A Call for Renewal in Tourism Ethnographic Research: The researcher
as both the subject and object of knowledge
Abstract
Our critique of tourism ethnographic research argues that too much existing published work tends
to cite preceding studies as methodological precedents without stating how particular approaches
were operationalised. Moreover, findings are often presented as individual cases with limited utility
in terms of theory building or wider understanding of contextual phenomena. We argue that closer
attention, first to current developments within anthropology, which seek to overcome researcher
naivety and second, greater philosophical reflexivity would elevate both the rigour with which such
work is undertaken and the seriousness with which it is received in the wider academy. We call for a
double-reflexivity in ethnographic research in tourism that accepts both the specific situational
nature of individual studies and the wider discursive frames within which they are embedded. We
call for constant reflection on, and acknowledgment of, this duality in ethnographic research where,
after all, the researcher is so intimately embedded in empirical and subjective terms.
Key Words
Philosophy; Subjectivity; Reflexivity; Ethnography, Cultural Tourism
Acknowledgement
The authors wish to pay tribute to the late Professor Richard Prentice with whom we were working
on this project when he sadly passed away. We also thank his wife, Vivien Andersen, for granting us
continued access to his papers. Richard’s ideas formed the original impetus for this paper and we
hope our development of them does him justice.
1
A Call for Renewal in Tourism Ethnographic Research: The researcher
as both the subject and object of knowledge
This article is prompted by some concerns with those uses of ethnography in tourism research which
privileges the single ethnographer engaged in brief, stand-alone, periods of fieldwork. Our call is for
multiple, associated, ethnographies to express the diversity and potential in association of such
expression. This call flows from a hallmark of ethnographic method: namely, that ethnography is
personal but that the subjectivities they proceed from and return to are collective. Personal
knowledge requires the far reaching participation of the knower (Polanyi, 1962). Further, people
express themselves variably in highly interpretive situations, and in this respect ethnographic
research in tourism shares many features with so-called ‘creative tourism’ as theorised by Prentice
and Andersen (2007) and Richards and Wilson (2007). Hom Cary (2004) reflects on the theoretical
challenges inherent in capturing the moment where the dissolution of immediate tourist experience
dissolves into wider narrative or discursive situatedness. Scarles (2009, p. 485), meanwhile, locates a
similar moment of individual dissolution and inter-subjective becoming in tourists’ production of
photography and its subsequent incorporation in a wider discursive realm. We suggest that this
problematic is also present in the case of individual tourism researchers adopting ethnographic
methods where the immediacy of experience, its expression and subsequent enunciation in and as
discourse is concerned. The boundary between experientially immersed, actively engaged,
consumers of tourism and many researchers of the phenomenon appears indistinct in much existing
research. Multi-perspective ethnographies would address Tribe’s (2006, p. 375) assertion that, “the
story that is told will be inevitably skewed by the person or the researcher and their situatedness.”
By referring to Foucauldian principles of knowledge production and management and calling for
engagement with contemporary anthropological practices in tourism, this article offers fresh
methodological insight to the field.
Previous use of Ethnographies in Tourism
Concern about inadequate attention to the actual uses of methods, as distinct from invocation-bycitation of their existence, by some users of ethnography in tourism research forms the motivation
for this study. The significance of the personal often ignored in practice and ethnographies are, in
effect, reified as representations of generality. In effect, users of tourism ethnographies are overprivileging certain studies by using individual interpretations as infrequently questioned ‘truths’.
While users of ethnographies may all know that the representations within them are highly personal,
this is rarely demonstrated in appraising the operationalisation of method or in making clear the
tentative and contingent qualities of the representations gleaned from the studies used. Our
concern is thus with the often stand-alone or ill-defined use of ethnographic methods in tourism
discourse, rather than necessarily with their original provenance. Multiple ethnographies
undertaken in tourism on the same society or sub-grouping to explore alternative interpretations
are rarely undertaken. The closest to such an approach is that of second-order abstraction from the
views of others (Matheson, 2008).
2
The failure to recognise the essentially personal qualities of ethnographies leads to a second concern
about tourism discourse: namely, that of the failure to mirror or to critique changes in ethnographic
method as articulated by anthropologists in the wider disciplinary sense. Reference to
anthropologists is important, as this is the discipline in which this method has traditionally been
developed. Ethnographies are rarely contested in tourism research, unlike, for example, journalistic
interpretations. Yet ethnographic discourse in anthropology has moved away from the Empiricist /
Structuralist approach commonly imagined in tourism. It has transformed into what may be termed
the Interpretative / New Journalism / Poetics approach (Denzin, 1997; Van Manen, 2002) and
progressively into the Expressivism / Expressive Perception approach (Rudd, 2003). These phases of
transformation are difficult to map in tourism discourse and, it might be said, have largely bypassed
it. These developments reveal the rigour of ethnography, as manifested within the tourism subject
area to be often lacking in theoretical and applied development.
As said above, our first concern is with how ethnographies have actually been used in tourism
discourse. The uses of four well-established methodological approaches for tourism ethnography
(Crang, 1996; Palmer, 2005; Smith, 1998; Sørensen, 2003) were analysed in terms of if, and how, the
foci of the method used was discussed, and if, and how, the operationalisation of these authors’
methods was fully articulated by other researchers making use of them. Summary results are shown
below in Table 1.
[Take in Table 1 here]
The results confirm our concern. Method was rarely discussed by the users of these ethnographies,
particularly in terms of detailed accounts of its implementation. We are not asserting that all users
should have discussed the methods of these ethnographies before citing them when the need is to,
for example, simply cite the precedents of broadly similar studies in analogous contexts. Nor are we,
in this paper, casting doubt on the soundness of the original ethnographic methods developed and
subsequently invoked. The focus of our concern veers towards ‘claims of use’ rather than
acknowledgment of prior occurrence. Yet the overall picture presented is far from an evaluative
profile, and in consequence our view is that current attention to method is inadequate. Indeed, the
current profile would imply that the findings of ethnographies are being used largely irrespective of
how they were derived. Our contention is that this is a misuse of ethnography which needs to be
corrected. Quantitative methods are commonly contested and their findings qualified by their users.
We are simply asking that ethnographic methods be subject to a like academic scrutiny. In turn, this
may require the authors of tourism ethnographies to engage in reflection similar to the discourse of
mainstream ethnography.
3
The Development of Ethnography, Personal Sensing and the Lived
Experience
Participation of the knower is central to the interpretive – expressive method. The leading principle
of the Vienna Secession was Naked truth and truthful nakedness (Metzger, 2005). The study of lived
experience likewise seeks to bridge the duality of the observed and the observer (Coffey, 1999) and
to re-align ethnography with hermeneutic phenomenology, as interpretive ethnography. It
recognises the potential contributions interpretive ethnography and hermeneutic phenomenology
can make to tourism analysis. Briefly defined, phenomenology is the description of lived experience,
and hermeneutics is the interpretation of experience. Developments in hermeneutic
phenomenology are paralleled in ethnography with changes from classical to interpretive and critical
ethnography. Whereas interpretive ethnography is interested in interpreting lived experiences,
critical ethnography commonly takes engagement a stage further and challenges power structures
(Foley & Valenzuela, 2005).
Despite its importance, lived experience is a comparatively neglected area of consumer experience
in tourism research (Franklin, 2003). Likewise, personal sensing is a comparatively neglected method
in the subject area, presumably because it makes no pretence to objectivity. It recognises, instead,
the centrality of subjective reaction and reflexivity, and is a form of exploration and meaningmaking. It is quite literally about relating lived experience. Its input is impression; its process is
engagement with subject matter; and its output is expression.
The validity of the method is in the creative process and in the insights produced, with reliability
important in identifying the contrasting expressions produced and their linkage to relived
experience, rather than in their replication. It is the plausibility and relevance to the reader of the
expression which makes personal sensing as a hermeneutic phenomenological method of value (Van
Manen, 1990). This is similar to the emotional authenticity felt in performances (Matheson, 2008).
Equally, as with design, general principles may be abstracted from expressions made by similar
individuals and these principles, however implicit, underpin shared expression. These are the
experiential structures, or themes, which give shape to the shapeless from everyday lived
experiences (Van Manen, 2002).
Personal sensing is nothing new, either as method or lived experience. It is how we function as
human beings and how we amass cultural capital appropriate to our lives. Ethnography seeks to use
like methods to describe a group or culture through sensing and reflection while submersed in a
local community. This is essentially a long term form of immersion which not only affects the
research outcomes but also the researcher (Coffey, 1999). Its intention is to show how social action
in one world can be understood from the perspective of another culture. This is what cultural
tourists also commonly do. The parallel may be taken further. Ethnographers seek ‘natural’ as
opposed to contrived or experimental contexts, although these now include mediated or
cinematised environments as the ‘real’ world is no longer the only referent for analysis, if it ever was
so (Denzin, 1997). ‘Serious’ cultural tourists, likewise, commonly seek ‘natural’ contexts as authentic.
4
Expressive Phenomenology and the Need for Multi-Ethnographies
Contemporary ethnography is as much about interpretation as it is about description (Denzin, 1997).
Like hermeneutical phenomenologists, ethnographers’ practice is, now, to reflect explicitly on lived
experience, and not simply to describe it. It can also become a discourse of emotions, with
ethnographers contesting how far it is possible to keep personal emotions out of analysis and
representation (Coffey, 1999). As such, it is a method about representing multi-vocal and parallel
discourses in which stability and firm representation is challenged. Multi-perspective epistemology
and multiple standpoints contest the privileging of any single ethnographer’s representation.
Ethnography is thus an impressionistic but also reflexive method, flexible in techniques, and is an
approach rather than a set of specific procedures.
‘Serious’ cultural tourists are similarly flexible, being practiced at what they are doing (Stebbins,
2006). Other than in the comparative transience of their stay at a place, ‘serious’ cultural tourists
may, in effect, be thought of as ethnographers. Much depends on the reflexivity and seriousness of
engagement ascribed to cultural tourists and the impact of their shortness of stays on how far this
ethnographic metaphor is appropriate. If it is, cultural tourists may be used as such to form a basis
of shared expression for academic analysis. For cultural tourists located in Pine and Gilmore’s
educational quadrant, absorption and engagement are foremost, and these are the true
ethnographers among tourists.
Like sociological impressionism, expressive phenomenology has also been recently introduced into
tourism (Wijesinghe, 2008) as a form of hermeneutic phenomenology. However, in contrast to
sociological impressionism, expressive phenomenology has sought to recognise the inevitability of
converting impressions into expressions. Unlike sociological impressionism, it seeks to connect
beyond the level of feelings, and seeks to get beyond emotions to what is felt (presences) in the
context of these emotions. It seeks to grasp and portray presences as a pre-analytical primordial
form of knowing before what Davies (2006, p. 182) calls the analgesic effect of historical illusio
modifies, through expressive representation, that fleeting aesthetic immediacy.
A useful metaphor for the approach is the early twentieth century European Expressionism artistic
genre (Lloyd & Moeller, 2003). The artistic genre sought to primitivise the representation of urban
society, emphasising passion, spontaneity and vitality in an intensity of expression (Lloyd, 1991). As
a form of ethnography, expressionism commonly uses narrative as a medium, recognising narrative
to be an active reconstruction of events and significances, tied together through time by the
narrator as a plot, like artist as painter.
5
Expressive phenomenology also focuses on explicitly past experiences rather than current
experiences, as illustrated in the latest use of expressive phenomenology in ‘Netnography’ (after
‘Ethnography’), interpreting blogs as narratives, thus post hoc and written to a reflective plot. In
expressive phenomenology the creative process of creating expressions is seen as desirable in this
method. In expressive phenomenology the use of narrative is thus not an attempt to recapture the
former meaning of an experience as it was first experienced, but is a rearranging of experience in a
way that creates possibilities for new meaning to emerge or for the authentication of the original
meaning. We acknowledge however, that this rearranging of experience cannot take place outside
of the discursive frames within which researchers themselves operate. This brings with it the need
for an additional layer of subjective reflexivity to be stated by researchers: a point we will return to.
Another important difference between expressive phenomenology and sociological impressionism is
that the former has used narratives produced by someone other than the researcher, rather than by
the researchers themselves. However, if interpreted as a form of hermeneutic phenomenology,
expressive phenomenology offers a working method for researchers also to convert their own
experiences into expressions.
As in all hermeneutical analysis, the task becomes that of interpreting pattern to make details
meaningful. Central to hermeneutics is its circular or spiralling method: the meaning of the part can
only be understood if it is related to the whole; and the meaning of the whole only through its parts,
and the repeated progression through this. What is interpreted is not fact or data, but text made up
of meaningful signs, requiring identification and contextualisation. Contextualisation includes new
contexts from other fields of knowledge and re-contextualisation through a dialogue with a text. This
dialogue requires entering the text, with dialectic between familiarity and distance, and a dialogue
with the imagined reader of the interpretation.
Hermeneutics commonly recognises the importance of insight and intuition. That is, that knowledge
is not acquired through reasoning but instead is gained in an instant flash. It is the authors’ belief
that hermeneutical spiralling can be used to operationalise expressive phenomenology as a method
for articulating self-expression as well as understanding the expressions of others by crossassociation with shared subjectivity and discourse. All of these processes can apply to so-called ‘mystories’ and ‘self-narratives’ as they can to the texts of others. Indeed, hermeneutical practice
includes starting with personal experiences as both accessible and orientating (Van Manen, 1990).
Self-narrative analysis thus provides one means of starting engagement with seeking meanings in
experiences. This is, we suggest, a self-conscious manifestation of what Said (1983, p. 40) has called
“the designed interplay between speech and reception” where experience rendered into text finds
its ‘worldly’ place and discursive utility.
Personal sensing has not been totally ignored in tourism. For example, Lynch (2005) used what he
termed sociological impressionism as a method. This is a method concerned with subjective
experience, the spiritual and the emotional self. It focuses on the intangibles that arise from
experience, and attempts to capture a stream-of-consciousness, and therefore to represent the
6
uniqueness of subjective experience. Lynch (2005) concentrated on immediate perceptions that
acquire permanency and on impressions which were as near spontaneous as circumstances
permitted. The method seems to be a less formal application of Descriptive Experience Sampling
(DES) which has been used in psychology for twenty years (Hulburt & Scwitzgebel, 2007). In the
latter method, experiences are recorded by subjects at set times. Like DES, sociological
impressionism requires researchers to focus on analysing their own experiences. As such,
sociological impressionism is a method of personal sensing, but not one undertaken at fixed
intervals, rather recorded on an opportunist and situational basis.
The difficulty with sociological impressionism is that it has so far focused only on the expressions of a
single individual, rather than seeking shared expressions. It is unclear how impressions can be any
more than a diary or set of notes produced at the moment of impression, and whether these notes
are an accurate representation of introspection. DES has attracted like concerns. Further, once
written up as an academic paper the author, in effect, converts impressions into expressions, but
without a formal method to record the processing of the information.
Discourse in hermeneutic phenomenology and interpretive ethnography would further contest the
ability of a researcher to report impressions rather than expressions of discourse. This is because the
transcription of feelings and emotions itself simplifies and interprets these into words. “All
recollections of experiences, reflections on experiences, descriptions of experiences, or transcribed
conversations about experiences are already transformations of those experiences” (Van Manen,
1990, p. 54). And likewise, “Our data are constructed through our memories of happenings and
memories of our informants” (Coffey, 1999, p. 110). Statements such as these reflect the
engagement qualitative methods foster in their users, and that memory can be reformed given that
it is simultaneously situational and temporal.
Philosophical Associations and Subjective Reflexivity
It would be an abrogation of intellectual responsibility if we did not acknowledge that our concerns
are manifestations of a philosophical problem of longstanding: that of the anxiety producing
dialectic between individual and collective subjectivities. Our response is not to argue for a
refinement of method within the tradition of individual tourism ethnographies, allowing for more
rigorously derived and empirically sound outcomes. Rather, we argue for attention to be paid to the
possibility for individual subjects’ forms of knowing within the wider discursive formations they
inhabit. This requires the systematic collation of multiple ethnographically derived representations
drawn from circumstances as similar and controllable as the unpredictable nature of research in the
social and cultural world may allow.
7
We may begin to consider this in relation to our iteration of the notion that the temporal
discontinuity between researchers’ textual expression of direct experience in the field can only ever
be representations. Time and translation into textual form mean that expression is not identical with
the immediate impression it claims to represent. This is not simply a matter of time and techniques
or indeed the deployment of stylistic self-authenticating strategies necessary to comply with the
collective verification processes leading to academic publication (Davies, 2006). Rather, as Bowie
(1990, p. 16) explains, it is a function of the Kantian notion of an individual’s encounter with endless
particularity which is then synthesised within, and enunciated upon, the framework of her or his
subjectivity. As Bowie (1990) goes on to explain, “for Kant, it is clear that we can only know the
world as it appears to us via the constitutive categories of subjectivity, which synthesise sense data.
The world as an object of truth is located in the structure of the consciousness we have of it”’. Nor,
as Bowie continues (1990, p. 246), relating the implications of Kant’s notions with later Niestzchian
ideas, these syntheses of individual aesthetic impressions within expressive frameworks are best
explained by their utility for the subject’s purposes rather than their efficacy as representations of
truth in any pristine sense.
We must acknowledge, therefore, that representations proceeding from expressive phenomenology
emerge as “power over, not unity with, or synthesis of, the object” (Bowie, 1990, p. 246). These
purposes of the subject, being socially constructed, must be located within the socio-historical
conditions peculiar to them. To do otherwise would be to return to the notion, just rejected, of the
autonomy and transparency of representations as identical with the individual enunciating subject.
Foucault (2002, pp. 784-785) explains that by contrasting the Cartesian notion of the ‘unique but
universal and unhistoric subject’ with Kant’s questioning of what constitutes knowledge at a
particular historical moment, one may proceed to the inevitable extension of that enquiry to the
historical contingency of the subjects (e.g. Man) who create knowledge forms. What Foucault was
concerned with was not the subject in any autonomous sense, but the historical conditions in real or
imagined terms that maintained the availability of subject positions as both subjects and objects of
particular structures of knowledge. This may lead to an emphasis on the conditions under which
objects of knowledge are determined as such.
In this, initial parallels may be drawn with the work of Althusser (2008, p. 45) who maintained that
”the category of the subject is only constitutive of ideology insofar as all ideology has the function
(which defines it) of “constituting” concrete individuals as subjects”. However, whereas as Jones
(2002, p. 232) points out, Althusser’s notion of interpellation and Foucault’s of subjectification are
closely related, they diverged on whether these took place within, respectively, an over-determined
structure of Marxist historical materialism or a decentred totality. The extent to which the two
thinkers may be used in tandem is, therefore, not so much one of direct ‘succession’ but rather one
of the creation of the possibility for the critical development of aspects of Althusserian thought by
Foucault. What can be said is that Foucault rejected the Enlightenment idea that the subject-object
relationship could proceed from anything transcending contingent, ephemeral historical experience.
8
Habermas (1987) meanwhile, was a trenchant critic of Foucault’s refusal to temper his critique of
the Enlightenment with a commitment to maintaining a commitment to it as, nonetheless, the
fundamental basis from which conceptions of reasonable exchanges of meaning must proceed.
Rorty (1989, pp. 61-62)is useful in outlining the point of initial convergence and subsequent
divergence between the two. While both accepted the Nietzchean rejection of the centrality of the
unmediated subject in traditional rationalism, Habermas maintained that an inter-subjective
philosophy of communicative reason could be drawn out of a critical reappraisal of the
Enlightenment. Foucault, on the other hand, Rorty (1989, p. 63) cautioned that such a society
constructed on such principles might restrict the possibilities for
“self-creation, for private projects ... like Habermas ... he [Foucault] accepts [the] view that
the self is a creation of society [but is unprepared to] admit that the selves shaped by
modern liberal societies are better than the selves earlier societies created.”
An understanding of the subject positions that generate and, indeed, themselves become objects of
knowledge is central to Foucauldian thought in the grand histories of systems of epistemology he
undertook. Our undertaking in this article is, clearly, far more modest in terms of theoretical and
contextual application but is framed within broadly similar concerns.
The Need for Double-Reflexivity in Ethnographic Research
Our call is for a double-reflexivity in ethnographic research in tourism that accepts both the specific
situational nature of individual studies and the wider, historically determined, discursive frames
within which forms of individual expression may occur. Pasquino (1993, p. 41) calls this the
‘problematisation of subjectivity’ in which consideration may move from the subject as not merely
the “given or presupposed instance of inquiry, but as its object”. This is what Foucault (2002) means
by Man being both subject and object of knowledge about itself; a situation that the author argues is
not metaphysically, but historically, determined. This is certainly an unresolved problem but not one
that can be avoided in the type of research we are critiquing here. How, Foucault (2001, p. 487) asks,
“can the world which is given as the object of knowledge … at the same time be the site where the
“self” as ethical subject of truth appears and is experienced?” This is not, we emphasise, a call to
choose between one and the other but rather for constant reflection on and acknowledgment of this
duality in ethnographic research where, after all, the researcher is so intimately embedded in
empirical and subjective terms.
Our view is that ethnography requires the far reaching participation of the knower, and is thus
simultaneously personal and expressive. At the outset we identified two concerns. The first concern
was with the inappropriate use of ethnography in tourism discourse in which the personal quality of
the ‘ethnographic account as representation’ is unacknowledged. Our second, associated, concern
was with that of the failure to mirror or to critique changes in ethnographic method as articulated by
anthropologists, namely in the move towards interpretive-expressive anthropology. Following the
analysis of the tourism ethnographies in this study it is apparent that there is clear dissonance
9
between the state of the art in terms of ethnographic research in anthropology and current
articulation of that discipline in the contextual domain of tourism research.
Tourism research would benefit from a conscious departure from methodologies that seem to
celebrate myopic and introverted impressionist ethnographies. Beyond this, recognition of multidimensional perspectives that encompass subjective, personal expressions and more objectively
posited expressions must be made to illustrate the richness of ethnographic research. This
recognition could lead to a greater breadth of multi-ethnographic research with a tourism-specific
focus. In doing this, work that is worthy of the current developments in anthropological research can
emerge and contribute simultaneously to the body of ethnographic research in tourism and, more
widely, to anthropological enquiry. It is hoped that this will address the aforementioned
philosophical narrowness within tourism discourse and encourage innovative ways of thinking.
The tendency towards anthropological studies of tourism as manifestations of wider socio-economic
superstructures had only just begun (Nash, 1991). This paper all adds value to the study of tourism
by calling for renewed attentiveness to the breadth and depth of applied ethnographic methods in
the field. This, as we have indicated, must both entail greater longitudinal and parallel associations
amongst individual studies within tourism as well as the embedding of both researcher-as -subject
and the contexts of study within broader 'extra-touristic' discursive formations. Thus, the reciprocal
importance of tourism as context and the broader significance of ethnographic methods for that
context are reemphasised. Furthermore our findings present an implicit warning against the
privileging of precedence to research that bases findings on one-dimensional ethnographic work. In
the contemporary socio-political climate, tourism is an integral factor to the economic welfare of
many countries and is equally sensitive to the changeable environment. Research that feeds directly
towards developmental and environmental considerations within tourism could negatively impact
these areas by offering contributions that are neither framed within their wider contexts nor based
upon faithfully operationalized research designs. Ultimately, given the impact tourism can have,
studies with direct policy or industry implications that use ethnographic methods owe it to their
audience to engage in the approach presented here in order to ensure sustainable and considered
tourism development.
Ultimately what is expressed as ethnographic tourism research is highly personal and thus
potentially both diverse and multi-dimensional. We must stop paying only lip service to this and,
importantly, confront what it means for how we represent what consumers and researchers, alike,
express in tourism. This means that we should develop multi-ethnographies to enable us to identify
what is generic to knowers, and what is particular to each knower. Otherwise, our progressive
knowing will be a haphazard collection of representations of successive single knowers and offer not
fulfil its collective potential in both the development of methodological theory and its articulation in
associated areas of commercial application.
10
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12
Table 1: Uses of Tourism Ethnographies
Number of papers
analysed using the
ethnography
Crang (1996)
Smith (1998)
Sørensen (2003)
Palmer (2005)
30
14
28
8
Number of papers
2
2
3
0
using the ethnography
discussing foci of
method
Number of papers
0
2
0
0
using the ethnography
discussing the
operationalisation of
method
Altjevic (2000);
Bigley, Lee, Chon, & Yoon Noy (2004); Ooi (2004);
Ballesteros & Ramirez
Papers citing the
Ateljevic & Doorne (2002); Ari & (2010);
Richards & Wilson (2004a); (2007); Hertzman
ethnographies
Mittelberg (2008); Bærenholdt, Weaver (2000); Aramberri Richards & Wilson,
(2008); McCabe (2005);
Haldrup, & Larsen (2008);
(2004);
(2004b);
Breathnach (2006);
Seaton & Lennon (2004); Hardy (2005); Hottola
Butler (2004);
Burns (2004); Iles (2006); (2005); Howard (2005);
Carnegie & McCabe (2008);
Lee (2006); Wanhill
Noy (2005); Simpson
Caton & Santos (2007); Chronis (2006); Bianchi (2006);
(2005);
& Hampton (2008);
Knox (2006); Wight
Uriely & Belhassen (2005);
Crang (1999);
(2006); Giordano & Nolan O’Reilly (2006); Teo &
Grayson & Martinec (2004);
(2007); Rittichainuwat, Leong 2006);
Halewood & Hannam (2001); (2008);
Adkins & Grant (2007);
Hanna et al (2004); Hannam
Sather-Wagstaff (2008) Brenner & Fricke (2007);
(2006);
Howard (2007); Lozanski &
Hannam & Halewood (2006);
Beres (2007);
Hannam (2008); Hashimoto &
Caruana, Crane, & Fitchett
Telfer (2007);
(2008);
Hede and Thyne (2010);
Noy(2008).
Hertzman (2008);
Kwan, Eagles, & Gebhardt
Hunt (2004; 2008); Holloway
(2008); Wilson & Richards
(2010); Johanson and Olsen
(2008);
(2010);
Cohen (2010); Huang &
Kim (2010); Krösbacher &
Hsu (2010);
Mazanec (2010); MalcolmBagnoli (2009); Huang &
Davies (2004); Matheson (2008);
Hsu (2009);
Mehmetoglu & Olsen (2002);
Allon & Anderson (2010);
Milne & Ateljevic (2001); Olsen
Musa & Thirumoorthi
(2002);
(2010);
Prentice (1998; 2001a);
Pansiri (2009); Barnick
Reislinger & Steiner (2006);
(2010)
Sternberg (1997); Thornton et al
(1997);
Uriely, Maoz (2009); Wall & Xie
(2005)
Prentice & Andersen
(2007); Weaver (2008);
Winter & Gallon (2008);
Broomhall & Spinks
(2009); Nina & McCain
(2009)
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