WHY THE FEDS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
DON’T TRUST THE STATES
AND VICE VERSA ON WMD PREPAREDNESS
BY WILLIAM R. CUMMING (VACATION LANE GROUP]
Recent reports in major newspapers and elsewhere have detailed the debate going on in
Washington, D.C. over whether Congress or the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has adequately funded the states and first responders to combat terrorism since
September 11, 2001. Recently, the U.S. Conference of Mayors released a report base on a
survey conducted by City Policy Associates, a Washington, D.C. consulting firm
indicating 76 percent of 215 cities surveyed had been left out of the December funding
round for Department of Homeland Security grant monies. It is somewhat unclear
whether these monies were doles out under the first ever Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, Public Law 108-90, October 1, 2003, or prior legislation. In
a quote picked up by Congressional Quarterly, John Thomasian, Director of the National
Governors Association’s Center for Best Practices stated “It’s a specious augment.”
Like the Japanese movie RASHOMON there are probably at least that movie’s seven
versions of the truth. It is, however, even more important that the always present effort by
bureaucracy whether at federal, state, or local level to attempt to evade accountability
even while maintaining authority over financial resources is documented. This brief essay
is a first step in documenting the past as represented by the federal civil defense program
that lasted from 1951-1995. Ultimately, federal civil defense grants to the states for
emergency preparedness and first response were made ineffective by a combination of
federal and state actions. The past can be studied to help develop the accountability that
in the future is necessary to combat terrorism as well as well as enhancing efficiency and
effectiveness.
When the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) opened its doors on April 1,
1979 (a date picked by a disgruntled OMB [Office of Management and Budget] official
who had hoped to be a high-level bureaucrat in the new agency) under E.O. 12127
[March 31, 1979] and further implemented by E.O. 12148 [July 20, 1979] it was faced
with administration of the civil defense programs, functions, and activities conducted
most recently by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (1972-1979) pursuant to the
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, originally enacted as Public Law 920 in
the 81st Congress. That statute had been modified in 1958 to make the civil defense of
the nation a joint responsibility of the federal government and the states. It is of some
interest that while the fire service had been the basis of civil defense in Great Britain
during WWII, the United States chose to create new cadres for civil defense essentially
independent of the fire service in the United States. Whatever the reasons for this
decision they appear lost to history but the enactment of the Fire Prevention and Control
Act of 1974, now amended [codified at 15 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and following] gave the
fire service a second chance to be involved in national level preparedness and response
issues. The United States Fire Prevention and Control Administration renamed the
United States Fire Administration became part of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency in 1979. Like FEMA, the United States Fire Administration was lost in the
scuffle when the Department of Homeland Security was formed largely based on the
absence of input from either the fire service community or the emergency management
community, but rather the law enforcement and defense establishments. It is interesting to
note that although there was reluctance to become a part of FEMA, the fire service was
hopeful that it would be a prominent part of the new agency, but instead it was rewarded
by being zero-budgeted twice by OMB on the basis of fire being largely a local issue.
Although restored by Congress momentum was lost throughout the 80’s and the States
did not participate in attempts to restore the budget, also seeing fire as a local issue.
Importantly, most State Fire Marshals even today, as with other state agencies, are
seldom involved with actual emergency preparedness and response but serve as a drain
on federal resources that would otherwise be available for local response organizations.
In 1979, FEMA had been under enormous pressure to achieve savings in overhead staff
and administrative costs since the President’s Reorganization Project (PRP) had in
negotiations with the Congress promised extensive financial savings and efficiencies in
administration as the primary benefit of the reorganization. This included an immediate
savings of 400 Full-time Equivalent (FTE’s) positions from the FTE authorization of the
predecessor agencies. A saving that OMB only too willing immediately enforced.
A review of grant programs indicated that those authorized under the civil defense
legislation might be eligible for consolidation and subsequent administrative savings by
the federal government and the states.
The programs, functions, and activities included the following:









Nuclear civil protection
National shelter surveys
Radiological defense officers
Maintenance and calibration [dosimetery]
Emergency Management Assistance
Maintenance and services
Supporting materials
Training and education
Emergency Operating Centers [EOCs]e
Toadying to an OMB whose high ranking appointees loved cost-saving proposals, the
FEMA management struggled with a way to achieve change with the law as constructed.
Finally, amendments in 1981 to the Federal Civil Defense Act, even though arguably not
relevant to the issue of grant consolidation, were used to design a new approach called
Comprehensive Cooperative Agreements. Additionally, the General Accounting Office
issued a comprehensive report on August 30, 1983, “CONSOLIDATION OF FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE RESOURCES WILL ENHANCE THE FEDERAL-STATE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT EFFORT” GAO/GGD-83-92 supporting
consolidation. It is interesting to note that the States were strong advocates of this
2
consolidation and the report could be issued today based on current Fiscal Year 2004
funding by substitution of DHS’s grant programs administered by the United States Fire
Administration, Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate [FEMA] and the
Office for Domestic Preparedness, all scheduled to be primarily administered in Fiscal
Year 2005 and after by the Office of State and Local Coordination to be renamed the
Office of State and Local Preparedness and Coordination. [Secretary Tom Ridge notified
Congress that he was intending to conduct such a consolidation in a letter dated January
21, 2004.]
The Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement was premised on legislation enacted in the
1970’s that tried to authorize a administrative compromise between the strict accounting,
audit, and monitoring requirements of federal contracting, i.e. where the federal
government was contracting for goods or services, and the federal grant requirements that
were basically a “Fire and Forget” approach with very little in the way of effective strings
except for audits sometimes years later. OMB had generic grant guidance out for several
decades, but one Circular of particular interest to this discussion is OMB Circular A-87
allowing the States to receive their indirect overhead costs for administration of federal
grants, analogous to G&A in federal contracts. By the mid-80’s some states were taking
upwards of 80% of total grant amounts issued pursuant to the Federal Civil Defense Act
in these overhead costs. In fact the Secretary of Health for New York State testified in
proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the Shoreham Nuclear Power
Station proceedings that New York State treated civil defense monies as unrestricted
revenue sharing. Existing FEMA regulations had mandated certain plans and products
even as this testimony was being given. No enforcement action was taken by FEMA.
OMB never developed guidance on cooperative agreements leaving implementation to
each department and agency.
With GAO’s backing, FEMA adopted the Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement
strategy even though GAO recognized it might be in violation of federal appropriation
law but relied on FEMA to submit legislation through the authorizing committees, in this
case the Senate and House Armed Services Committee. This was not done until 1992
informally in a report submitted in March 1992 entitled “Disaster Preparedness.” Then
the Federal Civil Defense Act was repealed by Public Law 103-337 in November 1994.
The concept of the cooperative agreement was one of a cooperative effort, with both
parties operating as partners in achieving mutually agreed goals with a continuing
dialogue throughout the term of the agreement. Shortly after adopting the Comprehensive
Cooperative Agreement two administrative events eliminated the staffing that might have
made this an effective arrangement. First, a major Reduction in Force (RIF) occurred in
FEMA’s primary field element the Regions. Second, the United States Fire
Administration was zero-budgeted by the Executive Branch in two separate fiscal years.
Although restored by Congress, the USFA staff was eliminated and dispersed throughout
FEMA, or terminated. This disrupted relations with both the states and first responders at
the same time.
3
The safety program around private nuclear power plants had been part of the State
Agreement Program of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with assistance from the
former Federal Preparedness Agency [part of GSA] that became part of FEMA in 1979,
and a research effort by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency that continued until
about 1985 in FEMA. Three-Mile Island accelerated these efforts when President Jimmy
Carter in a news conference indicated that off-site safety, as recommended by the
Kemeny Commission and the Rogovin Report would be assigned to FEMA. A very brief
Executive Order was issued {E.O. 12241] that defectively implanted this decision. Also,
the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program [REP] conducted pursuant to 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix E, and 44 CFR Parts 350-354, designed to improve off-site safety at
privately owned nuclear power stations and had been administered by FEMA in
conjunction with NRC since 1980 became a more significant program in the public
perception because of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1985. Suddenly, public
perception of FEMA changed to reflect more of a regulator role in health and safety. This
perception had ended by 1990, because of NRC administrative litigation and in part
because of two large disasters, Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake. The
agency had been so distracted by the onslaught of public attention and Congressional
oversight that civil defense issues and staffing were virtually ignored. A third factor was
that FEMA’s national security policy role had been severely curtailed by the issuance of
National Security Decision Directive 188 in summer of 1985 eliminating civil defense as
a policy driver for national security policy.
The end result was the states were left for a period of 5-8 years with almost no
involvement by FEMA staff in how the civil defense monies were administered.
Certainly the states were not interested in calling attention to this non-feasance.
Additionally, since state and local plans were lightly reviewed but seldom rejected by
FEMA regional staff, including REP plans, the States were able to focus on other issues
and the tough issues of monitoring, detection, decontamination, and skills in the issuance
of Protective Action Recommendations were allowed to wither.
In a second theme, FEMA and its civil defense predecessor civil defense agencies, like
the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, had been under mandates to prepare and report
on civil defense activities at the federal, state, and local level in various Executive Orders
and statutes. By 1985 these annual reports had been administratively ended and the
termination was encouraged by OMB because it viewed annual report mandates as a
vehicle for agencies to free-lance and escape from their system of financial, budget,
appropriations, and other reports controls. Even today Section 624 of Title VI requires
that “The Director [FEMA] shall annually submit a written report to the President and
Congress covering expenditures, contributions, work, and accomplishments of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency pursuant to this title, accompanied by such
recommendations as the Director considers appropriate.” Additionally, E.O. 12656, as
amended requires periodic assessments of federal, state, and local capabilities to respond
to national security emergencies. Part 17, Section 1701(5) of E.O.12656. The Director
FEMA was also required to submit assessments on federal, state, and local civil defense
plans and preparedness to the President under E.O. 12148. Perhaps it is instructive that no
oversight hearings have ever been held on administration of Title VI by the authorizing
4
committees in the Congress. Only the Appropriations Committees and their staff have
conducted reviews. This is interesting since arguably the broadest planning authority and
authorization for grants in all of the Department of Homeland Security resides in Title
VI.
FEMA had also tried to develop reporting systems in the early 80’s allowing state and
local governments to assess their own emergency management and preparedness
capabilities. In 1984 a comprehensive assessment tool was developed and sent to the
states and local governments to self-assess their capability for response to unexpected
events, including nuclear attack. Again, at the end of the administration of President
Clinton a further effort was made to assess state and local capability. Again it was a paper
audit system but it did have the imprimatur of the National Emergency Management
Association (State level emergency managers) and International Emergency Management
Association (principally local emergency management officials). It suffices to state that
even today; the federal government has only a paper audit system for determining state
and local capability. The struggle to develop and maintain an effective capability
assessment system is appropriate for another day. There are several legal reasons for state
reluctance to document their lack of preparedness. One is that by doing so they can
continue to blame the federal government for their failure to develop efficient and
effective administrative processes in the emergency management arena. They can also
continue to insist that even relatively minor natural disasters are beyond state and local
capability and thus receive federal disaster assistance. Finally, they can continue to allow
vendors to state and local government emergency management, fire, and law enforcement
to continue to market inefficient and ineffective products that limit effectiveness of
mutual assistance agreements and interoperability.
State and local governments under day-today pressures to deal with on-going budget
deficits for other programs have yet to become serious partners in the sense of wisely
expending their monies on still unarticulated federal priorities. Improvements have been
made, but the pressure for development of a Homeland Security Block Grant is just
around the corner and if the history of the Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement
program in FEMA is an example, flexibility granted to the states may well result in unpreparedness.
It is important to note that even after 2 and 1/2 years from 9/11 there is no complete
inventory of State and local WMD assets, nor does DHS have any real interest in
developing such an inventor. More importantly, there is no complete inventory of federal
assets that has been made available to the states. The result in a “By Guess and by
Golly” system that prevents correction of deficiencies. The important reforms that might
have been driven by 9/11 have now failed, since no systematic review of administrative
deficiencies that would block a successful WMD response has occurred and TOPOFF II
again revealed many of the same problems identified in earlier exercises.
It is also true that due to fiscal pressures on the federal executive branch, whichever party
takes over in Calendar Year 2005 administration of the federal executive branch will be
sorely pressed to not label natural disasters a principal function of State and local
5
government, and only WMD and terrorist threats and actions the federal responsibility.
The effect of this transfer, if it occurs, will deprive the system of preparedness and
response the real world activity that might assist in a WMD response. All-hazards may
soon become “No-hazards” and this will be a direct result of State inactivity and lack of
vision. That combined with federal inefficiencies and ineffectiveness will leave the actual
WMD responders in a lurch. Even now no one can identify actually State personnel or
resources that are dedicated to WMD response. The Governors should not sleep lightly.
6