By: Ronald F. White, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy
College of Mount St. Joseph
In Western liberal democracies, the concept of “diversity” serves a wide range of philosophical, ideological, social, and even economic purposes. Any concept that serves such multiple purposes will be necessarily vague. Vague concepts are OK, as long as we recognize them as such. However, when it comes to the task of objectively assessing progress toward the realization of institutional goals, notoriously vague concepts that operate at the highest levels of generality can be easily reshaped (constructed) to create the illusion success in achieving our institutional goals and/or the illusion of consensus.
In higher education, the concept of “diversity” functions as both a descriptive concept , which purports to relate to objective matters of fact that can be observed, quantified, and ultimately assessed in terms of “Truth” and “Falsity.” “Diversity” also serves as a prescriptive concept , which purports to relate to our values, which are ultimately expressed in terms of judgments of what is “Good” and “Bad.” Let’s take a closer look.
DIVERSITY AS A DESCRIPTION
When we employ the term “diversity” in its descriptive sense there are certain inviolable boundaries to its usage. Obviously, it is a collective term that says something about the plurality of properties, interests, individuals and/or sub-communities that comprise larger aggregates. Ordinarily we would not say that an individual is “diverse,” although we might say that an individual has “diverse interests.” It is also a comparative term, in the sense that we say that one aggregate is more or less diverse in comparison to some other aggregate. There is no objective threshold where an aggregate crosses the line from uniform to diverse apart from its relationship to some other aggregate. So let’s sum up by saying that as a descriptive concept, communities can be assessed in terms of degrees of relative “diversity” or “uniformity” in reference to the properties and/or interests of the individuals and sub-communities that comprise another community. Or in other words, any community is either relatively diverse or uniform in reference to a certain set of parameters in relationship to some other community.
Traditionally, all human societies measure “cultural diversity” in terms of parameters such as: national parameters (American, Mexican), racial parameters (black, white, red, yellow), gender parameters (male, female), ethnic parameters , class parameters (rich, poor), religious parameters , tribal parameters, age parameters , political parameters
(liberal, conservative), and sexual preference parameters (heterosexual, homosexual) .
Liberal societies also predicate diversity to the beliefs within that society. We’ll get to that later.
So if we want to know whether the Mount community is diverse or not we would need to refer to at least some of the above parameters (or some other parameter) and compare that
number to some other community. We can also break down our community and look at the diversity of its sub-communities: its faculty, staff, and student body. My point here is that this kind of assessment is an empirical matter that is objective and ultimately measurable. The ratio between male and female professors at any college can be expressed numerically, which makes it possible to compare that ratio with the ratios of other communities and institutions. (Of course, the question of whether we ought to compare our ratios with one population rather than another is a different matter.)
Let’s start out by admitting that if we were to conduct a scientific study of diversity in higher education (and it no doubt has already been done) we’d find that private liberal arts colleges are (in fact) less diverse in terms of most of the fore-mentioned parameters than most public universities. Although, I’m no social scientist, based on my nonscientific observations I would say that our faculty, staff, and student body are (in fact) overwhelmingly uniform in comparison to the rest of Cincinnati: American, Caucasian,
Middle Class, and Roman Catholic. Our male-female gender ratio leans toward the female side. Politically, our faculty is probably overwhelmingly liberal while our students are overwhelmingly conservative. In terms age, sex, and sexual preference we probably exhibit a bit more diversity than the rest of Cincinnati, or the University general population..
In sum, let’s just say that as a descriptive concept, diversity is more or less subject to empirical analysis and that, social scientists can measure our own level of diversity in comparison to other communities and institutions. And, all this stuff can be tracked by the administration via computer. So what can we say about “diversity” as a prescriptive concept?
DIVERSITY AS A PRESCRIPTION
Well, if “diversity” is a prescriptive concept it is either “Good” or “Bad.” In a liberal society “diversity” is generally is regarded as something “Good,” which is to say that it has “value.” It can also serve as an ideal , which is to say that if any specific community is descriptively uniform, it ought to strive toward being more descriptively diverse. In ethics, if something is “Good,” if possible, we “ought” to try to do it. If it’s “Bad” we
“ought” to try not to do it. (There is your ethics course in a nutshell!)
When we say that diversity is “Good,” we mean that it is either: an extrinsic good , or good because of the good things that it brings about; or that it is an intrinsic good , or good for its own sake. If diversity is an extrinsic good, we are basically saying that its costs are outweighed by its future benefits.
Good social science strives to predict both cost and benefits. So, at least in theory, we should be able to identify the extrinsic costs and benefits associated with the various instantiations of cultural diversity: diversity of national origin, racial diversity, ethnic diversity, class diversity, religious diversity, age diversity, political diversity, and diversity of sexual preference. If we look closely at the above parameters, we’d probably conclude that one of the consequences of diversity is diversity of opinion . In the liberal tradition, the more diversity of opinion there is in any given community, the more likely it is that it will stumble upon the Truth.
So if diversity as measured by any or all of the above parameters is something extrinsically good, it must be at least tolerated , if not nurtured .
Of course, as a liberal arts college we must be more or less committed to diversity of belief or opinion. However, there are limits. Would we be fulfilling our obligations as an institution of higher learning if we nurtured or even tolerated a student’s patently false descriptive beliefs, such as: 7+5=13, the earth is flat, or that the holocaust never happened? On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, diversity of belief on matters of fact is also essential for the survival of Science. Science is basically “trial and error.” The same might be said of students’ prescriptive beliefs. Would we be fulfilling our mission if we nurtured or tolerated racist, sexist, and/or homophobic, beliefs? In short, does commitment to “cultural diversity” necessarily imply “descriptive relativism” (whatever anyone believes is True) or “prescriptive relativism” (whatever anyone believes is
Good)? What does freedom of speech mean within this broad context?
Of course, not everyone believes that diversity is extrinsically good. Conservative communitarians tend to argue that all communities require at least a degree of enforced uniformity and that diversity undermines “community values.” In fact, it’s hard to ignore the reality that in the long history of the human race, diversity has been a prolific source of conflict. Most wars have been fought over nationalism, racism, ethno-centrism, tribalism, and social class. Therefore, many argue that “tolerance” is a bounded virtue that does not always lead to positive ratios. Although we are a liberal arts college, that definition must value “diversity” we probably would not tolerate persons or groups on campus that profess or support ideologies that condone: terrorism, racism, pedophilia, anti-Semitism, or Satanism.
Now if “diversity” is an intrinsic good , then it is “good for its own sake,” independent of its consequences. If this is the case, we would not have to conduct any cost/benefit analyses. Social science would be irrelevant to the assessment intrinsic value. We would simply apply reason or intuition. We would probably link the concept of “diversity” to other intrinsically good prescriptive concepts such as spirituality, equality, or democracy.
If the College of Mount St. Joseph believes that “diversity” is an intrinsic good, then it requires no external consequential justification. But what happens if we view “diversity” is “intrinsically good,” but it also carries with it a negative cost/benefit ratio? In our zeal to increase diversity, we might accrue exorbitant costs (scholarships etc.) and court economic hardship.
ASSESSMENT OF DIVERSITY
If the College of Mount St. Joseph is committed to “diversity” as an ideal, then there are obvious strategies that we can implement that can diversify our: national parameters , racial parameters , ethnic parameters , class parameters , gender parameters, religious parameters , tribal parameters, age parameters , political parameters , and sexual preference parameters. This is all a simple matter of recruitment. If we really value what we ambiguously refer to as “cultural diversity,” we could actively recruit specific
faculty, staff, and students of different: nationalities, races, ethnicities, classes, religions, ages, political views, and or sexual preferences. Liberals believe that students learn a lot about “cultural diversity” by actually experiencing it in an institutional setting.
Given the relative uniformity of our institutional setting, it is fortunate that students can also learn about “cultural diversity” from our curriculum. So do we really value cultural diversity in our curriculum? In general, actions speak louder than words. How many programs and/or courses in the curriculum address “cultural diversity?” How many students are enrolled in these programs or take these courses? What is the content of these programs or courses? How many faculty members profess knowledge of issues involving diversity?
If we find these ratios lacking, and if we want to improve upon those ratios we could start by increasing the number of programs, courses and/or course modules that related to the various instantiations of “diversity.” If we really value diversity, we ought to develop programs that directly address matters of diversity. International programs are expensive but probably, on balance, “extrinsically good.” How about promoting cultural diversity by providing students with the opportunity for foreign study? How about instituting new diversity-based programs in: Latin American Studies, Japanese Studies, Chinese Studies,
Women’s Studies, European Studies, and/or Gay Studies? Finally, one obvious way for us to address cultural diversity is by having a foreign language requirement in the liberal arts core curriculum and foreign language professors on the faculty.
In the end, if we really value “diversity” in the curriculum we ought to implement programs that promote that value and hire faculty that specialize in that area. In short, if diversity is good, we ought to be willing to pay for its advancement. If not, the concept of
“diversity” is certainly vague enough to accommodate “smoke and mirrors” strategies that makes everyone feel good, but do little or nothing to improve upon the status quo .
So, how should we go about assessing our progress toward our institutional goals associated with “diversity?” In no more than 400 words: “ Describe how your program addresses diversity.” Go figure. . .