FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO IPB
If I always appear prepared, it is because before
entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long
and foreseen what may occur.
- Napoleon Bonaparte, 1821
Historically, throughout the spectrum of operations IPB has been a
process interwoven into all levels of military decision making and
planning (Figure 1-1). The process itself involves thought,
knowledge of the enemy, and a certain amount of visual techniques
to create and communicate the necessary information to the
commander regarding the battlefield and the unit’s mission within
the integrated battlespace.
STABILITY OPERATIONS
1990-1 Saudi Desert Shield/Storm
1991-? Kuwait Southern Watch
1991-? Iraq Provide Comfort
- Show of Force
1992-4 Somalia Restore Hope
- Arms Control
1992 Hurricane Andrew
Panama 1989-90
1993 U.S. Midwest Floods
Lebanon 1983
- Noncombatant Operation
1994 Western U.S. Fires
Grenada 1983
1994 Rwanda Support Hope
- Nation Assistance
Sinai MFO 1982 - ?
1994-? Haiti
- Support to Counterinsurgencies Detroit/Chicago
1994-5 Panama Safe Haven
1967
- Combating Terrorism
Dominican Republic
1997 Bosnia
1966
- Civil Disturbance
1998-9 Desert Fox
Vietnam War
1965-75
1999 Kosovo Joint Guardian
- Counterdrug Operations
- Peace Operations
- Support to Insurgencies
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
- Humanitarian Operations
Future
Operations
Korean War
1950-53
World War II
1941-45
Range of Military Operations
FF O
O R
RC
C E
E
World War I
XXI
- Environmental Operations
Army 2010 and beyond
Figure 1-1.
Range of military operations.
WHAT IS IPB?
IPB is a systematic continuous process to analyzing the weather,
terrain, and threat in a specific geographic area for all types of
operations. IPB integrates threat doctrine with the weather and
terrain as they relate to the mission within a specific
battlefield environment. This is done to determine and evaluate
threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of
action (COAs). This analytical process builds an extensive
database for each potential area in which a unit may be required
to operate to determine the impact of the threat, environment, and
terrain on operations and ultimately presents it in a graphic
format.
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FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
IPB PROCESS
The IPB process consists of four steps:




STEP
STEP
STEP
STEP
1:
2:
3:
4:
Define the battlefield environment.
Describe the battlefield’s effects.
Evaluate the threat.
Determine threat COAs.
A particular battlefield may have unique boundaries but regardless
of the operation the analysis process is the same. The
commander’s initial input into the IPB process is directly
proportional to success on the battlefield (Figure 1-2). By
providing the commander’s intent and guidance early on into the
process, the G2/S2 directs the intelligence cycle allowing the
staff to focus on what’s important to the mission. Each staff
element and each echelon conducts IPB for its specific functional
area. The IPB process helps the commander maximize the unit’s
combat power at critical points in time, space, and resources to
shape the battlefield by –

Determining the threat’s likely COA.

Describing the environment your unit is operating within and
the effects of the environment on your unit.
IPB
Initial IPB
MDMP
RECEIPT OF MISSION
Completed
Mission
Brief to
Commander
MISSION ANALYSIS
Update IPB
Products Completed
IPB
Products
Brought to the
Wargame
COA DEVELOPMENT
COA ANALYSIS
(WARGAME)
Cdr’s initial guidance
Warning order 1
Initial IPB products
Restated mission
Cdr’s Intent & Guidance
Warning order 2
Staff products
Battlefield framework
Preliminary movement
COA stmts and sketches
Wargame results
Task organization
Mission to subordinate units
CCIR
Decision matrix
COA COMPARISON
Refined IPB
Completed
Continuous IPB
COA APPROVAL
ORDERS PRODUCTION
Approved COA
Refined Cdr’s Intent
Specified type of order
Specified type of rehearsal
HPTL
OPLAN/OPORD
DENOTES: CDR’s Input
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FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
Figure 1-2.
IPB embedded into the Mititary Decision Making
Process (MDMP).
The IPB process is continuous. IPB is conducted prior to and
during the command’s initial planning for an operation. The
analyst continues to perform and refine the IPB products
throughout the MDMP. This ensures that –

The products of IPB remain complete and valid and create the
correct vision for the commander. IPB is the primary means by
which the commander develops that vision in mind of how an
operation will unfold and how the threat will be depicted
throughout the operation.

The initial IPB process must be completed before the mission
analysis brief to the commander in the MDMP, prior to
developing the friendly COA and the development of the staff
estimate. This ensures the effective visualization and
communication tools necessary to inform the commander.
A brief overview of each step of the IPB process follows:
STEP 1:
DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

Establishes the limits of the area of
operation (AO).

Establishes the limits of the area of
interest (AOI).

Identifies those characteristics of the
battlefield that will influence friendly and
threat operations.

Identifies gaps in current intelligence holdings and
information.
To focus the remainder of the IPB process, the G2/S2 identifies
those battlefield characteristics requiring in-depth evaluation.
This may include terrain, weather, logistical infrastructure,
demographics, and visualizing the operation in the integrated
battlespace of an operation (See Figure 1-3). Generally, the
command’s AO is a geographical area assigned to the commander’s
responsibility whereas the AOI is usually larger. The AOI
includes any threat or characteristics of the battlefield
environment that significantly influences the mission of the
Maneuver & Fires
Traditional Intel
Logistics
National
Nontraditional
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FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
command. This enables the G2/S2 to focus the IPB effort on a
specific area within the operation.
Battlespace encompasses the surface, subsurface, endoatmospheric,
and exatmospheric spheres of a particular geographic area. It
also includes the electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace, and human
psychological aspects of military operations. The dimension of
the command’s battlespace is dictated by the mission and the
capabilities of any potential threat throughout the operation.
Defining the significant characteristics of the battlefield
environment also aids in identifying gaps in current intelligence
holdings and the specific intelligence required to fill them.
Similarly, the G2/S2 identifies gaps in the command's knowledge of
the threat and analyzed current threat situation.
Once approved by the commander, the specific intelligence required
to fill gaps in the command's knowledge of the battlefield
environment and threat situation becomes the command's initial
intelligence requirements (Figure 1-4).
CCIR
Information required by the commander that directly affects his decisions
and dictates the successful execution of operational or tactical operations.
PIR
Intelligence requirements that
a commander has anticipated
and stated priority in the task
planning and decision making.
EEFI
Critical aspects of a friendly
operation that, if known by
the enemy, would subsequently
compromise, lead to failure,
or limit success of the operation,
and therefore must be protected
from enemy detection.
FFIR
Information the
commander
and staff need about the
friendly forces available
for the operation.
INFORMATION REQUIRED TO ANSWER CCIR
DATA
IR
Information regarding the enemy
and the environment that needs
to be collected and processed
in order to meet the intelligence
requirements of the commander.
COLLECTION
REQUIREMENTS
ISR Plan /Collection
Plan of threat information tasked
Gathering
by:
- Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIR)
- Specific Orders and Requests (SOR)
Gathering of Information regarding threat
collection capabilities/ assets to include:
- Threat’s IMINT, ELINT, SIGINT, HUMINT,
MASINT capabilities and locations.
- Threat’s Force Protection &
Information Operations Capabilities
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Priority for EEFI
INFORMATION
Information regarding the
threat’s detection collection
efforts in order to protect
the friendly forces critical
aspects of the operation.
Tasked for EEFI
Information collected
and compiled by the staff
to provide the commander
with current readiness status
regarding the friendly force
operational data.
Unit Status Readiness
Information the
commander
needs to know to protect
the friendly force.
- Equipment Status
- Personnel Status
- Logistical Status
- Experience and Leadership
- Weapon Systems Status
FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
Figure 1-4.
Commander’s critical information requirements.
As the commander visualizes the operations, one develops the
commander's critical intelligence requirements (CCIR) by
considering the following questions:

What decisions do I need to make?

What information about the enemy, terrain, and
situation do I need to know to make those decisions?


What friendly information must I conceal from the enemy?
When, during the operation, do I need this information to
support my anticipated decisions?
friendly
This series of questions then generates the sub-elements of the
CCIR: PIR, EEFI and FFRI with related information requirements
(IR). Eventually being combined into the information collection
requirements tasked out to assets available within the command.
STEP 2:
DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD’S EFFECTS
Step 2 evaluates the effects
of weather and terrain for
both the friendly and
threat environmental
conditions. The G2/S2
identifies the limitations
and opportunities the
Weather Data - Forecasts, Visibility, Illumination, TDAs, IWEDA products…etc.
environment offers to
Terrain Topographic Products - Terrabase II, DTED, Elevation, Slope, Soils Data.
mission planning,
Lines of Communication Overlay - Roads, Railroads, Airfields, Related Infrastructures.
equipment capabilities,
Specialty Products - Population Overlays, Urban City Plans, Imagery & Spectral Products.
and maneuver potential for
ground assets. This evaluation focuses on the general
capabilities for each force until COAs are developed in later
steps of the IPB process.
This assessment of the environment always includes an analysis of
the weather and terrain but can include discussions of the
characteristics of detailed geography, demographics, urban city
plans, or computer information infrastructure and their effects on
friendly and threat operations.
Characteristics of geography include general characteristics of
the terrain and weather, as well as such factors as politics,
civilian press, local population, and demographics. An area's
infrastructure consists of the facilities, equipment, and
framework needed for the functioning of systems, cities, or
regions. Products developed in this step might include, but are
not limited to—

Population status overlays.

Overlays
terrain.
that
depict
the
military
aspects
and
effects
of
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FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A

Weather analysis matrices.

Integrated products such as modified combined obstacle overlays
(MCOOs).

Information Infrastructure templates.
Regardless of the subject or means of presentation, the G2/S2
ensures the product’s focus on the effects of the battlefield
environment.
STEP 3:
EVALUATE THE THREAT
In step 3, the G2/S2 must identify the threat by evaluating the
command's intelligence holdings (i.e., country studies,
contingency plans, intelligence readiness files) to determine how
the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts operations
under similar circumstances. Identifying the intelligence gaps in
the available threat holdings allows the time to develop requests
for information (RFI) from higher headquarters to include the
national agencies.
Identification of the threat’s capabilities becomes apparent and
the analysis of the broad COAs are discerned by understanding the
environment, terrain, and then the patterns of behavior the threat
may use as possible COAs to achieve their objectives and intent on
the battlefield. The G2/S2's evaluation is portrayed in the
creation of threat models which are graphic depictions and
narratives that include doctrinal templates, the threat’s
Description:
• Movement begins as early as 1.5 hours after order.
• Movement along previously rehearsed routes.
PREFERRED
TACTICS, OPTIONS,
Failu AND PECULIARITIES
• Fix friendly forces for counterattack by reserve of
higher HQ.
EXAMPLE (DEFENSE):
Description of
Preferred
Tactics,
Options, and
Peculiarities.
DESCRIPTION
• Defense in two echelons with a reserve.
• Local counterattacks to restore defensive
positions.
• Tank Battalion counterattacks if defense is
compromised.
• Detailed and coordinated fire support plan
supporting defense and counterattack.
• They prefer obstacle systems (usually
minefields) that turn enemy forces into their
engagement areas. They seldom employ fixing,
blocking, or disrupting obstacles.
Peculiarities:
DOCTRINAL
TEMPLATES
• Limited to 24 hour sustained operations due to
lack of fuel.
De sc riptio n :
• Mov e me nt b eg ins as e arly as 1 .5
h ou rs a fter o rd er.
• Mov e me nt a lo n g p re vio us ly
re he ars ed rou te s.
• Lea d e lem en ts an d su pp o rting
d efe ns es f ix frie nd ly fo rc es w ith fire s.
• Main bo d y se ek s fla nk s o f frien d ly
fo rce s.
XXXXXXXX
XXXX
F ailu re O ptio n s:
IDENTIFICATION
OF TYPE HVT’S
• F ix frie nd ly fo rc es fo r co u nte ratta ck
b y re se rve of h ig he r HQ.
P ec u li a rities :
• Limite d to 2 4 ho u r su stain ed
o pe ratio n s du e to lac k o f fu el.
XX XXXX XX
XX XX
XX XXXX XX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXX
XX XXX
XX XX
XX XXXX XXXX
XX XX
FAILURE OPTIONS
• Local counterattacks.
• Counterattack by division reserve.
• Withdraw.
PECULIARITIES
• Critical shortages of tank ammunition.
• Defenses weak due to lack of engineer spt.
Description:
• Movement begins as early as 1.5 hours after order.
DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES
• Organization
• Equipment
• Battle Positions
• Supporting Elements
• Echelons
• Frontages
• Depths
• Boundaries
• Engagement Areas
• Objective Depths
• Control Measures
• Any Graphic Depiction
XXXX
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D
I
S
R
U
P
T
D
E
L
A
Y
L
I
M
I
T
X
X X
X X X
RELATIVE
WORTH
TARGET SET
C
Command centers coordinate move
and commitment of reserves. Central
FS centers nearby.
3
LOC allow rapid move of reserves and
continued resupply.
FS
MANEUVER
Reserve units critical to success of
defense.
ADA
ENGINEER
X
X
RISTA
FS masses fires to assist defense and
commitment of reserves.
REC
NUC/CHEMICAL
X X
Acquire deep targets to disrupt
friendly attack.
BULK FUELS
AMMO
MAINT
X
Stockpiles vulnerable, important for
continued anti-armor and FS fires.
LIFT/LOC
XXXXXXXX
XXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXX
FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
preferred tactics, options and peculiarities, and identification
of HVTs as shown in Figure 1-5:
Figure 1-5.
Portions of the threat model.
When facing a well-known threat, the G2/S2 relies on databases and
threat models readily available. The G2/S2 will use updated
information to keep the databases current. It is also entirely
possible that one may have to create new threat models by
combining doctrinal templates, threat tactics, and available
options within the operation. The G2/S2 must take into account
the threat's many options by identifying all possible branches and
sequels and peculiarities of a specific threat’s behavior into
this IPB product termed the threat model.
While this detailed
analysis is being developed, a direct outcome of this process is
the identification of the threat’s high value targets (HVTs).
This enables the friendly to begin identifying their assets to
target the threat's vulnerabilities and HVTs along with building
some broad COAs to consider as threat plans of attack/defend
alternatives.
There is also the realistic nature of the current threat dilemmas
that the G2/S2 may know very little regarding a certain threat.
The motives, intentions and agenda may be unpredictable if
analyzing a new terrorist faction or key leader whose profile is
immature and has no identifiable history of behavior
characteristics.
Another obstacle to threat determination are
the technological threats that are so diverse in options and
sophistication. Assuming a database will be available for all
threat’s capabilities become inherently impossible when
considering the asymmetric and asynchronous types of delivery
means and diversification of the threat agendas.
*Asymmetric Threat: A threat that uses dissimilar weapons or force
(e.g. WMD, small-scale attacks, information attack) to offset a
superior military force and technological advantage.
*Asynchronous Threat: A threat that doesn’t require the
orchestration of timing or simultaneous use of its capabilities
to achieve a desired effect. Therefore causing haphazard attacks
that result more on circumstance and personality rather then by a
well designed operation. (e.g. A terrorist faction that is
structured by separate cells branched off for anonymity purposes
acting independently of a primary leader of the faction.)
(*The above definitions are
not yet approved as official
doctrine until the final
ID THREAT OBJECTIVES
draft of FM 34-130)
ID FULL SET OF THREAT
COAs
STEP 4:
DETERMINE
THREAT COAs
*REVERSE IPB*
ENEMY PERCEPTION OF
FRIENDLY SITUATION
Step 4 integrates the
IPB products of the
previous steps into
conclusions that
EVALUATE/PRIORITIZE
ENEMYCOAs
DEVELOP EACH COA
WITHIN TIME LIMITS
? ?
?
? ?
?
IDENTIFY INITIAL
COLLECTION
REQUIREMENTS
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FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
formulate possible COAs. The G2/S2 develops threat COA models
depicting the threat's potential COAs. (See Figure 1-6.)
Additional IPB products during the final step involve the
preparation of event templates, situation templates, and
specialized matrices that focus intelligence requirements and
collection requirements on identifying the most likely COA the
threat will use to meet their objectives on the battlefield.
Figure 1-6. Sequence of determining
threat.
The threat COA models developed in step 4 are the products taken
into the MDMP of COA analysis and the wargame process which help
develop the planning phase of an operation for the unit. Once the
friendly COAs are war gamed separately against each possible
threat COA, the commander is briefed on the COAs which meet the
requirements of the commander’s guidance and intent of the
operation that were successful in the wargame process. (See Figure
1-7.)
STEP 1
PRODUCTS
REQUIRED
MAPS
DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
- Significant characteristics of the environment
- Establish the limits of the AO and AOI
- Evaluate existing databases and identify
intelligence gaps
- Collect required materials
STEP 2
DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
MCOO
TERRAIN
PRODUCTS
- Analyze the battlefield environment
- Terrain analysis (OCOKA)
- Weather Analysis (5 aspects)
- Describe the battlefield effects on the threat
and friendly capabilities
- Demographics, politics, legal issues …etc.
GEOGRAPHY
POPULATION
SOCIECONOMIC FACTORS
TRANSPORTATION
ROE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
OBSERVATION & FIELDS OF FIRE
COVER & CONCEALMENT
OBSTACLES
KEY TERRAIN
AVENUES OF APPROACH
VISIBILITY, WINDS
PRECIPITATION
CLOUD COVER, HUMIDITY
TEMPERATURE
STEP 3
EVALUATE THE THREAT
DOCTRINAL
TEMPLATES
- Convert threat doctrine into doctrinal template
- Describe the threat’s tactics, options
and peculiarities
- Identify threat capabilities
- Identify high-value targets
MANEUVER
FIRES
NBC (WMD)
M/S
ADA
AIR THREAT
C2
LOGISTICS
EW
RECON
SECURITY
LEADERSHIP
MORALE
AIR ASSAULT
INFILTRATION
REINFORCEMENT
UNCONVENTIONAL
TACTICS
STEP 4
DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
SITEMPs
EVENT
TEMPLATE
INTEL
REQMTS
HVT LIST
-
Identify the threat’s likely objective
Identify a full set of COAs available
Evaluate and prioritize each COA
Develop each COA in detail
Identify collection requirements
Figure 1-7.
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ENEMY COA CONSISTS OF:
SITEMP which portrays all enemy
capabilities
DESCRIPTION OF TACTICS
AND OPTIONS
HIGH-VALUE TARGET LIST
Key components of IPB.
FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
The entire staff depends on the G2/S2 to use all the IPB products
and analysis tools acquired to portray the threat in the decision
making and targeting processes. COAs are compared until the
commander approves the friendly COA to meet objectives versus the
most likely threat COA. The G2/S2 cannot produce these models,
effectively predicting the threat COAs, unless he has—



Adequately analyzed the friendly mission throughout the time
duration of the operation; identified the physical limits of
the AO and AOI; and identified every characteristic of the
battlefield environment that might affect the operation (step
1).
Identified the opportunities and constraints the battlefield
environment offers to threat and friendly forces (step 2).
Thoroughly considered the threat capabilities and preferred
COA in like situations if all conditions best suited the
threat in an unconstrained battlefield environment, using
“reverse IPB” to best understand the threat (step 3).
In short, the G2/S2 provides the commander with the best
visualization of the threat’s capabilities by developing threat
COA models that drive the MDMP. These models are valid only if
the G2/S2 establishes a good foundation of analysis during the
first three steps of the IPB process.
HOW IPB INTERELATES TO THE SIX INTELLIGENCE TASKS
There are six intelligence tasks that generate products that
ultimately synchronize the intelligence efforts in assisting the
commander to visualize the battlefield and aid in the MDMP. These
six tasks are thought of as the mission-essential task list (METL)
for intelligence: provide indications and warning (I&W), perform
IPB, perform situation development, perform target development,
support force protection, and perform battle damage assessment
(BDA). Figure 1-8 illustrates how the G2/S2 tailors intelligence
INTELLIGENCE
TASKS
I&W
COMMANDER’s
FOCUS
Orient on
contingencies
readiness?
COMMANDER’ s DECISIONS
Increase intelligence
Implement OPLAN?
Plan a mission
Which COA will I implement?
Where is my main effort?
Execute and
Manage a Plan
Are these threat actions expected?
Is a FRAGO required now?
Target
Development
Destroy/Suppress/
Neutralize Targets
Does destruction of this target
accomplish the objective?
When to execute this fire mission?
Force
Protection
Secure the Force
Enemy?
Is the intent obvious to the
accomplishment of the mission?
BDA
Reallocate
Intelligence
Is the fire/maneuver plan effective?
Reprioritze the HVTL.
IPB
Situation
Development
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FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
to the commander’s needs and how IPB is interrelated to the other
five tasks.
Figure 1-8.
Illustrates how the six intelligence tasks aid the
commander in decision making.
WHO CONDUCTS IPB?
IPB enables all the services to leverage information about the
threat’s capabilities and potential centers of gravity, and
determine possible COAs across all dimensions of the battlespace.
IPB is a proven flexible technique used across the range of
conventional operations out to unknown battle environments into
the future. On a global scale the IPB process is continuously
used in analyzing the ongoing multifaceted conflicts in stability
actions and support actions handled daily.
As shown in Figure 1-9, the transition of IPB through the history
of military operations remains a proven, effective process.
A DYNAMIC NEW ERA
1990 - 2010
Decades of Transition
21st Century
The Information Age
- CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
- OVERPOPULATION
- ECONOMIC STRAINS
- POLITICAL REORDERING
- WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
- NEW TECHNOLOGIES
- NEW USES FOR OLD TECH
20th Century
The Industrial Age
• Turmoil
• Crisis
• Conflict
• War
IPB
REMAINS A PROVEN
AND EFFECTIVE PROCESS
WHILE DYNAMIC FORCES ARE RAPIDLY REORDERING
THE WORLD. CREATING NEW CHALLENGES IN
TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION WARFARE ISSUES
TO SOLDIERS AND THEIR LEADERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE
Figure 1-9.
IPB transition.
Applications for this predictive analytical approach are employed
to handle the new realms of threat encompassing information
warfare, worldwide terrorism, and the enormous potential in space
operations. The IPB four-step process remains consistent varying
only on the focus within the type of operation and the
environmental effects.
DOCTRINE VERSUS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
The doctrinal principles of IPB are sound and can be applied to
all situations at all levels. The TTP of the applications of IPB
may vary according to the mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops, time and civilians available (METT-TC) in a given
situation. (See Figure 1-10.)
The doctrinal principles of IPB
call for –
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FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A

Evaluating the battlefield’s effects on friendly and threat
operations.

Determining the threat’s possible COAs and arranging them in
order of probability of adoption.

Identifying the activities, or lack of, and the locations
where they will occur that will identify which COA the threat
has adopted.

Identifying assets the threat needs to make each COA
successful HVTs and where they can be expected to appear on
the battlefield target areas of interest (TAIs).
MISSION
Higher commander’s mission and intent two levels up.
Higher commander’s concept of operations.
Tasks (implied, specified, and essential).
Brigade’s mission.
Risk.
TROOPS AVAILABLE
CCIR.
Task organization.
Potential for exploiting success.
Friendly strength, composition, and disposition.
Readiness and condition of subordinate units.
ENEMY
Morale.
Composition, strength and disposition.
Training, experience, and leadership.
Capabilities.
Status of logistics.
Likely objective and intentions.
Doctrine and known tactics.
TIME
Likely COAs .
Planning and preparation time.
Potential vulnerabilities.
Critical timing aspects of the mission.
METT-TC
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
OCOKA (terrain); five aspects (weather).
Effects on friendly and enemy forces.
Advantages and disadvantages.
Figure 1-10.
CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS
Attitudes and activities.
Anticipated refugee movements.
Interagency operations in the AO.
METT-TC factors.
The decision to use a sketch instead of an overlay to depict the
battlefield’s effects or the threat’s available COAs is a matter
of TTP. Such a decision can be made only within the context of a
given situation. Similarly, the amount of detail that goes into
each step of the IPB process, the techniques for depicting areas
of RESTRICTED terrain, and other such decisions are also driven by
factors of METT-TC and local policies and procedures.
PLANNING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT
Although the task is difficult, the commander and staff must be
able to produce simple, flexible, and tactically sound plans
under severe time constraints. They must develop and issue a
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FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A
plan within one-third of the available preparation time (onefourth is
preferred). The commander only hurts his subordinates and
jeopardizes mission success by issuing a late order. Having a
well-trained staff and standing operating procedures (SOPs) with
clear divisions of labor in the staff are essential.
The MDMP is adjusted any time there is too little time for its
thorough and comprehensive application. The commander decides
what techniques to use to save time. The five primary techniques
to save time are—

The commander increases involvement. Get involved directly to
save time. Ranging from participating in the steps of the
MDMP with the staff to keep personally available. The staff
may need additional guidance and intent without wasting time
to get affirmation.

The commander issues more directive guidance, limiting the
staff’s options. This saves time by focusing the staff on
those things of importance.

The commander limits the number of COAs developed and
analyzed.
In extreme cases, direct that only one COA be
developed.
This option carries great risk especially in
military operations on urban operations where there can be up
to four potential avenues of approach against a single target.
The goal is an acceptable COA that meets mission requirements
in the available time.
However, the COA must still be
flexible enough to succeed against all feasible threat COAs.

Maximize parallel planning. Although parallel planning is the
norm, maximizing its use in a time-constrained environment is
critical.

Functional area integration of IPB. Functional areas
responsible for specific TTPs regarding the battlefield must
forward their critical informational and IPB products to the
next echelon for integration into the big picture and MDMP.
(For example, air avenues of approach from air assets,
engineer obstacle updates, LOC issues from signal and MP
support, HUMINT updates on IO issues all should be updated and
forwarded to higher on a regular 24-Hour basis to form a
collaborative tool to pull information). This saves an
enormous amount of time allowing the experts in their
functional area to supply up-to-date IPB products into an
integrated database.
END RESULT OF A STRONG
IPB ANALYSIS
Once the G2/S2 has provided the initial IPB analysis and
continued the process during the MDMP to the point of briefing
the commander, the desired outcome should address the following.
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Place the most critical information regarding the threat up front
and early on in the MDMP. Upon receipt of the mission, the
higher echelon should identify the threat’s desired intent,
possible centers of gravity, and threat’s culmination point.
IPB identifies the facts and assumptions about the battlefield
and the threat’s capabilities. It provides the basis for
intelligence direction and synchronization. Once developed, the
collection plan supporting the commander's chosen COA will
follow. Wargaming the possible COAs effectively isolates and
develops the operations plans (OPPLANs) or operations orders
(OPORDs). IPB continues with the execution of the OPORD/OPLAN
with actual situational development and updated information from
the battlefield.
The ultimate goal is to identify the threat’s COA and obtain
information superiority (IS) against the adversary. Analyzing
the ranges of threats poses an interesting dilemma for the G2/S2.
Options range from conventional warfare versus asymmetrical or
asynchronous threat with the possible integration within one
operation. This can create a diverse spectrum in COA
development.
Remaining informed of the threat’s actions can be
elusive. If the threat is currently unknown (i.e., such as
terrorist bombings, computer network attacks, or a biological
agent released without ownership), the role of the G2/S2 in
developing initial IPB can be frustrating and leads to creative
deductive reasoning. Predicting who, what, when, where, and the
next move of the adversary becomes the ultimate challenge.
Even with the knowledge of the adversary’s capabilities and
location, perhaps the terrain is the wildcard. As an example,
urban warfare is the modern day “jungle” in which most soldiers
are untrained and unprepared to fight. The increased number of
mobility corridors (i.e., air, building, intra-building, street,
and subterranean levels) available to the threat commander and
avenues of approach tend to have an exponential effect on the
number of possibilities. Consider the other added dimension, the
G2/S2 cannot easily identify the difference between the adversary
versus the civilian population.
No matter the adversary, environment, nor operation the G2/S2
will provide the best initial IPB assessment.
Once the
commander receives the mission, the immediate step is extracting
all the critical information from higher to be as exact and
detailed as possible for analysis. Highlight who, what, when,
where, how and why associated to the operation and the threat?
If the threat’s intent is clearly defined, it should include
possible culmination point and center of gravity issues that will
allow the commander’s staff to focus their efforts on specific
and tangible threat capabilities. Depending on the type of
mission, the culmination point is usually phased. Each phase of
an operation will address a friendly and a threat's culmination
points.
More effort should be made to create an OPORD that depicts as
much detail and information to direct the staff and IPB process.
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The entire unit should then be informed of the mission and
execution expectations. The individual soldier then knows his
personal impact for mission success, which leads to ownership of
the “team of teams” concept. This lends itself to a higher
morale of the unit’s effectiveness and ultimate success in
battle.
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