus, Russia’s foreign policy too became considerably less
cooperative with the Western nations.
Comparing Policy to Other Relevant Cases
The final step in interpreting policy involves a comparison to other cases. State
actions and the policy vision upon which they rest are rarely fully independent from
actions pursued in other policy areas. A larger strategic vision usually guides several
policies, and not only the one of direct interest to the scholar. Therefore, one can expect a
reasonable degree of consistency across several types of the vision-inspired policies. In
addition to studying a policy’s immediate social context, one can then expand the
analysis by identifying a broader universe of policy-relevant cases and selecting one for a
closer investigation. The latter may serve as approximation of an external validity test of
the established meaning of policy. The objective of the test is to learn whether a
subjective meaning and objectivization of an additional policy case is generally
congruent with that of the original case. For example, if Russia’s European policy in the
early 1990s sought to incorporate the country into existing international institutions, such
as the European Union and NATO, then one may reasonably expect that Moscow’s
11
See memo by the U.S. Ambassador in NATO Ivo Daalder (2009).
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policies in non-European directions – Asia, the Middle East, the United States, and the
former Soviet world – would not be fundamentally disruptive to the European objectives.
Alternatively, one should not expect Moscow to pursue pro-Western objectives in global
settings, if Russia’s own relations with the West are not cooperative.
Illustration: Dmitri Medvedev’s European Security Policy
This section offers illustration of the above-made points using the example of
Russia’s European security policy during 2008-2010. My purpose is limited to probing
and highlighting the above-made theoretical points in an empirical context. I make no
claim of offering a definitive analysis – a more detailed research would be required to do
that. Dmitri Medvedev’s pan-European diplomacy may be understood in terms of the
outlined necessary steps to establish a meaning of foreign policy action (please see table
2). The preliminary analysis offered here does not support the view of the Russia’s
diplomacy as seeking to divide the European continent and strengthen Russia’s leverage
in dealing with neigbors.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Step 1: Medvedev’s Pan-European Diplomacy
Speaking in Berlin in June 2008 Russia’s president, Dmitri Medvedev (2008a),
articulated a broad perspective on Europe “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” and
proposed a new all-European treaty to establish a new security architecture by moving
beyond NATO expansion and the conflict over Kosovo. He cited the need to strengthen
international law and urged to move beyond Atlanticism by developing an equal
partnership between the European Union, the United States and Russia. Medvedev
further suggested that, if the West and Russia were able to sign the Helsinki Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, then they would be in an
even better position to negotiate a new security treaty after the end of the Cold War.
Moscow’s intervention in Georgia’s conflict with South Ossetia of August 2008
created new tensions in Russia-West relations, yet Medvedev saw the conflict as an
opportunity to strengthen his case. According to him, very fact that neither NATO, not
OSCE were able to prevent the military confrontation indicated the need for an improved
security framework in Europe. The two organizations, Medvedev argued, were important
yet insufficient for filling the existing security vacuum. Comparing the significance of the
Caucasus conflict to Russia to that of September 11, 2001 to the United States, Russia’s
president insisted that “[w]e simply have to create a new security system, otherwise there
will be no guarantees that someone like Saakashvili could not … try something similar to
what happened in August” (Medvedev 2008b, 2009a). In November 2009, Russia
published its proposal for a new security treaty by pledging to legally restrict its unilateral
use of force in exchange for European nations and the United States doing the same. The
Kremlin presented the draft as the document that would "finally do away with the legacy
of the Cold War" (Humphries 2009).
Throughout the subsequent year, Medvedev promoted his idea, but at the end of
2010 he expressed disappointment with the lack of international support. During the
Munich Security Conference in October 2010, the President appealed to the European
audience with his vision of a new comprehensive security treaty, expressing hope to have
a “worthy global response” to his idea (Bridge 2010; Bennhold 2010). However, in
11
December, addressing the participants of the OSCE summit in Astana, Kazakhstan,
Medvedev acknowledged that two and half years of discussions did not lead to any
breakthrough. Citing the power of stereotypes, he said his initiative may have appeared
ahead of its time and would have to wait before being considered in the future (RIA
Novosti 2010).
Step 2: Does Medvedev Sound Like a Supporter of European Cooperation?
How should one interpret Medvedev’s vision? Some observers presented it as a
tactics to promote Russia’s interests by driving a wedge between Western countries and
undermining cohesiveness of existing European organizations, such NATO, the EU, and
the OSCE (Bugajski 2010; Kulhanek 2010). In this interpretation, Medvedev’s policy
continued Vladimir Putin’s efforts to divide the European continent by practicing
selective energy deals and coercive diplomacy toward the former Soviet neighbors. One
problem with this approach is that Medvedev’s own interpretation of his security
initiative is excluded from analysis. Rather than studying Medvedev’s views, such an
approach dismisses them either as largely irrelevant rhetoric – assuming that it is Putin
who holds the real power in Russia – or as a smokescreen to conceal Moscow’s genuine
intentions.
The President’s own explanation of his actions does not fit the West-hostile
perspective that is occasionally attributed to him. Analogies, metaphors, examples and
the overall language of his speeches and statements provide ample room for interpreting
his subjective vision as that of a committed supporter of Russia-Europe cooperation.
Positive references to the Helsinki Act and statesmen such as Charles De Gaulle and
Mikhail Gorbachev, on the one hand, and negative references to the Cold War and
conflicts that separated Russia and the West, on the other, constitute discursive evidence
in favor of such interpretation. The metaphors of Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok
and a “common European home”, once exploited by Gorbachev, also provide support for
such conclusion. Furthermore, despite his critique of the European organizations’ failure
to deliver security, Medvedev’s language indicates support for Russia’s increased
cooperation with these organizations, not the desire for their dissolution as obsolete
entities.12 The President’s justification for such a framework is defined in positive-sum
categories of common values, common history and common security interests, and
reveals little bitterness over Western countries’ lack of attention to Russia’s concerns in
the past. That Medvedev advocates cooperation with Europe, while remaining sensitive
to the national interests of Russia, does not make him a supporter of weak European
institutions and a strong unilateral Russia.
Step 3: Is Medvedev a Westernizer or a Statist?
To go beyond Medvedev’s subjective interpretation, the section matches his
vision with those of existing schools of foreign policy thinking in Russia. Broadly
speaking, the country has developed three distinct schools of thought about the self and
the world – Westernist, Statist and Civilizationist. Westernizers places the emphasis on
12
For example, he proposed to begin discussions of a new security framework
using the format of the OSCE and he supported Russia’s growing cooperation with
NATO (Medvedev 2009a).
12
Russia’s similarity with Western nations and views the West as the most viable and
progressive civilization in the world. Statists equate successful foreign policy with that of
a strong independent state and emphasize the state’s ability to respond to external threats
to Russia’s security. Finally, Civilizationists conceptualize the Russia-West relationship
in terms of cultural oppositions. Viewing Russia as a civilization in its own right, many
Civilizationists insist on its “mission” in the world and spreading Russian values abroad
(Tsygankov 2010).
Medvedev’s security initiative found strong support among Westernizers and
Statists, thereby obtaining inter-subjective meaning. Westernizers supported the initiative
as helpful for integrating Russia with European institutions, which many of them viewed
as indispensable for Russia’s development. For example, the Institute of Contemporary
Development, a liberal think-tank headed by Igor Yurgens, issued a wide-ranging report
describing Russia’a aspired future in the 21st century (Rossiya XXI veka 2010). The report
presented the country as bound to the European Union by a legal treaty on strategic
partnership in military, energy, political, and cultural areas, as well by a new security
treaty concluded along the lines of 1975 Helsinki agreement. The authors of the report
described the EU and Russia as two entities with shared values, security interests, and
visions of world order (Rossiya XXI veka 2010, 44-45). Those favoring the Statist line of
thinking extended their support to Medvedev on the ground of protecting Russia’s
sovereignty and security from potential external threats. They viewed the lack of strategic
ties with the West as a tough predicament for Russia because of the nation’s internal
weakness and the rising China problem (Lukyanov 2008; Khramchikhin 2009; Suslov
2010). By insisting on equal partnership with Europe, Statists presented the optimal
relationship with the EU in terms of a strategic “bargain” (Bordachev 2009) that would
position Russia for political maneuvering in an increasinlgy dangerous multipolar world.
Although some Westernizers and Civilizationists challenged the WesternistStatist consensus, it enjoyed the hegemonic status within the national discourse. Those
critical of Medvedev’s security initiative (for example, Shevtsova 2010a; Kasparov 2010)
found themselves marginalized in the political spectrum and without significant foreign
policy resources. On the other hand, many of those who had previously been behind
Putin’s assertive stance toward Europe13 now embraced Medvedev, whom they viewed as
someone with sufficient support of Putin. As three European analysts concluded about
the Russian discourse, “Although there is a lively debate between different factions
around the Kremlin …, it is important to understand that this is a competition within the
wider ‘Putin consensus’” (Krastev, Leonard and Wilson 2009).14 The Westernist-Statist
consensus had precedents in Russia’s past and was therefore also historically sustainable.
For both institutional and security reasons, a number of Russian statesmen, beginning
with foreign ministers Nikolai de Giers and Alexander Gorchakov, historically favored a
On Russia’s European policy under Putin, see, for example, Lukyanov 2008;
Kratochvíl 2008; Kanet 2009. On European and Western perceptions of Russia’s foreign
policy, see Tsygankov 2009; English and Svyatets 2010; Feklyunina 2010.
14
In the expression of one Putin’s supporters, “Dmitri Medvedev can build his
presidency on European norms and values because he is ‘standing on the shoulders’ of
Putin, who ended our chaos while himself rarely following the norm” (Pavlovski 2008).
13
13
strong alliance with European nations, viewing it as essential for preserving peace and
continuing with modernization at home.
Step 4: Is Medvedev Gaining International Recognition?
Russia’s attempt to objectivize the meaning of its policy on the international level
was not successful. Despite sufficient backing at home, Medvedev’s vision did not
receive the outside support he was looking for. Although some Western nations
welcomed Russia’s efforts to reach out to Europe, they offered only general support and
remained wary of Medvedev’s initiative. Germany and France responded by proposing to
establish the EU-Russia Political and Security Committee as an institution to consult on
strategic issues on the continent (Dempsey 2010; Terekhov 2010). They agreed with the
need to address the vacuum of European security, but did not find Russia’s proposal
satisfactory. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said he saw no need for
the new legally binding security treaty "because we do have a framework already"
(Bridge 2010). The United States was equally dismissive. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton found that a new European treaty was unnecessary – the position that Medvedev
was described as reflecting “a certain envy” among “our American partners” (RIA
Novosti 2010). Washington expressed full confidence in the NATO-centered security
system in Europe and proposed that any revisions should be discussed in the OSCE
context.15 Finally, the Eastern European nations were concerned that Russia’s initiative
was about recognizing Russia’s sphere of interests and giving Moscow a veto over
NATO’s international operations. They shared the perspective of Georgia and viewed
Russia as the most important threat to their security.16
Step 5: Medevedev’s European Policy in Comparative Perspective
Medvedev’s European security proposals were generally in line with his policies
in other international directions. Although Russia was critical of the United States’
unilateralism in world politics, Moscow did not call for any concerted effort to undermine
the U.S. global position. Instead, Russia’s foreign policy documents defend the notion of
collective leadership and multilateral diplomacy as the alternative to unilateralism and
hegemony in international relations.17 Concerned about Washington’s plans to deploy
For a more detailed analysis of the United States’ position from a conservative
perspective, see McNamara 2010.
16
For documentation that Baltics and Poland wanted NATO to develop secret
contingency plans in response to the war in the Caucasus, see Daalder 2009.
17
For example, the Foreign Ministry report “A Review of the Russian
Federation’s Foreign Policy” of 2007 embraces the objective of multi-polarity based on
“a more equitable distribution of resources for influence and economic growth,” but also
advocates multilateralism for solving international problems (Obzor vneshnei politiki
2007). In the same spirit, the National Security Strategy of 2008 states that Russia
continues to aspire to “defend national interests as a subject of multipolar international
relations,” but refrains from identifying the “unipolar” structure of the world as a key
threat to Russia (Kommersant, December 25, 2008). Similarly, the Military Doctrine of
2010 identifies NATO enlargement as an external danger (opasnost’), but not as a threat
(ugroza), which commentators interpreted as indicative that Russia was afraid not of
15
14
elements of the missile defense system (MDS) in Europe, Medvedev sought to address
the issue by establishing a good rapport with Barak Obama, cooperating with the United
States on Iran and the new nuclear treaty, and proposing to develop MDS jointly.
Russia’s president also worked on improving the image of Russia in Western business
circles, and he traveled to the United States in part to facilitate investments and
cooperation in the information technology sector. In relations with European nations,
Russia sought to build new pipelines, like the North Stream, and jointly develop energy
fields, such as Shtockman in the Barents Sea. Outside the West, Russia strengthened its
regional influence and played an important role in establishing international coalitions,
such as the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India,
and China). Moscow also further improved bilateral ties with China, Turkey and Israel.
Medvedev’s approach was formulated in his address to the Federation Council in
November 2009, when he insisted that the effectiveness of foreign policy must be
"judged by a simple criterion: Does it improve living standards in our country?"
(Medvedev 2009b). He subsequently instructed Russia’s ambassadors to build
“modernization alliances” across the world, especially with the United States and other
Western nations (Medvedev 2010). The global economic crisis heralded a new era in
which Russia could no longer think about its foreign policy priorities as predominantly
Western, yet Moscow remained convinced of the value of reengaging the West. Overall,
Medvedev’s foreign policies offer additional support to the interpretation of his European
diplomacy as aiming to strengthen Russia’s relations with Western nations, rather than
undermine their unity. The 2008-2010 period does not offer strong evidence to the latter.
Conclusion
This paper has advocated an approach to foreign policy that helps to establish its
meaning in relevant national and international settings. While recognizing the importance
of social context in interpreting state action, I stress the contested and heterogeneous
nature of such a context. The contested identity approach adds to our understanding of
foreign policy formation and the likelihood of its implementation.
Russia’s proposal to conclude a new European security treaty is a case in point.
The approach undertaken in this paper illustrates the proposal’s inadequacy in terms of its
ability to gain the sought inter-subjective meaning. Although Russia’s policy meant to
move beyond the existing divisions on the continent and was supported at home – from
those favoring strong ties with the West to those sensitive to Russia’s independence – it
failed to generate broader support among Western governments. The Russian meaning of
the proposal as an invitation to cooperate with Europe, not to divide it for power
purposes, did not resonate abroad, and the proposal could not be implemented.Thecase of
Russia’s European diplomacy tentatively supports one of the hypotheses articulated in
table 1: an internally supported foreign policy may not be viewed as successful if it is not
supported by the relevant outside audience.
More generally, the Russian case suggests that social contestation matters in both
accurately describing foreign policy formation and predicting its outcomes. For a policy
to be established and implemented, its official meaning must engage those on the broader
being attacked by the Western alliance, but of not participating in a NATO-centric system
of European security (Tsypkin 2010).
15
national and international level. Obtaining such inter-subjective understanding shared by
all relevant actors is essential for policy success. Scholars of foreign policy will therefore
do well to pay more attention to theorizing social contexts in terms of their boundaries,
overlaps and degree of contestation.
16
Table 1. Two Conditions of Foreign Policy Success
National Support
Yes
No
Yes
Success
Hope
No
Hope
Failure
International Recognition
Table 2. Russia’s European Diplomacy: Five Steps to Understanding
Foreign Policy Interpretation
Russia’s European Policy: Key Questions
Step 1
Recording State Action
What are Medvedev’s key actions and
statements toward Europe?
Step 2
Interpreting the Official Documents
Is Medvedev Supporter of a European
cooperation?
Step 3
Locating Policy withn National
Schools of Thought
Is Medvedev a Westernizer of a Statist?
Step 4
Tracking International Recognition
Is Medvedev’s European policy gaining
international recognition?
Step 5
Comparing Policy to Other
Relevant Cases
Is Medvedev’s European policy comparable
to policies in other directions?
17
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