Executive Report from the APCSS
Conference on “Inter-Korean
Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects”
March 1-3, 2005, Honolulu, HI,
Prepared by Alexandre Mansourov, Ph.D.
Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects
The APCSS conference on “Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Challenges and Prospects”
examined the economic transition in the DPRK and its impact of North-South relations,
evaluated the direction and prospects for political change in North Korea and the South’s
approaches to influencing the direction of political evolution in the North, considered the
impact of political changes in the ROK on inter-Korean relations, examined the crosspenetrating and mutually remolding influences of the North and South’s foreign policies
and national security strategies on one another, contemplated the future scenarios in
political reconciliation and Korean nation-building, discussed various Northeast Asian
perspectives on inter-Korean reconciliation, as well as analyzed the long-term
sustainability of the US-ROK alliance in the context of the North-South rapprochement,
the ROK domestic trends, global US defense transformation strategy, and the US-ROK
military force realignment on the peninsula.
Forty-nine policy practitioners and academics from six countries attended the conference,
including representatives from the U.S. State Department, Office of the Secretary of
Defense (2), U.S. Congress, KEDO, Air University, Naval War College, World Bank,
Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, and a Washington-based NGO, 10
participants from ROK, 2 from Russia, 1 from Japan, 1 from the PRC, 1 from the
Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom, a Swedish representative from the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 4 from PACOM, 3 from USFK, 1 from
JICPAC, 1 from MARFORPAC, 1 from PACAF, 1 from PACFORUM, 7 from APCSS,
Consul-Generals from Japan and ROK, and other on-island (BYU, UH, HPU, EWC)
participants (see a list of conference attendees attached).
Below are some of the major observations made by the conference participants:
1. Economic Transition in the DPRK and Its Impact on North-South Relations
North Korea is extremely serious about economic reforms, but at the same time it
is extremely nervous about the political and social impact of reforms. These reforms
have caught on, they are real, not just a tactical adjustment. The mid-level cadres in the
North are allowed to travel abroad more and learn more, and they want to accelerate
domestic changes, but the political leadership is worried about the risks involved, knows
its limitations, and will continue to regulate the process. The nuclear standoff has a
relatively insignificant impact on the current direction of economic reforms, but may
place limits on their pace, ultimate depth and breadth in the long run. Without the
resolution of the nuclear issue, although Pyongyang may continue to benefit from its
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growing economic engagement with China and expanding inter-Korean economic
relations, it will not be able to join the “club” of civilized nations and get access to the
international financial institutions and global capital markets which could provide
financing necessary for the fundamental recovery and restructuring of the North Korean
economy. Economic reform amidst political stability appears to be Kim Jong Il’s goal;
the question is whether he will be able to have the cake and eat it, too.
The South has so far reacted positively and encouraged the North’s economic
reforms through a strategy of “asymmetric engagement,” while benefiting from them in
several important ways. South Korea’s “cash-based give-aways” helped shift the basis of
North Korea’s economy to hard currency, forcing the North Korean Won to lose almost
all its value. This is a huge macroeconomic change in the North where money in general
and foreign currency in particular became king. South Korea altered the way the North
Koreans think about profit-making, private entrepreneurship, market economy, and
capitalism even at the level of official pronouncements. The South succeeded in
improving dramatically the North Korean public and private perceptions of and attitudes
toward the ROK (while the North Korean attitudes towards the United States are
changing for the worse). The South is sweeping the North into the global Korean chic
wave (“hallyu”), thereby refining the latter’s image in the eyes of the world public.
More significantly, the ROK government was able to make its own public feel
much more secure and less threatened by the North. The ROK was able to prevent the
collapse of the DPRK and stopped the humanitarian tragedy in the DPRK through the
delivery of annual fertilizer aid. The North’s growing economic dependency on the
South allows Seoul to counter-balance expanding Chinese economic influence in the
DPRK. Inter-Korean economic integration opens up new venues and opportunities for
the industrial restructuring of the ROK’s small and medium-size enterprises facing
intensifying competition from China. In other words, all three South Korean goals vis-àvis the North (secure its own people, prevent collapse, and prevent domination of North
Korea by a foreign power) are met with satisfaction.
It is not clear yet to what degree South Korean influence squares with China’s
role in the DPRK’s economic restructuring and reforms. The lack of mutual benefit,
transparency, and public accountability raises the questions about the efficiency and
moral hazard in South Korean strategy of “asymmetric engagement.” Also, it is still an
open question whether or not growing inter-Korean economic exchanges will lead
eventually to a fundamental change in the DPRK’s economic system, and whether that
will result in a greater improvement or no change in the North-South relations or may
leave South Korea in the cold, thereby reigniting the game of competitive legitimation on
the peninsula.
2. Political Changes in the DPRK and Their Impact on North-South Relations
North Korea seeks to build a strong military state under the “military-first policy”
(MFP) and “kangsong taeguk” (“building a powerful and prosperous nation”) vision.
The MFP is distinct from the old WPK (Workers’ Party of Korea) policy of militarization
of the entire society. Neither is it simply a transient measure instituted to deal with the
famine. Implementation of the “military-first policy” may be an act of transition to a
different kind of political system reflecting primarily the corporate interests of the
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national security establishment rather than the political order dominated by the socialist
workers’ party. Through the MFP, Kim Jong Il aligned himself with the military, hoping
to survive, because the KPA is the only political, economic, and social entity that works
very well in the North Korean society today. However, one should not discount the fact
that in a communist state such as the DPRK, the military and the party tend to be fused at
multiple levels: the KPA top brass are party members; and everyone depends on Kim
Jong Il and is completely loyal to him. In this light, the MFP may be just a reflection of
the fact that at the present moment Kim Jong Il is more pleased with the performance of
the military cadres than the civilian cadres, which may change anytime at his discretion.
Can North Korea maintain the “military-first policy” and succeed with economic
reforms? From the perspective of the DPRK’s domestic politics, the answer is positive:
the MFP may be a slogan, an ideology, and the glue for domestic cohesion and stability,
helping Kim Jong Il “keep the mind of military leaders intact” at a time of deepening
economic reforms. Can North Korea pursue the MFP and reach a nuclear settlement with
the United States? From the same domestic political perspective, the answer is negative;
because nuclear weapons may be Kim Jong Il’s give-away to the Korean People’s Army
to keep the top brass happy and content so that he can continue his economic reforms,
save money on the modernization of conventional weapons, and intensify his pro-active
engagement with the South.
The South goes along with the MFP, because Seoul does not want to interfere
openly into the North’s domestic political affairs, and because the ROK government is
not sure if they push for fundamental political changes, let alone regime change, they will
get a better regime than Kim Jong Il’s in the end. Seoul prefers to look for a silver lining,
making promising comparisons between the MFP and Park Chung-hee’s military rule.
Some South Koreans regard the MFP as a convenient cover for Kim Jong Il, allowing
him to proceed safely with the succession process – it is high time for the Dear Leader to
start grooming his own successor under the protection of the DPRK’s national security
establishment. Obviously, Seoul has an indirect stake in succession politics in
Pyongyang, but the ROK government has not determined yet what role to play in North
Korean domestic politics or how to exert influence upon it. The South believes that the
process of inter-Korean reconciliation may contribute to the restructuring and
dismantlement of the North’s economic and political systems in the long run. However,
at the present moment, the ongoing political changes in North Korea do not appear to be
of systemic or fundamental nature and do not to have much impact on the South-North
relations yet.
3. Political Changes in the ROK and Their Impact on South-North Relations
In the process of deepening democratization, South Korea is moving away from the
ideology of anti-communism and the 1948 consensus. Old ideological assumptions and
political tenets are questioned, challenged, and thrown away. The key question is why
should South Korea exist as an independent state separate from North Korea? The role
and interests of the United States in the formation and preservation of the distinct South
Korean national statehood is increasingly scrutinized. As the generational gap between
the so-called 386 and 5060 generations widens, the ROK society and politics get more
polarized, especially on such core issues related to the essence of the ROK’s national
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identity as the repeal of the National Security Law, re-writing of colonial and post-war
history, reduction and withdrawal of USFK, re-alignment with China, etc. As a
consequence, some participants suggested that inter-Korean reconciliation must be
preceded by political reconciliation within the ROK. The South Korean political class
must overcome internal divisions because its seeming inability to accept the
responsibility for the past may impede the South-North reconciliation in the future.
“Progressive” observers credit President Roh Moo-hyun for challenging the structural
status-quo, opening the long-overdue domestic political debates about the past social
injustices and political persecutions, their necessary, albeit painful, present cures, and
future course of Korea. They also commend him for following the U.S. model in
“civilianization” of the ROK military, as well as for showing courage and standing up to
the U.S. President Bush after the latter had publicly humiliated his predecessor President
Kim Dae-jung. In contrast, “conservative” observers regard him as a short-sighted
revolutionary leading his “young Talibans” in the Blue House to destroy domestic
(values, institutions) and external (alliances, commitments, reputation) foundations of
South Korea’s successful existence as a strong independent and prosperous state for the
past half a century. In particular, they denounce the “Red House’s” “policy of feeding
and engorging the monster” (read Kim Jong Il’s regime). They criticize the efforts of the
“386G-infested” National Security Council, which relegated the Ministry of National
Defense to the role of just a bystander in defense policy-making and damaged the morale
among the officers’ corps. Pro-American sentiment is said to be increasingly suppressed
within the ROK’s military, which is being re-socialized in accordance with more
nationalistic educational guidelines. The “conservative” participants further contend that
“the Roh Moo-hyun administration probably purged more people (with “pro-American”
views) from the MND, MOFAT, and other national security agencies than Kim Jong Il
did among his own ranks,” which resulted in a loss of self-confidence and sense of
mission within the ranks of the national security establishment. Moreover, whereas in the
past, one would advance his or her career at the MND and MOFAT by working the U.S.related issues at their respective North American divisions, in the current political
climate, reportedly, it would be rather dangerous for career growth to work on the U.S.
issues or with the U.S. officials.
Political changes in the ROK in the past several years blind-sided everyone and
led to the institution of the “pro-North” “sunshine policy” by the Kim Dae-jung
administration and “pro-engagement” “peace and prosperity policy” (PPP) by the Roh
Moo-hyun administration, which both totally redefined the South-North relations and
transformed the ROK into an economic benefactor, diplomatic cheerleader, and military
sentinel for Pyongyang, as well as a draw bridge between the DPRK and the world. The
PPP is based on three principles – “no war, no collapse, and no pressure,” which puts it in
stark contradiction with the U.S. approach towards North Korea, emphasizing that “all
options are on the table,” “regime change may be a good idea,” “blackmail ought not to
pay, and pressure must be applied.”
Among the growing number of areas that the South and the North can agree on
today and appear to lend moral support to each other, one can note the vacillating antiAmerican feelings, dormant anti-Chinese sentiments (awakened by the “Koguryo flareup”), and escalating anti-Japanese animosity (aggravated by the recent Tokto dispute and
the history textbook problem). North and South Koreans tend to fight together against
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what they mutually hate, not for what they stand in common. Of course, one cannot
discount the fact that South and North Koreans live in a tough neighborhood, and,
therefore, they define their national identity through a lot of “antis.”
4. North Korean Foreign Policy and Its Impact on the North-South Relations
In general, North Korea has always sought to penetrate and subvert the South
Korean political process with varying degrees of success and to influence the South
Korean decision-making, especially with regard to Seoul’s policy towards Pyongyang
and Washington. At a maximum, the North Korean leadership has not given up its longheld ambition of unifying the Korean peninsula on its own terms as a strategically
superior power, arguing that the Southern leadership lacks the moral nationalist
credentials because it allowed for the Southern land to be disgracefully occupied by
foreign military forces for six decades, and asserting Pyongyang’s “indigenous” nuclear
credentials (which is quite inconsistent with the North’s promise to dismantle its nuclear
programs if the U.S. abandons its “hostile policy”) unavailable to Seoul because of its
non-nuclear pledge. At a minimum, on security and economic grounds, the DPRK
government seeks to take advantage of the “peace and prosperity policy” and to ensure
that the ROK government will continue its engagement strategy towards Pyongyang,
while attempting to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington and calling for the
formation of a “united front” between the North and the South against the United States
through the strategy of “national cooperation” on the nuclear and other important issues.
Some conference participants suggested that in KEDO and at the six-party talks, North
Korea’s strategy may be much more complex than just “driving a wedge” between the
two allies: Pyongyang may regard Seoul as an intermediary helping “bring along the
United States” and “make it more accommodating and flexible” in its policy towards the
DPRK, as well as a facilitator and promoter of a unique “Korean (or Asian) solution” to
the North Korean nuclear issue, if the six-party talks fail.
Some U.S. participants emphasize continuity in the North Korean negotiating
behavior vis-à-vis South Korea and regard it largely as uncompromising, unyielding,
deceptive warrior-like “pseudo-negotiations,” and a tool of revolution and class struggle
to be used to defeat the Southern enemy. In contrast, the ROK participants point out the
incremental changes in “real negotiations” – less propaganda and grandstanding, more
pragmatism and preference for “behind-the-curtain” dealings, more sincerity, greater
flexibility and willingness to close the eyes to formality and procedures, more diversity of
issues under consideration (including the military issues), proliferation of meeting
locations, more diverse negotiating partners, less frequent resort to suspension and delay that have emerged since the North-South summit in June 2000. These changes resulted
in a new friendlier and more cooperative atmosphere in bilateral negotiations and the
North-South contacts in various multilateral settings, including within the United
Nations, KEDO, and on the sidelines of the six-party talks.
In terms of substance, however, recent political changes in the South led to
dramatic changes in the South Korean negotiating behavior. South Korean political
leaders promoting the “kumbaya-like” policy of peace and prosperity toward the North
are reluctant to use the economic leverage to influence North Korea’s behavior and do
not take “no” for an answer from their own inter-Korean negotiators, which ties the
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latters’ hands and puts them in an inferior bargaining position. As a consequence, as one
U.S. participant argued, “the ROK negotiators are forced to absorb the insults from the
North,” and the “North Korean negotiators manhandle, dominate, and bury them.” The
Chinese participant echoed this sentiment by asserting that “for North Korea, interKorean reconciliation is a tool for squeezing economic resources and learning capitalist
ways from the South, as well as for trying to break up the South Korean society by
penetrating into the ROK through various exchanges and the Internet.” He argued that
the DPRK dictates the speed, direction, and scope of the inter-Korean reconciliation; and
although the ROK has accepted a lot of North Korea’s demands, the DPRK leadership
still refuses to describe the Roh Moo-hyun’s administration as a “good Korean
government,” because “it has only one good side – a pro-North policy, whereas the other
side of it is bad, namely, its adherence to the strategic alliance with the United States.”
5. Future Scenarios in Korean Nation-building
Conference participants discussed three ways how the inter-Korean reconciliation
may unfold – the North-led, the South-led, and mutually cooperative, and four different
hypothetical scenarios of the emergence of a unified Korean state, namely, through
gradual internal reformation of the North and deepening political reconciliation through
proliferation of joint standing commissions, or a fratricidal war, or abrupt collapse and
extinction of the DPRK, or the South-led appeasement and virtual reunification. Some
participants felt strongly that reunification was unlikely to be either peaceful or
democratic or equitable, despite all public declarations and good intentions of all the
parties concerned, because power essentially cannot be shared.
One participant raised the possibility that the Northern collapse scenarios could
differ: the North Korean state may break up along some invisible internal fault lines and
the KPA military leaders may attempt to set up their own mini-garrison states
(“warlordism”), or an economic collapse may lead to political chaos and a civil war
among the KPA generals competing for central political power. Under both collapse
scenarios, although the ROK may attempt to step in and take the lead in restoring the law
and order and restructuring the economic, political, and military institutions in the
northern half of the peninsula in accordance with its own blueprint, China may deem it
necessary to move in, too, and play a greater role in defending the sovereignty and
national interests of the crumbling North Korean state with or without Kim Jong Il’s clan.
Many U.S. participants wondered whether political reconciliation between two
Koreas meant growing South Korea’s appeasement of the North. The ROK government
appears to be willing to concede some strategic ground as a non-nuclear weapon state and
grant Kim Jong Il his wish to gain a certain degree of international acceptance or
acquiescence by the world for his nuclear weapons program and a freshly minted
membership card in the nuclear club. Koreans, both in the North and South, are said to
be “ready to tolerate almost anything from each other, except foreign domination.”
Hence, they predicted the emergence of a more assertive, nationalistic, autonomous, and
strategically non-committed Korean peninsula as a result of the inter-Korean
reconciliation process in the future. Both Russian and Chinese participants expressed
their support for greater Korean political reconciliation, hoping that when Korea is
eventually unified, it will be “a friendly country without any foreign troops on its soil.”
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Many other participants expressed hope that American troops would stay on the
peninsula even after Korean reunification.
6. US-ROK Alliance and Inter-Korean Reconciliation
Conference participants held a very lively exchange about the current state of
relations within the U.S.-ROK alliance. The optimists say that South Korea has been one
of the most reliable U.S. allies for decades, despite occasional policy disagreements and
flare-ups of anti-American sentiment in the South. The U.S.-ROK alliance is “rocksolid” (no pun intended). Security cooperation is “good” and the alliance is “in an
excellent condition,” despite some public misperceptions. The ROK military views the
North Korean threat in the same way as the U.S. military does. The inter-parliamentary
dialogue is at a high level. Bilateral trade and investment are growing. Optimists argue
that public expectations about the alliance performance are extremely high, and,
therefore, any minor issue or problem tends to provoke extreme disappointment in both
capitals. In contrast, there are rather low expectations in the management of the U.S.Japanese alliance, and, as a result, there is little disappointment whenever anything goes
wrong. Optimists believe that although North Korea is looking for ways to break apart
the alliance, the inter-Korean reconciliation has had no negative impact on the U.S.-ROK
military alliance yet.
The pessimists argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance exist on nostalgia for the “good
old days,” questioning whether “the good old days” were really “so good.” They contend
that the alliance is “on life support,” and alliance restructuring is “badly needed,” because
“the alliance no longer serves the best interests of either the United States or the Republic
of Korea.” The U.S. and ROK appear to define the North Korean threat differently,
which tends to undermine alliance cooperation. Seoul seems to believe that the North
Korean threat emanates from its weakness (danger of economic collapse, internal
instabilities), not its strength; whereas Washington tends to regard North Korea as a
“blackmailing bully,” and not as “legitimate state, worth saving,” with which the U.S. can
enter into binding agreements (as one participant put it, “what should you do if Hitler
walked into the room?”). Pessimists believe that the North-South reconciliation is
damaging the U.S.-ROK alliance. They suggest that “if there is a zero chance of the
North attacking the South, as many South Koreans are told by their government, then
why does not Seoul ask Washington to withdraw the USFK completely?” They go even
further by raising the possibility that the U.S. should “bring our boys home” and totally
disengage from the Korean peninsula, both from the South and the North, but stay
committed to Japan and Australia, and tell Koreans “call us back when you get serious
about your defense.”
But, the “middle-of-the-road” moderate views prevailed among conference
participants. They argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance is “in a pretty good shape.” The two
allied democracies and market economies share many national interests and common
bonds, norms, and values, as well as command plenty of mutual trust and understanding
across a wide range of issue-areas and problems. They assert that the U.S.
disengagement from the Korean peninsula is a “lousy idea,” a “nutty idea,” “a bad idea”
that serves as an example of the so-called “avoidance behavior” on the part of the United
States, because it would damage incalculably the national interests of both the United
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States and the Republic of Korea in many obvious and invisible ways. Instead of
abandoning the Korean peninsula, some moderates argued that the U.S should stop
calling the North “evil” or “rogue” and look at it as a “legitimate negotiation partner,”
albeit “very angry and weak,” with which the international community “can do business”
and resolve the outstanding concerns, including the nuclear issue through genuine
negotiations. Whereas other moderates may concede that North Korea is evil, but they
insist that it is time to “shake hands with the devil,” and start listening to the “silent
majority” of the ROK people who believe in the inter-Korean reconciliation, that “there is
no alternative to engagement, whatever its form,” and that a policy of “forced regime
change will cause a suffering to all Korean people.” All moderates assert that the NorthSouth reconciliation is “not an illusion,” that “it is feasible, especially if China and Russia
say it is feasible,” and that the “United States should be prepared to give Koreans some
space and allow for the South-North reconciliation to proceed beyond just an agreement
not to fight.” These moderates believe that the U.S-ROK alliance must be the main
leverage for the South Korean government in its dealings with the North aimed at
enhancing the South’s security and accelerating the inter-Korean rapprochement.
In conclusion, conference participants engaged in a lively debate about the future
direction of the reconciliation efforts on the Korean peninsula. While some focused on
the dramatic changes that have occurred in both the North and the South, others
emphasized the importance of maintaining the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the
face of an uncertain neighbor to the north. Regardless of the perspective, however, all
attendees agreed that the political and economic shifts on the peninsula are driving a
demand for changes in the security relations in the region. Therefore, going forward it
will become increasingly important to take into account the growing sense of Korean
nationalism in South Korea and the gradual movement toward a more open economy and
society in North Korea. Recognizing these shifts will be crucial to any reshaping that
occurs within the U.S.-ROK alliance.
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INTER-KOREAN RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION:
DRIVERS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS
CONFERENCE ATTENDEE LIST
1-3 MARCH 2005
Dr. J. Michael Allen
Associate Dean and Professor of History
College of Arts and Sciences
Brigham Young University - Hawaii
Campus
55-220 Kulanui Street #1938
Laie, HI 96762-1294
Phone: 1-808-293-3794
Fax: 1-808-293-3328
E-mail: allenm@byuh.edu
Mr. Bradley Babson
Consultant
149 Pennellville Rd
Brunswick, ME 04011
Phone: 1-207-373-0707
Fax: 1-207-373-0555
E-mail: bradbabson@aol.com
Dr. Seungjoo Baek
Chief, North Korea Research Team
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
Cheong Ryang P.O. Box 250
Seoul 130-650, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-961-1383
Fax: 82-2-961-1172
Phone: 82-2-961-1778
Fax: 82-2-961-1160
E-mail: bsj@kida.re.kr
Lieutenant Colonel Carl Baker
Military Professor
Policy Studies Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-8957
Fax: 1-808-971-8949
E-mail: bakerc@apcss.org
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
Professor of National Security Studies
Air Command and Staff College
Air University
225 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112
Phone: 1-334-953-5073
Fax: 1-334-953-1999
E-mail: bruce.bechtol@maxwell.af.mil
Mr. Stephen Bradner
Special Advisor to Commander,
UNC/CFC/USFK
United Nations Command/U.S. Forces
Korea
PSC 303 Box 40
APO AP 96204
Phone: 82-2-7913-3490
Fax: 82-2-7913-7813
E-mail: bradners@korea.army.mil
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Dr. Seongwhun Cheon
Senior Research Fellow
The Korean Institute for National
Unification
Kangbuk-ku
Suyu 6-dong
Seoul 535-353, Republic of Korea
Phone: 822-901-2571
Fax: 822-901-2547
E-mail: swc339@kinu.or.kr
Mr. Ralph A. Cossa
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J.
Gransback
Country Director-Korea
U.S. Pacific Command
Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate
Northeast Asia Division
Box 64015
Camp H.M. Smith, HI 96861-4015
Phone: 1-808-477-3500
Fax: 1-808-477-0513
E-mail: stephen.gransback@pacom.mil
President
Pacific Forum CSIS
Pauahi Tower Suite 1150
1001 Bishop Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Phone: 1-808-521-6745
Fax: 1-808-599-8690
E-mail: PacForum@hawaii.rr.com
Mr. Richard Halloran
Mr. Scott R. Feeney
Ms. Balbina Y. Hwang
Major Stephen M. Folena
Mr. Im Jong In
North Korea Country Director
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Asia and Pacific Affairs
International Security Affairs
2400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400
Phone: 1-703-614-6473
Fax: 1-703-695-8222
E-mail: scott.feeney@osd.mil
Chief, Combined Political and Economic
Analysis
United States Forces Korea (C/J-2)
PSC 303 Box 26
APO, AP 96204-0026
Phone: 315-723-3099
E-mail: Stephen.m.Folena@korea.army.mil
Visiting Professor
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-395-0511
Fax: 1-808-396-4095
E-mail: oranhall@hawaii.rr.com
Policy Analyst
Northeast Asia
Asian Studies Center
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 1-202-608-6134
Fax: 1-202-675-1779
E-mail: balbina.hwang@heritage.org
Member of National Assembly
National Assembly
834 National Assembly Bldg 1
Yoido-Dong
Young Deung Po-Gu
Seoul 150-702, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2 784-6301
Fax: 82-2 788-3834
E-mail: jonginim@hanmail.net
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Mr. Frank Jannuzi
East Asia Specialist
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
2523 Guilford Ave
Baltimore, MD 21218
Phone: 1-410-243-3706
Fax: 1-202-228-3612
E-mail: frank_jannuzi@foreign.senate.gov
Lieutenant Colonel Clay C. Janssen
Special Operations Planner
Special Operations command Korea
(SOCKOR)
PSC 450 Box 419
APO, AP 96206
Phone: 315-723-7623
Fax: 315-723-5751
E-mail: Clay.Janssen@korea.army.mil
Dr. Christopher R. Jasparro
Associate Professor
Transnational Studies Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-8968
Fax: 1-808-971-8949
E-mail: jasparroc@apcss.org
Ambassador Charles Kartman
Executive Director
The Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization
600 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10016
Phone: 1-212-455-0211
Fax: 1-212-681-2649
E-mail: ck@kedo.org
Dr. Kim Byung Kook
Professor
Korea University
Department of Political Science
5-1 Anam-Dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-3290-2189
Fax: 82-2-2277-1684
E-mail: bkk@korea.ac.kr
Mr. Kim Gun Su
Chief of Staff, Assemblyman Im, Jong In
National Assembly
834 National Assembly Bldg
1 Yoido-dong
Youngdeung po-gu
Seoul 150-702, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-784-6301
Fax: 82-2-788-3834
E-mail: pdgkgs@hanmail.net
Dr. Steven Kim
Assistant Research Professor
Research and Publications Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-4057
E-mail: kims@apcss.org
Dr. Ko Seung-Kyun
Professor, International Studies
Hawaii Pacific University
MP-301
1188 Fort Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Phone: 1-808-247-5339
Fax: 1-808-544-0834
E-mail: sko@campus.hpu.edu
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Dr. Koh Byung Chul
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Illinois at Chicago
380 Woodlawn Ave
Glencoe, IL 60022-2176
Phone: 1-847-242-0824
Fax: 1-847-835-4618
E-mail: bckoh99@hotmail.com
Dr. Jimmie R. Lackey
Executive Director
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-8915
Fax: 1-808-971-8999
E-mail: lackeyj@apcss.org
Professor Lee Seok-soo
Director, Office for North Korea Studies
Korea National Defense University
The Mershon Center of Ohio State
University
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
Phone: 82-2-300-2156
Fax: 82-2-309-9878
E-mail: sslee@kndu.ac.kr
Dr. Lim Wonhyuk
Fellow
Korea Development Institute
Cheongryang PO Box 113
Seoul, Republic of Korea 130-012
Phone: +82-2-958-4206
Fax: +82-2-964-5479
E-mail: lilmster@kdi.re.kr
Professor Stephen W. Linton
Chairman
Eugene Bell Foundation
PO Box 170
Clarksville, MD 21029
Phone: 1-410-531-8424
Fax: 1-410-531-8425
E-mail: linton@eugenebell.org
Dr. Liu Ming
Director of International Relations
Program
School of World Economy & Politics
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
7/622 Huai-hai Road (M)
Shanghai, China 200020
Phone: 5306-0606 ext 2463
Fax: 5306-3814
E-mail: lium_14@yahoo.com
Colonel Kevin W. Madden
Secretary
United Nations Command Military
Armistice Commission
PSC 303, Box 54
APO, AP 96024-0054
Phone: 011-82-2-8913-3200
Fax: 011-82-2-7913-4315
E-mail: maddenkw@korea.army.mil
Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov
Professor
Regional Studies Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-5025
Fax: 1-808-971-8989
E-mail: mansourova@apcss.org
Dr. John Merrill
Chief, Northeast Asia Division
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
U.S. Department of State
2244 North Illinois Street
Arlington, VA 22205
Phone: 1-202-647-4767
Fax: 1-202-647-5286
E-mail: jmerrill05@comcost.net
ACjmerri@us-state.osis.gov
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Dr. Park Syung Je
Director
Military Analyst Association
Sinwon 308-1701
Ku Mi-Dong
Bun Dang Ku
Sung Nam, Korea 463-510
Phone: 82-16-360-5901
Fax: 82-31-715-6151
E-mail: syungjepark@yahoo.com
Dr. Jonathan Pollack
Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies
United States Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
New Port, RI 02841
Phone: 1-401-841-4532
Fax: 1-401-841-4161
E-mail: pollackj@nwc.navy.mil
Ambassador Jack Pritchard
Colonel David M. Shanahan
Deputy Dean
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2058 Maluhia Rd.
Honolulu, HI 96815-1949
Phone: 1-808-971-8945
Fax: 1-808-971-8949
E-mail: shanahand@apcss.org
Professor Yoichi Shimada
Professor of International Politics
Fukui Prefectural University
4-1-1 Kenjojima
Matsuoka-cho
Fukui-ken, Japan 910-1195
Phone: +81-776-61-6000 ext.2304
Fax: +81-776-61-6014
E-mail: xyshimada@yahoo.co.jp
Dr. Edward J. Shultz
Visiting Fellow.
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusets Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-2103
Phone: 1-202-797-4369
Fax: 1-202-797-2485
E-mail: jpritchard@brookings.edu
Professor
Department of Asian Studies
University of Hawaii at Manoa
1881 East-West Road
Honolulu, HI 96822
Phone: 1-808-956-6316
Fax: 1-808-956-2682
E-mail: shultz@hawaii.edu
Dr. Ryoo Kihl-jae
Ms. Jane Skanderup
Associate Professor
University of North Korean Studies
28-7 Samchung-Dong
Chongro-ku
Seoul 110-230, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-3700-0734
Fax: 82-2-3700-0748
E-mail: kjstar@kyungnam.ac.kr
Director for Programs
Pacific Forum Center for Strategic
and International Studies
1001 Bishop Street
Pauahi Tower Suite 1150
Honolulu, HI 96813
Phone: 1-808-521-6745
Fax: 1-808-599-8690
E-mail: jskanderup@hawaii.rr.com
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Mr. Valery Sukhinin
Minister-Counsellor & DCM
Embassy of the Russian Federation
to the Republic of Korea
34-16, Chong-dong, Chung-gu
Seoul 100-120, Republic of Korea
Phone: 82-2-318-2116
Fax: 82-2-754-0417
E-mail: rusemb@uriel.net
Mr. John Du Toit
Korea Desk Officer
HQ, U.S. Pacific Command
(Contact information withheld per
request)
Major General Lars B. Frisk
International Relations Specialist
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command
C5, Strategy Division
APO, AP 96204
E-mail: tharps@korea.army.mil
Swedish Member of Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
UNCMAC
PSC 303 Box 54
APO, AP 96205-0032
Phone: +82-505-734-8991
Fax: +82-505-734-8825
E-mail: frisklb@korea.army.mil
Dr. Alexander V. Vorontsov
Consul Takashi Hatori
Mr. Stephen M. Tharp
Head of Section for Korean Studies
Institute of Oriental Studies
Russia Academy of Sciences
103753 Rozhdestvenka Street 12
Moscow 119602, Russia
Phone: 7-095 928-3566
Fax: 7-095-975-2396
Consulate-General of Japan
1742 Nuuanu Avenue
Honolulu, HI 96817-3294
Phone: 1-808-543-3111
Fax: 1-808-524-7434
E-mail: takashi.hatori@mofa.go.jp
Professor Woo Seong-ji
Professor
Department of Political Science
Iowa State University
503 Ross Hall
Ames, Iowa 50011
Phone: 1-515-294-7256
E-mail: ykihl@iastate.edu
Assistant Professor
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National
Security
1376-2 Seocho 2 Dong
Seocho Gu
Seoul 137-072, Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 2-3497-7648
Fax: +82 2 575-5245
E-mail: seongjiwoo@hotmail.com
Lieutenant Colonel Clyde T. Burton
Korea Desk Officer
Policy & International Affairs, G-5
Marine Forces Pacific
355 Aoloa St., #L101
Kailua, HI 96734
Phone: 1-808-477-8581
Fax: 1-808-477-8580
E-mail: Clyde.burton@usmc.mil
Dr. Young W. Kihl
Dr. Choon Nam Kim
Project Coordinator
Research Program
East-West Center
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, HI 96848-1601
Phone: 1-808-944-7372
Fax: 1-808-944-7446
E-mail: kimcn@eastwestcenter.org
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