CRITICIZING FOUNDATIONALISM
Central claim of foundationalism (whether
classical or modest):
Foundational beliefs have (at least some)
justification independent of any relations to
other beliefs.
BonJour: If basic beliefs are not justified by
appeal to other beliefs, on what basis are
they justified?
Foundationalist: on no basis!
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Justification as truth-conduciveness
Epistemic justification = likely to be true.
So, whatever feature makes a basic belief
self-justifying must also explain why it is
likely to be true.
But then we are asking for a justification for
basic beliefs!
 I.e. we want an explanation (“reason”)
as to why they are likely to be true.
 This will involve appeal to other beliefs.
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The argument in detail
I.e. there must be some F such that:
1.
Basic belief B has F
2.
Beliefs with F are likely to be true
Therefore:
3.
B is likely to be true
Suppose B is some (basic) empirical belief.
 Then the premises of this argument
must be justifiable if we are to accept B
as justified.
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A problem
I.
1 and 2 can’t both be justified a
priori, since this account applies to
empirical beliefs.
II.
So, either 1 or 2 must be empirically
justified.
III.
Thus, the justification for B in fact
depends on some other empirical
belief and it isn’t basic after all.
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Two possible responses
A. Externalism:
 We shall discuss this later.
B. The doctrine of the given:
 The justification that B has F is seen
through “immediate apprehension”, not
via other empirical beliefs.
 Immediate apprehension is not belief
but something else.
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The doctrine of the given
The given = “directly apprehended”.
 “Raw”, unconceptualized experience.
 This justifies basic beliefs, not other
beliefs.
The picture:
 Direct apprehension: I’m in pain.
 Belief that I am in pain is justified
Former is not a belief so doesn’t need
justification.
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Against the given
BonJour: Immediate apprehension is either:
1.
A cognitive (non-belief) state; or
2.
A non-cognitive state.
If #2, then:
 It doesn’t require justification, but…
 It can’t justify anything else – noncognitive.
If #1, then:
 It can justify a basic belief, but…
 We can ask what justifies it!
Reply: Given is justified because it
corresponds to reality.
BonJour: be we can’t “step outside” our
beliefs to confirm this.
 Direct correspondence is cognitively
inaccessible.
 Won’t do as justification for other beliefs.
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A new regress problem
Three elements are involved in the doctrine
of the given:
1.
The state of affairs apprehended.
2.
The direct apprehension of this.
3.
The belief that is to be justified.
1 justifies 3 via 2.
But how is 2 justified?
 Presumably by 1 as well.
BonJour: But don’t I need another
immediate apprehension, i.e. that 2 is
justified by 1?
 Otherwise 2 justifies 3 and itself.
 Then self-justification is never
explained.
 Infinite regress.
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General problem with foundationalism
Perhaps immediate apprehension is a
“semi-cognitive” state:
 Like belief it can justify.
 Unlike belief, it requires no justification.
BonJour: This is ad hoc. It amounts to:
 We need to stop the regress.
 Beliefs won’t do the trick.
 So let’s just posit some mixed entity that
will do the trick.
Foundationalist: Isn’t this good reasoning?
 Identify what’s needed then posit
something to explain it.
But there are other options:
 Scepticism might be true.
 Coherentism is true.
So it’s false that we “need” to posit direct
apprehensions.
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Summary
 Foundationalism is a reply to the
regress argument.
 It assumes that scepticism is false.
 Critics argue that self-justification makes
no sense.
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An Alternative: Coherentism
Foundationalist: Ultimately, all beliefs
(propositions) are justified by reference to
basic beliefs (props.).
The essence of justification is not relation to
another belief (proposition) but something
else: relation to the “given”.
Coherentist: This is paradoxical.
 A belief (prop.) can justify something
else, but then it makes sense to ask
what justifies it.
 A non-belief (-prop.)—e.g. a cause—
doesn’t require justification but can’t
justify.
Coherentist conclusion: the only kind of
justification that makes sense is relational.
All beliefs are justified by other justified
beliefs. There is no foundation.
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Basic elements of the coherence theory
Justification is holistic:
 Beliefs aren’t justified in isolation.
 They are justified if they belong to a
system of beliefs that is coherent.
Notice that:
1. The only thing that justifies a belief is
other beliefs.
2. Justification is symmetrical:
 Any belief can play a role in justifying
any other belief.
 There is no essential “direction” from
basic beliefs to others.
The idea: you have good reason to believe
that P if this belief “fits in” with your overall
system.
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Defining coherence
But what is it that makes a set of beliefs
coherent?
1. The members must be mutually
consistent.
2. The system must be mutually
explanatory.
So, when considering whether to adopt a
new belief, one must ask:
 Would adopting this belief contradict any
of my current beliefs?
 Would adopting this belief increase or
decrease the explanatory power my
current beliefs?
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Explanation and belief
What is explanatory power?
P explains Q = Given P, Q should be true.
But remember: Coherentism is holistic.
 So to be justified, Q must be explained
by all the beliefs in your set.
 I.e., in a coherent set: each belief is
explained by all the others.
Not:
 P explains Q; Q explains R; R explains
S; S explains P.
Rather:
 Q & R & S explain P
 P, R & S explain Q
 P, Q, & S explain R
 P, Q & R explain S
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An example
Imagine the following set of beliefs:
 P: y – 2x = 0
 Q: x2 – y = 0
 R: x + y = 6
Now I want to know whether to believe that:
 S: <x, y> = <2, 4>
Coherentist: S is justified because:
 (P & Q & R)  (S must be true).
 (P & R & S)  (Q must be true).
 (Q & R & S)  (P must be true).
 (P & Q & S)  (R must be true).
So:
1. The new set is consistent.
2. Adding S to (P & Q & R) increases the
number of explanations you can make.
3. Deleting S reduces that number.
Therefore: S is justified because it belongs
to a coherent (justified) set.
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Other explanatory kinds
Note that the above example is quite
simple:
 All the explanations are those of logical
deduction.
In fact the coherentist adds other kinds of
explanatory principles. E.g.:
1. If I remember that P, then (probably)
P.
2. If others told me that P, then
(probably) P.
3. If it seems to me that P, then
(probably) P.
These should look familiar to you:
 They are part of Chisholm’s
foundationalist theory of evidence.
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Justifying principles of evidence
How might the foundationalist justify these
additional principles of evidence?
 They are not basic beliefs.
 They are not logically entailed by basic
beliefs.
So there is a problem here.
Coherentist: They are easy for me to justify!
 They are justified because they increase
the coherence of our belief-set.
 So coherentism can explain them within
the confines of its own theory.
 The foundationalist has a much harder
task here.
We can add other principles:
 Simplicity
 Comprehensiveness
 Inductive support…
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Coherence and inquiry
Justification comes in degrees:
 The more a set can explain, the more
coherent it is.
 Therefore, the more justified are the
beliefs in that set.
So, you can work to increase the
justification of your beliefs.
 I.e., try to add beliefs to your set so as
to increase its explanatory power.
 This is your cognitive goal.
Ultimately, we seek the most explanatorily
set we can attain.
 I.e., we are after complete coherence.
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More advantages of coherentism
Fallibilism: It doesn’t assume that anything
is known with absolute certainty.
 Our entire belief set is continually
modified—any belief may ultimately be
dropped.
 This is a good, modest epistemological
stance.
Knowledge is social: It is easy to justify
principle 2 above (testimony).
 So we can easily see how knowledge
grows through social interaction.
 Harder for the foundationalist to show
this.
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Coherence and truth
Two theories:
1. Correspondence
 <P> is true iff <P> corresponds to
the fact that P.
 I.e. truth is correspondence between
a proposition and the world.
2. Coherence
 <P> is true iff <P> is a member of a
coherent set.
 Truth is a relation (coherence)
between propositions.
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Coherentist critique of correspondence
1. Correspondence claims that truth is a
relation between a proposition (belief)
and external reality.
2. We never have access to reality
except through our beliefs (concepts,
etc.).
3. Therefore, there is no way to examine
bare, unconceptualized reality.
4. Therefore, there is no way to know
when correspondence between a
belief and reality exists—this would
require a “God’s eye view”.
5. So, the correspondence view makes
truth cognitively inaccessible.
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Coherentist truth
The problem is that truth and fact are
separated on the correspondence view.
On the coherentist view, truth and fact are
one and the same:
 It is true that P iff P coheres with my
belief set.
 It is a fact that P iff P coheres with my
belief set.
So now we can see why justification is truth
conducive:
 It is justified that P  it is true that P
Coherentist: how could a foundationalist
argue that justification is truth conducive?
Similarly, we should not adopt a coherence
theory of justification with a correspondence
theory of truth.
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Coherence and fiction
Objection: There can be fully coherent
accounts in fiction: e.g. the Lord of the
Rings.
 But these do not form a justified, true set
of claims.
Reply: Among our beliefs are:
 Our empirical beliefs, sensory beliefs,
historical beliefs, etc.
 Our belief set must cohere with these
too.
 Given these, the best explanation is the
LOTR is a fictional set from Tolkien’s
mind.
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The role of empirical beliefs
Revising one’s empirical beliefs will cause
more disturbance of one’s belief set than
revising one’s fictional beliefs.
Therefore, empirical beliefs have more
subsequent security than other beliefs.
 All beliefs have identical antecedent
security.
 But once one attempts to integrate them
into the set, some have greater
subsequent security.
Hence, the coherentist respects empirical
data.
 However, their additional security is
justified on coherentist grounds.
 I.e., they are taken seriously because
ignoring them causes great incoherence
(as opposed to fictional beliefs).
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More on empirical beliefs
Perhaps we take our empirical beliefs as
foundational, as experiential data.
Coherentist: it doesn’t follow that it must
remain fixed in our belief set.
 It might be revised later as the result of
coherence considerations.
Instead of a pyramid, the coherentist views
knowledge as a “raft”.
 In order to engage in any inquiry, some
beliefs must be taken as given.
 But in the course of the investigation
even these might be overturned.
Metaphor: we need some “planks” to stand
on, but once we’ve replaced others, we can
stand on them and replace the originals.
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Coherence and scepticism
An unexpected advantage of coherence
justification + truth:
It defeats scepticism.
1. There is no reality/belief distinction.
2. The only empirical reality is the set of
empirical beliefs.
3. So, there is no chance of “reality” not
matching our empirical beliefs.
Foundationalism can’t defeat scepticism. It
just assumes it is false (re: Chisholm).
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