WILLIAM GOLDMAN 10/3/2011
For Educational Use Only
A REVIEW OF BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE, 5 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 399
5 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 399
Harvard Negotiation Law Review
Spring 2000
Book Review
A REVIEW OF BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE
Bargaining For Advantage: Negotiation Strategies For Reasonable People. By Richard G. Shell. New York:
Viking, 1999. Pp. 286.
John Richardsond1
Copyright (c) 2000 Harvard Negotiation Law Review; John Richardson
Richard Shell’s Bargaining for Advantage offers negotiation advice to a general audience. One might think that there are
enough of those books already. But Shell’s book is excellent. Its strengths are a solid recitation of some of the standard
negotiation advice and a fine crop of fresh new ideas, all presented in an enjoyable style.
I. The Fundamentals, Nicely Presented
Shell’s book has two main sections. The first is a compendium of the “Foundations of Effective Negotiation” (p. 1). It is
essentially a prescriptive list of the topics negotiators should think about to improve their results-“Your Bargaining Style”;
“Your Goals and Expectations”; “Authoritative Standards and Norms”; “Relationships”; “The Other Party’s Interests”; and
“Leverage” (Table of Contents, p. ix).
The second section of Shell’s book is a descriptive model of how negotiations work, with advice for handling each stage (p.
115). Shell describes “The Negotiation Process” as consisting of four steps: 1) “Preparing Your Strategy”; 2) “Exchanging
Information”; 3) “Opening and Making Concessions”; and 4) “Closing and Gaining Commitment” (Table of Contents, p. ix).
Shell tops off the book with chapters on “Ethics in Negotiation” (p. 201) and “On Becoming an Effective Negotiator” (p.
235).
Much of the book is a pithy restatement of negotiation verities. Readers of Getting to YES and The Art and Science of
Negotiation will find familiar exhortations. We are urged to think about the other side’s interests, to formulate goals for their
negotiations, form relationships before throwing out numbers, and so on. I do not mean that comment as a criticism. Shell’s
book made me think of a martial arts *400 teacher who encouraged me to study at other schools in addition to his own. “I
might tell you something a hundred times but you won’t understand. Someone else could tell you once and it would be
clear.” Shell is like that other teacher, to whom I would be very comfortable sending good students.
Happily, Bargaining for Advantage is written in an engaging style that is easy to read. The language is crisp and clear.
Plentiful charts and tables summarize the central points. It is illustrated with a host of examples that are clear as well as
entertaining. Some readers will like Shell’s invocations of the wisdom of tribal societies (the Arusha of Tanzania and the
Fulfulde of Nigeria make numerous appearances). Those who style themselves fast-track business people get stories of the
cunning of Donald Trump and the steadfast resolve of Akio Morita. I particularly liked Shell’s accounts of the wiles of
Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan and other tycoons of the guilded era. All the presentation only makes it easier to take in
Shell’s analysis and advice. That advice is well worth taking.
II. What’s New and Useful in Bargaining for Advantage
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WILLIAM GOLDMAN 10/3/2011
For Educational Use Only
A REVIEW OF BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE, 5 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 399
A. The Case for Criteria Grounded in Social Psychology Research
Shell knows the social psychology literature well, and does a solid job of integrating it with his advice for negotiators.
Reader’s familiar with Robert Cialdini’s Influence 1 will recognize many of the concepts and a few examples. Shell does a
good job of translating the social psychology ideas from the sales and marketing situations that concern Cialdini to the
negotiation context where both parties are simultaneously trying to influence the other. I especially liked the job Shell does of
marshaling the social science literature in support of the use of criteria. Some commentators disagree with Fisher, Ury and
Patton2 and Raiffa3 on the importance of effectiveness of criteria. Lately I have been hearing some of my colleagues claim
that Fisher, Ury and Patton’s embrace of criteria as a distribution strategy as naive. 4 I think that Shell effectively defeats that
view.
*401 B. Simple Prescriptive Advice for Positional Bargaining
The second half of Bargaining for Advantage consists of Shell’s descriptive model of “the negotiation process” and his
advice for each stage. I think Shell makes a real contribution here. The simple model he describes-- information exchange,
opening and making concessions, closing and gaining commitment--does indeed describe many negotiations, perhaps even
the great majority (pp. 132-200). Novice negotiators will feel happy to have a outline to follow. Distribution is described as
founded on a base of positional bargaining (pp. 156-75).
I do think his four-stop model needs some qualification. It is not universal. There are other processes that one could imagine.
Negotiators sometimes come in with a final position, before any information exchange, and attempt to get the other side to
agree. Other negotiations proceed by prolonging the information exchange and invention period until there is a package that
both sides can accept-essentially leapfrogging the concession stage and jumping right to commitment. 5 With regard to the
distributive phase of a negotiation, one might also proceed by attempting to agree on principles for division that both sides
can support, without even knowing what the actual numbers will turn out to be.
That said, I think it is important that all negotiation students learn to perform positional bargaining. And Shell provides the
best simple prescriptive advice I know on how to do it effectively. Shell offers advice on all the big questions: whether or not
to open first (go first if “you think your information about market value is better than your counterpart’s”) (p. 160), how high
one’s first offer should be (“[t]he highest (or lowest) number for which there is a supporting standard or argument enabling
you to make a presentable case” (p. 161, emphasis in original), how generously should one concede (it depends on the
situation) (pp. 164-69).
*402 C. An Organizational Framework
The titles of the first six chapters of Bargaining for Advantage provide a simple taxonomy of variables that a negotiator
should keep in mind while preparing for or conducting a negotiation. A simple list of this sort is a great aid to teaching and
learning. It could be used as a good preparation or diagnostic checklist. It provides a common vocabulary for colleagues to
use in discussing a negotiation in which they represent the same side. Most important, it provides a single negotiator with a
system for categorizing and digesting the bewildering mass of information that comes at her in the course of a complex
negotiation. Both the list of “Six Foundations” in Shell’s Bargaining for Advantage and the “Seven Elements” in Fisher,
Kopelman and Schneider’s Beyond Machiavelli6 try to meet this need.
A side by side comparison shows that there is a good deal of overlap:
Fisher, Kopelman & Schneider
Shell
Interests
Your Goals and Expectations The Other Party’s Interests
Criteria
Authoritative Standards and Norms
Relationship
Relationship
Your Bargaining Style
Leverage
Alternatives
Options
Commitment
Commitment7
Communication
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WILLIAM GOLDMAN 10/3/2011
For Educational Use Only
A REVIEW OF BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE, 5 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 399
Shell’s prescriptive framework starts from a different set of assumptions about what variables negotiators are most likely to
be able to effect, and what they are most likely to forget in the heat of the moment. For example, Shell separates the other
side’s interests from one’s own, putting double emphasis on this area. Similarly, he frames the challenge relating to one’s
own interests as one of setting appropriate aspiration levels (pp. 22-38), rather than one of coming to *403 understand one’s
own interests.8 Both Bargaining for Advantage and Beyond Machiavelli put equal weight on criteria and relationship. Fisher,
Kopelman and Schneider pay more attention to the question of value creation, the elements of options, which Shell does not
give equal dignity with the rest of his foundations.
I like some of Shell’s changes, particularly his attention to setting aspiration levels. It has long been established that high
aspiration levels are correlated with a greater share of the distributive pie while also carrying a greater risk of no agreement.9
Shell offers solid advice for how to set one’s own reservation value: aspire to the highest or lowest value you could justify
with criteria (pp. 31-33).
Moreover, many negotiation students will profit from having a choice of frameworks. One could choose either set, depending
on what “elements” or “foundations” one is most at risk of forgetting, or which seems more effective given the distribution or
counterparts one runs into in the course of one’s work. Perhaps the best advice would be for a negotiator to craft her own list,
taking the elements that appeal most from either system, or from some other source.
III. A Few Caveats
While I count myself among Mr. Shell’s admirers, I do have some disagreements with his advice. In each instance I think
there is a plausible case to be made for Shell’s advice, but a stronger one to be made for a different view.
A. Not Preparing a Reservation Value
Shell advises that, as part of their preparation, negotiators should set themselves an aspiration value on the basis of the
highest (or lowest) figure that one could justify with a straight face (pp. 31-33). So far, so good. But he also advises
negotiators not to figure out a reservation value. He supposes that with limited cognitive resources, those who set a
reservation price will inevitably compare offers to it rather than their aspiration, and so settle for less (pp. 28-29).
I doubt that is good advice. Our cognitive resources are surely limited, but is it really too much to write down both an
aspiration and *404 a reservation? There may be some danger that a negotiator’s attention will be captured by his reservation,
and she will be unable to focus on a more ambitious goal. But both in the classroom and on the street I see people settle for
less than their reservation price everyday. And one need only open the paper to a story about any intractable conflict to see
negotiators turning down agreements that have to be better for at least one side than it’s reservation value. I think Shell
ignores large risks with heavy consequences that avoid a smaller risk. He adds, “[Y]ou can always address the issue of your
‘walkaway’ once you get into the negotiation and test the other side’s reaction to your goal” (p. 29). But wait: in the middle
of a negotiation which is going poorly--at least to the extent of prodding me to think about walking out-I am supposed to
figure out my reservation value on the spot? That would involve generating a rich list of alternatives, evaluating that list to
choose the best one, comparing non-monetary aspects of both deals in order to compare apples to apples, and then estimating
the cost of exercising that alternative-a difficult calculation even when you have complete time and no emotional pressure. 10
That sounds like a difficult cognitive feat--far more so than remembering to which of my two numbers written on my pad I
should pay more attention.
B. “Leverage”
One of Shell’s central organizing concepts is “leverage” (pp. 89-114). He defines it as the “power . . . to obtain an agreement
on your own terms” (p. 90). But once Shell breaks down what he means by leverage, there doesn’t seem to be anything
beyond what he has written in previous chapters. He says there are three kinds of leverage (pp. 101-05): positive leverage
(knowledge of the other side’s interests and the ability to satisfy them); negative leverage (knowledge of the other’s
alternatives and the ability to worsen his alternatives); and normative leverage (criteria by which the other will feel
constrained) (pp. 102-05).
Since two of his chapters are titled “The Other Party’s Interests” (p. 76) and “Authoritative Standards and Norms” (p. 39), it
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WILLIAM GOLDMAN 10/3/2011
For Educational Use Only
A REVIEW OF BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE, 5 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 399
is difficult to see why this new category of “leverage” is needed. Except for the material about alternatives, which Shell
chooses to put in a supporting role compared to his “foundations,” the components of leverage are all dealt with at greater
length elsewhere. With the limited space *405 that one can use for a short checklist, it seems ill-advised to cover the same
material twice while leaving out other important points.
I can imagine that it is a useful frame for teaching to Shell’s audience at the Wharton Executive Negotiation Workshop;
students might feel more energized by talking about increasing their leverage than by the relatively dry concepts of interests
and alternatives. But I cannot see how this broad concept of leverage, as opposed to its specific components, makes an
enlightening lens for the analyst.
There is a potential harm for the student. Shell suggests that negotiation students analyze negotiations by asking who has the
leverage? (p. 105). Treating leverage as a zero-sum commodity misses the complexity of negotiation. One can think of
negotiation situations in which neither side has appreciable power to influence the other to change (think of long stalemates
like Northern Ireland or Israel and Syria) and situations in which both parties have a great deal of leverage (my wife and I
over where to vacation). Deciding that one has little leverage could cause one to neglect the helpful steps one could make.
Deciding one has a lot of leverage could lead one to an indolent overconfidence.
C. Labeling the Student
Shell’s first chapter is the one with which I disagree most. He recommends that negotiation students categorize themselves
into one of the five descriptions found on the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument11 (pp. 9-12). Shell’s advice is to
figure out which type you are and to play to your strengths. “Your job is to find out who you are as a negotiator and then
work to be more effective with the skills you have-not try to become someone you are not” (p. 20).
The problem with this advice is that there are a lot of kinds of negotiation situations. What works in one will not work in all.
Shell recognizes this in his “situational matrix” (p. 166), in which he notes that different situations call for the skills of
different types identified by Thomas-Kilmann. But then what advice does Shell offer to a negotiator faced with a situation
that calls for another skill set? “Get help from someone with better people skills” (p. 167).
I think Shell has solid practical reasons for giving this advice to at least some students. At the Wharton Executive Negotiation
Workshop Shell teaches mid-career executives in fairly brief courses. Someone who comes to a week-long negotiation
workshop and feels *406 that he is too busy for on-going study may be well advised to accept who he is and to make the best
of it. But serious students, highly intelligent ones with a lot of time to invest in improving their skills like the MBA students
that Shell teaches at Wharton and the law students I see at Harvard, can aspire to much more. I would rather that negotiation
students concentrate their efforts precisely in the areas in which they are weaker.
Shell notes that “[s]ome people have a wide ‘bandwidth’ when it comes to bargaining styles” (p. 20). They do not just “have”
that bandwidth. They learned this bandwidth of different techniques at some point in their life. And people with narrow
“bandwidths” can learn more and widen their repertoire. None of us are born with anything like the Thomas-Kilmann
repertoires of Avoider, Compromiser, Accommodator, Competitor and Problem Solver (described pp. 10-11). The pitfall
Shell warns against, “becom[ing] someone you are not” (p. 20), is what we are all doing from the moment we are born.
It is difficult for the student, since those behaviors may be so deeply ingrained as to be unconscious. Videotaping to become
more aware of one’s actual behavior can help. So can specific coaching on how to enact different behavior.
IV. Conclusion
While I would caution the reader in the areas I have outlined above, I do recommend that all serious students of negotiation
take a look at Bargaining for Advantage. It has a great deal of valuable analysis and advice, and that will not be found in The
Art and Science of Negotiation, Getting to YES, The Manager as Negotiator, or Beyond Winning. It will be valuable to
students as a supplement for those books, or as a good starting primer on its own. Not a bad graduation or holiday present for
the negotiator on your list.
Footnotes
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WILLIAM GOLDMAN 10/3/2011
For Educational Use Only
A REVIEW OF BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE, 5 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 399
d1
Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School and Associate of Harvard Negotiation Project. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1992. The
author would like to thank Sheila Heen for her comments and support.
1
Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (1993).
2
Roger Fisher et al., Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement without Giving in (2d ed. 1991).
3
Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (1982).
4
Personal conversations with the reviewer. Since my colleagues have not taken the trouble to argue the point out at length, and
since I think they get the worst of the argument, I will avoid naming names.
5
See, e.g., James C. Freund, Smart Negotiating: How to Make Good Deals in the Real World 25 (1992); David A. Lax & James K.
Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (1986). Lax & Sebenius’s discussion of
distribution has advice for using many distributive tactics, including making commitment, holding prime values hostage, and
“powerology.” It discusses fairness as an afterthought. Id. at 150-52. It concludes that “conceptions of equity” are “fragile and
divisive” and that “[o] ne person’s fairness may be another’s outrage.” Id. at 151. They offer no advice on how to use criteria.
6
Roger Fisher et al., Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict 75 (1994).
7
Shell does discuss commitment issues in a later chapter, though it is not part of his “foundations” (pp. 177-201).
8
But see John S. Hammond et al., Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions (1999) (asserting that one’s own
interests are difficult to know and quantify, and deserve to be the subject of extended analysis).
9
See Fisher et al., Beyond Machiavelli, supra note 6, at 76-77. See also Fisher et al. Getting to YES, supra note 2, at 56-80; Leigh
Thompson, The Heart and Mind of the Negotiator 43-67 (1998).
10
See, e.g., Sally Blount White et al., Alternative Models of Price Behavior in Dyadic Negotiations: Market Prices, Reservation
Prices, and Negotiator Aspirations, Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 430 (1994).
11
Shell describes the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument in Appendix A (pp. 243-46).
End of Document
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© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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